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THE STORY OF THE 27TH DIVISION

By Major General JOHN F. O'RYAN



1921

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The Spirit of the 27th Division

THE above photograph shows Private First-Class Clifford D. Howe (1205317), of Company K, 105th Infantry, going to the rear after having been wounded in Le Selle River operations, near Mazingheim, France, on October 19, 1918. Note the smile. It indicates the spirit of the division. This soldier subsequently died of his wound at the Bath War Hospital, Bath, England, November 6, 1918. and was buried at Lockbrook Cemetery, Bath, England.

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
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DEDICATION
This book
is reverently dedicated
to those
who bear
the heaviest
burdens of war
THE MOTHERS


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FOREWORD

Upon the return of the 27th Division from its service abroad, and even before its return, the question of the history of its activities and achievements was discussed. It became evident that numerous histories would be written, some of them histories of regiments and many of them histories of companies. Some of these have since appeared. The officers and men of our division were proud of their record. Their families and their friends desired the opportunity to read in authoritative and connected manner an account of the division's war activities. There seemed to exist an impression that this should be done with the least possible delay. Other divisions upon their return had produced and published divisional histories. It seemed to me that if a real history of the division were to be written it would be essentially a military history and, therefore, should include an accurate statement of operations, supported by official maps, orders and instructions. To attempt to write such a history within a few months' time was obviously impracticable. An examination of the histories of other divisions, which appeared shortly after their return, indicated that they had been hastily prepared. Accordingly, when I determined to write the history of the division, I concluded to collect and arrange the data with care and to take whatever time might be necessary for the writing of the story, irrespective of other considerations.

Of course, a history written in the unattractive language of a military report of operations obviously would not be satisfactory to the men of the division and their friends. And so I have tried to prepare the history in a way that will present the story in interesting fashion to the average reader, making reference to the more technical side of our activities in the form of orders, reports, maps and other official papers, which may be found in the appendices.

JOHN F. O'RYAN,
Major General.

September 1, 1921.

Acknowledgment is made to my secretary, Captain James A. Walsh, A. G. D., for the preparation and arrangement of the exhibits, statistics, and maps used in this work. Great industry and unremitting care to avoid errors were essential, and these qualities he contributed in the manner characteristic of him.

JOHN F. O'RYAN,
Major General.

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CHAPTER I

THE ORIGIN OF THE NEW YORK DIVISION



OMING back on the steamer from France in the winter of 1917, a Frenchman informed me that what was most characteristic of Americans in relation to their conversation was their apparent determination to get at the bottom of any subject of discussion—to begin at the beginning.

Perhaps this is a national characteristic. At any rate assuming it to be so, I must say something of the origin of the New York Division.

Going back to what might be termed the "Stone Age" of the National Guard, it is interesting to observe that the earliest National Guard units were so-called independent companies, which were organized and developed by veteran officers of the Revolution and of the War of 1812. In that period of our national development the militia of the Constitution was the military reliance of the government. By statute the militia were required to provide themselves with specified weapons, to be organized into military units and to hold assemblies at stated intervals. In time these stated intervals came to be known as the "Annual Training Day," and, as the name indicates, were held once a year.

When General Upton, in his work on the military policy of the United States, fairly and properly criticized the militia, it was this militia of the Constitution to which he referred, a force without discipline or real training of any kind. So strong appeared to be the prejudice in Congress against soldiers that efforts to secure proper organization and armament, to say nothing of adequate training for the militia, were unavailing. Accordingly, veteran officers of the wars with Great Britain, who had gone into civil life and who viewed the then existing conditions with alarm, were patriotic enough to organize volunteer independent military units throughout the various states. These units of their own accord drilled frequently. They provided themselves with arms and equipment that were modern, and they soon acquired a very satisfactory state of efficiency in relation to drill and minor tactics of such units.

When there was local trouble which bordered on insurrection, the county sheriffs frequently called upon these units, as the only trained forces available, and employed them as a "posse comitatus." Such service led to appreciation on the part of the public, here and there resulting in a license

to occupy part of the town hall, or some other public building for storing military property. As the efficiency of these units developed, and as the authorities of the counties and states came more and more to rely upon them, so the efficiency of the militia and the interest of the people in it correspondingly waned. Congress had appropriated annually a small amount for the maintenance of the militia of the country, and it became apparent that the independent companies might secure the financial benefits to be derived from sharing in these appropriations, could they establish the claim that they were militia. And so apparently it came to pass that these independent companies, which originated as living protests against the worthlessness of the militia, made claim that they were part of the militia, in order that they might receive government support.

Some of the earliest of these independent companies in the state of New York, through the process of development, became some of our present-day regiments. The Washington Grays was the origin of the present 8th Coast Defense Command. The 27th Artillery, National Guard, organized about the year 1803, became ultimately the present 7th Infantry. Some of these National Guard regiments served in the Mexican War. Most of them served in the Civil War. Nearly all of them served in the Spanish American War, and all of them served in the World War.

For a considerable period after the Civil War there existed a lack of interest in military matters, and the strength of the National Guard of New York was low. The National Guard was, moreover, an aggregation of regiments, separate battalions and companies, in effect commanded by the Adjutant General of the state, although nominally commanded by the Governor as Commander-in-Chief. With the advent of a new Governor there was a new Adjutant General, and so there was lacking trained military leadership and a continuity of policy, both essentials in the development of efficiency, particularly in a force approximating the strength of a division.

The officers of the National Guard struggled in vain against these conditions for many years, and until 1898, when, in the administration of Governor Black, they succeeded in securing a new military law, which provided for the organization of the National Guard of the state as a division, to be commanded by a permanent Major General, who was vested with the command, training, administration, discipline and efficiency of the National Guard.

Major Charles F. Roe, who commanded Squadron "A," was appointed Major General under this law, and thus was organized the New York Division under its first Major General.

Major General Roe continued in command of the division from 1898, until May 1, 1912, when he was retired, having reached the age of 64 years. Under his leadership the development of the National Guard of New York was steadily progressive. The division during this period was never strictly a tactical division in the sense that all units of such an organization were existent and trained in coordination, but they constituted a division at least in a territorial sense, and possessed esprit-de-corps, confidence in themselves and their leader, and a very high sense of military responsibility.

After the Spanish American War there was a revival of interest in military matters throughout the country. In the National Guard there existed a strong sentiment for further and more rapid development of efficiency along practical lines of field training. In response to this sentiment the regimental summer camps at Peekskill gave way to maneuver camps at Pine Camp, New York. The full dress uniforms so prominent in camp activities were replaced by the field service uniform. In practically every unit of the National Guard there developed two distinct schools of thought, one composed of those who harkened back to the old days and who looked with disfavor upon the subordination of the ceremonial side of military service to the strenuous activities of the maneuver camp, and the other composed of the younger officers and men, who preferred the Spartan activities of the maneuver campaign to the ceremonial life of the old-fashioned state camp.



Major General Chas. F. Roe, National Guard, New York, retired

The latter school believed that the National Guard, if properly developed, would become the real and dependable citizen army of the nation, and to a considerable extent they sought to coordinate their aims and efforts with the officers and men of other states, who thought as they thought. The so-called Dick Law, enacted by Congress in 1903, was a legislative expression of this growing sentiment.

And so when the writer, then a Major of Field Artillery of the New York National Guard, was appointed Major General to succeed Major General Roe on May 1, 1912, he found the sentiment among the officers and men of the National Guard of New York strongly in favor of vigorous action to insure the progressive and rapid development of the division along paths which would make it a dependable fighting unit in the event of war.

It is not a part of the mission provided for this work to describe what was done between 1912 and 1916 to carry out this determination. Suffice it to say that officers' schools were established and attendance made com-

pulsory, that these schools included theoretical work throughout the year and vigorous and practical work in the officers' schools of application early in the summer. It included training camps for non-commissioned officers and for companies, troops, batteries and regiments. These were followed by maneuver camps, where the various arms of the service were instructed in the coordination of their battle efforts. All of this work culminated in such grand maneuvers as those of the Massachusetts Maneuver Campaign in 1909 and the Connecticut Maneuver Campaign in 1912.

Finally, in the early summer of 1916, and while a considerable portion of the officers were attending a course of field training at the Infantry School of Application at Peekskill, there suddenly came the order to mobilize for service on the Mexican border. The manner in which the division was able to respond to that call was most satisfactory to all those officers and men who had the vision to foresee such an occasion and the loyalty, perseverance and capacity to prepare themselves to meet it.

CHAPTER II

PREPARATORY SERVICE ON THE MEXICAN BORDER



N account of the Mexican border service of the New York Division is included in this history for two reasons. In the first place, the Mexican border service was hardly completed before the division was called for service in the World War, and in consequence, there has been no opportunity to record a history of that most interesting and valuable service. Had we not participated in the World War I feel sure that many volumes would have been written covering the various phases of the border service. For that reason alone it is desirable to include as part of this history at least a narrative of the more prominent features of that experience. But there is another and controlling reason which links it with our service in the great war. The New York Division went into the World War composed very largely of disciplined and seasoned soldiers. So substantially was this attributable to the long service on the Mexican border, that it may truly be said that the border service was a preparatory course of training for the participation in the World War, and to that extent a part of it.

The reader will doubtless remember that for many years there existed in Mexico conditions which produced revolutions against the authority nominally in control. Armed conflicts between the forces representing the government of the hour and those in insurrection were frequent and where these combats took place close to the international boundary American citizens suffered in their persons and property. At various periods irresponsible bands of Mexican marauders crossed into the territory of the United States with resulting international complications. So frequent did these forays and raids become that our government finally maintained a border patrol of regular soldiers to guard against such incursions.

In the early spring of 1914 serious affront was given us by the Mexican authorities at Tampico, and the United States naval forces were sent into the harbor of that city. The demands of the United States not being met, our navy was sent to the port of Vera Cruz, where, after shelling the defenses, a force of sailors and marines was landed and possession of the city secured. This naval force was shortly thereafter augmented by a reinforced brigade of regular troops, commanded by Major General Frederick Funston. This force continued to hold and administer the city of Vera Cruz and its environs for a period of several months.

Nevertheless, the disorders in Mexico continued and raids and forays into American territory were not uncommon. On March 11-12, 1916, the bandit, Pancho Villa, with a band of his followers crossed the international line and in the presence of one or more squadrons of regular cavalry attacked and successfully raided the town of Columbus, New Mexico. The

result of this was the organization of a punitive expedition for the purpose of capturing and punishing Villa and his followers. This expedition, composed of regular troops, under then Brigadier General John J. Pershing, advanced some distance into Mexico, but were unable to effect the capture of Villa.

The organization of General Pershing's punitive expedition necessitated the use of additional forces as reserves and for the patrol of the border. This led to the mobilization of the National Guard and its distribution along the Mexican border.

On Sunday evening, June 18, 1916, while sitting at my desk at the Camp Headquarters at the Infantry School of Application at Peekskill, New York, a telephone message was received from the Governor, to the effect that the President had called into the active service of the United States, for the purpose mentioned in the call, the National Guard of the United States, and that the quota from New York state was a complete tactical division. Governor Whitman read the order to me and directed that necessary action be taken. The Governor's verbal orders were later confirmed by a written order, which appears in the Appendix as Exhibit 1.

Division orders were immediately sent out directing all units to assemble at 8.00 P. M. the following evening in field service uniform. Pursuant to these orders the commands were assembled, and thus within twenty-four hours of the first telephone call 15,289 officers and men were assembled and ready for duty. The figures of strength are in addition to the Coast Artillery Corps, which at this time aggregated 3,398 officers and men. The composition of this force by units is interesting to record, and accordingly a summary of their strength is included in the Appendix as Exhibit 2.

Orders were issued for the reorganization of the 65th Infantry of Buffalo as the 3d Field Artillery (howitzer). All troops assembled in their armories, and the routine of a rigorous form of garrison life established. The parks in the cities and towns throughout the state, where units of the National Guard were stationed, were utilized as drill grounds. The large and modern armories, most of which had facilities for messing the strength of the regiment, had no difficulty in subsisting the troops. Where such facilities were lacking, company kitchens were established in an adjoining street, just as they would be in the field. A percentage of the men of each unit were required to sleep in the armory, while those who lived nearby were permitted at the close of the day's work to sleep at their homes. The system worked out most satisfactorily, both as to discipline and in relation to economy.

On June 20th the 69th Infantry and two battalions of engineers were sent to the mobilization camp near Green Haven, Dutchess County, New York, and these troops began the work of clearing the land and installing a water system for a large unit.

Division Headquarters in the meantime had moved to the Municipal Building in New York City, so as to be in close liaison with the Eastern

Department Headquarters at Governors Island, where Major General Leonard Wood was in command.

During the period of activity which followed, many apparently unsurmountable obstacles afforded by federal rules and regulations were removed solely through the willingness of General Wood to assume responsibility to ignore them.

It may be said in connection with this mobilization, so far at least as the New York Division was concerned, that practically all of the delays and shortcomings which followed were directly attributable to the War Department and its methods—none to the state or to the authority of the Eastern Department commander.

As far back as two years prior to this call I had urged upon the War Department the urgent necessity of maintaining the war stores of clothing, equipage, supplies and material for the division, at some point or points within the state where they would be immediately available at the time of call. Major General Wood had studied this subject, and as a result had recommended the approval of what was proposed. The plan, however, was never favorably acted upon. The result was that when this call came the Philadelphia Arsenal, where much of our war property was stored, had to ship property to many other states. Not only delays, but errors in shipment inseparable from rush work performed by additional and inexperienced help, followed.

The War Department had provided cumbersome regulations prescribing the physical examination of each officer and man to be made prior to the time of the muster into the active service and had sent half a dozen medical officers of the army to make such examinations. These examinations included the recording of height and weight of a man, the condition of his eyes, ears, heart, teeth, bones and joints and nervous system. Certainly ten minutes would seem to be the minimum of time required to make any kind of physical examination. At that rate men could be examined by medical officers at the rate of six an hour. Such work is exacting, but in the stress of the emergency medical examiners might be required to work ten hours in each twenty-four, thus examining sixty men per day. At this rate it would take the examining officer assigned to a regiment twenty working days to make this rather cursory examination of the 1,200 officers and men in the average regiment. All this while other raids like the Columbus, New Mexico, affair threatened. The thing was ridiculous, but there were the War Department's regulations, and regulations to many elderly professional soldiers are like the laws of the Medes and Persians. The military crustaceans complained of by Colonel Theodore Roosevelt at the outbreak of the Spanish War were in evidence again.

Another feature which delayed the immediate utilization of the troops were the regulations governing the accountability for military property. This property was United States property in the possession of the state troops. Nevertheless, the regulations treated it as if it were state property —even foreign property—to be received, examined and receipted for from some other government. Such regulations were survivals of a former


To Maj Genl John F. O'Ryan and the officers and
men of the 27th Div with a high appreciation of their
gallant service Over Sea and all best wishes for the
Division
1920

period, when the states equipped their troops and when it was necessary upon the United States taking over the state property to make a proper record of its transfer. And so the regulations provided that an inventory in quadruplicate, setting forth every item of military property, was to be made out. At a time when the officers and men were intensely occupied with other and important work, they were compelled to engage in this apparently endless paper work, and many and frequent were the inquiries and discussions which followed. Rulings asked for were given in most solemn manner, as to the methods involved and the orthodox manner of describing various articles. Frequently were these modified or reversed. I might continue at length in pointing out the inconsistencies of these federal regulations, all of which had been presented to the War Department again and again for years prior to the call, but without result. It was through this period that General Wood in informal conference assumed responsibility to disregard absurd requirements and to modify rulings and interpretations which had the effect of creating confusion and delay.

Shortly after the call the War Department decided that the emergency which called forth the troops was not to be considered sufficient to warrant the subordination of the country's commercial railroad transportation to the troop movements. Accordingly, there was time between the mobilization of troops, which immediately followed the President's call, and their transportation south to meet many of the requirements of the ancient federal regulations. The entraining of troops from New York for the Mexican border was in charge of the Department Quartermaster of the Eastern Department. The Assistant Quartermaster on the Division Staff at that time was Captain James T. Loree, in civil life the general manager of the Delaware and Hudson River Railroad. His special capacity for the carrying out of this work soon developed and with the approval of General Wood he was placed in charge of our troop movements. After he took hold there were no further hitches or delays.

The order in which the troops were transported is shown in a table which appears in the Appendix as Exhibit 3. This table shows the date of departure of each organization, the date of arrival at the border and the date of its return from the border. There were also shipped with the troops 3,377 horses and mules.

With the arrival of the division on the border we were assigned to three camp sites. These were at Mission, McAllen and Pharr, respectively, about sixty miles from Brownsville, near the mouth of the Rio Grande River. Preparation of these camps was under way when we arrived. Some of the errors in their preparation illustrated the complete unfamiliarity of the average army officer, accustomed to handling small units such as companies and battalions, with the requirements of a relatively large body of troops. For example, we found that the water system would not furnish water to more than half the camp at McAllen. No adequate allowance had been made in the pipe installation for the carrying of water sufficient for the units near the source, plus an excess sufficient to pass on to all units to the end of the system.



House moving on the Mexican Border

The first problem, and a most important one in that hot country, was, therefore, to secure an adequate water supply. The problem presented afforded a remarkable instance of the almost unlimited capacity of a National Guard division composed as it is of virile men in the professions and industries of civil life, to meet the many demands of active military service, with a maximum of efficient response. A glance through the card index of the commissioned officers of the division served to recall that Lieutenant Colonel Merritt H. Smith of the 1st Field Artillery was the chief engineer of the great water supply system of the city of New York. A conference between this officer and the one who had installed the system, followed by an examination of the plan, soon disclosed the trouble. Colonel Smith recommended the matter be turned over to two other officers of the Division for attention. One of these was a hydraulic engineer, whose specialty it was to design water supply installations for small cities and towns. This officer was Captain Ernest F. Robinson of the 22nd Engineers. The other officer was Major James M. Hutchinson of the 71st Infantry, whose specialty, when he could afford time from his National Guard soldier duties, was construction work of such character for municipalities. These officers soon designed and installed an adequate system at a minimum of cost to the government.

After the camps were prepared intensive training was commenced, awaiting possible orders for an invasion of Mexico. In the event of invasion the New York Division, which became known officially as the 6th Division during the period of the Mexican border service, was to constitute a striking force.

The Mexican border along the Rio Grande River in the vicinity of our stations consisted largely of a desert country inflicted with intolerable heat except for two or three months of what in the north would be called the



Doughboys moving at double time

winter season. No rivers flow into the Rio Grande from United States territory for many miles from the mouth of the river. The Rio Grande is, however, fed by a considerable number of streams flowing north from Mexican territory. The region occupied by the division was a part of what was known during the Mexican War of 1846 as the disputed territory. It will be remembered that when Texas entered the Union a dispute arose between the United States and Mexico concerning the southern boundary of the former republic of Texas, the United States claiming the Rio Grande as



A company of the 12th N. Y. Infantry deployed along the Rio Grande in maneuver exercises at Hidalgo, Texas

the boundary line, while the Mexican government claimed the Nueces River as the true line. When the Rio Grande was established as the boundary as one of the results of the war, the intervening territory was occupied almost wholly by Mexicans. There was little to invite American occupation, and accordingly conditions in relation to population which obtained at the time of the Mexican War continued in a general way until about twenty years ago, when, due to the richness of the soil and the irrigation possibilities, parts of this territory attracted the influx of American planters. Nevertheless, at the time the New York Division occupied its area the population was almost wholly Mexican. Villages of from 100 to 300 inhabitants would include but two or three Americans, or none at all. Towns like McAllen, Mission and Pharr were known as American towns, yet the population of McAllen at the time we were there was made up of 800 Mexicans and 300 Americans.

Many of the Mexicans regarded the presence of the American troops in an unfriendly way. Some of them seemed to feel that the troops had invaded Mexican territory. I was told that some of the peons felt that the United States had never rightfully secured sovereignty to the land lying between the Nueces and the Rio Grande, and that the day would come when this land would again be a part of the Mexican Republic.

As to this Mexican population, they were for the most part Indians, representing a number of Indian tribes. I met a few who spoke very little Spanish and whose Indian dialects were so dissimilar that it was only with



A small Mexican family

difficulty that they could converse. There were, however, exceptions. The mass spoke a character of Spanish known as "Mex." Undoubtedly there was a strain of Spanish blood among these people and the extent of it appeared to vary. I think it can be said so far as the mass of our men were

concerned, that they came to like the Mexicans. At least they did not dislike them. In the first place they were as a whole very temperate. They were polite, especially when one considers their lack of education and opportunity to acquire a knowledge of the conventionalities which obtain among more cultivated people. We observed that they were strong believers in the family. It was not infrequent to find a family of twelve or fifteen children. The peons carried themselves in the presence of Americans with dignity, and they were not given much to speech. The fathers and mothers of this class were very fond of their children and seemed to lead happy lives. Certainly their lives were simple, for during the summer most of them seemed to live wholly or in part outdoors, frequently in the shade of a roof made of



Type of native dwelling along the Rio Grande

thatched leaves set on poles. They subsisted on tortillas and frijoles, occasionally supplemented by goat's meat. They also used goat's milk supplied by the small herd of goats which every Mexican family seemed to possess. On Sundays it was noticeable that the families rested from their work and did considerable walking about. On such occasions one would see them on the roads and trails and always it was the man of the family who carried the baby, the women never being used as a burden carrier. There was, of course, a small percentage of unruly Mexicans who frequented the drinking places, some of whom were inclined to be quarrelsome. We discovered when we employed Mexicans that they could be developed into very good mechanics. They were skillful in the use of tools and could imitate very successfully the construction of such articles as tables, chairs and desks placed before them as models. These peons were extremely fond of music, and many of them could play one or more stringed instruments, such as the guitar or mandolin. Their attitude toward us at the beginning was one of fear and resentment. After a time this changed and became one of reservation and suspicion. In spots this was removed by closer association. I

visited at various times the families of Mexicans who were admittedly good Americans and, of course, was well and graciously received. On other occasions I visited the huts and camps of Mexicans who lived mostly in the brush. The sense of hospitality of these people seemed to be so great that in a few moments their suspicions and noticeable reservation gave way to an effort to show courtesy and hospitality. They seemed very appreciative of any confidence and courtesy shown them. I believe the Mexicans would have received from our officers and men a rather complete assurance of confidence and good will, except for the fact that most of the Texans continually warned us that the peons were not to be trusted.

When we first arrived along the Rio Grande the sounding of an automobile horn by the driver of one of our motor cars would drive into the brush any peons on the road ahead who were within hearing of the horn. They seemed to feel that they had no rights on the road against Americans. This attitude was soon changed when it was found that our troops accorded them the full rights which the law and fair dealing demanded.

Having made an inspection of our territory and finding a large number of saloons, cafes and other places where strong liquor was sold, I felt that



The main saloon of McAllen, Texas, one of many, none of which our soldiers could enter

such conditions in connection with the almost intolerable heat of that region would make desirable the total abstinence of officers and men from the use of liquor. Venereal disease has ever been the curse of armies, and such disease and the use of liquor have been intimately related. It was felt that by prohibiting the use of liquor effective measures might be adopted to keep down the venereal rate. Accordingly, the order which became somewhat famous, known as G. O. 7, was issued prohibiting officers and men of the New York Division using intoxicating liquors in any form during their

service on the border, or entering houses of prostitution or places where liquor was sold. A copy of G. O. 7 and the order amending it are included in the Appendix as Exhibit 4.

It is interesting to note that this order was the forerunner of the rigid prohibition against liquor which obtained in and about our camps in America during the war. The order was in fact scoffed at by many very capable officers of the army. Some few of them argued that soldiers had always been permitted to use strong drink and that it would lessen their efficiency if such drink were denied the mass of them. Others, while acknowledging the evils flowing from the use of such stimulants, were convinced that prohibition could not be enforced, particularly in the absence of the support of state and federal laws. Many officers of the army have since said that they held such views at the time and that they watched with keen interest the progress of the enforcement of G. O. 7.

Major General Funston, who commanded all the troops on the border, told me laughingly one day that he was personally glad that my jurisdiction was subservient to his and that in consequence there was no danger of G. O. 7 being applied to Fort Sam Houston, which was at that time his headquarters. He told me, however, that the matter of the use of liquor was one to be regulated by me within my own division and that he would not interfere with my effort. His attitude was a great help for very great pressure was brought to bear to compel a rescinding of this order. Liquor dealers, brewers and promoters of disorderly houses in numbers had planned a rich harvest from their proposed enterprises in the area of the New York Division. Their efforts and intimidations profited them nothing. One lawyer representing the proprietor of a liquor saloon, who had expended a considerable sum of money in preparing it for the advent of the New York troops, threatened me with an injunction, stating that my action was in restraint of legitimate business. The sale of liquor was, of course, a legitimate business in Texas at that time. It was explained to him that a military commander possessed the right to keep his men confined to the limits of their camps even for the period of their entire service if he felt such order to be necessary and the same was not overruled by higher military authority. Furthermore, that he might, for example, lawfully require his men to walk on one side of the street and never to walk on the other side, and that following out this authority he could prohibit them entering places where liquor was sold.

Permanent guards were established by the military police on the highways covering the front and rear entrance to every saloon and disorderly house in our area. They arrested soldiers of the division who attempted to enter such places. In three weeks we had driven out of our territory every house of prostitution but one and this closed down a week or two later. The conditions which existed in other parts of the border have frequently been described in the public press.

The most remarkable feature of this project was the magnificent response of the 19,000 officers and men of the division to this unusual prohibition. At least 80 per cent of them saw the reasonableness of the

regulation and made no attempt to violate it. This attitude of so large a percentage insured its success from the beginning. Of the remainder, most of them were deterred from violating the regulation by the fear of the consequences, while a small percentage, perhaps 3 to 5 per cent of the whole, continually made effort in one way or another to contravene the regulation.

The result of this order and of the high standard of conduct which accompanied it, produced the most remarkable health record ever made by an organization of similar size in the history of the army up to that time. Venereal disease practically did not exist in the division throughout the period of its service on the Mexican border. The same comment applies to typhoid fever. The sick and venereal record of the division from July 19th to November 30th is included in the Appendix as Exhibit 5.

One particularly interesting feature of the Mexican border service was the assignment to our division of the 3d Tennessee Infantry when the 2d New York Infantry was relieved in September. The assignment of this regiment to the New York Division was a happy circumstance, because the same regiment in the World War became part of the 30th Division and throughout the service in Belgium and France we saw much of them. The regiment was commanded by Colonel Carey F. Spence, who continued in command throughout the border service and the World War as well. The 3d Tennessee Infantry was a fine regiment and soon felt perfectly at home in its new environment. All the officers and men of our division will remember its fine band. This band in fact was the best in our division.

While on the border some of the officers and men of the division, with the authority of Division Headquarters, established a divisional newspaper known as the *Rio Grande Rattler*. The motto of this paper which appeared at the head was "The strength of the Wolf is the pack, but the strength of the pack is the Wolf." This well typified the determination of officers and men to make of every member of the division a soldier, individually efficient in the performance of his duties, and at the same time to weld the individuals into a harmonious whole, into which should be breathed a dependable esprit-de-corps. This was accomplished and the result stood the division in good stead in all its future service, both on the border and in the World War.

It was in this paper that Lieutenant Edward Streeter of the Field Artillery first published his remarkably successful "Letters to Mabel," which have appeared in many editions during and since the World War.

The *Rio Grande Rattler* was in charge of Major Franklin W. Ward as Managing Editor. Major Fred M. Waterbury, Editor, had as his assistants Captain Wade H. Hayes of the 7th Infantry and Lieutenant Samuel J. Fisher of the 12th Infantry. Private Donald Emery, who later distinguished himself in the fighting abroad, was the Art Editor.

During the summer of the border service many tactical exercises were carried out in which the various arms of the service were combined and practical understanding was had by the officers and men of each arm of their duties and obligations in relation to the others.



The camp defenses of a company on outpost duty

These field maneuvers usually consisted of an operation which employed a reinforced brigade, opposed by a small force of cavalry and infantry, screening or covering an assumed larger force. This necessitated coordination in the combined use of the several arms constituting the reinforced brigade. Our infantry came to know something of the capacity and limitations of the auxiliary arms and the latter had impressed upon them that "the infantry is the army," and that accomplishment of the auxiliary arms would be measured by the extent of their assistance to the infantry.



County Court House, Hidalgo, Texas

One of the exercises planned contemplated the forcing of a crossing of the Rio Grande in the vicinity of Hidalgo on the American side. This small town was opposite Reynosa, a similar town on the Mexican side. The latter place was the headquarters of Major Flores of the Constitutionalista Forces, who had a garrison of troops under his command. There existed a flat boat ferry across the river between the two towns. Our previous exercises had all been carried out away from the river, so that the firing of the blank ammunition and the concentration of the troops might not excite the forces on the other side and perhaps bring on a clash. An "entente cordiale" had already been established with Major Flores, who on one occasion had dined at Division Headquarters, after which he reviewed the 7th Infantry. Accordingly it was decided to take him into the plan. He came over to Division Headquarters and was asked if he would have any objection to an exercise so near the line. He not only had none, but graciously gave assurance that all his people would be informed of the practice character of the operation and offered to help in any way he could. The statement of the exercise was interesting, for it indicated that his troops had been forced to retire towards Monterey, on the approach of a large force of Villastas and that our division, in order to cross the river and go to his assistance, would be opposed by the common enemy. The exercise was carried out without unhappy incident and with great wonderment on the part of the natives. Much profitable experience was gained by all who participated.



General Flores' visit to the New York Division. General Flores center, General O'Ryan on right, Colonel Bandholtz on left, Colonel Ward and Lieutenant Wainer in rear

Among other exercises the infantry and cavalry of the division made a 110-mile practice march. Some of the details affecting this march may be noted by reference to the division order on the subject, copy of which appears in the Appendix as Exhibit 6.

We also provided a very advanced type of rifle range for field firing at a place called La Gloria, Texas. This was in the early fall of 1916. The course of field firing followed the completion of the ordinary course of target practice. In the field firing exercises, each company was deployed

for combat and advanced through the brush, where it came in sight of targets representing the silhouettes of enemy individuals and groups, in prone, kneeling and standing positions, the exercises terminating in an assault against an entrenched position. The enemy trench to be assaulted was occupied by silhouette hats, which could be seen and which were made to appear and disappear by means of wires controlled by men in pits. As service ammunition was used in all of these exercises, it will be understood that considerable risk was assumed in carrying them out. Yet so excellent was the discipline and so perfect the arrangements, in relation to supervision, that not an accident marred the long course of training carried out at La Gloria.

The officer in charge of this important work, and who was largely responsible for the discipline which prevailed in the execution of the problems, was Major George F. Chandler, Adjutant of General Lester's First Brigade, at present writing, the New York State Commissioner of Police. An editorial which appeared in the *Rattler,* describing the value of the field firing as conducted at La Gloria, is worth preserving for future reference. It appears in the Appendix as Exhibit 7.

After some months it developed that there was to be no invasion of Mexico. With the arrival of 150,000 National Guard troops at the border, order was restored. No more raids were attempted. The mission of the National Guard had been accomplished and the War Department ordered the gradual relief of organizations.

Another feature of our border service was the occasional divisional review on the big plain south of Sharyland. Here the division was reviewed on different occasions by Major General Frederick Funston, who commanded the Southern Department; United States Senator James W. Wads-



A company of the 22d N. Y. Engineers passing in review. The soldiers of this regiment were unusually large men

worth, Jr., and Governor Charles S. Whitman of New York. The review of a complete tactical division was something which had not been seen in this country since the Civil War. The formation with nine regiments of infantry, three regiments of field artillery and a regiment and one separate squadron of cavalry, together with engineers, signal troops, sanitary units and trains, was most impressive. It was an opportunity for officers and men, as well as the few sightseers who were present to gain a comprehensive idea of the magnitude and power of a fighting division.



The Field Artillery Brigade passing in review near McAllen, Texas

On September 30th the division had a great Frontier Day, staged on the drill field of the 7th Infantry. Cowboys and vaqueros for many miles about came in to compete in tests of broncho busting and roping while there were numerous exhibitions showing the efficiency of military units. Much to the surprise of the spectators, the best exhibitions of broncho busting were not given by the Texans and Mexicans, but by two men of the division, Privates Hathaway of the 2d Field Artillery and Joe Hooker of the First Cavalry. Much of the success of this great occasion was due to the energy of Lieutenant H. LeRoy Whitney of the Field Artillery Brigade, assisted by Sergeant M. A. Hart.

The division lost a number of very good men during the period of the Mexican border service. Sergeant Arthur Lockwood of Company L, 12th Infantry was drowned in the Irrigation Canal near Sharyland at noon on August 26th. The following is a list of other deaths with causes between July 19th and November 25th, 1916.

Name	Rank	Co.	Organization	Cause of Death
Martin, Clarke	Private	Hq.	69th N. Y. Infantry	Pneumonia
Locher, Joseph	Corporal	M	12th N. Y. Infantry	Typhoid
Healy, Clinton	Private	H	23d N. Y. Infantry	Tuberculosis
Whelan, Hans S.	2d Lieutenant		69th N. Y. Infantry	Tubercular Meningitis

Name	Rank	Co.	Organization	Cause of Death
Chichester, Geo. B.	1st Sergeant	H	7th N. Y. Infantry	Dysentery
Winslow, Claude	Private	B	N. Y. Signal Corps	Gastroenterocolitis
Boldtman, Harold O.	Private	L	7th N. Y. Infantry	Paratyphoid "A"
Cohn, Joseph	Private	B	12th N. Y. Infantry	Intestinal obstruction
Johnson, William	Private	E	2d N. Y. Field Art'y.	Accid. kick by horse
Bishop, Fred E.	Private		N. Y. Amb. Co. No. 1	Gunshot wound
Riley, Peter	Private	B	1st N. Y. Cavalry	Dysentery
Baker, Willett	Mas. Sig. Elec		N. Y. Signal Corps	Interstitial nephritis
Smith, Robert J.	Private	D	12th N. Y. Infantry	Paratyphoid "A"
Webster, William J.	Private	B	N. Y. Signal Corps	Paratyphoid "A"
McEvoy, Joseph F.	Private	F	12th N. Y. Infantry	Tuberculosis
Vassar, Rufus P.	Private	E	7th N. Y. Infantry	Nephritis
Smith, William N.	Private	E	12th N. Y. Infantry	Paratyphoid "A"
Flynn, Richard J.	Private	B	3d N. Y. Field Art'y	Gunshot Wound
Murtaz, Peter	Private	K	69th N. Y. Infantry	Endocarditis

During the period of the Mexican border service every regiment developed an entertainment troupe, while most of the companies had their local talent for ordinary occasions. The best of all these entertainers occasionally appeared in a big bill on an improvised stage near the Division Headquarters. The veterans of the border service can look back to many pleasant evenings of entertainment furnished by the men under Lieutenant William A. Halloran, Jr., of the 1st Cavalry.

Every regiment also had its fighters and wrestlers and gradually the championship of each regiment was determined. In the fall of the year many fights were held before large audiences, between champions representing the various regiments. Barney Williams of the Field Artillery was one of the best. Private Diamond of the 12th Infantry was another good man. Privates Cohan and Mack of the 69th and Crottie of the 12th frequently exhibited. Private McDermott, Troop B, 1st Cavalry, Private Ray



A "yellow leg" of the 1st N. Y. Cavalry furnishing experience to an ambitious doughboy

Rourke, Headquarters, 1st Cavalry, and Sergeant Eugene Sullivan, Supply Troop, 1st Cavalry, were among the fighters and wrestlers who gave exhibitions.

The training on the border played so important a part in the preparation of the division to enter the World War effectively, that something should be said concerning the results of that training. Unless the principles underlying this training are understood, it will be impossible adequately to sense the tremendous devotion and intelligent spirit of sacrifice which later characterized in such forcible manner the conduct of the division in the World War. In the earlier part of the border service these principles were not disclosed to the men. Some would not have understood them. Others might have doubted their practicability. But later on opportunities were made to explain the motives which had determined the methods employed. One of these occasions was an address delivered at the Y. M. C. A. Building at McAllen to the soldiers stationed at the latter place. Mention was made of this address in the *Rattler* a day or two later, and, as it seems to cover the subject very fully, it is quoted in part.

In this address I referred to the fact that a previous speaker had said "God never made anything finer than a good soldier," but reminded the men that it was also true that "God had never made anything more dreadful than a bad soldier—the man of laziness, selfishness and lust—the man with the animal desire to satisfy the passions of the moment and without restraint except as the efficiency of the military law imposes it upon him." The following is quoted from the *Rattler:*

" 'It is not my purpose,' said the General, 'to paint the ideal good soldier as a holier-than-thou individual, who takes an unnecessarily solemn view of life, or an ascetic who wears a hair shirt possessing the hospitality of the cactus plant. The good soldier is a very human type of individual. He makes mistakes, he has his off days, and, in fact, is a regular fellow. But you will find in his character those fundamental qualities which we greatly admire in others, whether we possess them or not—generosity, courage, the habit of truth telling, respect, and the sense of responsibility. The world has always admired the good soldier and it always will admire him, while men and women have hearts and ideals. And I say to you that the very people at home who call themselves pacifists and who profess to see in you a menace to peace and happiness, do not dare permit themselves to know you as you are, but must continue to base their fears upon the picture they paint of you. The picture, needless to say, is that of the bad soldier. Were they to come here and see you as you are they would become infected with admiration for men who are practicing what they and others are preaching—courage, self-denial, respect for authority and truth telling.'

"The General then told of a soldier of the Headquarters detachment who was out after taps. The following day the General told him that the men of the detachment were expected to act as examples for the rest of the division in the observance of regulations and asked him whether on the previous evening he had violated the regulation prohibiting men drinking

any form of intoxicating liquor. The soldier was warned that the General had no evidence against him, that if he convicted himself he would be punished, but that the question was justified by the rumor that one or more men of the detachment had violated the rule. The soldier promptly answered, 'Sir, I did drink one glass of beer last night.' It was the first drink he had taken since coming to the border four months ago. The General went on to explain that the soldier was tried the next day and sentenced to five days' confinement with hard labor, and continued, 'but he told the truth. He subordinated expediency to honor. His dependability was tested and not found wanting. He possessed the soldier virtue of self-sacrifice and therefore subordinated his personal interests of the moment for the ideal of truth. When he went into the guard house he took his self-respect with him and kept it untarnished.' "

"General O'Ryan then proceeded to point out the necessity for Spartan training in the development of soldiers. He said that this was not generally understood, that the average person believed that soldier development had to do solely with learning the manual of arms, how to ride and shoot, how to make and break camp. He pointed out that these are qualifications requiring physical dexterity and are readily acquired; that war requires self-sacrificing and dependable men, men who will suffer and endure without unreasonable complaint and that these are qualities not grown overnight. That they are the result of a biological and psychological process, and that such process compared with the mere acquisition of manual dexterity, is slow. He mentioned that the hikes developed the good material and weeded out the weaklings. The rigid rule against liquor, while it safeguarded the health and morals of the division to an extent that is difficult to appreciate, performed a most valuable service in the development of morale, in that it stimulated self-control and pride in individual accomplishment."

"He said that it taught men to regard themselves as composed of a dual being—the commander and the machine, that when a man's stomach pleaded for a 'beer,' and the man had developed enough morale to say to his stomach, 'Shut up, I am running this machine, nothing doing with the beer,' he knew he had developed a *MAN*, a good soldier who would command his legs and keep them moving on the hike when they pleased to fall out. Such training he pointed out was the best kind of fire training, because when the nerves of the body wildly telephoned to the head their fears in battle, his command over the body would dominate and insure a proper performance of duty."

"These are the fundamental principles which have guided the training of the New York Division for the past few years, and that training has been intensified during the past four months, with results that speak for themselves."

The Mexican border service afforded opportunity for the weeding out of officers and men who for one reason or another lacked capacity to be efficient soldiers. It afforded opportunity to harden and endure officers and men to the fatigue and hardships of service in the field. It developed

their qualities of leadership. The morale and esprit-de-corps of most of the regiments were greatly increased. Finally and perhaps more important than all else in connection with the future, was the opportunity offered for the development of efficient staff officers.

The division had been mobilized, transported to the border, fed, equipped, drilled, trained, disciplined, exercised and returned to the state of New York by its own corps of officers. In a force as large as a division, the problems and difficulties affecting such activities and accomplishment are numerous and require the services of a trained staff. In our country no opportunity had been offered our army officers to engage in work of



Supplementing the government ration. From left to right, Captain Johnson, Lieutenant Colonel Conrow, William Sterling, Major Humphreys and Captain Lane

this character in a large way because of the small size of the Regular Army and of the policy which at that time prevailed of scattering its units about the country.

The Mexican border service provided an extraordinary experience for the staff officers of the division in the performance of their important duties and they profited mightily.

No account of the Mexican border service would be complete without some mention of the work of our various commanding officers.

There was Brigadier General James W. Lester, who commanded the 1st Brigade, composed of the 2d, 14th and 69th Infantry Regiments. General Lester at one time commanded the 2d Infantry. He was an officer eminently qualified for his work, for he brought to it long experience, sound judgment and the soldierly virtues of loyalty, determination and leadership. He was the last general officer of the division to leave the border, he having been left to supervise the departure of the 1st Cavalry and the 23d and 74th Infantry, which were the last units to leave when

the border service was concluded. He reached his home station in the spring of 1917, just prior to our entry into the World War, in the early part of which he commanded the 54th Infantry Brigade of the 27th Division, during its period of training at Camp Wadsworth.

Then there was Brigadier General George R. Dyer, a soldier of long service in the New York Division, who was in command of the 2d Brigade, composed of the 7th, 12th and 71st Infantry Regiments. General Dyer was the kind of an officer, who when asked for his views by a superior, always stated them with complete frankness, whether or not he believed they would be approved. With equal zeal, however, he carried out his orders whether or not they conformed to that which he had recommended. He possessed a great quality in a soldier—optimism. His subordinates respected and liked him, and he was one who could always get work done.

Brigadier General William Wilson another officer of long service and experience commanded the 3d Brigade composed of the 3d, 23d and 74th Infantry Regiments. General Wilson commanded at Pharr and had a very healthy and efficient command.

The Field Artillery Brigade composed of the 1st, 2d and 3d Artillery Regiments, was commanded by Brigadier General William S. McNair, of the Regular Field Artillery. I had applied for General McNair, because I believed him to be specially fitted to give our Field Artillery Brigade a proper start. I had known him many years and we were together in the same class at the Army War College in 1913 and 1914. He was respected and liked in his brigade and succeeded in developing a high standard of efficiency.

Colonel H. H. Bandholtz, U. S. A., who was the Divisional Chief of Staff, served continuously with us on the border, in New York state during the brief interval between that service and the World War, and in the latter war at Camp Wadsworth, Spartanburg, South Carolina, until he was promoted to the grade of Brigadier General to command the 58th Brigade of the 29th Division. He was a most efficient officer and while we regretted to lose him we knew that his promotion in the early part of 1918 was well merited.

Then there was Colonel James M. Andrews of the 2d Infantry, who had served in that regiment in nearly all grades after some years of service in the Regular Army. He had an excellent regiment and had succeeded in surrounding himself with a considerable number of very capable officers. The regiment possessed a very good esprit-de-corps and its men were characterized by excellent behavior and a willingness to go anywhere and do anything. This regiment augmented by the transfer of several hundred officers and men from the 71st Infantry, later became the 105th Infantry of the 27th Division in the World War and served throughout under Colonel Andrews.

Colonel John H. Foote commanded the 14th Infantry, a fine old regiment with a Civil War record of distinction. Colonel Foote's men particularly distinguished themselves on one occasion during the period of the great hike when a tornado with forty-eight hours of heavy rain and hail

struck them while they were bivouacked at La Gloria. During the long period of the storm they had literally to hold themselves to the ground for fear of being blown away. Without shelter they endured hardship to the point of exhaustion, but never was there a murmur of complaint from them. They won the respect of the division by the manner in which they conducted themselves on this occasion. This regiment in the World War became the 2d Pioneer Infantry, Corps and Army troops, and served in France and Germany.

Colonel William N. Haskell, a permanent Captain in the Regular Army, commanded the 69th Infantry. Colonel Haskell had been an Inspector Instructor with our division before the border service, and when a slight physical disability resulted in the disqualification, to his great disgust be it said, of the then Colonel Louis D. Conley, Haskell was recommended as the man best fitted to take the regiment. He performed his work so well that the entire regiment developed a great admiration for him and clamored for his retention as Colonel when the regiment entered upon its service in the World War as the 165th Infantry of the "Rainbow Division." As will be explained in another part of this book, this was not to be.

The 7th Infantry Regiment was commanded by Colonel Willard C. Fisk, who had a short time before the beginning of the Mexican border service succeeded Colonel Daniel Appleton in command. Colonel Fisk had about thirty-five years of continuous service in the 7th and was noted as a rigid disciplinarian and an excellent tactician. At all times his regiment performed its work in accordance with the high standards of its traditions. This regiment, augmented by the transfer of several hundred officers and men from the 1st Infantry, in the World War became the 107th Infantry of the 27th Division and served with great distinction in Belgium and France, especially in the fierce attack against the Hindenburg Line in September, 1918.

The 12th Infantry was for a time commanded by a Captain from the Regular Cavalry, whose service was unsatisfactory and who was relieved. The regiment thereafter was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Reginald L. Foster, another officer of long service and experience and a newspaper man in civil life. Colonel Foster while a Major served as Chief of the Military Police of the division, and it was largely due to his energy and determination that G. O. 7, which prohibited the use of liquor, was so effectively enforced. This regiment at the time of the reorganization of the New York Division for the World War was designated as the 52d Pioneer Infantry, Corps and Army troops, and served under Colonel Foster in France and Germany.

Colonel William G. Bates commanded the 71st Infantry. This was the first regiment to return from the border service and so had a considerable period of time between its muster out and the commencement of the World War to prepare for its next service. Colonel Bates began his service in the 7th and served in the Spanish American War both in the states and in the Philippines. He later served in the World War as Commanding Officer of the 54th Pioneer Infantry, by which name the 71st became offi-

cially known and which was designated as Corps and Army troops. His experience, therefore, has been long and varied.

Colonel Edgar S. Jennings commanded the 3d Infantry, which, like the 2d Infantry, was composed largely of separate companies from the central part of the state. His regiment, consolidated with a large number of the personnel of the 74th Infantry of Buffalo, later became the 108th Infantry of the 27th Division. Like its service in the World War under Colonel Jennings, who commanded it throughout, its service on the Mexican border was always dependable and satisfactory.

The 23d Infantry was commanded by Colonel Frank H. Norton. He was another officer of long service and experience and one who held the regard of officers and men of the division generally. This regiment, augmented by the transfer of a number of officers and men from the 14th and 47th Infantry, also of Brooklyn, became the 106th Infantry of the 27th Division and served with great distinction, especially in the attack against the outer defenses of the Hindenburg Line in September, 1918.

The 74th Infantry, whose home station is Buffalo, was commanded by Colonel Nathaniel B. Thurston, known to soldiers throughout the country as "Peggy Thurston," one of the fathers of rifle practice in America. This really remarkable man deserves a chapter in any military book dealing with the soldiers of New York. Alert and virile, both in intellectual strength and bodily vigor, he was an intense partisan in his likes and dislikes. He possessed keen judgment, great loyalty and strong determination. He was a natural leader. His instruction to officers and men always compelled interest because always replete with original and picturesque illustrations given in convincing fashion. He always distinguished between his official and personal relations with his comrades, being very formal and exacting in official life, sympathetic and kindly in his social life. He contracted fever on the border and after a severe illness, much wasted away, was sent north to recuperate. After some months he returned, apparently completely recovered, but died suddenly in January, 1917, at McAllen, Texas. The division lost a great soldier and thousands of officers and men a true friend. The 74th Infantry was later designated as the 55th Pioneer Infantry, Corps and Army troops, and served abroad.

Colonel Henry H. Rogers commanded the 1st Field Artillery. He had served in the 22d Engineers and on the staff of the 1st Brigade before he became an artilleryman. In the 1st Field Artillery he had served as Adjutant and as a battery commander. He had an excellent command on the border and later served with distinction in France. The regiment in the World War was the 104th Field Artillery of the 27th Division.

Colonel George A. Wingate commanded the 2d Field Artillery. Like the other regimental commanders, his service had been long and varied. He brought to his job the point of view of the division staff, for he had served under Major General Roe as Chief of Staff of the division. He won great distinction not only during the border service, but during the World War in which he was promoted to the grade of Brigadier General and in command of the 52d Field Artillery Brigade of the 27th Division,

gained the award of the Distinguished Service Medal. This regiment served in the World War as the 105th Field Artillery of the 27th Division.

Colonel Daniel W. Hand, a Captain from the Regular Army, commanded the 3d Field Artillery. This officer was another of those who had served as an Inspector-Instructor with our division prior to the Mexican border service. He had come to be recognized not only at Division Headquarters, but throughout the Field Artillery Brigade, as a leader of exceptional ability. It was Colonel Hand who organized the 3d Field Artillery from the old 65th Infantry of Buffalo. To this day they talk of Colonel Hand as the father of the regiment. It is men like Hand and Haskell, who have by their conduct and example, established in the hearts of the National Guard a belief in the capacity and square dealing of the mass of regular officers. To Colonel Hand's zeal and accomplishment in organizing this regiment is due much of the credit for its fine service in the war abroad, as the 106th Field Artillery of the 27th Division.

Major William L. Hallahan, quiet and efficient, commanded the 1st Battalion, Signal Corps. In Texas his men established radio communication with Department Headquarters at Fort Sam Houston and saved the government thousands of dollars in telegraph tolls, by enabling us to transmit most of our rush communications by radio. His men were always at work and they built a large number of government military lines in our section of Texas. Major Hallahan as Lieutenant Colonel and Signal Officer of the 27th Division gained the coveted Distinguished Service Order of the British army and won distinction in Belgium and France.

The engineers of the division first consisted of two battalions, one commanded by Major Frederic N. Whitley, later succeeded by Major Frederic M. Humphreys, who had up to the time of his promotion been my Aide. Major Humphreys was an honor graduate of West Point and had



Heavy pontoon bridge erected by the 22d N. Y. Engineers west of Mission, Texas

served in the Engineer Corps of the Regular Army. Major Whitley was a most efficient engineer. Major William S. Conrow who commanded the second battalion and who later became Lieutenant Colonel, when the two battalions were organized as a regiment, was an officer of long and distinguished service, including important work in the Philippine Islands. When the regiment was formed Lieutenant Colonel Cornelius Vanderbilt, the Division Inspector, was made Colonel and placed in command. His service on the border won for him this merited promotion. The service of this regiment as the 102d Engineers of the 27th Division was most distinguished during its operations in Belgium and France.

The 1st Cavalry was commanded by that sterling soldier Colonel Charles I. De Bevoise, organizer, disciplinarian and great leader, who had commanded the regiment from the time of its organization in 1913. Everyone intimately acquainted with the service of this officer predicted a great future for him in the event of war, and well indeed did he measure up to the expectations of his friends when the opportunity afforded by the World War came. In the great war he commanded the 107th Infantry in all its battles and engagements, and was promoted on the field to be Brigadier General in recognition of his distinguished service. Thereafter he commanded the 53d Brigade of the 27th Division. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. In the reorganization of the 27th Division preparatory to its service abroad, the 1st Cavalry was broken up and formed the 104th and 106th Machine Gun Battalions, while Troop "I" of Buffalo became the 102d Trench Mortar Battery. All these units served with distinction in the operations abroad.

The sanitary units under Majors Dunseith, Gaus, Slee and Harnden and Captains Sears, Boswell, Shearer and Latta were developed into efficient organizations and rendered most important service. These units later became the 102d Sanitary Train of the 27th Division and served in various parts of Belgium and France under Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Wadhams.

The Supply Train under Major T. Harry Shanton, who later became Chief of the Military Police of the 27th Division, was organized under difficulties affecting its recruitment, but under Major Shanton's leadership met these problems successfully, and entered into the World War as the 102d Supply Train of the 27th Division.

The Field Bakery Company, organized and trained by Captain Jesse A. Millard, gained distinction as the most efficient bakery company anywhere in the army. It was later expanded into two bakery companies and Millard became a Major.

At Division Headquarters the Chief of Staff was assisted by Majors Franklin W. Ward and Edward Olmsted. For most of the period of the border service the position of Division Adjutant was filled by Major Allan L. Reagan. These three officers had an intimate knowledge of the personnel of the division and were thoroughly acquainted with their functions. Their services were invaluable.

I have already mentioned the remarkable health record of the division.



General O'Ryan and staff

In no small measure was this due to the medical staff led by Lieutenant Colonel William S. Terriberry as Division Surgeon, Major Edward R. Maloney, assisting him, and Major William H. Steers as Sanitary Inspector. The team work through the division was so well developed that these medical officers at all times secured the sincere and active cooperation and support of all unit commanders. Much of the operative surgery at the Divisional Hospital at McAllen, Texas, was performed by Major Robert P. Wadhams and with most satisfactory results.

The supply end of the staff work was in charge of a most experienced officer, Lieutenant Colonel Henry S. Sternberger. He brought to the performance of his duties not only an intimate knowledge of the ration, its issue and preparation, and of the problems of regimental supply officers in relation to property, but a considerable experience in the clothing, equipping and feeding of large masses of troops, the result of his long service on the staff covering numerous maneuver periods. He was ably assisted by Captains James T. Loree and Hugo F. Jaeckel.

The ordnance work of the division was in charge of Major Fred M. Waterbury, who brought to his department the experience of fifteen years of rifle work in the National Guard of New York. He had charge of the construction of rifle ranges at Sharyland and Pharr, as well as the range for field firing at La Gloria. The New York Division was the only one on the border which was practiced in individual rifle and pistol work, as well as in group and field firing with ball ammunition.

Captain Joseph J. Daly of the 22d Engineer Regiment was detailed to Division Headquarters as Engineer Officer. He had general charge of all road and bridge construction and took over the construction of the water supply system from Major Hutchinson.



Pistol practice along the canal near McAllen, Texas

The Division Inspector, until he assumed command of the Engineer Regiment was Major Cornelius Vanderbilt. This officer on the border acquired the nickname of the "Salamander." No matter how high the temperature—and during the summer it varied between 120° and 135° during the day—Major Vanderbilt was traveling about making inspections and observations in a most thorough manner. For many years he had quietly and modestly progressed through the grades, and so it was with much amusement that the officers and men of the division who knew so well his thoroughness and capacity at the time of his promotion to the command of the engineer regiment, heard the comments of civilians who knew the Colonel only through financial and social news columns. While some men with a fraction of the demands that were his were impatiently awaiting the relief of their commands from further border service and complaining of the uselessness of being kept there, Major Vanderbilt was not only uncomplaining throughout, but was as cheerful and exacting in the performance of his duties on the last day of his service on the border, as he was on the day of his arrival. His soldierly bearing and demonstrated capacity in Texas, left no question in the minds of his superiors of the character of service that would be rendered by the engineer regiment when it was again called into service for the great war and which later was acknowledged by the President's award of the Distinguished Service Medal to then Brigadier General Vanderbilt, who trained and took the engineer regiment to France.

CHAPTER III

GUARDING PUBLIC UTILITIES AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR



HEN our participation in the World War became imminent, it was recognized that there were internal problems of law and order to be met. From 1914 to 1917, there had existed in our country strong and opposing feelings in relation to the outcome of the war. It was known that the German government maintained a paid staff of propagandists to cultivate sentiments of sympathy for Germany in her struggle with the Allied powers. This propaganda was supplemented by the activities of agents who did not stop at attempts to cultivate pro-German and anti-British sentiment. It became apparent that it was their duty by violence or other means to cause as much damage as possible to the interests of the Allies. This latter activity took the form of destruction of ships laden or about to be laden with war material for shipment overseas, of the sinking of barges transporting remounts for overseas use and of the setting fire to plants of various kinds that were manufacturing war supplies for the Allies.

It was recognized of course that while a substantial percentage of the population of America was of German extraction, the loyalty to their adopted country of the great majority was above question. Nevertheless, so partisan in their justification of the German cause had some of the minority become that prudence demanded preparedness to meet any internal problems that might arise when our government threw in its lot with the Allies for the restraint of the Central Empires.

The city of New York presented a number of grave problems in relation to this subject of possible internal disorder. New York City, the metropolis of America, with a population of more than five millions of people, was dependent for its very life upon the non-interruption of the stream of necessaries which continuously flowed into it. These necessaries were food, fuel and water. Hundreds of trains daily emptied their vast stores of supplies into the city of New York over lines of railroad, which like the spokes of a wheel in relation to the hub, converged upon the city. These roads supplemented by the coastal steamers not only furnished the city with its supplies, but they carried to it great stores of raw material and finished products for shipment overseas. Any interruption of this system even for a few hours would entail very appreciable results. An interruption for a matter of several days would cause suffering to the population and affect the progress of the war. The consumption of water in the city of New York amounted in 1914 to 580,000,000 gallons per day. Damage to the great aqueducts which carried the water from Ashokan and other sources in the Catskill Mountains to the local storage basins of the city would in a short while endanger the safety of the city

by impairing, through lack of water, the ability to fight fire. The fire installation of the city of New York is dependent upon the fresh water system of the city and is not adaptable to the use of the salt water of the East or Hudson River.

On February 3, 1917, which was about two months before the United States entered the war, John Purroy Mitchel, Mayor of the city of New York, made demand upon the Governor of the state of New York for troops to guard the public utilities of the city of New York. On the same day the Governor issued a special order containing this demand and directing the Commanding General of the National Guard and the Commandant of the Naval Militia to issue orders placing the 1st and 10th Regiments of Infantry and the 1st and 2d Battalions of Naval Militia on duty for the purpose mentioned. A copy of this order is included in the Appendix as Exhibit 8.

The organizations mentioned were by telegraph ordered to mobilize the same day. The 1st Infantry was to secure that part of the Aqueduct between Great Neck on the east bank of the Hudson River, two miles north of Cold Spring, to the influent chamber at Kensico, six miles west of Tarrytown. The 10th Infantry, less a detachment to cover the Brooklyn water supply on Long Island, was ordered to secure the Aqueduct on the west bank of the Hudson, from the western uptake of the St. Elmo syphon at Moodna Shaft, opposite Cold Spring, to the Ashokan Lake. The regimental commanders were advised that the character of this service would necessitate the use of small guard detachments and patrols, which would make necessary a system of boarding the men locally, similar to the billeting practice abroad. The winter of 1916-17 was a severe one and the climate in the highlands of the Hudson and in the Catskill Mountains during February and March was most severe. The Naval Militia were employed in guarding the bridges over the East River.

The prompt dispatch of these troops at this time for the protection of the public utilities of the city produced a profound impression upon all. It was evidence that the people of New York, at least, anticipated war and were ready to take care of any local situation that might arise. The service of these troops was necessarily disagreeable at that time of the year and permitted no opportunity for training. The duty was satisfactorily performed and there were no incidents indicating that any real attempt was made to damage the water supply.

The sudden and unexpected action of the troops in taking over the protection of this and other public utilities had served its purpose. When the troops on guard were relieved for concentration after the declaration of war, they should have been replaced by state or municipal police or watchmen specially organized for the purpose. Obviously any attempt to damage public utilities would have to be executed by malefactors employing stealth and to frustrate their attempts by the employment of troops was unnecessarily expensive. Nevertheless troops, federal or state, with their buglers, orderlies, field officers, cooks and what not

having no relation to the job in hand, were continued on this duty throughout the war.

The service of the two regiments mentioned above continued until April 9th, when the President called into the service of the United States the 23d New York Infantry, which was directed to relieve the 1st Infantry in its sector. Nothing is known of the reason for this action, unless it was based upon a plan to have the expense of guarding these utilities made a federal expense instead of an expense upon the city of New York. The expense of maintaining the 1st and 10th Infantry placed on duty by the Governor of the state was borne by the city of New York pursuant to the state law. When the President ordered out the 23d Infantry and directed it to take over the sector then held by the 1st Infantry, the expense of maintaining the 23d Infantry necessarily became a federal charge. However, the President had the same authority over the 1st Infantry that he had over the 23d, and by calling out the former regiment, which was already on the ground and familiar with the condition, money would have been saved and a great deal of unnecessary effort conserved.

The situation was later on further involved by the War Department when additional infantry regiments of New York were called into the active federal service and detailed to guard railways throughout the state, but without any brigadier general to coordinate their work or supervise their discipline. All this was attempted to be done by the authorities at Governors Island, who were dealing at the same time with the troops of numerous other states similarly employed. Needless to say discipline relaxed and there was much waste of time and effort, the effects of which were noticeable for some time after the units rejoined the division.

In the Appendix as Exhibit 9 will be found a table showing the units called out prior to July 15, 1917, and the character of service performed, as well as a table of units called out under the call of July 15, 1917.

CHAPTER IV

MOBILIZATION FOR THE WORLD WAR



HE mobilization for the World War found parts of the National Guard of New York, as explained in the preceding chapter, on active duty for the protection of public utilities. These units were the 2d and 71st Infantry Regiments, guarding railways and power plants, the 23d Infantry, one squadron of the 1st Cavalry and one battalion of the 47th Infantry protecting the water supply of the city of New York, and the 3d and 47th Infantry guarding bridges.

The National Defense Act, in the form in which it existed at the outbreak of the World War, provided for the utilization of the National Guard by the Federal government pursuant to a draft of its officers and men into the Army of the United States. This draft provision of the National Defense Act had been made a part of the law in order to change in this summary manner the organic legal status of the National Guard from that of militia to that of federal soldiers. In order that the reader may understand the need and importance of the distinction which then existed and still exists under our Federal Constitution, between the militia soldier and the soldier organized under the so-called Army Clause of the Federal Constitution, it should be explained that the Federal Constitution provides that there shall be reserved to the states the power to train the militia in time of peace and to appoint its officers, while the same document vests in Congress the exclusive power to raise and support armies and in the President the power to command the armies so raised. The Federal Constitution also limits the use by the Federal government of the militia, granting to the President the power to call forth the militia only for the purpose of repelling invasion, suppressing insurrection and executing the law. In other words, the President, for the purpose of waging war against the Central Empires, could not employ any troops which were militia. Anticipating that this Constitutional restriction might embarrass the government, the National Defense Act provided that when such occasions arose the President might draft into the army of the United States and discharge from the militia all officers and enlisted men composing organized units of the National Guard of the several states.

Acting under this proviso of the law, the President, by the following proclamation, drafted the National Guard into the army of the United States:

WAR DEPARTMENT

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 90

WASHINGTON, July 12, 1917.

The following proclamation by the President is published to the army for the information and guidance of all concerned:

(CALL INTO FEDERAL SERVICE AND DRAFT OF THE NATIONAL GUARD) BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA A PROCLAMATION

Whereas, the United States of America and the Imperial German government are now at war, and having in view the consequent danger of aggression by a foreign enemy upon the territory of the United States and the necessity for proper protection against possible interference with the execution of the laws of the Union by agents of the enemy, I, WOODROW WILSON, President of the United States, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States and through the governors of the respective states, call into the service of the United States as of and from the dates hereinafter respectively indicated, all members of the National Guard and all enlisted members of the National Guard Reserve of the following states, who are not now in the service of the United States, except members of staff corps and departments not included in the personnel of tactical organizations, and except such officers of the National Guard as have been or may be specially notified by my authority that they will not be affected by this call, to wit:

I. On July 15, 1917, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota and Nebraska.

On July 25, 1917, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Illinois, Montana, Wyoming, Idaho, Washington and Oregon.

The members of the National Guard of the various states affected by this call will be concentrated at such places as may be designated by the War Department.

II. And, under the authority conferred upon me by clause second of section one of the act of Congress "to authorize the President to increase temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States" approved May 18, 1917, I do hereby draft into the military service of the United States as of and from the fifth day of August, nineteen hundred and seventeen, all members of the National Guard and all enlisted members of the National Guard Reserve of the following states, except members of staff corps and departments not included in the personnel of tactical organizations, and except such other officers of the National Guard as have been or may be specially notified by my authority that they will not be drafted, to wit:

New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Illinois, Montana, Wyoming, Idaho, Washington, Oregon, Indiana, Kentucky, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas, Missouri, Kansas, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah and California.

III. All persons hereby drafted shall on and from the fifth day of August, nineteen hundred and seventeen, stand discharged from the militia, and, under the terms of section 2 of the act of May 18, 1917, be subject to the laws and regulations governing the Regular Army, except as to promotions, so far as such laws and regulations are applicable to persons whose permanent retention in the military service on the active or retired list is not contemplated by law.

IV. The members of each company, battalion, regiment, brigade division, or other organizations of the National Guard hereby drafted into the military service of the

United States shall be embodied in organizations corresponding to those of the Regular Army. The officers not above the rank of colonel of said organizations of the National Guard who are drafted and whose officers are provided for in like organizations of the Regular Army are hereby appointed officers in the army of the United States in the arm, staff corps or department, and in the grades in which they now hold commission as officers of the National Guard, such appointments to be effective, subject to acceptance, on and from the fifth day of August, nineteen hundred and seventeen, and each of them, subject to such acceptance, is hereby assigned as of said date to the organization in the army of the United States composed of those who were members of the organization of the National Guard in which at the time of draft he held a commission. The non-commissioned officers of the organizations of the National Guard, the members of which are hereby drafted, are hereby appointed non-commissioned officers in their present grade in the organizations of the army composed of said members and shall in each case have the same relative rank as heretofore; and all other enlisted men are hereby confirmed in the army of the United States in the grades and ratings held by them in the National Guard in all cases where such grades and ratings correspond to grades and ratings provided for in like organizations of the Regular Army, all such appointments of non-commissioned officers and confirmations of other enlisted men in their grades to be without prejudice to the authority of subordinate commanders in respect of promotions, reductions and changes in enlisted personnel.

V. Each organization of the military force hereby created will, until further orders, bear the same name and designation as the former organization of the National Guard of whose members it is composed.

VI. All necessary orders for combining the organizations created by embodying therein members of the National Guard and National Guard Reserve hereby drafted into the military service of the United States into complete tactical units will be issued by the War Department.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this third day of July in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and seventeen and of the (SEAL) independence of the United States of America the one hundred and forty-first.

WOODROW WILSON.

By the President:

ROBERT LANSING,
Secretary of State.

(382.1 A. G. O.)

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

TASKER H. BLISS,
Major General, Acting Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

H. P. McCAIN,
The Adjutant General.

It will be noted that this order called into the active federal service on July 15th all National Guard units and provided that they were drafted into the military service of the United States as of the fifth day of August, 1917. In accordance with the provisions of this Presidential Proclamation, the Governor, through the Adjutant General of the state, wired the Commanding General of the New York Division to assemble all units in their armories, preparatory to initial muster into active military service of the United States. This telegram was later confirmed

by G. O. 35 of the State Adjutant General's Office and appears in the Appendix as Exhibit 10. This order was carried out by the provisions of G. O. 11, Headquarters, New York Division, on July 12, 1917. By that order all units not already in the active federal service were directed to mobilize on Monday, July 16th, at 9.00 A. M. With the departure of units from their armories, responsibility for the buildings was to vest in the commanding officers of the depot units. Commands were assembled in their armories, and the work of vaccination and inocculation against typhoid and paratyphoid immediately commenced. Every effort was made to proceed with the elementary instruction of recruits and the issue of clothing and other military property. By the provisions of G. O. 95, War Department, dated July 18th, the New York Division was assigned to Camp Wadsworth at Spartanburg, South Carolina, for its training.

On July 25th, pursuant to S. O. 183, Eastern Department, dated July 20th, the Commanding General of the New York Division organized the tactical division to be known as the 27th Division. Under the tables of organization as they then existed, the division was to be composed of three brigades of infantry, of three regiments each, plus the auxiliary units. This order is interesting as a matter of history, as it affects the question of the birth of the division under its new designation. It is, therefore, included in this account of the mobilization of the division. The order was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS 27TH DIVISION, U. S. A.
Municipal Building

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 1.

NEW YORK CITY, July 25, 1917.

Pursuant to S. O. 183, Eastern Department, July 20, 1917, the undersigned assumes command of the 27th Division, formerly the 6th (New York) Division, consisting of the following organizations:

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS:

1ST BRIGADE, N. Y. INFANTRY:
- Brigade Headquarters
- 7th Regiment, N. Y. Infantry
- 12th Regiment, N. Y. Infantry
- 69th Regiment, N. Y. Infantry

2D BRIGADE, N. Y. INFANTRY:
- Brigade Headquarters
- 1st Regiment, N. Y. Infantry
- 23d Regiment, N. Y. Infantry
- 71st Regiment, N. Y. Infantry

3D BRIGADE N. Y. INFANTRY:
- Brigade Headquarters
- 2d Regiment, N. Y. Infantry
- 3d Regiment, N. Y. Infantry
- 74th Regiment, N. Y. Infantry

1ST BRIGADE, N. Y. FIELD ARTILLERY

Brigade Headquarters
1st Regiment, N. Y. Field Artillery
2d Regiment, N. Y. Field Artillery
3d Regiment, N. Y. Field Artillery

1ST REGIMENT, N. Y. CAVALRY

22D REGIMENT, N. Y. ENGINEERS

1ST BATTALION, N. Y. SIGNAL CORPS

N. Y. TRAINS HEADQUARTERS AND MILITARY POLICE

N. Y. Ammunition Train
N. Y. Supply Train
N. Y. Engineer Train
N. Y. Sanitary Train

1ST N. Y. FIELD BAKERY COMPANY

JOHN F. O'RYAN,
Major General.

H. H. BANDHOLTZ,
Lt. Col., U. S. Infantry,
Chief of Staff, D. O. L.

OFFICIAL:
F. W. WARD,
Lt. Col. Adjutant.

Under date of August 6th, telegram was received from the Headquarters of the Eastern Department as follows:

"FOLLOWING TELEGRAM FROM WAR DEPARTMENT REPEATED FOR YOUR INFORMATION QUOTE REFERENCE YOUR TELEGRAM OF JULY 19TH PRESENT NUMERICAL DESIGNATIONS OF NATIONAL GUARD ORGANIZATIONS WILL NOT BE CHANGED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE McCAIN UNQUOTE ORDER FROM THESE HEADQUARTERS CHANGING DESIGNATION YOUR DIVISION TO 27 IS CHANGED TO READ 6TH NOTIFY ALL CONCERNED. SIMPSON."

Accordingly, the designation 27th Division was dropped and that of 6th Division, which was the numerical designation officially used during the Mexican border service, was resumed. For some time, therefore, after August 6th, the official designation of the division was the 6th Division, although in G. O. 95, War Department, of July 18th, the numeral 27 had apparently been assigned. But on August 29th, pursuant to G. O. 115, War Department, of that date, the plan for numbering divisional and other units of the army was prescribed. Under this plan the 6th Division became officially known as the 27th Division. It might be mentioned here that many officers and enlisted men ultimately found that little was gained by the adoption of the scheme mentioned in this order, while on the other hand, much of psychological benefit in the way of locality tradition had been wantonly abandoned. In the case of units of our own state, the 7th Infantry, with a continuous existence of over one hundred years and with a fine record of accomplishment, particularly in the development of

officer material, lost the prestige of its name and became known as the 107th Infantry. The 69th Infantry, with a magnificent Civil War battle record, supplemented by service in the Spanish-American War, became known as the 165th Infantry. Similar comments have application to many other famous regiments throughout the country. Later on it was found that the plan adopted frequently led to misunderstandings, due to the fact that regiments of different arms of the service had the same numerals. For example, a soldier asked what his organization was, would reply, "the 102d." To his mind as a zealous soldier, there was but one unit of that number. His answer, however, always called for additional interrogation in order to disclose whether he belonged to the 102d Infantry, the 102d Field Artillery, the 102d Engineers, or the Ambulance Company, Field Hospital, Military Police Company, Ammunition Train, Supply Train or Machine Gun Battalion, bearing the same numeral. As a matter of fact, through the influence of tradition and locality pride, troops abroad were frequently referred to by locality names and the attempt to defeat this natural and, as a matter of fact, advantageous system of designation was to some extent nullified. The 26th Division was constantly referred to as the New England Division, and the 28th as the Pennsylvania Division. In the 42d or Rainbow Division, composed of National Guard units from various parts of the country, it was common even within the division for the men to refer to the New Yorks, meaning the 69th (165th) Infantry, or the Ohios, meaning the 166th Infantry from that state, or the Alabamans, meaning the 167th Infantry from that state, or the Iowans, meaning the 168th Infantry from that state.

On August 15th, by G. O. 4 of the division, the staff of the Division Commander was composed of the following:

Captain Edwin W. Moore, Aide

1st Lieutenant Charles P. Franchot, Aide de Camp.
Lieutenant Colonel Harry H. Bandholtz, Chief of Staff.
Major Edward Olmsted, Assistant Chief of Staff
Captain Homer B. Battenberg, Assistant Chief of Staff
Lieutenant Colonel Franklin W. Ward, Adjutant
Major Allen L. Regan, Assistant Adjutant
Lieutenant Colonel J. Mayhew Wainwright, Inspector
Major James L. Kincaid, Judge Advocate
Lieutenant Colonel Henry S. Sternberger, Quartermaster

Major James T. Loree
Major Joseph W. Farrell
Captain Raymond T. Moniz
Captain Edward Miller
} Assistant Quartermasters

2d Lieutenant George W. Peppard
2d Lieutenant William H. G. Ballance
2d Lieutenant Harold T. Clement
} Assistants to the Quartermaster

Lieutenant Colonel Edward R. Maloney, Medical Corps, Surgeon
Lieutenant Colonel Walter C. Montgomery, Medical Corps, Sanitary Inspector
Major Lefferts Hutton, Medical Corps, Assistant Surgeon
Major Joseph J. Daly, Ordnance Department
Major Arthur L. Howe, Signal Corps

On August 23d, by G. O. 114, War Department, Major General O'Ryan was directed to proceed to Camp Wadsworth, Spartanburg, South Carolina, and assume command of the troops there. Prior to this time Company A of the 22d Engineers had been ordered to proceed to Yaphank, Long Island, for the purpose of surveying and laying out the cantonment for a National Army division at that place. About the middle of August, Company D was ordered to Camp Wadsworth for duty in connection with laying out the camp for the division. This company, under command of Captain (now Colonel) George D. Snyder, performed its service in a most efficient manner.



Kitchens of 71st Infantry outside Armory in 34th Street

When it became known that the troops of New York state were to



Troops of 71st Infantry en route for Camp Wadsworth

entrain for Camp Wadsworth, and were shortly to leave the state for that place, an insistent demand was made by the public that the troops be paraded in New York City before their departure and given a farewell dinner by the city of New York. In anticipation of these ceremonies, regiments were quickly concentrated in and about the city of New York. The 3d Infantry was ordered to Pelham Bay Park and went into camp there. The 1st and 10th Regiments of Infantry from up the state were ordered to Van Cortland Park, where they joined the 71st Regiment. At this time the 2d Field Artillery was camped in Prospect Park, Brooklyn, the 1st Field Artillery and Squadron "A" Cavalry in Van Cortland Park, and the 1st Cavalry on the Bliss Estate in Bay Ridge, Brooklyn. The Coast Defense Commands, the 8th, 9th and 13th, were garrisoning the defenses about New York harbor.

A committee, composed largely of hotel men and supply merchants, was appointed by Mayor Mitchel of the city of New York and to them was entrusted the problem of giving a send-off dinner or dinners to nearly 20,000 officers and men of the division. Only a town like the city of New York could seriously undertake a hospitality of such magnitude. The Committee was aided by a Women's Auxiliary Committee, of which Mrs. John Purroy Mitchel was the Honorary Chairman and Mrs. Cornelius Vanderbilt the active Chairman. Mrs. Vanderbilt was by common consent regarded as the proper active head of this committee. During the period of the Mexican border service she had headed and financed the work of relief for the families of men whose service on the border had resulted in financial embarrassment to those at home. Without publicity or without any commendation, she had labored during the summer of 1916 in the interest of the families of our men. In this instance, as head of the Women's Committee, she surrounded herself with 100 prominent women of the city who acted as hostesses at the several camps and hotels where the dinners were served. One of the dinners was given to the Division Commander and staff and the commanding officers of units, at the Hotel Biltmore. Mayor Mitchel presided as toastmaster. Many generous tributes were paid to the division, its officers and men. In reply to these, the Division Commander said:

"I take it that this dinner is an expression of the good will which the people of the city of New York, through the Mayor and the committee in charge, bear toward the officers and men of the Guard organizations now about to leave the city and state. We have no prediction to make in relation to the accomplishment of the division, but we do promise you to endeavor at all times and at all places to conduct ourselves as American soldiers should."

This statement is mentioned here in view of the generally acknowledged excellence of the conduct of the officers and men of the division throughout the war and of the high standard of their discipline in battle.

The dinners were greatly appreciated by the men and were carried through without a hitch in the arrangements.

The parade was held on August 30th, the route of march being down



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"Send-off" parade of the 27th Division. A general view of the "send-off" parade of the 27th Division passing the New York Public Library, Fifth Avenue and Forty-second Street, August 30, 1917. Members of the immediate families of the soldiers occupied the great reviewing-stand on the steps of the library, shown on left of photograph

5th Avenue to Washington Arch, the reviewing stand in front of the Union League Club. The concentration of the troops, the parade, and the departure of a number of the units for the South were so timed and coordinated that the latter units, having concluded the parade, were marched to their trains and continued their movement South by rail, while other units returned, some to their armories and others to camps in the vicinity of New York, to await their rail movements South.

The train transportation movement of the division to Camp Wadsworth was in the immediate charge of Major James T. Loree, Assistant Division Quartermaster, who had functioned so efficiently during the period of the Mexican border mobilization. The Chief Quartermaster at Governors Island had turned this matter over to Major Loree and there were no hitches affecting the rail movement of any of our units.

There were some interesting features of this parade. In the first place, it was desired that the families of the men should have special opportunity to see the parade. Many of them could not afford to purchase seats which were for sale along the line of march. Accordingly, it was arranged that the Police Department should reserve the westerly side of 5th Avenue from 110th Street to 59th Street for their use, and that for purposes of identification the families would be furnished with tags labelled "Soldier's Family." Each soldier was given four of these tags. The plan worked very satisfactorily, as it brought the families together along the sidewalk mentioned. The division was led by the New York Police Department band, which enabled all units of the division entitled to bands to parade with their own bands. Apparently it was realized by the people along the line of march that many of the officers and men in the passing column would not live through the war to take part in any homecoming parade, for sadness was more noticeable upon the faces of the spectators than enthusiasm. The officers and men, however, were in fine spirits and made a most soldierly impression in their swing down Fifth Avenue.

The subject of mobilization would not be complete without some reference to the lessons to be drawn from the mobilization of the New York Division for the World War. Officers are naturally influenced in their plans and judgment by their own experience. In the Regular Army the personnel of units represent many sections of the country. The Regular Army is not organized territorially. In time of peace the Regular Army commands live, for the most part, in buildings at army posts. In effect their personnel are always mobilized. With the advent of war, the first step in the case of regular units is, therefore, rather a concentration to bring units together to form higher organizations, and in order that their training and instruction in field work may proceed without delay, the place of concentration is usually a camp in the field. Due to this experience and practice in the Regular Army, it was assumed by the War Department in plans for the mobilization of the National Guard, that it would be desirable to get the National Guard under canvas as soon as practicable after the call. Accordingly, the War Department plans called for mobiliza-



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Watching their loved ones start for war. Pride and sorrow mingled in the hearts of relatives of men of the 27th Division, who lined the sidewalks of Fifth Avenue, when the boys marched in the last appearance in New York before departing for Camp Wadsworth, in the great "send-off" parade on August 30, 1917



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Officials reviewing "send-off" parade. View of the reviewing-stand in front of the Union League Club at Thirty-ninth Street and Fifth Avenue. In the stand, starting with the fourth from the left: Major General Daniel Appleton, Governor Charles S. Whitman, Mayor John P. Mitchel, who was later killed in an aero accident at Gerstner Field, Lake Charles, Louisiana; Major General J. Franklin Bell, who died in January, 1919, while in command of the Department of the East; Major General Eli D. Hoyle, Major General William A. Mann, then Commander of the 42d, or Rainbow, Division.

tion camps. In the case of the New York Division, possessing modern barracks and facilities in the form of armories, it is obvious that a mobilization in the field could not possibly be as effective as a mobilization in the armories, to be followed by concentration in the field. This was true, because under existing mobilization regulations a very great mass of paper work, physical examinations, inspection, purchase and shoeing of animals, issue of clothing and other property, was necessarily to be completed before commands could function properly in the field. These measures could be taken in much more efficient manner in the great armories of New York state than they possibly could in open fields while commands were endeavoring to make camp with ranks augmented by many recruits and without military property adequate for their strength. The idea of permitting a substantial number of men mobilized in armories to go home over night during the relatively short period of the mobilization was entirely out of keeping with all Regular Army procedure, although otherwise most economical, feasible and desirable. It was in effect a form of billeting which later was necessarily accepted as orthodox when the army went to France. Very much of the smoothness with which the New York units moved to the training camp at Spartanburg, South Carolina, was due to the fact that so many of them were mobilized in their armories instead of in the field and the preliminary work before mentioned disposed of in the orderly atmosphere of the great armories and with the aid of the many facilities they provided. The permission to carry out the mobilization in this way was given by Major General Leonard Wood, who, after he had heard the arguments in support of a modification of the War Department plan for mobilization, assumed authority to give the desired permission.

In the Appendix (Exhibit 11) will be found a table showing the units of the New York Division mobilized for the World War, the date of their muster into the federal service and their strength on August 5, 1917. There is also attached in the Appendix (Exhibit 12) a table showing the dates of arrival of divisional units at Camp Wadsworth.

CHAPTER V

ORGANIZATION OF CAMP WADSWORTH



HE National Guard divisions were sent to camps rather than to cantonments because it was expected that they would be moved to France before the winter season set in. Accordingly, they were to live under canvas until the time came for their departure overseas.

Upon arrival of our Division Headquarters at Camp Wadsworth, it was found that a large number of civilian employes were at work erecting hospitals, mess shacks, storehouses, railroad spurs and sidings, and constructing roads, culverts and drains. The camp site was not ready for occupancy by troops. Nevertheless, it was obvious that very much work necessary to be done in the way of clearing land for drill and training purposes could be done and the work thus expedited if soldiers were employed for the purpose.

The units of the division as they arrived at Camp Wadsworth were composed very largely of trained and seasoned men, and they were accordingly put to work improving the roads, cutting down trees and removing stumps and brush from the proposed drill fields. As a matter of fact, many of them had done similar work in preparing camp sites on the Mexican border.

After they had been at work for a week, the camp appeared to develop as if by magic. The amount of work accomplished by the troops lessened to that extent the work to be done by the contractors and, therefore, the amount to be paid the contractors by the government. The contractors who built camps were not paid a fixed sum, but for the work actually done by them, based upon cost plus percentage. The labor of the men of the division, therefore, saved to the government a very considerable sum of money.

Very much could be written here in criticism of the construction of Camp Wadsworth and of decisions of the War Department in relation to recommendations made by the Camp Commander. However, it was recognized at the time, in relation to construction of the large number of camps and cantonments needed, that the War Department had before it a really tremendous problem, and that in connection with this problem, they were handicapped by the necessity of relying upon an overhead greatly augmented by new and untried officers. Many of these, it is true, were exceptionally efficient, but others were timid or incompetent. In view of the magnitude of camp operations, many of these new officers in Washington necessarily made decisions in the name of the chief of the bureau or department concerned. And so it frequently happened that the person who actually disapproved the recommendation of a camp commander of experience and who was on the ground was some relatively inexperienced officer. Camp construction was adversely affected by indecision on the part of the War Department in relation to policy. For a considerable time

the department apparently did not know whether camps such as that at Spartanburg would be maintained for a few months only, or whether it would assume a more permanent rôle in connection with the training of other units after the departure of the 27th Division for France. For a time it was known as a "summer camp," later as a "semi-permanent camp." This attitude directly affected questions of labor and material to be used in the development of the place. If the camp were to be used only by the 27th Division for a few months before going overseas, it would be a waste of public monies to install board floors in the tents for so great a number of units. If, on the other hand, our division or other troops were to occupy the camp during the winter months, board floors would become almost a necessity if good health were to be preserved. In a great camp of this character there must be organization and facilities for handling great masses of supplies that are daily delivered. Particularly we had found from previous experience at training and maneuver camps within the state of New York that a lumber yard is almost a necessity if any considerable amount of lumber is to be used. Otherwise it is almost impossible to protect lumber from theft. This and many other features in connection with the construction and development of Camp Wadsworth had been carefully considered and recommendations made covering each feature, all of which were in the alternative and dependent upon the decision of the War Department as to whether the camp was to be temporary or permanent. Many of these recommendations were determined by the War Department apparently without relation to a definite policy regarding the permanency of the camp. One branch of the War Department apparently assumed that the camp was to be permanent, while another branch would assume that it was to be temporary and make their decisions accordingly. Many recommendations which were at first disapproved as calling for unnecessary construction and expense were later adopted by the War Department, some of them on its own initiative. One of these related to the necessity for a proper road or highway from the city of Spartanburg to the camp, the existing road being no more than a tortuous country lane, which we were informed had no bottom during the winter season. Ultimately, the government, after many delays, undertook the construction of this road, but the work was not commenced until shortly before the armistice and was not completed until some time after the war was over and the camp about to be abandoned. This road, known locally as the "Snake Road," was a necessary artery between the camp and the city of Spartanburg and, as its modification and repair were essential, it was necessary, in view of the War Department's decision to do nothing about it, to reconstruct it with soldier labor. One of the first units to arrive at the camp was the 22d New York Engineers under Colonel Cornelius Vanderbilt, and to the latter was entrusted the work of straightening, ditching, ballasting and widening this important highway. By borrowing road machines from the city of Spartanburg and the county authorities, Colonel Vanderbilt and his men made radical changes in this roadway, including construction of new and safe bridges over the several streams which crossed the road. The



Widening the "Snake Road" to fifteen feet

work was under the immediate charge of 1st Lieutenant Charles E. Bregenzer, who was ably assisted by 1st Lieutenant Herbert E. Odell.

Upon the arrival of the division in South Carolina, Governor Manning sent the Division Commander a cordial telegram of greeting, which was the beginning of many other friendly manifestations of hospitality from the people of South Carolina and particularly of Spartanburg.

Shortly after the arrival of the division at Camp Wadsworth, the War Department detailed as Constructing Quartermaster Major John D. Kilpatrick, Q. M. C., to supervise the construction work going on there. This officer was well known to our division, he having begun his military



The "Snake Road" undergoing repair. The lower crib

career in Squadron "A," New York Cavalry, and at the time of the outbreak of the war was a lieutenant colonel in the National Guard of New Jersey. Largely through his zeal and experience, the contractors in charge of the work at the camp were made to speed up the construction of the necessary buildings.

It might be interesting to the reader to insert here some statistics relating to the construction of Camp Wadsworth in order to convey some idea of the magnitude of the work. The constructing contractor was the Fisk & Carter Construction Company. His general contract was concluded about September 10, 1917, although much additional work was in progress after that date under the supervision of the Constructing Quartermaster, Major Kilpatrick, and later under the Camp Quartermaster, Major Robert E. Grinstead. The work of Major Kilpatrick has already been referred to. Reference should be made to the efficiency of Major Grinstead. He had a very considerable task in relation to additional construction authorized from time to time, besides which he was, as Camp Quartermaster, in charge of the receipt and distribution of the great mass of property that daily poured into the camp. By great patience and industry, he was enabled to function efficiently, although handicapped by several incompetent assistants.

The following table gives some of the items of material used in the construction of the camp up to December 10, 1917:

Number of cars of lumber	1,036
Amount of lumber, in B. F	20,000,000
Number of cars of roofing	28
Amount of roofing, in square feet (two-ply 3,276,000,one-ply 424,000)	3,700,000
Number of cars of wire screening	5
Amount of wire screening, in square feet	375,900
Number of cars of nails (6,000 kegs)	12
Amount of electric wiring, in feet	1,559,577
Number of lamp sockets	21,111
Number of doors	6,119
Number of sash	11,357
Amount of vitrified pipe, in feet	2,840
Amount of iron pipe, in feet (includes all sizes ½ inch to 12 inches)	217,819
Number of cars of all kinds of pipe	44
Total number of cars of material of all kinds	2,051
Greatest number of cars of material handled in any one day	47
Average number of cars of material handled per day when operation was in full swing	28
Number of miles of roads	18
Number of miles of railroad siding:	
On reservation, miles	2½
Off reservation, miles	1
Number of miles sewer line	None
Number of miles water line (mains)	13
Number of miles trenching (including target and pipe trenches)	15
Amount of money expended in plumbing fixtures (on showers and faucets for water lines)	$27,000.00
Method of heating (steam or stove)—Stoves.	
(a) If by steam, number of miles of steam lines.	
(b) If by stoves, number of stoves	629
Greatest number of men employed in any one day	3,806



"Snake Road" undergoing repair. View of bridge No. 1 under construction

Average number of men employed per day when operation was in full swing	2,800
Highest payroll in any one week	$72,016.20
Average payroll per week when operation was in full swing	$60,000.00
The number of men in executive organization of the Government (average)	55
The number of men in executive organization of the contractor (average)	25
Total cost of camp (includes everything as paid by Constructing Quartermaster, as of December 10, 1917)	$2,223,223.59

One feature of camp construction that caused much inconvenience was that, although infantry companies were to have a strength of 250 men,



View of bridge No. 2

the kitchens were built to accommodate but 150 men. It was understood that the decision to organize the infantry companies at 250 instead of 150 was not reached until after plans for the construction of the camps on the basis of the smaller companies had been approved and the work commenced.

This illustrates a shortcoming which appears to be characteristic of our army and it is noted here not in a spirit of captious criticism, but with the hope that the army may free itself of this weakness. Let the reader reflect for a moment that the war had been in progress over three years. If it had taught anything in the way of military organization it had demonstrated the desirability of infantry companies having a strength of at least 200 men. All the great powers engaged had come to the strong infantry company. What then delayed our War Department arriving at a proper conclusion in relation to organization prior to our declaration of war? It is the chief function of the General Staff to prepare plans to meet the emergency of war, and yet our war experience showed that many of our most annoying delays were to be charged not to Congress or to the people, but to the action or failure to act of those who had the authority and whose duty it was to have made timely decisions and plans for the great emergency. Many of the failures of the War Department in relation to preparedness are to be traced, not to a lack of zeal or of industry on the part of the officers of the army, but rather to an excess of misdirected zeal which leads them to seek perfection in organization and material; and in this attempt at the unattainable, to defer decisions and actions which, if made and consummated, would meet the emergency. For the purposes of war, it is immaterial, broadly speaking, whether the infantry company is organized on a basis of 200 men or 250 men or of any number between these limits, because after a company is so organized it begins almost immediately to lose men by promotion, detail, transfer, sickness, accident, wounds and death. Seldom, if ever, is it possible to maintain its strength exactly at the number prescribed. Probably no command in the army after the first month of its existence on the new basis of 250 men had that number, except by mere accident for a few days. Nevertheless, so long-drawn out were the discussions and conferences in relation to the proper strength of an infantry company that a decision was deferred until after our entry into the war, and in consequence many embarrassments and financial losses resulted from the failure to come to some timely decision.

In similar manner regrettable and unnecessary delays resulted from the failure of the War Department to make prompt and final decisions in relation to armament. Machine guns and automatic rifles complete in their designs and ready to go to the manufacturer to be turned out in great quantities for the use of the troops eagerly awaiting their receipt, were subject to minor changes by experts of the Ordnance Department in the effort to attain perfection. These minor changes necessitated new dies and tools as well as modifications in manufacturing machinery. All

these meant more delay, the result of which was that few of these weapons were used by American troops before the armistice.

The history of warfare has always demonstrated that the soldier, that is to say, the man, is the determining factor in battle—not the weapon. By the soldier and the man is meant, character, leadership, physical fitness, discipline, morale, tactical and technical skill, and experience, all coupled with numbers. The best weapons in the hands of troops not possessing these qualities are worse than no weapons, for they become but trophies to be captured by an efficient enemy.

In this war a million Americans did not spring to arms overnight literally, but actually the draft law furnished with surprising smoothness and speed several millions of young Americans possessing in the rough most of the essential qualities of the successful soldier, and hundreds of thousands of these young men were living in camps for months awaiting impatiently the arms and equipment which were not forthcoming. Much better, therefore, that the War Department in the future should have in reserve, weapons and equipment of some type for immediate issue to the great numbers of men demanded by modern warfare, than to defer the accumulation of the same until too late, in the attempt to increase effectiveness by the adoption of the latest refinements in design.

While the organizations were still arriving at Camp Wadsworth a telegram was received that 200 reserve officers had been directed to report there for duty. On the same day this telegram was received, these young officers began to arrive. It was difficult to know what to do with them. The organizations of the division had practically a complete roster of commissioned officers and at that time all units at the camp were engaged as stated in the work of developing their camp sites. However, in the absence of sufficient tentage, provision was made to house them in buildings not yet in use, and it being learned that their instruction at the training camp had not included such subjects as company administration, property accountability and other matters of military routine, a practical course of instruction was laid out for them and officers of special capacity and experience assigned as instructors. Later when the remaining units of the division had arrived at camp, these officers were distributed among them and assigned to companies as additional officers.

The 200 reserve officers were, on the whole, a very promising looking group of young men. Shortly after their arrival it developed that there was friction between some of them and a percentage of the officers of the units to which they had been assigned. This friction was perhaps a natural outcome of circumstances. Some of the reserve officers had gone to the training camps as enlisted men from the New York Division. Most of these were young men of service and experience, who had been recommended for commissions and whose ambition had led them to the officers training camp as the medium to gain advancement. Most of them knew that there were other soldiers in the division of equal or greater capacity and experience still serving in the ranks, and because of this knowledge they were always on guard to conduct themselves with becoming modesty.

There were others, however, who had gone to the officers training camps without special recommendation from the division, and whose promotion in their old commands would have been long deferred on account of the great number of better men who would have preceded them in promotion on the merits. Their presence in the camp as commissioned officers naturally affronted the sense of justice of their old comrades. The mass of the reserve officers, however, were young men without previous military experience. Their mental attitude depended largely upon their common sense. It is believed that most of them understood that in a three months' training period they could not possibly have acquired the knowledge, skill and experience of those who for many years had been attending drills, schools, maneuver camps and strike duty, all crowned by long months of hard and varied service on the Mexican border. This group, like the first group named, went hard at work to learn all they could from those with whom they were associated. The remaining element of the reserve officers were those who had taken literally the exhortations and stimulating comments of some of the younger regular officers at their training camps concerning the National Guard. It is apparently true that some of the regular officers in an excess of zeal and perhaps in order to advance their standing in the minds of the young civilians who went to the training camps, had criticized and undervalued the worth of the non-regular officers and units of the army. Naturally there were some of the training camp graduates who had been greatly influenced by these unhappy class references and in their conduct and attitude of mind seemed for a time at least to be looking for trouble.

The foregoing circumstances taken in connection with the fact that many of the non-commissioned officers of the division believed that the presence of the reserve officers indicated a block in promotion for them will make clear to the reader that the situation was one which gave promise of unpleasantness. As a matter of fact, several of the reserve officers had made complaint that they were not properly received and treated by the officers of the units to which they were assigned. The Camp Commander personally interviewed the reserve officers and otherwise investigated the subject of their relations with the officers of the division. The great majority of the reserve officers testified that their treatment was all that could be desired. A few only were dissatisfied; all were gradually absorbed, many of them by our own division. Soon any distinction between one class of officer and another disappeared in the intense and universal loyalty which all the officers and men manifested for their division.

Soldiers are notoriously hungry and notoriously willing to put almost anything into their stomachs between meals. So much success resulted on the border from the control of places which sold cakes, fruit and soda, that promptly upon the arrival of Division Headquarters at Camp Wadsworth a regulation was prescribed which prohibited the establishment of any places where eatables or drinkables of any kind were sold, within 500 yards of each camp. In some instances this zone extended outside the reservation and included private property. The only method of enforcing



Commanding General's office, quarters and aide's office. Front view, Camp Wadsworth



102d Engineers repairing the "Snake Road"

compliance so far as private property was concerned, was to place guards over any stands to be erected thereon and prevent soldiers patronizing them. As the threat to do this accompanied the order which was issued and this was done before private property had been so occupied, property owners recognized the inevitable and did not lease their property for such purposes. The rule was at all times rigidly enforced and had not only a beneficial effect upon the health of the command, but enabled the camp to present an appearance free from the litter which abounds in the vicinity of hucksters' stands.

Soon after the arrival of the division at Camp Wadsworth, it became apparent that the attitude of the people of Spartanburg was most friendly and accordingly a General Order was issued to the troops as follows:

"The civilian inhabitants of this section of the country have a national reputation for open-handed hospitality. They have shown in every way possible a sincere and patriotic desire to do everything in their power to aid the country and the army. It is, therefore, enjoined upon every member of this command to do his utmost to show his appreciation of this desire and to maintain cordial and harmonious relations with all civilians."

The soldiers of the division conducted themselves at all times in harmony with the provisions of this order.

Shortly after our arrival the newly organized battalion of two companies of Military Police, under Major T. Harry Shanton and Captains Cornelius W. Wickersham and William T. Starr, arrived and established their headquarters in the old Magnolia Street school building in the town of Spartanburg. The members of this remarkably efficient force were picked with great care, not only for their physical excellence, but as much for their moral dependability. It is interesting to note that throughout the entire service of the division this Military Police command, although enforcing all rules and regulations, maintained at the same time the respect and high regard of the division as a whole.

CHAPTER VI

GENERAL O'RYAN'S TOUR OF OBSERVATION WITH THE BRITISH AND FRENCH ARMIES IN 1917

ON September 18th, while at Camp Wadsworth, the Division Commander received a telegram from the War Department directing him, his Chief of Staff, Colonel H. H. Bandholtz, one aide and two enlisted men, to proceed to the port of embarkation at Hoboken, New Jersey, prepared for a protracted tour of hard field service abroad. The aide selected was First Lieutenant Charles P. Franchot and the enlisted men Sergeant Thomas S. Johnson and Corporal Albert A. Breunig of the Division Headquarters Troop.

The party immediately left Camp Wadsworth and arriving at Hoboken, New Jersey, sailed on the U. S. Army Transport *Antilles* on September 22d. The transport was one of a convoy of five ships escorted by the cruiser *San Diego* and three destroyers.

Without sighting submarines en route, although there were some false alarms, the convoy safely arrived at St. Nazaire, France, on Sunday evening, October 7th. The *Antilles* was a small American coast steamer and hardly fit for the rough voyage across the Atlantic. She was torpedoed and sunk on the return trip.

The day following the arrival at St. Nazaire the party left for Paris and reported to the Commanding General of that district for orders. There were in the party five other division commanders with similar staff groups accompanying them.

On Tuesday, October 9th, the entire party left Paris in motor cars and after stopping at Amiens for lunch, arrived at Chateau Lovi, near Poperinghe in Belgium, the headquarters of General Sir H. de la P. Gough, Commander of the Fifth British Army. This army at that time was engaged in fighting its way toward Paschendaele. The last part of the trip to the army headquarters was made over roads choked with troops, transport and ambulances. Large groups of German prisoners were also observed as they were marched toward the rear.

Immediately after arrival of the party at the Fifth Army Headquarters they were presented to General Gough, who, in most informal and friendly manner, invited the Division Commanders and Chiefs of Staff to attend an army conference about to be held between the Army Commander and officers of his staff, and the Corps Commanders of the Army. This invitation was of course accepted, and the party was present at a most interesting and profitable discussion of the operations of the day and the proposals affecting a continuance of operations on the day following.

At the conclusion of the conference the several American divisional groups were allocated to British divisions. The 27th Division Commander

and party were assigned to the 29th British Division, commanded by Major General Sir H. De B. De Lisle, K. C. B., D. S. O., with headquarters at Elverdinghe, north of Ypres. The 27th Division party left immediately after the conference for the new station and arrived the same night at Division Headquarters of the 29th British Division, which was located in a half-demolished chateau, reinforced and protected by great heaps of sandbags. In the grounds about the chateau were located heavy British batteries which fired throughout the night. Among these was an immense naval gun, which fired about once an hour, the concussion of each explosion rocking the building and shattering fragments of glass where they still existed in some of the window sashes.

At 1:30 in the morning all were awakened by heavy detonations accompanied by blinding flashes of white light. These were caused by enemy aviators, who dropped a number of bombs about the headquarters in an effort to locate the big gun. None of the occupants of the building, however, were injured.

Early the next morning the 29th Division continued its attack behind a rolling barrage and General O'Ryan and Colonel Bandholtz accompanied General De Lisle on a tour of observation toward the front of his division, at that time heavily engaged. The trip was made on foot and over ground deep with mud and heavily pitted with shell craters made by the British in previous attacks. The party passed through supporting troops and reached the advanced dressing station without injury, although it was necessary to pass through some heavy shelling. The dressing station visited was located in the remains of a German pill-box on a perfectly flat field. Dead and dying soldiers were lying about, while a large number of wounded, both British and German, were being accumulated and given attention by a small group of very much fatigued officers and men of the Royal Army Medical Corps. The observations made throughout this day were most profitable to the 27th Division party.

That night the 29th Division was relieved by the 17th British Division, the latter commanded by Major General P. R. Robertson, C. B., C. M. G., the change being effected without particular incident. The following morning the attack was continued by the 17th Division, while observations of British battle methods were continued with that division. After four days of very hard and active service with these two British divisions, the 27th Division party was ordered to proceed to the headquarters of the 2d British Army at Ecoivre. There the party was assigned to the 31st British Division, commanded by Major General R. Wanless O'Gowan, C. B. The sector of the 2d Army was in the vicinity of Arras. The sector of the 31st Division, which was in the line, lay directly east of Vimy Ridge, which had been captured by the Canadians earlier the same summer. Four days were spent with the 31st Division in studying British methods of trench warfare. During that period the 31st Division delivered a cloud gas attack against the enemy, and one raid was made by the enemy. Careful inspections were made of the British light and heavy batteries, their emplacements and methods of fire, camouflage, methods of relief of troops,

gas defense, liaison, ammunition supply, sanitation, shelter, etc., while visits were made and methods studied at ration issue sheds, horse lines, divisional schools, bath houses and recreation centers. On October 17th a demonstration was given of the efficiency of a new type of British trench mortar in the destruction of wire entanglements.

While with the 31st British Division the 27th Division party had a narrow escape. While proceeding through a long approach trench toward the front line, attention was attracted by the sight of a rather low flying enemy airplane which was being fired upon by Lewis guns from the trenches about. The party consisted of Major General O'Gowan, British Division Commander; Brigadier General Wilson, Division Artillery Commander; Colonel Bandholtz, Lieutenant Franchot and the writer. In order better to observe the enemy plane, the party stopped in the trench at a point about 1,000 yards from the front line, and standing in column formation, gazed with interest at the evolutions of the enemy aviator, who finally passed directly overhead and disappeared in the direction of his own lines. The party continued its walk toward the front line when, about three minutes later, the threatening scream of a Howitzer shell was heard approaching. The entire party crouched against the right wall of the trench, the shell falling a few yards to the right and exploding, throwing a rain of dirt into the trench. A few seconds later a second shell arrived and burst with a terrific concussion close to the edge of the trench, covering the party with earth. The force of this concussion knocked Lieutenant Franchot down. The party then ran rapidly toward the front, while the enemy battery continued to drop six or eight more shells along the trench where the party had been walking. When near the front trench the Germans began a minnenwerfer bombardment of the front line in that sector, the effect of which was to drive the party into such shelters as were available until the bombardment was over. Trench warfare in that sector during the period of the visit of the 27th Division party consisted of a more or less continuous performance of such experiences. Every day brought its toll of casualties, not material so far as the losses of any one day were concerned, but totaling at the end of each month a considerable number of men killed and wounded.

The 31st Division was known as the York and Lancashire Division. In a recent visit to France the writer, while in the British area, saw many graves of Lancashire soldiers, and found that upon the cross of each there had been placed a circular disc with the words, "They Win or Die Who Wear the Rose of Lancaster."

After relief from service with the 31st British Division, the 27th Division party spent two days with Lieutenant General Sir F. W. N. McCracken, K. C. B., D. S. O., commanding the 13th British Corps, with headquarters in the Chateau of Comtesse d'Escalaibes at Chateau Ecoivres and there studied corps organization and functions and visited corps schools, the corps artillery headquarters and the corps photographic plant.

The American officers constituting the 27th Division group and officers of other American divisions with whom views were exchanged, all seemed

to be in agreement concerning the British army. In the first place, it was found that all of them had been cordially received by the British. In a way this attitude was natural, in view of the imperative need for American help. Nevertheless, aside from this, all the officers had been made to feel that there existed among the mass of the British officers a genuine desire to cultivate the friendship of Americans. Those who had opportunity to serve with the fighting elements of the British divisions were impressed with the courage and steadfastness of British troops, and with their marked submissiveness to discipline and to the rigorous and, one can truly add, cruel demands of war. All were impressed with the fact that war had become to the British army, as a result of three years of campaigning, a matter of daily routine; so much so, that their attitude in relation to tragic events seemed to us to be almost casual. All were impressed, too, with the gallant manner in which the British had sustained huge losses since the beginning of the war, and we could not withhold our admiration for their quiet and confident determination in relation to the outcome, a determination which did not seem to be affected by adversity or temporary non-success.

The British soldiers bore their sufferings when wounded without emotion or complaint, although numbers of British officers assured us that the average Tommy found much satisfaction in cursing the Hun, the conditions under which he had to live, and the war generally. Probably this comment applies to all soldiers in campaign. However that may be, the writer had opportunity to witness the conduct of slightly wounded, badly wounded and dying British soldiers of the 29th Division during the attack of October, 1917, near Langemarck, Belgium. On that occasion the writer was with the Commanding General of the 29th Division at a forward dressing station already referred to, during the progress of the attack. This dressing station was established in a German pill-box, which had been captured shortly before and which stood in a flat sea of mud. The only shelter against machine-gun bullets and heavier fire was found by remaining on the lee side of the small building. In this locality were gathered perhaps thirty badly wounded soldiers, several of them Germans. Half a dozen dead were also there. The morning was misty, rainy and cold. The surgeons were operating as best they could within the pill-box. We watched the work within for a few minutes, then withdrew to the outside, where we remained for an hour watching the progress of the attack. Many walking wounded approached the place, but were turned away and directed to continue their movement to the post for walking wounded, considerably further to the rear. Some of these walking wounded had been able to drag themselves to the point where we were, only because of the sustaining hope that this dressing station would mark the end of their great effort. It was affecting to note the reaction of such men when they were ordered to continue on to the rear. Some of them dropped to the ground to rest, looked helplessly at their bleeding wounds and then almost hopelessly over the shell-swept fields that lay between them and their goal. But not once was any plea heard from them, nor any criticism made of the

treatment accorded them. Those who delayed because of exhaustion or the character of their wounds were admonished that they probably would be hit again if they remained where they were and that the sooner they got through to the rear the better for them. Then and ever afterward such cases seemed particularly appealing. The gallant men who have gone forward and who have been wounded while courageously performing their battle functions would seem to be entitled on their way to the rear to immunity from the continued fire of the enemy. That, of course, cannot be, and so it frequently happened in the war that such men, while on their way to the rear, sometimes walking and sometimes carried on litters, were wounded a second and even a third time, while some were killed. In our own division we had two extraordinary cases illustrating the vagaries of chance in this connection. In the Hindenburg Line battle a shell struck a litter being carried by two German prisoners and upon which was one of our own men, badly wounded. The shell, without exploding, cut the litter in two and instantly killed the patient, leaving the two prisoners unharmed. The other case was that of a badly wounded soldier of one of our infantry regiments at St. Souplet, who was turned over to four German prisoners, who were directed to carry him in. The soldier made some protest against being carried by four prisoners without a guard, stating that he had no confidence in them. The prisoners were directed to proceed, but after going some distance a shell struck on the road and without injuring the patient, killed or badly wounded all four of the carriers, the legs and arms of some of them being torn off. When another group which had been following them came up they found the doughboy lying on the ground alongside his litter, cursing the worthlessness of the German prisoners and justifying his original opinion of their unreliability as litter bearers.

The 27th Division party was greatly impressed with the thoroughness of British preparation for battle in other fields besides actual fighting. For example, in the attack of the 29th Division referred to, large numbers of troops were engaged in carrying duck boards forward into the area over which the division was advancing. Duck boards are pieces of studding laid parallel and about ten inches apart upon which narrow strips of board are nailed for the purpose of providing a walk in places where men would otherwise sink deep in the mud. These labor groups under continued and harassing shell fire were laying three of these duck-board walks in the divisional sector straight out to the front over the shell-pitted and boggy fields. These duck-board walks made much easier the movement of carrying parties going forward with their heavy loads of ammunition and rations, the bringing in of wounded, and the coming in of messengers and others whose duties required them to return to the rear. At the same time that these duck boards were being laid, highways leading to the front were being repaired by other groups to connect up with the forward area. What interested us particularly in relation to this work of road repair was the substantial character of the work being done and the thoroughness of its execution. Concrete mixers and self-dumping wagons drawing cement and crushed stone from near-by demolished buildings were

working at top speed. While we were passing one of these groups going forward on the occasion referred to, we came under rather heavy shelling, and as there was no target in the immediate vicinity, other than the group engaged in laying the concrete, it seemed apparent that in spite of the mist, the party had come under enemy observation and that it constituted the target for the enemy artillery fire. Accordingly, the men engaged in the work were directed to withdraw laterally, leaving the machinery in the road. They did so slowly and to a distance of not more than 300 yards, when they squatted in the mud and watched the enemy's apparent effort to destroy their road equipment. We did not stop to see the result, but when we returned that evening the concrete road had been pushed well on in advance of the point referred to, and had been covered with loose boards throughout its length for the protection of the cement. In two or three places shells had struck and created craters in the newly made roadway, and at these places groups of men were engaged in filling in the craters and topping them off with a concrete surface.

Simultaneously with these efforts for the construction of duck-board walks and good motor truck highways, other large parties were engaged in pushing forward a narrow gauge railway, so as to advance the railhead for this type of road as far forward as possible. These groups worked with great courage under harassing shell fire. The result of work of this character was that the British army moved with deliberation, but fully prepared, so far as foresight indicated, to hold and make good its gains.

American officers in their early relations with the British were for a time misled by the casual manners of British officers. The latter seldom, if ever, employed technical military terms in conversation, formal or informal. American officers, on the contrary, naturally and habitually talked the technical language of the military profession. If, for example, information were lacking concerning the character and composition of an opposing force, and the probable intentions of such force, an American officer would suggest the desirability of a "reconnaissance in force." On the other hand, the average British officer having the same thing in mind would say: "I think we should push in and have a look."

If casualties were extremely heavy in a particular part of the line, the average American officer would report: "Heavy casualties here." The British officer would report: "Things here are a bit fruity."

If front line troops were fatigued by nervous strain and loss of sleep, and fearing attack, began to fire nervously and send up rockets unnecessarily, the American officer would report: "Front line troops fearing attack, firing unnecessarily." The British officer would report: "Lads in front have the wind up, making a deuce of a racket."

If a British command were badly defeated and driven back with heavy losses, the average British officer, referring to the matter, would say: "The Nth Division were jolly well checked, and, as a matter of fact, were knocked about a bit." On the other hand, the enthusiasm of the average British officer in relation to his successes was no greater than his chagrin when defeated. The accomplishment of a British division brilliantly successful

in attack was usually commented upon in some such language as this: "Well, they didn't do badly at all."

During this trip of observation and later after the 27th Division arrived in France, there were many occasions when our officers and British officers messed together. These occasions gave opportunity for observing the mannerisms, customs, habits and points of view of the numerous classes and types of officers of the British army. Seldom was there an occasion at a British mess when there were not present Scotch, Irish and Welsh officers, as well as English. Frequently, also, there were attached Colonial officers, Canadians and Australians more particularly. It was rather noticeable that the natural and proper pride of men in their homeland, their own people and the military prowess of their units prompted most of them to come vehemently to the defense of their own against good-natured criticism by others of the party. Sometimes the criticism was made for the purpose of getting a particular officer "started," and was not seriously made or with any justification. At other times a discussion would be inaugurated, based upon criticism of an organization, an individual or a race, apparently for the mere enjoyment to be derived from the discussion. On these occasions it was to be observed that the newer peoples such as Americans, Australians and Canadians were, as a rule, more sensitive to criticism and indicated a greater zeal in coming to the defense of their people, their methods, customs and habits than was the case with representatives of the older nations. This attitude to some extent seemed to apply also to the Scotch and Irish, perhaps more particularly to the latter. Many officers in these groups seemed to feel they had a mission to undertake a defense against any criticism, no matter what its purpose and irrespective of its merits. English officers seemed, as a rule, to be less disturbed by bantering and criticism than most other classes. Whether their lack of zeal in the defense was by reason of an appreciation of the uselessness of such arguments is not known. Perhaps they were hardened against criticism. But it was noticeable that the average English officer seldom defended criticisms made of England, its people or their customs and habits. Not infrequently an English officer, after some thought, would agree with the justice of some criticism. Facts seemed to disturb the English less than they disturbed others on these occasions. On the other hand, the average English officer seemed to many American eyes to be rather self-sufficient. This comment applied more to regimental officers than to those of higher grades. In any discussion concerning the merits of a particular kind of organization, of methods of warfare or of supply and replacement, the final and most convincing argument by the average English officer seemed to be that what he advocated was the rule in the British army. But the outstanding feature of all these associations and the discussions which grew out of them was the good will and harmony which prevailed among the great and diversified body of officers who were working together in furtherance of their common cause.

Another characteristic of British officers was their almost universal ability to visualize official criticism. For a people supposed to be un-

imaginative, this characteristic always seemed to us quite remarkable. For example, a British colonel, being dissatisfied with the appearance of one of his companies, would send for the company commander and address him somewhat as follows:

"Good morning, Jones, I wanted to have a talk with you about B Company. Look here, I don't think your lads looked quite right this morning. It seemed to me—well, I mean to say, they weren't quite up to the standard of this battalion, were they—buttons, boots and all that sort of thing—what? I wish you'd mention it to your platoon commanders."

The import of this apparently casual criticism and what can hardly be called more than comment cannot be understood without considering the effect produced upon the company commander. Under such criticism the British officer would return to his company much chagrined and not a little flustered. Usually he would summon his subaltern officers and address them somewhat as follows:

"Look here—I have had a perfectly dreadful morning. I was hauled up before the C. O., who gave me a hell of a telling-off and said the company was filthy."

Having concluded its service with the British, the 27th Division party returned to Paris and, after two days' rest, left for the French front in company with other American division commanders and their staffs. The party left Paris by motor on October 21, 1917, and went first to the palace at Compiegne, where they were presented to General Petain, then Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies. After a short stop at Compiegne the party continued on and arrived at Soissons the same evening. Soissons at that time was uninhabited except by the caretakers of the better class mansions and by a small number of civilians whose duties in connection with the army kept them there. Officers and enlisted men of the French army were, of course, to a small extent, billeted in the town. Daily the city was subjected to long-range harassing fire and it was depressing to see the fine buildings of this city daily suffering the results of that fire. The day following our arrival at Soissons the 27th Division party was assigned to the 38th French Division, commanded by General G. De Salins. The 38th Division was composed of Algerian troops and had made a famous reputation in the French army. About this time Captain Baron de Kergorlay of the French army reported to the 27th Division party as liaison officer. We were confidentially informed that within a few days the French would commence an offensive which had been in preparation for several months, having for its object the taking of the German position along the Chemin des Dames north of the River Aisne. The Headquarters of the 38th Division were located in an extensive system of dugouts, built into the side of a hill near the destroyed village of Vailly, north of the town of Couvrelle. The Division Commander, General de Salins, explained to the 27th Division party in detail the plans for the attack and the mission of his particular division. To his division had been assigned the task of capturing the German strongpoint, consisting of the former French fortress de Mal Maison. Two Japanese officers had

also been assigned as observers with this division. The attack was to be accompanied by a large number of small French tanks. The French had prepared carefully concealed positions for a considerable number of their batteries immediately behind their own front line. The plan for the attack involved the advance of the infantry behind a rolling barrage to a first objective line. After a short rest the advance was to continue to a second objective line, which was about the limit of the range of the supporting artillery. After another short rest, the attack was to continue, this time, however, supported by a rolling barrage fired by the guns which had been secretly placed far forward for that purpose. It was believed that this final advance would carry the French infantry into and beyond the German gun positions. The 27th Division party spent two days before the attack getting acquainted with the preparations for the offensive, inspecting the tanks, the artillery and troops to be engaged. For several days, more than 600 75 mm. guns, 432 Howitzers, 120 heavy guns of various caliber, 50 large naval guns and 260 trench mortars had been firing continuously on the German positions on a front of six and two-thirds miles. Early on the morning of October 22d the 27th Division party went forward to a high hill overlooking the coming battle-field. This hill was occupied by the old fortress known as Fort de Conde. It was still dark when we arrived. The noise of the artillery was continuous and in every direction could be seen the punctuating flashes of the guns as they were discharged. At zero hour the barrage fell and the infantry went forward. At times the infantry could be seen, but more often visibility was obscured by the smoke and fumes of the barrage which gradually enveloped the field. Soon the walking wounded began to pass as they went to the rear. Information received was that all was going well in the attack. After an hour or two at this station the 27th Division party left for the evacuation hospital to observe the manner in which the wounded were handled. En route to the hospital, which was near Couvrelle, we passed large numbers of German prisoners going to the rear. At the hospital at Couvrelle every modern appliance and convenience seemed to be provided for the efficient care of the wounded. This French offensive of 1917, known as the Battle of the Chemin des Dames, was a brilliant success. More than 12,500 prisoners were captured. All the enemy positions were taken, as well as 350 pieces of artillery.

The same day we returned to Soissons and there witnessed the interrogation of a large number of German officer prisoners. Many of these spoke English indifferently, while some of them spoke that language very fluently. The writer had opportunity to talk freely to some of these German officers. These all expressed the same views in relation to the participation of America in the war. They estimated the number of American troops in France to be 50,000, which, if the estimate related to combatant troops at that time, was not far wrong. They all claimed that the U-boats would make a large American army in France an impossibility. Most of them were quite sure that German-Americans in the United States would so conduct themselves as to make it necessary for the United States Govern-

ment to maintain most of its army in the United States. This latter opinion was expressed most confidently to the writer by a very intelligent and apparently well-educated German officer. He was thereupon asked whether he would like to talk to a German-American then and there. With some surprise, he said he would, whereupon the orderly to the 27th Division Commander, Sergeant Major Albert A. Breunig, was called into the factory building, where the prisoners were gathered, and directed to answer any questions the German officer might see fit to ask him. The writer told the German officer that the Sergeant was a German-American, and like most other German-Americans of military age, was in the American Army. He was told that he might talk freely in German with this soldier. After some hesitation and with evident surprise, he asked the Sergeant in German his name, grade and organization. This information was promptly given in German. While asking this question, the German Major was studying the soldier. The latter presented a very military appearance, but had received no advance information of the fact that he was to be questioned in this manner. The German Major then asked him where he was born. He replied, "In New York City." He then asked him where his father was born. The Sergeant mentioned a town in Germany. He then asked him where his mother was born and he replied, "In New York City," but immediately added that her parents were born in Germany. Having received these answers, which appeared to make a deep impression upon the German officer, he asked with some show of emotion: "Then why are you in the American army?" The soldier was equally surprised to be asked such a question and replied simply, "I am here to fight the Germans." The soldier was then excused and the German Major turned to the writer and said: "My God, I cannot understand it."

The further feelings of this officer may be imagined when he was assured that a very considerable percentage of the writer's division was made up of men of German blood and that there were no more dependable soldiers in the American army than this class.

Following the Battle of the Chemin des Dames, the 27th Division party inspected the aviation camp at Maison Neuve and the following day proceeded by motor to Chalons to inspect the school work of the French Army at that place. There were seen large numbers of the nineteen-year-old class receiving their military training. The training was being carried out with great thoroughness and vigor. A visit was also made to the headquarters of the French army at Maiste, where opportunity was had to discuss with appropriate officers many questions affecting the recent offensive.

It is interesting to compare the impressions gained of the French officers and men with those received while with the British. The one outstanding fact concerning the French soldier was his strong physique. In America it was a popular idea that the average Frenchman was a slender, agile man, quite easily excited. While with the French army we did not see a French officer or soldier excited, either in battle or out of it. There was one exception in the person of a French Poilu who was intoxicated.

He is mentioned because he was the only French soldier our party saw intoxicated during this visit to France. The French soldiers were short in stature. They seemed, on the average, older than the "Tommies," and certainly the mass of them were broader of shoulder, deeper of chest and thicker of limb than the average British soldier. While the British army kept their buttons polished, boots shined and their faces shaved, the French soldiers apparently gave little attention to these niceties of military appearance. They impressed the writer not as soldiers who were waging a war, but as serious-minded and tired men, who were protecting their homes and their families from the threatened ravages of the enemy.

In the British area it was a common sight to see battalions of the Guards division of the British army marching in step even on road marches. In the French army the picture was quite different. The French soldiers almost always wore their overcoats with the skirts buttoned up. The horizon blue of the uniform appeared in many shades and frequently bore evidences of hard usage. The French steel casque was usually seen well back on the head and below this appeared the stout, strong, bronzed, serious face of the French soldier, with its intelligent dark eyes and black moustache. A pipe in the mouth, a mass of equipment piled high on his back, an exceedingly long rifle with an exceedingly long bayonet slung from the shoulder, completes the picture of the individual French infantryman. On the march they moved along, every man for himself so far as the cadence of step was concerned, but without straggling. They presented a picture of excellence of health, carelessness of attire, confidence and determination in their movements, great intelligence and seriousness of purpose.

A French regiment was usually followed by its transport. To the American eye the transport was very nondescript. Wagons of various types were to be found in the column. The horses were not often well groomed and many of them were hardly serviceable. The harness, too, was frequently observed to be in poor condition, having been augmented by ropes and wire. In the British army, on the other hand, the transport might serve as a model for any army. No army equaled the British in the condition of its animals, harness and vehicles. Apparently they know more about the upkeep of horses than any other people.

The French soldier seemed to be a generous captor in his relations with German prisoners. In the Battle of the Chemin des Dames large numbers of German prisoners frequently went to the rear in charge of an almost negligible number of French soldiers, some of them wounded. In almost every instance the French soldier guards carried their rifles slung over their shoulders, in which position, of course, they could not be prepared to use them with great promptness. It was not uncommon to see a French soldier give a cigarette to a German prisoner.

Another aspect of the French army which differed materially from the British was the relation between officers and enlisted men. While going forward on one occasion near Soissons we found a narrow road blocked by a French infantry regiment and a transport column seeking to pass it

in the same direction. Taking advantage of the short delay, we looked over the French troops while the French liaison officer with us engaged a French lieutenant in conversation. While this conversation was going on, one of the French soldiers stepped from the column with an unlighted cigarette in his hand and approached politely within a yard or so of his lieutenant, where he waited until the conversation was terminated. Thereupon the French officer looked inquiringly at the soldier and the soldier asked him if he might secure a light from the officer's cigarette. "Certainement, avec plaisir," replied the lieutenant as he handed his cigarette to the soldier, who, in the presence of the company, lit his own cigarette from that of the officer and thereupon returned it with a very polite bow to the lieutenant, who nodded pleasantly to the soldier while the latter returned to the ranks. The incident apparently aroused no interest among the French soldiers, who took it all as a matter of course. Such a thing in the British army would have been unthinkable. Even in the American army, had such an incident occurred, the life of the soldier for the following few days would have been made miserable by his comrades, who probably would have addressed the soldier as "Captain" or "Lieutenant." In the American army public opinion among enlisted men of most commands will not tolerate actions on the part of individual soldiers which are departures in matters of this kind from the action of the mass.

The French officers impressed us as being fast and accurate thinkers. They, too, like the British, under a very attractive garment of politeness, held a high regard for their own methods and military doctrines, which, like those of the British, were entitled to great respect, because supported by four years of continuous experience in war. While with the French we were accorded every courtesy and consideration, and from what we saw and learned could not withhold our admiration for their fortitude and the gallantry which enabled them to bear up so bravely under the great losses which had been inflicted upon them. In both the British and French armies we found every evidence of a sincere appreciation by each army of the merits of the other. This was true at least among the officers.

Following our period of service with the French army, all the American officers went to the American General Headquarters at Chaumont, where two days were spent with officers discussing staff organization of the American General Headquarters. American schools were also visited, and shortly thereafter the 27th Division party was ordered to Bordeaux for transportation back to the United States. The party reached New York November 26, 1917.

The opportunities afforded by this service with the British and French armies, including the examination of the facilities in France for the training of divisions behind the lines, were obviously most valuable, not only to the officers who constituted the party, but indirectly to the division they represented.

It became clear that training could proceed much more rapidly and effectively in South Carolina than could be the case in France, particularly during the winter season. Concentrated as the division was in the Ameri-

can camp, it was available without delay for any kind of maneuver exercises. Owing to the sparsely settled condition of much of the country in the vicinity of Camp Wadsworth, there was ample maneuver field available, and target practice furnished no difficult problem. In France, however, every division behind the lines occupied a billeting area, which included a score of towns, villages and hamlets, in many cases widely separated. The average billeting area was ten or fifteen miles in length and five to seven miles in width. To concentrate the division under such conditions would normally require a day's march before a field exercise could begin. During the bleak and long winter season in France it was not desirable to attempt to bivouac troops under training in the open fields. It was almost impossible in France to secure adequate target ranges. Most of the ranges in the British area were from 50 to 200 yards in length, while those at Camp Wadsworth were complete and satisfactory.

The trip abroad also accentuated the fact that the war would continue for a considerable period of time, and that there was very much to be learned by American troops in relation to the methods best adapted to apply in combat the sound principles of our own Field Service Regulations.

As a result of our observations and experiences abroad, the subjects of correct march discipline, unfailing ammunition and ration supply, physical endurance and determination of all ranks, thorough preparation for battle and a clear understanding by all of combat orders, took on a new importance. As will be seen in the next chapter, the experience abroad affected materially the continued training of the division after the return of the Division Commander and his party to Camp Wadsworth.

CHAPTER VII

REORGANIZATION OF DIVISION

IT will be remembered that prior to the official declaration of war on April 6, 1917, certain regiments of the National Guard had been called into the active federal service by Presidential proclamation for the purpose of guarding public utilities. As it had been determined to compose the tactical division of the same units that had constituted it during the period of the Mexican border service, it was the desire of the Division Commander to secure, as soon as practicable after the declaration of war, the release from such service of the regiments to be designated as part of the tactical division. This was gradually accomplished, and so the first of the General Orders of the 27th Division, already referred to in Chapter IV, composed the divisional infantry of the same regiments that had served on the border. Accordingly this order organized the 7th, 12th and 69th Infantry Regiments in the 1st Brigade; the 1st, 23d and 71st Regiments in the 2d Brigade; the 2d and 3d and 74th Regiments in the 3d Brigade. At the time this order was issued the new tables of organization prescribing four infantry regiments to the tactical division had not yet been published.

Prior to the departure from New York the 69th Infantry had been detached from the division and assigned to the newly organized 42d or "Rainbow" Division. At the time of this assignment, and in order to bring the regiment to war strength, it was directed by the War Department that 346 men from each of the other regiments stationed in New York City should be transferred to the 69th. This detachment of men from one regiment to another on the eve of war activity was a great shock to all the regiments concerned. It constituted a severe blow to their morale. Each of these regiments had its own traditions. In each regiment the men were led to believe that their regiment was the best. Actually, and by tradition as well, the 69th Infantry was an Irish or Irish-American regiment. This regiment could have been recruited to the new war strength within a week's time after they were designated for early overseas service. It could, furthermore, have been recruited by men whose traditions were of the same character as the men already in the regiment, and who for that reason would fight all the more determinedly. This would have avoided the transfer to it of men from the other regiments. None of the other regiments wished to give up any men for transfer to the 69th. To take a man away from his own regiment and place him in another is like taking a child away from its own home and placing it in the home of some other family. But so high was the standard of discipline and so strong the spirit for what was said to be the common good that these transfers were in fact made with a minimum of friction. Detachments were formed of men to be trans-

ferred and with due ceremony they were marched to the armory of the 69th Infantry and there turned over to the commanding officer of that regiment, Colonel Charles D. Hine, who left nothing undone to reconcile the newcomers to their new environment. The 69th Infantry was, therefore, temporarily out of the division. It served throughout the war with the 42d Division and added new glory to the already magnificent war record and traditions of the old regiment. Upon the detachment of the 69th Infantry from the 27th Division the 14th Infantry was assigned to the 1st Brigade in its place.

General Orders No. 5 of the 27th Division, issued from the Municipal Building, New York City, under date of August 27, 1917, directed the movement of the division from New York to Spartanburg, South Carolina. Almost as soon as the division had arrived at Spartanburg it was rumored that the new infantry divisional organization would provide for but four regiments of infantry. It can well be understood what this meant in a division of nine regiments of infantry, each regiment with its own pride of organization and record of service.

About the middle of September the War Department sent alienists to the various camps for the purpose of testing the personnel of each division in relation to mentality and nervous durability. Every man was examined by officers expert in nervous diseases and all peculiarities were carefully noted. All those who seemed likely to break down under the nervous strain of battle were checked for transfer to some character of work not involving battle strain. These examinations, of course, developed the presence of a few men suffering from mental disorders of a character necessitating their discharge. It is worthy to note, however, that the officers who came to Camp Wadsworth to make these examinations stated after their work was done that the men of the 27th Division were the finest body of men they had seen at any of the camps.

The Division Commander had determined tentatively in his own mind the four infantry regiments which should constitute the division as reorganized. He required to be prepared by each of the several staff officers intimately familiar with the record and personnel of all the regiments, a statement of recommendations of regiments to be chosen, given in the order of their merit. The result was practical unanimity concerning three of the four regiments to be chosen. There was some difference of opinion concerning the fourth regiment. The four selected were the 2d, 3d, 7th and 23d, and these served in the war as the 105th, 108th, 107th and 106th Infantry Regiments, respectively.

It was realized that the coming reorganization would result in an excess of officers in the higher grades, thus making necessary a selection of officers to serve in the regiments as reorganized. This subject was very carefully and exhaustively considered, with the result that when the reorganization was directed by the War Department to be made it was done pursuant to General Orders No. 9, Headquarters, 27th Division, under date of October 1, 1917. This order was executed with a minimum of discontent and without any outside interference whatever. The officers affected



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General view of the camp of the 107th Infantry at Camp Wadsworth, Spartanburg, South Carolina

favorably and unfavorably realized that the reorganization was made necessary by the experience abroad and they knew that the selections, whether or not acceptable in the case of particular officers, were nevertheless the result of sincere conviction that they were in the best interest of the service. The selections were not made on the theory that the best officers would all go with the tactical division. Numbers of officers were selected to remain with the depot units, by reason of their special experience or capacity in school and training work. Others were retained for other reasons in the interest of the service.

In view of the trouble experienced by the War Department in relation to similar reorganization at other camps, it is a source of pride to be able to record that the War Department received no protests and heard no criticism on behalf of the 27th Division in relation to its reorganization. Blanket authority was given the Division Commander by the War Department to effect the reorganization of the division, and before it was actually made, the Division Commander publicly assumed responsibility for everything that was to be done.

The command of the four infantry regiments therefore fell to Colonels James M. Andrews, who commanded the 105th Infantry, with Morris N. Liebman as Lieutenant Colonel; Frank H. Norton, the 106th Infantry, with John B. Tuck as Lieutenant Colonel; Willard C. Fisk, the 107th Infantry, with James M. Hutchinson as Lieutenant Colonel, and Edgar S. Jennings, the 108th Infantry, with William A. Taylor as Lieutenant Colonel.

The assignment of Majors gave to the 105th Infantry two of its own Majors, Everett E. Pateman and Jesse Scott Button, and added Major Sidney G. DeKay, transferred from the 12th Infantry. The 23d Infantry, when it became the 106th Infantry, did not retain any of its Majors and gained by transfer Majors Walter A. Delamater from the 71st Infantry, Gabriel G. Hollander from the 14th and Harry S. Hildreth from the 12th. The 7th Regiment, when it became the 107th, retained Majors Robert Mazet and Nicholas Engel and received by transfer from the 1st Infantry Major Thomas M. Sherman. The old 3d Infantry as the 108th retained all three of its Majors, namely, Frederick S. Couchman, William A. Turnbull and Otto I. Chorman.

As illustrating the demands of the military service in relation to the use of the officers in fields taking them away from their organization, it is interesting to note how few of the field officers originally assigned to the infantry regiments of the division, remained with their units throughout. In the 105th Infantry Colonel Andrews served throughout. Lieutenant Colonel Liebmann was killed in action in Flanders, Major Pateman was detailed to the Army School of the Line at Langres, France, and after graduation therefrom was assigned to the Motor Transport Corps. Major Button served with the regiment until transferred to the 106th Infantry. Major DeKay, ill for a time with pneumonia, rejoined the division in August and served with the 106th Infantry until detailed to the General Staff College at Langres, from which he graduated. After graduation he was assigned as Assistant G-3 of the division. In the 106th Infantry Colonel

Norton was discharged for physical disability before the departure of the division for overseas. Lieutenant Colonel Tuck after arrival in France was sent to the Army School of the Line and General Staff College, from which he graduated and was then sent to the 1st Army Headquarters as an acting General Staff Officer. Major Delamater went abroad with the regiment, but like Colonel Tuck was detailed to the Army School of the Line and General Staff College, upon graduation from which he was assigned to the 1st Army Headquarters. Both of these officers won distinction in these later assignments. Major Hollander was transferred to the 2d Pioneer Infantry while the division was at Camp Wadsworth and was replaced by Major Ransom H. Gillet, at one time a Major in the old 2d Infantry, who was a graduate of the Third Officers' Training School at Camp Wadsworth. Major Harry S. Hildreth went overseas with the regiment, participated in some of its engagements and was later transferred to the 7th Regular Division, where he won distinction as a battalion commander in active operations. In the 107th Infantry Colonel Fisk took the regiment overseas, but was forced to retire because of serious illness. Lieutenant Colonel Hutchinson never served with the division, being retained by the War Department on special duty. Major Engel was promoted to be Lieutenant Colonel in his place. Captain Roland Tompkins was promoted to fill the vacancy. Major Mazet went overseas with the regiment, but was later retired for physical disability. Major Sherman went overseas with the regiment and served with it until sent to the Army School of the Line and General Staff College, from which he was graduated with distinction.



Colonel Willard C. Fisk, commanding 107th Infantry

Thereafter he was assigned as Brigade Adjutant of the 54th Brigade, being General Pierce's Chief of Staff during Le Selle River operations. Shortly thereafter he became Lieutenant Colonel of the 107th Infantry. In the 108th Infantry Colonel Jennings, like Colonel Andrews of the 105th Infantry, served with his regiment throughout. Lieutenant Colonel Taylor became Colonel of the 106th Infantry just before leaving Camp Wadsworth for overseas and commanded the regiment during more than half the period of active operations, when he was transferred to other duty, being succeeded by Colonel Franklin W. Ward, Division Adjutant. Of the three Majors Couchman went overseas with the regiment and served with it until October, 1918, when he was assigned to other duty. Major Turnbull went overseas but was later detached to the Army School of the Line and General Staff College, from which he was graduated, returning to the division and serving for a time as Brigade Adjutant of the 54th Brigade. Major Chorman went overseas and served with the regiment until detached for duty as an expert in the chemical warfare service.



Brigadier General James W. Lester, commanding 54th Infantry Brigade

The command of the 54th Brigade went to Brigadier General James W. Lester, who had most successfully commanded a brigade of the division during the Mexican border service, while to the 53d Brigade there was assigned Brigadier General Robert E. L. Michie of the Regular Army.

The other officers assigned to these and other units of the division are mentioned in General Orders No. 9, already referred to and included in the Appendix as Exhibit 13.

Between the date of the reorganization of the division and its departure for France there were many other changes in its officers. One of these was the promotion of Colonel Harry H. Bandholtz to the grade of Brigadier General and his departure on February 9th to Camp McClellan, Anniston, Ala., to take over command of the 58th Brigade, 29th Division. Others will be referred to in the progress of the story of the division.



Rifle range, Camp Wadsworth



The long, long trail. Forced marches of from three to ten days' duration put the boys in trim for the more rigorous marching overseas

The transfer of the enlisted men from the various regiments to those selected to constitute the tactical division left such regiments largely skeletonized. Some of these skeletonized regiments had a fine record of previous service. These were notably the 12th and 14th Infantry regiments, both of which served with great distinction during the Civil War. Colonel Reginald L. Foster, commanding the 12th Infantry, paraded his regiment before sending away the majority of his officers and men to their new units. The men of the 14th, equally loyal to their regiment, were paraded by Colonel James R. Howlett before leaving the regiment for their new assignments. In each regiment so depleted, there was left a nucleus of officers and men to maintain the entity of the unit. For some weeks the policy of the War Department, as it concerned these excess regiments, was not known, but finally orders were received that they were to be filled up by drafted men and organized as pioneer infantry regiments and anti-aircraft machine gun battalions. Under this scheme of reorganization for the excess regiments the 1st Infantry became the 1st Pioneer Infantry, the 10th Infantry the 51st Pioneer Infantry, the 12th the 52d Pioneer Infantry, the 14th the 2d Pioneer Infantry, the 47th the 53d Pioneer Infantry, the 71st the 54th Pioneer Infantry and the 74th the 55th Pioneer Infantry.

The reorganization, it will be noted, hit the 1st New York Cavalry and Squadron A particularly hard. These two fine cavalry commands, possessed of fine traditions and a high morale, were highly trained and efficient cavalry units at full strength. They had a national reputation for efficiency. They had been on the Mexican border during 1916. Indeed, the 1st Cavalry had not returned to New York State until the spring of 1917 and were back but a few weeks when they mobilized for service in the World War. Under the reorganization plan they ceased to be cavalry and became machine gunners. Naturally they were downcast. Their life preparation for cavalry service in war was apparently to be scrapped. The alternative was to remain as cavalry and go to the border to watch the Rio Grande while building hopes for ultimate cavalry service abroad. But these units were too valuable for that. The very qualities which made them such efficient cavalry units were the qualities needed in the machine gun battalions, namely, intelligence, boldness, skill and pride of organization. Colonel Charles I. Debevoise of the 1st Cavalry and Major William R. Wright were therefore told by the Division Commander to back the change by the power of their very great qualities of leadership. This they did in most loyal and successful fashion. The men responded. In each unit there was a mock ceremony and an actual burial of a yellow hat cord, to signify the end of their cavalry service. As to the handsome manner in which these organizations measured up to the requirements of their new service their battle records are abundant proof.

Shortly after the reorganization of the division was under way, the War Department began to make calls upon the Camp Commander for the transfer elsewhere of officers and men who possessed special capacity or experience in particular fields of activity. It was forcibly emphasized by the experience then accruing that modern war cannot be waged by an army

made up of the old-fashioned trigger-puller type of soldier. The army was a complex and vast organism. No man could know all of its parts and complexities. In every field there must be experts in charge and the efforts in all fields must be controlled and coordinated by expert staff work. Very largely is the accomplishment of modern war the result of activities that are normally civilian activities—the maintenance and operation of shipping lines, of railways, repair plants, supply depots, telegraph and telephone lines. Great fleets of motor trucks have to be maintained and operated, animal hospitals established, water supply plants, often on a scale required for an American city, installed, while from almost every field of human endeavor experts are needed to initiate, improvise, apply or develop their specialty in its relation to the requirements of the military situation. The National Guard divisions were veritable treasuries of this skilled personnel, and they had in addition the needed knowledge of military customs, habits and methods, so essential in the application of industrial expertness to the special needs of the military service. Hence followed what became unofficially known as the War Department "raids" on the divisions for this needed personnel. In the case of the 27th Division, due to the extraordinary character of a substantial percentage of its enlisted personnel, some thousands of non-commissioned officers and private soldiers had already secured commissions in the army. The New York National Guard furnished more than 5,000 officers to the American army in the World War. That will give some idea of the strain to which the division had already been subjected. Fortunately the earlier shortages were immediately made up by drawing upon the other New York units at the camp, but the "raids" were so heavy and continuous that soon this source of supply was depleted.

One of these man-power requisitions called for 275 enlisted men who spoke French, to be transferred to a unit destined for military police service overseas. As most of our men of this class were high-type young men of college training, many of whom had been in the division for a considerable time and had become expert in their military specialties, the division, and in consequence the army, lost the services of many trained soldiers as a result of this requisition. Later, in France, we occasionally saw some of these men walking the streets as military policemen in the ports of embarkation in France.

Another requisition took from the division at one time 532 enlisted men needed elsewhere as motor mechanics. The guard officers never could understand the policy which took away from the combat division thousands of trained soldiers, selected originally for their physical fitness and martial qualities and in whose development as soldiers there had been expended much money and effort. Certainly there were many thousands of motor mechanics available through the draft to perform the non-combat work in shops and repair stations behind the lines and in the S. O. S. in France without breaking into the organism and damaging the efficiency of combat units by taking from them automatic riflemen, machine gunners, signal men, physical instructors, bayonet experts, etc., who were more valuable to the government in these rôles than they could be in the performance of work

in the field of their former civilian occupations. Many draft craftsmen and skilled mechanics relieved from military service on account of minor physical defects should have been required to render non-combat service in the army so that the combat personnel could have been relieved from these disheartening and unwise demands. The combat troops supply the battle casualties. They should not in addition be called upon to supply personnel for the service troops whose function is to serve the combat units. Exception, of course, should be made in the case of disabled soldiers whose disabilities do not prevent non-combat service.

This subject of the so-called raids upon the combat divisions is mentioned in this story because it is one of those matters which do not appear in textbooks on organization and training of military forces for war, but which is nevertheless one of great importance in the effect upon morale and efficiency and as well upon the conservation of the combat man power of the country. In another war it will recur. Those who demand the men expert in the industries are those who are close to the authority which can direct the necessary transfers from the combat units. They want skilled men and with the least delay and annoyance to themselves. They are not primarily interested in the combat forces which theoretically they are expected to serve, but in their own technical missions. Their reasons for the transfers seem plausible to the ordering authority in the absence of a hearing given the commanders of the combat units concerned, and most often they have their way to the detriment of the army as a whole. This subject might well be covered by drastic orders upon the outbreak of another war, for the tendency of those in authority in the "services," which are supposed to exist for serving the fighting men at the front, is to fight their own wars. Whether their operations become known as the "Battle of Washington" or the "Battle of Paris," or by the name of some other back area, is important only as indicating the feeling of the combat troops who often felt that service troops took advantage of their positions and were not adequately checked. The doughboys' idea was that it took seven men behind the man with the bayonet and bullet to keep the latter going. On this theory he assumed that seven bars of chocolate and seven boxes of cigarettes should be sent to him every time it was expected to have one bar and one box reach him in the trenches. His idea was that beginning in America, each of the supporting echelons would take its one-seventh share. What the doughboy bitterly complained about was that he often failed to receive even his one-seventh share under this strange arrangement.


The story of the reorganization of the division would not be complete without some mention of the manner in which the so-called excess organizations were affected by the reorganization. Reference has already been made to the fact that these regiments became more or less skeletonized as a result of so many of their officers and men being transferred to units of the tactical division. When these skeletonized regiments received the new drafts, the strength of the troops at Camp Wadsworth became so great that it was necessary to separate the headquarters organization of the 27th Division from that of the remainder of the camp. Accordingly a camp head-



Commanding General and members of his staff at Camp Wadsworth, Spartanburg, South Carolina. Left to right: Brigadier General Charles L. Phillips, Major General John F. O'Ryan, Colonel H. H. Bandholtz, Captain Edwin W. Moore, Lieutenant Colonel Henry S. Sternberger, Lieutenant Colonel J. Mayhew Wainwright

quarters was established and separate records kept covering the administration, discipline and supply of units at the camp which were not part of the 27th Division. Major General O'Ryan therefore had a double rôle of Camp and Division Commander.

In the spring of 1918 the strength of units at the camp aggregated about 40,000 officers and men. It was most important that the training of all units should progress with the utmost speed and efficiency and the continued training of the 27th Division should not be interfered with by demands upon the time of the division's officers growing out of the training needs of other organizations. In like manner the latter organizations were not to be neglected in relation to their training because of the demands made upon the headquarters staff by the activities of the 27th Division. Early in January, therefore, the War Department directed the organization of all units other than the 27th Division into the Provisional Depot for Corps and Army Troops and shortly thereafter Brigadier General Guy Carleton, formerly of the regular cavalry, reported for assignment to command the Provisional Depot for Corps and Army Troops. Other officers were assigned by the War Department to assist General Carleton in the administration, supply and training of the corps and army troops. These were Brigadier General Christopher T. O'Neill, formerly of the Pennsylvania National Guard; Brigadier General E. Leroy Sweetser, formerly of the Massachusetts Coast Artillery; Brigadier General William Wilson, formerly commanding the 4th Brigade of the New York Division, and Brigadier General Randolph A. Richards, formerly of the Wisconsin National Guard.



Major General Guy Carleton, commanding Provisional Depot for Corps and Army Troops


General Carleton, therefore, took over the immediate command and training of all units other than the 27th Division, which left the camp commander free to devote his time to the 27th Division, except in so far as the nominal duties of Camp Commander interfered. General Carleton, a most efficient officer, soon established a separate headquarters and organized an efficient staff to administer and train his command. Colonel John H. Gohn of the Regular Army was assigned as his Chief of Staff. One of the best officers in the old New York Division, Major Andrew E. Tuck of the 3d New York Infantry, went to him as Adjutant.

A very large number of young men well fitted for military service and affiliated traditionally or sentimentally with one or more of the organizations of the division, had withheld final action in relation to their enlistment because of rumors that particular regiments were to be broken up. They did not wish to join a regiment which was not to see service abroad. The process of reorganization served to justify this attitude in the minds of these young men and it was not until the reorganization had been completed that this class were ready to select and enlist in the regiment of their choice. But shortly after the division had arrived at Camp Wadsworth an order was received from the War Department which occasioned surprise and comment. It was to the effect that no recruiting would be permitted for National Guard units. The war was on—every day to be gained in the training of recruits was desirable. The recruits were available by voluntary enlistment in large numbers for the guard divisions. Why then this extraordinary order? No official reason has ever been forthcoming, but the criticism was constantly heard that the recruiting field was to be left to the Regular Army free from National Guard competition. If this was the motive back of the order it is not believed that it served its purpose. The two forces recruited from different fields. It is not believed that the Regular Army units gained many recruits from the National Guard field, even though the National Guard units were not permitted to recruit. The order apparently caused much resentment throughout the National Guard of the country. Whether with justification or not, it was assumed to be an order not in the interest of the army or of the country.

It was not until the spring of 1918, and after repeated requests, that the order was revoked and we were given authority to recruit by voluntary enlistment, it being specifically prescribed, however, that no men within the draft age could be recruited. Hence the recruits received were composed of youngsters under twenty-one years of age or older men past thirty-one. In a short space of time about 1,200 men, a percentage of them ex-soldiers, were enlisted in New York State and transported to Spartanburg and placed in a separate camp for special intensive training. The recruits constituting this detachment were most intelligent and zealous. Their development progressed rapidly. It was planned to keep them in the training camp for a longer period of time than was actually accorded them. Orders, however, were received in April for the overseas movement of the division and in consequence the detachment was broken up and the men assigned to the various units of the division.

CHAPTER VIII

LIFE AT CAMP WADSWORTH



IFE at Spartanburg merits a chapter. To record in detail the activities of the officers and men and of the many thousands of individual members of their families who visited them during the long stay of the division in the south would require the space of a book. The period from September, 1917, to April, 1918, was an important period in the lives of the men of the division. It is an interesting period to look back upon. It saw the development physically and in many other ways of thousands of impressionable and zealous young men who had had no previous military training. It continued the training in new fields of the men who were veterans of the Border service. It brought together many of the families of the division under circumstances of common interest that served to stimulate mutual understanding and a common purpose to serve the cause.

In another chapter, mention is made of the character of work that occupied the men when they first went to Spartanburg. Even during this early period, members of the families of officers and soldiers began to arrive in Spartanburg. Some came for short visits. These were usually fathers or mothers of the younger men who would see for themselves the environment in which their boys were to be trained for war. Others, for the most part wives, rented houses or rooms and prepared to stay at Spartanburg so long as the division might be in the vicinity. In this way there gradually developed a considerable colony of New York women in and about the city of Spartanburg. Many of these women occupied themselves in efforts to create proper diversion for the soldiers. Some helped the Y. M. C. A. or the K. of C. Others promoted entertainment for the men or assisted church societies in organizing social occasions for them to meet the young people of the city.

One of the most active and efficient women in the colony was Mrs. Anne Schoellkopf, wife of Captain Walter C. Schoellkopf of the 52d Field Artillery Brigade staff. Her work deserves special mention, for she was deeply interested in the happiness of the enlisted men, and quite generally they appreciated and understood her interest, her zealous effort and her efficient accomplishment. She organized a movement for the establishment of an enlisted men's club in the city of Spartanburg. The committee was formed, the funds were raised. An old building was leased, remodeled, and shortly thereafter was furnished and equipped for the purpose. It became a most popular place for the soldiers who daily visited the town. There they met the best women of the division and of the city of Spartanburg, who had organized for the purpose of making the club a wholesome and attractive place for soldiers. Mrs. J. Mayhew Wainwright

was another woman whose interest in the men was always keen and practical. There seems to have been ample diversion for the officers who visited Spartanburg during the evening. There were several hotels in the city, the most modern of which was the Cleveland. This hotel was soon crowded with visitors from New York. Every Saturday night there was a dance at this hotel and always the ballroom was crowded with officers. The officers found no difficulty in securing dancing partners, for the families of the officers, as well as the ladies of Spartanburg, attended the dances in large numbers.

The social festivities at the hotel, the church entertainments, the Y. M. C. A. and K. of C. activities, the stores and shops, and all the other attractions of the city resulted in much travel between the city and the camp. There soon developed a jitney service which transported visitors to and from the camp, and the officers and men to the city and back. The great number of these improvised busses resulted in the usual complications affecting traffic and charges. The situation, however, was satisfactorily controlled by the military police, rules and regulations being made, and from time to time modified in accordance with new conditions as they arose. The greatest obstacle to proper communication between the camp and the city was the condition of the roads after the winter rains set in. The so-called "Snake Road" between the two points became almost impassable. The importance of this road was recognized immediately after Division Headquarters arrived at the camp, and a recommendation was made that the War Department authorize its proper preparation to serve as the main line of travel between the camp and the city. As explained elsewhere, this was not done, and accordingly the immediate necessities were looked after by the Engineer Regiment, which considerably improved conditions. It is interesting for the veterans to know that after the division left for France in the spring of 1918, belated authority was given for a concrete roadbed, properly surfaced, to be laid in the "Snake Road." The carrying on of this work rendered use of the road impossible, and sent traffic to another and longer road. The Snake Road was not finished and ready for use until after the Armistice, and at a time when the last detachment of troops was leaving the place.

During the winter the writer, traveling between Spartanburg and camp, made it a practice to pick up soldiers on the road to the limit of the capacity of the car. These were usually men who had been unable to secure places on the overcrowded jitneys. The conversations carried on with these men during these trips were a real inspiration. In spite of the trying conditions as to transportation and of the fact that they were required to live in tents during a very severe winter, there was never any complaint made by these men. Their attitude was always disciplined and attentive, while at the same time they seemed to be the very incarnation of confidence and optimism. They always thought their own regiment the best in the division. All liked the training. All were impatient to get to France. None had any doubt as to the outcome of the war. All seemed to possess an almost fanatical affection for the division. At times valuable

hints were obtained from these men affecting details of their routine. Sometimes these related to the preparation of the rations in a particular company, or to a mystery concerning the disappearance of some civilian's wood fence or pile of cordwood. None of the men seemed to feel that the ride accorded them was merely a simple and decent thing to have offered, but rather placed an excessive value upon it. During the battle period in France soldiers of the division were frequently met in out-of-the-way places where the conditions were trying, who made cheerful reference to the personal acquaintanceship gained on one of the "lifts" between Spartanburg and the camp.

Two very well-known colleges are located in Spartanburg. One of these is the Converse College for girls, and the other Wofford College for boys. The presidents and faculties of these two colleges were most cordial in their relations with the Division Commander and the officers generally, and there were a number of occasions when the large halls of one or the other of these institutions were made available for lectures or entertainments organized at the camp. The officers were frequently invited to attend concerts given at the colleges. It will be interesting for the soldier readers of this story to learn of the great concern which was manifested by the president and faculty of Converse College when it was first learned by them that a division of troops was to be concentrated in the immediate vicinity of Spartanburg. The first callers received by the Division Commander upon his arrival at Spartanburg in September, 1917, were several gentlemen representing Converse College, who sought to impress upon the Division Commander the gravity of the situation. Various suggestions were made concerning the means best adapted to safeguard the girls of the college from what one of the staff facetiously referred to as the "the coarse and licentious soldiery." After the division had been in the camp for some weeks, there were no more enthusiastic and sincere friends of the division in the city of Spartanburg than the president of Converse College and the members of his faculty. In fact, this perhaps is a proper place to record the really exceptional conduct of the men of the 27th Division in their relations with the people of Spartanburg throughout the entire period of their stay at Camp Wadsworth. Constantly it was remarked by the older people of the town that the men of the division were never seen to look at or attempt to flirt with women or girls whom they passed on the streets. All the men from the beginning seemed to take a personal pride in maintaining a dignified bearing in public places, and in the reputation they were building up with even the most exacting people of the town.

It was obvious that the advent of so large a body of troops coming into the life of a city of the size of Spartanburg would create many perplexing little problems. Street traffic was controlled by the local police. Soon the streets became crowded with vehicles of all kinds, from heavy army motor trucks to side car motorcycles. Which force could most effectively control traffic under the conditions, the local police or the military police? Again the messes at the camp were augmented by articles of



Resting on Main Street, Spartanburg

food purchased in the city. These included milk, eggs, fresh vegetables, ice cream, etc. What was the sanitary condition of the places where these products were stored or sold? The Division Commander was vitally concerned with this question. Who should be responsible for proper inspection of these places, the local health officer, or the camp sanitary officer? In like manner, the Commanding General was vitally interested in the enforcement of the liquor law and in the character of all resorts which might be frequented by soldiers. How was it legally proper for the military to interfere with civilian authority in relation to these matters? All of



Parade for Third Liberty Loan, Spartanburg, S. C.

these and many other kindred subjects were satisfactorily disposed of and without an unpleasant incident of any kind, due to the very marked spirit of cooperation manifested by the officials and the people of the city of Spartanburg. It may be said in brief explanation of the foregoing that the Camp Commander was accorded the widest character of latitude in relation to these matters by the city authorities. When the results of inspections showed that laws or ordinances were being violated by civilians, evidence was furnished to the local police authorities, who made the necessary arrests or complaints. The sanitary inspections resulted in a big clean-up of back alleys and other places needing such attention. So far as concerned stores and shops where foodstuffs were sold, these were all inspected by sanitary officers of the division. Many requirements were imposed upon the proprietors which were not based upon any legal authority. They were carried out, however, because of the effective penalty involved in a refusal. The penalty was provided for by the following system. A certificate was printed, very formidable in its appearance which certified that Mr. Blank, the proprietor of such and such a store, had complied with all the requirements of the camp sanitary inspectors, and that his stock might be purchased by officers and men of the army. The point was that unless such a certificate was obtained and displayed in a prescribed place in the window of the shop, a military policeman was placed on duty on the sidewalk, who prevented officers and soldiers making purchases at such places.

An efficient secret service section of the military police operated most successfully in the detection of criminals and in picking up, as soon as they detrained, criminals who came to Spartanburg for the purpose of preying upon the soldiers.

Mention is made, in other parts of the story of the division, of the exceptionally fine men who composed the corps of chaplains. They were a harmonious and brotherly group. They had been accustomed to working together. Similar standards of team-work did not, of course, prevail among the ministers of the city of Spartanburg. There was no organization prompting their coordination of effort. It was therefore suggested that our chaplains invite the ministers and priests of the several churches in Spartanburg to meet and discuss with them subjects of common interest to the church people of Spartanburg and to the soldiers of the camp. Several such meetings were held, and they were most profitable to all. Two of the leaders among the ministers of the city in the development of this team-work were Dr. W. H. K. Pendleton of the Church of the Advent, and Dr. A. D. P. Gilmour of the First Presbyterian Church. They were assisted by Father N. A. Murphy of St. Paul's Roman Catholic Church. Major McCord of the 107th Infantry, as senior chaplain of the division, presided at the joint meetings, which were usually attended by the Division Commander.

During the stay of the division at Camp Wadsworth a number of reviews were given to visiting officials. Among these were Governor Manning of South Carolina, Governor Whitman of New York, Senator



Officers of the 27th Di

Wadsworth of New York, and Major General John Biddle, Chief of Staff of the Army.

In work of the above mentioned character, which had to do with the morale of the division, real assistance was given at all times by the army auxiliary organizations, such as the Young Men's Christian Association, the Knights of Columbus and the Red Cross. Among the workers of note was Dr. C. A. Barbour of Rochester. Although his stay was relatively short, he made a strong impression upon the minds of the large number of young men with whom he came in contact.

The life at Camp Wadsworth afforded ample opportunity for observing human nature. At one time more than 40,000 soldiers were in the command. The responsibility for their proper development, morally, physically, mentally and technically, was a considerable one. A military organization of the size of a division is a great and complex organism, made up of several arms of the service, but in the last analysis it is com-



en at Camp Wadsworth

posed of men—men of varying likes and dislikes, of preferences, prejudices, interests and emotions. To best effect the common military purpose which brought them together, it was necessary that they be so developed and controlled that each individual and group in the great team would bring into play every quality contributing something to the common purpose, and withhold every individual or group influence that might adversely affect the result sought. To develop men and coordinate their efforts in this way is a great and complex problem, requiring a knowledge of human nature and a capacity for organizing and maintaining the developing and guiding agencies. It is obvious that to reach all the men of so great an organization, and to harness the minds and hearts of every last one of them to the common purpose, so that each might pull his share of the load, required the use of agencies completely coordinated. No one man can personally lead by individual word and effort more than forty or fifty fellow men. Go beyond that number and the leader must have

assistants. The greater the number to be led and developed, the more assistants must the leader have, until the latter so increase that they in turn must be organized, supervised and led.

To better understand the complexities of this problem of the development of morale among so large a body of men, many of whom were inexperienced, let us glance at a rough outline of the picture presented to the minds of one charged with responsibility for such a force. To begin with, it would be idle to attempt the development of morale until subsistence was provided for. The army moves on its stomach; in fact, all men must eat to live, and they must have wholesome and varied food, properly prepared and served, if they are seriously to attempt anything. But before the men can be fed, the necessary supplies must flow into the camp without interruption. For safety there must be maintained a reserve supply of subsistence stores. Some articles of food must be obtained locally in order to insure the requisite fresh quality. In the case of so large a force, the daily subsistence stores so required necessitated adequate housing for their protection from the elements. This means the construction of necessary depots for the reception of stores, their accounting, distribution, and the safe-keeping of the reserve. Transportation from the depot to the various camps of the units is as essential as the stores. This means wagons, mules and motor trucks, and in turn these vehicles imply necessary personnel, repair shops, and gasoline and oil supply stations. The item of wood for the hundreds of fires constantly going is a considerable one, especially in the American army, which is so wasteful of wood. In turn, this implies more transportation. There is the question of ice for refrigeration; the preparation of meals must be supervised; cooks must be instructed; daily sanitary inspections are imperative. Accordingly, this single department of effort having to do with the subsistence of the men is divided into several fields of effort and of supervision, each with its necessary personnel. If an army could campaign without eating, one of the most complex and annoying problems of war would be eliminated.

But assuming that the matter of subsistence has been provided for, the matter of morale training must still await other fundamental provisions. Eating is but one of several considerations governing the mere existence of the men. Another consideration is housing. This involves the construction of barracks and hutments or the use of tents. In any event there must be available sanitary sleeping quarters for every man, shower baths and latrines in adequate numbers, and an adequate drainage system.

Always a percentage of humanity is ill. In the army the percentage is normally low, but among so large a force as a division even a low percentage produces a substantial number of patients. These must be properly provided for. This means the availability of hospitals, operating rooms, dispensaries, convalescent wards, contagious disease wards, and all the other appurtenances of modern hospitals. In like manner, clothing, equipment and armament must be provided for, each with its complex organization and detail.

It is only after all these things, which have to do with the mere routine existence of the mass, have been provided for, that the development work can be seriously undertaken. Having provided means to exist and the material things needed by the men in their training, we can then carry out a program for the development of the individual soldier and the team-work of the mass. In this field of development it is obvious there must be departments and some provision for inspection and supervision. Then there is the physical side. All the men must be developed physically, for the physical efficiency of the mass is not to be judged by the athletic prowess of a few men, but by the average standards of the mass. And so the mind may run on in considering this subject of organization. There are the fields of technical training, theoretical instruction, rifle practice, road marches, tactical walks and maneuvers. Finally, there must be recreation, games and amusements. These latter constitute a most difficult field to plan, for experience shows that the mass cannot be left wholly to their own devices and choice. Where this was practised in the army, abuses usually resulted. On the other hand, too much supervision would cause the recreation to be regarded by the men as work. The supervision and control of all forms of recreation should be carried out through the men themselves, so that they are little conscious of the force which is controlling and directing their activities.

The divisional theatrical troupe was an example of entertainment which was at all times controlled, and which it is believed was most satisfactory to the men, who seldom, if ever, reflected upon the careful control which was exercised over the troupe. The entire enterprise was the product of the talent, energy and zeal of one or two junior officers and from eighty to one hundred enlisted men. While the division was at Camp Wadsworth the troupe, having thoroughly prepared the show known as "You Know Me, Al," presented it at the local theater to packed houses for a period of two weeks. The show was such a success that it was later given in New York City for two weeks and in Washington for several nights. With the proceeds of these outside entertainments it was possible to equip the troupe with costumes and other needed properties. In other parts of the story the value of this organization in the maintenance of morale is referred to.

In nearly every non-technical field of the war-time life of the soldier there were various individuals who were more or less expert in the subjects of their interest, who rendered their advice and assistance to the War Department. In many cases they were permitted to visit camps and to stimulate an understanding of the particular subjects in which they were interested and to develop the interest of officers and men. The difficulty with these usually intelligent and self-sacrificing individuals was that not always did they understand the necessity for maintaining a proper balance between the particular activity they represented and the numerous other activities which necessarily occupied the time and attention of the army. It was the duty of the Camp Commander to benefit so far as practicable by the suggestions and advice of these individuals



Typical regimental infirmary, Camp Wadsworth, S. C.

in their respective fields, but to control and coordinate their activities so that the soldier would not become a victim of some specialty, in charge of one who possessed exceptional ability and dominating character. For example, a serious effort was made by the War Department to have our soldiers sing. Expert leaders and directors of community singing were sent to most of the camps. The testimony of some high ranking officers was



Watching the baseball score, Camp Wadsworth

published to the effect that "a good army is a singing army." Some even went so far as to urge that an army that could not sing could not fight. Analogous claims were made by the bayonet experts, grenade specialists, machine and automatic rifle enthusiasts, each on behalf of his own specialty. At Camp Wadsworth the specialists were encouraged, but their work was coordinated and strictly confined to the limits of the time periods allotted them. Periodically they were all reminded that the war could not be won by the singing of songs, by the firing of machine guns or grenades, by the use of the bayonet, or by any other single effort or device, but by divisions of troops so trained that each unit by its discipline and skill would be able at a particular time and place to be more effective in the complexities of combat than the enemy opposed to them.

In the 27th Division, singing was not popular in the average unit during the march. Group whistling was more in evidence. An exception in relation to singing was Major Gaus's 106th Field Hospital Company. This company made a practice of singing while on the march and attained excellence in that field. The average company early in the war seemed too large for the men to sing in unison when stretched out in column of squads. The platoon was a better song unit on the road. The most popular songs among the soldiers of the division seemed to be "The Long, Long Trail," "Joan of Arc," "Pack Up Your Troubles in Your Old Kit Bag and Smile, Smile, Smile," and the divisional song, written by two men of the division show troupe, "My Heart Belongs to the U. S. A."

Toward the end of the stay at Camp Wadsworth, after the severe winter weather was over, one of the most popular places of amusement was the outdoor movies. Even the movies were used, to a reasonable extent, for instructional purposes. Between the thrilling films usually displayed on such occasions, official films were shown, portraying the correct and incorrect methods of performing the duties of the soldier. The men took these instructional efforts in good part, and on some occasions derived more merriment from these films than they did from those specially designed to entertain. Pictures of soldiers thrown on the screen for the purpose of illustrating the correct method of executing the manual of arms were greeted with a hurricane of criticisms. Many of the comments were exceedingly funny. The screen would announce, for example, "Correct Method of Executing Present Arms," after which the soldier on the screen would execute that movement. If there existed the slightest defect in the soldierly bearing of the screen artist or in the manner in which he carried out the movement, the entire soldier audience would groan, "Rotten—awful!" and the artist would be advised to undertake a week's training at Major Sharp's school.

Boxing was a popular pastime in most of the units of the division. The War Department had assigned to the camp as boxing instructor Mr. Frank Moran, a celebrated professional boxer. He was popular with the men interested in boxing, and succeeded in developing scores of men who became expert in this form of athletic competition. Practically every company had its champion boxer in each of the several classes of weights.

Within each regiment these company representatives competed for the honor of representing the regiment, and in like manner there were brigade and divisional contests for the purpose of determining the best man in the division in each class.

One of the best features of Camp Wadsworth was the Third Officers' Training Camp. The Division Commander was directed by the War Department to organize a training camp for the training of candidates for commissions, and the orders prescribed how the candidates would be selected from the companies. The training of the candidates was to cover a period of months, beginning January 4, 1918. In the first instance, there were perhaps 700 men selected by their organization commanders and recommended for detail to the Third Officers' Training Camp. The final decision in relation to the details rested with the Division Commander. The final selections were made in the following way: The men were sent to the Division Commander in groups of 100. The men of each group were formed in a column of files. Each man was required to advance, halt and salute. During this period of perhaps ten seconds of time, there was opportunity to observe conformation and physical fitness of the candidate, his military bearing, degree of confidence, and his features. The names or organizations of the men were not known. If there was no doubt concerning the general fitness of the man, he was directed to pass to the right, where his name was listed by an officer designated for the purpose. The men so listed were thus approved for detail to the training camp. Where, however, the inspection indicated that the candidate was lacking in one or more of the qualities believed to be essential in a commissioned officer, the candidate was directed to turn to the left and report to an officer, to be listed as a candidate who had been rejected. Where the inspection indicated a doubt as to the fitness of the candidate, he was sent to a third officer for later and more extended reexamination. In this way the entire 700 men who had been designated for this inspection were passed before the Division Commander in two days. A few more than 500 were accepted and detailed to the training camp.

The high standards required, which resulted in so large a number of men being eliminated, provided the training camp with a very extraordinary corps of officer candidates. The discipline of this training camp, the industry of the men, their physical fitness, intelligence and capacity for development, resulted in extraordinary progress being made by them during the period of the prescribed course. They were soon recognized as a *corps d'elite* throughout the division. It would be well worth the time of some graduate of this training camp to record its history and the later service and accomplishment of its graduates. They were graduated shortly before the division left for France. Later they could be found in practically all the combat divisions of the army. Numbers of them were killed or wounded; a very considerable number won distinction. Everywhere they were recognized as men who had been carefully selected and highly trained. From many of the units of the A. E. F. the Division

Commander received favorable comments from superior officers concerning the graduates of this camp. The names of these graduates will be found in Special Orders No. 182 of the division, an extract from which is included in the Appendix as Exhibit 14.

The Commandant of the camp was Lieutenant Colonel William A. Taylor of the 108th Infantry, later made Colonel of the 106th Infantry. He was assisted by a very able corps of instructors, which included such officers as Major Jesse S. Button of the 105th Infantry, Chief Instructor; Captain Jacob S. Clinton, Senior Instructor of Infantry, and Captain George B. Gibbons of the 104th Field Artillery, Senior Instructor of Field Artillery. Captain Gibbons' battery and the camp students under him might well be considered models in any army.

During the period of the service at Spartanburg more than 2,500 men were lost to the division because they excelled or were experienced in some civilian line of effort of such value to the government that their services were believed to be more important in the non-military field than in the combat service. This has been referred to elsewhere in this story. When these drafts began to constitute a drain upon the division, application was made for leave to recruit other men, but the application was denied. It was not until February, 1918, that the ban was lifted and the Division Commander was authorized to send recruiting officers to New York for the purpose of gaining recruits. These officers, however, were limited by War Department orders to enlisting men who were above or below the draft age.

In February the hostess house was completed and opened for the convenience of visiting members of the soldier families. Miss Bertha M. Loheed was the popular and efficient directress of this adjunct of the camp.

During the winter the various battalions of the division took their turns in occupying the practice system of trenches. Due to the frequent severity of the winter weather, this class of training at times necessarily involved some hardship. The conditions, however, were carefully observed so that the degree of discomfort or hardship might not be out of proportion to the value to be derived from the experience. The practice periods in the camp trenches furnished some incidents which illustrated the extent to which rumors are circulated in a war army, and as well the credulity of people in relation to such rumors. Undoubtedly numbers of the younger men wrote home stories of their trench experiences and such accounts probably lost little in the telling. Soon the Division Commander began to receive letters from uneasy parents, suggesting that their particular boys were not any too strong constitutionally and might succumb under the rigors of the trench training. At one time rumors were circulated in New York that one or more soldiers had been frozen to death while on duty in the camp trenches. Finally, by division order the men were warned that the spreading of any rumor tending to injure the morale or efficiency of the army or any of its units would be very summarily dealt with, and it became the duty of all to report the names of those who repeated rumors. There was little to criticize in relation to rumors after

this order was published. In any future mobilization on a large scale, it might be well for commanding officers of troops to anticipate the abuses in relation to rumors which were so general in our army, for a time at least, by pointing out the evil effects of rumors and the obligation of officers and men to avoid transmitting them.

The pleasure of camp life was added to by the number of bands available for concerts. In the first place, there were the seven bands of the 27th Division; four of these belonged to the infantry and three to the field artillery. Among the corps and army troops at the camp were fifteen additional bands, making a grand total of twenty-two bands. A professional band was organized from among the bands of the 27th Division to play on special occasions. This special professional band was organized by Lieutenant Francis J. Sutherland. The band played very successfully in the city of Spartanburg, at Asheville, N. C., and other places. Later a similar band was organized from among the musicians of the corps and army troops.

After the first two or three months at Camp Wadsworth, the men began to think of France, and as the weeks wore on they became more and more eager and impatient to begin their overseas movement. At times they were warned that after they had been in battle a few times they would look back on their stay at Camp Wadsworth as a period of comfort and relative happiness. They did not know how true was the warning, but during the battle period in France many men gave expression to the sentiment.

In March, 1918, about 1,200 replacements were received and distributed among the units of the division. These were drafted men. They received a hearty welcome in accordance with the spirit of Bulletin No. 25, of the division, of which the following is an extract:

> The Division Commander takes this means of informing the officers and enlisted men of the division that detachments of drafted men will arrive in this camp from time to time to increase the strength of certain organizations stationed at this camp. It is the desire of the Division Commander that every enlisted man of the 27th Division cooperate with the officers to the fullest extent in making these drafted men feel at home with us and that they have the respect and regard of the soldiers of the 27th Division.
>
> An effective army must be a homogeneous army and not a fanatical army. In doing our part to meet this requirement, we must measure up to the high standards of a division composed of men like ours. Our soldiers are trained men, who know how to obey orders and therefore how to carry out this order in letter and in spirit. Our men are noted for their intelligence, loyalty and zeal. Accordingly, they will see the desirability of carrying out in effective manner the course of action prescribed for them to help make our army a united army. Furthermore, every ordinary, commonplace sense of hospitality would prompt veteran soldiers to make happy the lot of newcomers.
>
> It is hoped that our men will provide opportunities to make this attitude clear and unmistakable in the minds of the drafted men as their detachments arrive. Whether this be done by cheering their entry into camp, by inviting them to entertainments, or in other ways, is unimportant, as long as outward, visible evidences of the attitude of the division toward the newcomers is made clear.
>
> It is directed that this paragraph be read at two formations of every company and unit in the division.

A very thorough and interesting study was made of the subject of camouflage during the spring months. This specialty was in charge of Second Lieutenant Linwood P. Ames, one of the Division Commander's aides. Many practical features were developed, and numerous samples of camouflage art were constructed about the camp and in the area of the trench system. The general principles which these studies and experiments developed are enumerated in Bulletin No. 27 of the division, a copy of which follows:

Regimental and similar unit commanders at the next assemblage of officers will read and discuss the following bulletin with a view to impressing their officers and through them the enlisted men of their commands with the importance of the subject of camouflage.

The use of the word camouflage in relation to deception of the enemy regarding positions, strength, lines of communication and other material military agencies may be new in the sense that the present application of the word may have been used for the first time in this war, but the art itself is old and has been employed to advantage in past wars. Officers and men therefore should be given to understand that camouflage is not a new military wrinkle, interesting and clever, but of relative unimportance.

Efficiency in the art of camouflage means the saving of life among soldiers, the saving of guns and other military materiel which might otherwise be destroyed, and the ability to see through and detect enemy camouflage which is screening and masking the enemy personnel and materiel.

In maneuvers it is unfortunately a common sight to observe platoon, company and even higher commanders leading their men into positions over ground within full view of the enemy, when close at hand there is some feature of the terrain which might be termed nature's camouflage for the particular movement. Frequently this natural camouflage would have provided as ready an approach to the desired position as the one selected, with the additional advantage of providing a complete mask for the movement. Again it frequently happens that a deployment in a particular location is made on a line affording the enemy every opportunity to inflict losses, when in the immediate vicinity there exists a camouflaged position almost providentially provided by nature for the occasion.

It has happened that an officer directed to effect the crossing of a river will attempt the crossing at a point in the stream where the river runs straight and which in consequence is under observation for long distances from the enemy's side, when there was available above or below such place sharp turns in the river with high banks where enemy observation, except that which is wholly local, was completely cut off. In other words, nature has provided a camouflaged crossing which has been overlooked. This is not a forced picture, because sharp turns in a stream are frequently occasioned by a natural obstacle such as a ridge or embankment, while at other times, when the turn of a stream has been influenced by other causes, it will frequently be found that the flow of the stream in making the turn has piled up on the outward side deposits of alluvial soil which have resulted in thick vegetation or other formations furnishing excellent cover.

The first distinct impression which the Division Commander desires the officers and men of his division to receive and retain, in relation to this subject of camouflage, is that aspect of the subject which has to do with nature itself. With this view of camouflage we will hear no more of the criticism that the subject is relatively unimportant on the theory that it has no application to warfare of mobility. Those who make such comments see in camouflage only a means to successfully mold and paint the remains of a dead horse, with the view of furnishing cover for some sniper or kill a man or two of the enemy's forces.

That form of camouflage which is only artificial has been the subject of remarkable development during the present war, due to the peculiar conditions affecting the warfare of fixed positions, and many things have been successfully done, some of them

more or less inconsequential, because there has been time for adequate preparation. The value of camouflage, however, bears a direct relation to its approximation to nature.

The ideal camouflage is "nature's camouflage," that is to say, features or idiosyncrasies of the terrain which may be availed of for particular tactical purposes. The next most effective form is a combination of artificial camouflage with "nature's camouflage," as for example the artificial extension of some natural feature of the terrain when "nature's camouflage" would be insufficient for the particular purpose. The least effective, although perhaps the most interesting form of camouflage is that which is wholly artificial. This is true because camouflage to aid the movement or operations of considerable forces must be provided on a huge scale, and consequently to provide artificial camouflage to such an extent would involve materials, labor and time in prohibitive measure. Furthermore, artificial camouflage deteriorates more rapidly than natural camouflage and is more readily detected by the enemy.

From the foregoing it will be seen that the most important class of camouflage activity might be termed tactical camouflage. With this conception in mind it will be seen that the subject bears an intimate and important relation to mobile warfare, and accordingly a study of the principles of camouflage will throw an illuminating light upon the problems of the tactical dispositions of troops in open warfare. As troop movements resolve themselves into troop dispositions and the occupation of positions, natural camouflage should be promptly augmented by artificial camouflage, and when these positions become more or less permanent, artificial camouflage is resorted to in its fullest measure.

A knowledge and understanding of the importance of this subject is the concern of every officer and enlisted man of this division. Perhaps the greatest factor in contributing to tactical success in the conduct of war is the factor of surprise. A trained force will often stand its ground under twenty per cent. of losses suffered in the course of what might be termed normal combat conditions, when the same force might stampede under ten per cent. of losses inflicted suddenly and in the form of surprise. To effect tactical surprise upon the enemy an appreciation and practical understanding of camouflage, particularly natural camouflage, is most essential.

The commanding officer of each regiment and similar unit will carefully select and designate a regimental camouflage officer. In like manner an officer will be selected and designated by each battalion and company commander, whose duty it will be to devote special time and study to the work, and will confer with other camouflage officers of their own and other units in relation to this subject. They will give theoretical and practical instruction to the officers and enlisted men of their units, upon such occasions and under such circumstances as may be prescribed by their commanding officers. A roster of their names and record of their industry and efficiency will be maintained by the divisional camouflage officer, whose duty it will be to keep track of their work, to provide lectures and special instruction and demonstration for them on particular occasions.

Normally, camouflage officers will continue the performance of their regular routine duty. The permanent enlisted camouflage personnel will be one non-commissioned officer and one private at regimental headquarters, the same at battalion headquarters and the same for each company. Record of their names and work will be maintained at regimental headquarters.

When manual labor for camouflage is required it will be furnished by the commanding officer of the organization concerned. The strength of camouflage detachments will vary from two to three men to the entire strength of the regiment, dependent upon circumstances.

The stay at Camp Wadsworth constituted a vital period in the lives of the many thousands of men who were there. As a result of the training they were developed and bettered in innumerable ways. It is believed that none will give more enthusiastic corroboration to this statement than

the men themselves. Toward the end of the training period the physical excellence of the command was remarkable. They made a record for good health; their intelligence had been stimulated; they were orderly, prompt and responsive. They fastened themselves securely in the hearts of the people of Spartanburg, and in like manner the people of Spartanburg won an enduring place in the affections of the officers and men of the 27th Division.

CHAPTER IX

TRAINING OF THE DIVISION FOR WAR



O part of this book should prove more interesting to one who seeks a correct understanding of the war accomplishment of the 27th Division than this chapter on the training of the division. The character of training received by the *personnel* of the division very largely determined the standard of their efficiency. Viewed superficially, it does not seem a difficult matter for any experienced officer to prescribe an appropriate course of military training suited to meet the needs of a particular body of troops. When, however, the problem is carefully examined, it will be found always that there are many circumstances which affect its solution, and which call for decisions that are certain to affect favorably or adversely the general result. In the first place, a course of training suited to an organization that may have had little field experience might not be productive of good results in another organization schooled and experienced in field work. Again, modern war is so comprehensive in its operations and so complicated in its details, that the great number of activities in which the men should be trained is apt to twist training programs from the solid foundation of fundamental necessities to the instabilities of new and attractive specialties.

The initial training of a newly organized war army is always influenced by the peace-time customs and experience of the professional army maintained in peace.

In all countries in time of peace the business of soldiering is left largely in the hands of professionals. Particularly has this been true in Great Britain and in the United States. In these countries the regular or standing army, through force of circumstances, has been left largely to itself and, in consequence, has lived to a considerable extent separate and apart from the people as a whole. Under such circumstances it was natural that a percentage of regular officers in the course of half a lifetime should have become more or less out of touch with the things that dominate the interest and determine the habits of their fellow countrymen. This condition made it difficult for such officers fully to understand the psychology of the army in which they served, when that army became almost wholly a citizen army. This condition was accentuated by the experience of the professional officers with the men who constituted the soldiers of the peace-time professional army, for there was a tendency to assume that because these soldiers came from the people, they were truly representative of the people. And in relation to training, it was natural for such officers to assume that the military organization, methods and discipline which their experience told them were best for regular soldiers would have equal effectiveness with the citizen soldiers. Nothing

of course could be more incorrect. The war army included in its make-up the best young manhood of the country—the young men of education, sense of responsibility, intensity of purpose and a capacity to attain success in almost any field of effort engaged in. Obviously, methods of training and discipline necessary for the government of regular soldiers in time of peace needed modification before being applied to young men of this type, who were in the army at personal sacrifice and for the express purpose of doing whatever was necessary to be done to defeat or destroy the enemy in the shortest time and in the most effective manner. There existed also in time of peace in the Regular Army features of professional soldiering—social, academic, technical, political, disciplinary and organizational which had little relation or value in the development and conduct of a war army. As a matter of fact, many of these features served only to trip and tangle, annoy and delay those who had big and important tasks to do under military jurisdiction. The great corps of reserve officers complained feelingly of these features at the outbreak of the World War, and ultimately the ultra-conservative professional officers, who were instinctively and almost reverently laboring to preserve such things, were pushed aside.

In our own Regular Army the system of promotion by seniority without elimination of the unfit, which had obtained for so many years, was responsible for much of the inefficiency that obtained in the army for a considerable period after the outbreak of the war. Thus it was that elderly officers of little imagination and with no real experience in handling large numbers of men, or in any kind of important work, but with kingly dignity, fostered by years of formalism, were found in charge of important posts for which they were completely unfitted. It was this type that constituted the *bête noir* of the virile and energetic officers who were assigned as their assistants. It should be a source of pride to the Regular Army that in spite of the deadening influences of army peace-time existence, they produced so large a number of officers of great capacity in this war. Some of these when they attained the necessary rank and authority were most ruthless in weeding out and rendering innocuous the class above criticized.

When the war came it was a question which group, the professional or the citizen officers, were most changed as a result of war service. A score of comments and inquiries every day showed that some of the professional officers for some months after the war commenced were like persons in a dream, so new and extraordinary to them seemed the events that were transpiring. Pay day and no men drunk, train loads of supplies received, unloaded, checked and issued in a period of time usually required for the unloading of one truck, pumping stations installed, pipe lines laid, motors repaired, telephones installed, instruments of all kinds operated by soldiers already skilled in their work.

Obviously, training programs which did not adequately reckon with the efficiency assets brought into the army by the war officers and recruits were programs needing prompt revision.

Another consideration which vitally affected training was the question of the length of time necessary for the development of a soldier. Prior to the war, professional soldiers were almost unanimous in their opinion that at least three years were required for the training of a soldier, and as far as the officers were concerned, obviously this training involved a much greater period of time. Major General Leonard Wood was the first officer of rank to deny the truth of these assertions. Some years before the war he organized a detachment of Regular Army recruits, selected instructors and prescribed a course of training for them with the result that in a period of a few months they had developed standards that excelled those of organizations of the Regular Army largely made up of so-called old and experienced soldiers. General Wood followed this successful experiment by the inauguration of the training camps for civilians (college students and business men). He had been quick to see what the mass of the army had overlooked, namely, that the vital qualities which an officer must possess, that is to say physical fitness, education, intelligence, industry, courage and resourcefulness, are already the possessions of the best of the young manhood of the country, and that by limiting the training camp enrollments to men who met such requirements, he would be concerned in the problem of training almost wholly with the technical side of the subject. The great success of the Officers' Training Camps which were later officially adopted for the production of war officers demonstrated conclusively that in our country a veritable army of junior officers could be quickly trained from among the masses of young men when the selections were made upon merit to meet the fundamental requirements referred to.

These points are mentioned in this chapter on training because they furnish side lights upon the subject of divisional training as that was presented for consideration when the division was concentrated at Camp Wadsworth.

There were other interesting considerations and influences which affected the question of training which should be mentioned. There were numerous officers, most of them British, who sincerely believed that the war would be won with the bayonet. Others just as sincere advocated that all training should be subordinated to the development of machine gunners and machine gun units. Still others believed in the dominating importance of bombs, or of grenades, mining operations, gas, airplanes, or of some other specialty. There existed also a school of officers who believed that the World War marked a complete change in tactical principles and that time expended in maneuvers was time wasted. Such officers believed that trench warfare should be featured in training and every detail of trench operations worked out with the greatest nicety and precision.

In 1917, the so-called warfare of position, popularly known as trench warfare, had become so completely a part of the lives of the foreign armies that all military considerations seemed to be materially affected by its influence. The higher officers in all the armies knew that an ulti-

mate decision could not be gained by force of arms without a change to the warfare of movement, and that the then existing state of war was but a period of preparation for the other. But in war the will of the commander is affected and limited not only by factors of weather, topography, numbers and armament, but also to a greater or lesser extent, dependent upon the individual, by the experience and convictions of those about him. In 1917, when the writer served with the British and French armies, he seldom heard a foreign officer express confidence in any plan to penetrate the German defensive and force a change to open warfare. As one British officer said, and his point of view was typical of many at that time, "It probably is possible, with an unlimited supply of artillery, ammunition and of replacements, to barrage and fight our way through some part of the line and to bring on a battle in the open country now held by the enemy, but there are not enough shells or men to meet the demands of such a plan." And so the attacks and offensives of the Allies were for a considerable period of time carried out more or less locally and with limited objectives, for the purposes of gaining a ridge, or relieving pressure elsewhere, or getting out of bottom land, or driving in a salient, or of removing one held by the enemy. The French under Marshal Joffre called this policy one of attrition. This state of mind and policy is referred to by Philip Gibbs in his most interesting book, "Now It Can Be Told." He says:

"In the early days the outstanding fault of our generals was their desire to gain ground which was utterly worthless when gained. They organized small attacks, against strong positions, dreadfully costly to take, and after the desperate valor of men had seized a few yards of mangled earth, found that they had made another small salient, jutting out from the front in a V-shaped wedge, so that it was a death trap to the men who had to hold it."

Speaking of 1915, he says:

"The battle of Loos and its aftermath of minor massacres in the ground we had gained—the new horror of the new salient—had sapped into the confidence of those battalion officers and men who had been assured of German weakness by cheery, optimistic, breezy-minded generals. It was no good some of those old gentlemen saying, 'We've got 'em beat!' when from Hooge to the Hohenzollern redoubt our men sat in wet trenches under ceaseless bombardment of heavy guns and when any small attack they made by the orders of a high command, which believed in small attacks, without much plan or purpose, was only 'asking for trouble' from German counter-attacks by mines, trench mortars, bombing sorties, poison-gas, flame throwers and other forms of frightfulness, which made a dirty mess of flesh and blood, without definite result on either side beyond filling up the lists of death. 'It keeps up the fighting spirit of the men,' said generals. 'We must maintain an aggressive policy.' They searched their trench maps for good spots where another 'small operation' might be organized. There was competition among the corps and divisional generals as to the highest number of raids, mine explosions and trench grabbings undertaken by their men."

And so it came to be accepted by many officers that this war was to be fought and won by the development and application of principles and methods wholly new. It is, therefore, particularly interesting to reflect at this time upon the mental attitude of the man to whom was entrusted the destinies of the great American army, known as the American Expeditionary Forces.

After the writer's service with the British and French armies, referred to in the previous chapter, he was, with other division commanders, ordered to General Headquarters of the American Expeditionary Forces at Chaumont. The party was to dine there with General Pershing, but as he had been unexpectedly summoned to Paris, the dinner was held aboard a train *en route* from Chaumont to Paris. After the meal, in groups of two or three at a time, the officers constituting the party visited and chatted with the Commander-in-Chief in his compartment. One of these officers made some reference to the possibility of a stalemate on the Western Front, a term frequently used at that time. It was then that General Pershing sat straight up in his seat and accentuating his remarks with vehement vertical gestures of the forearm, said: "Gentlemen, there will be no stalemate. The war will be won and right here on the Western Front. And while I am on this subject, let me add that I was amazed a few days ago to hear an American officer say that the Western Front could not be broken. I sent him away. I will not have an officer with me who talks or thinks that way. I repeat, we shall break through. This war has not changed principles. Our Field Service Regulations are sound. The rifle is still a determining weapon and the men should be skilled in its use. Viewed broadly, there is no such thing as trench warfare. Trench warfare is but a temporary phase of warfare. When you go back to your divisions, spread that doctrine."

Now that the prophesy has been fulfilled, it seems so obviously sound as hardly to be worthy of mention, but at that time when the great armies of the world were settled down with apparent permanency in their great trench systems and engaging ceaselessly in limited attacks, his words seemed to be radical and overconfident.

The training problem at the outbreak of the war was complicated by a veritable avalanche of books, booklets, pamphlets and bulletins covering every phase and aspect of the conduct of war, which were delivered at the training camps almost daily. These came from the War Department and apparently had been prepared hurriedly by officers on duty in Washington. Most of them were reprints and adaptations of foreign books and pamphlets. Some of them were illuminating and valuable. Many were repetitions of other pamphlets, while a considerable percentage were obsolete.

Out of this mass of considerations, influences, orders, requirements, recommendations of foreign officers, and text books, recourse was had to the reflection that throughout the entire history of war, certain principles in relation to the training of soldiers have never changed. The first of these is that the ideal army is composed of soldiers, possessing, first, moral character and physical fitness; second, team-work; third, expertness in use of weapons and in tactics. With these principles in mind, training programs were arranged and instructors assigned so that no department of training should be featured at the expense of others and all effort directed to the development of a divisional team possessing the qualities mentioned.



Bayonet training, Camp Wadsworth



Hand grenade throwing practice, Camp Wadsworth

It will be noted that the requirements first and second above mentioned deal solely with the man, while the last requirement deals with the man and his use of weapons and movements. It is believed that at the time we entered the war our people, who for three years had been reading hectic accounts of gas, grenades, aircraft, bombs, machine guns and other mechanical implements of war, had come to believe that the war would in some way be determined by the relative efficiency of the implements employed on the opposing sides. This assumption to a considerable extent invaded the minds of the soldiers. Such persons placed too much stress upon the importance of the ever-changing implements and devices of war as compared with the character and efficiency of the man power of the army. Accordingly, from the very beginning, it was stressed at Camp Wadsworth that wars are won by men and not by or with inanimate things. It was pointed out to the officers and men of the division that weapons of warfare, no matter how mechanically efficient they may be, serve only as trophies to be captured by the enemy, unless they are in possession of men who understand their use, and understanding, employ them with indomitable courage and determination of purpose. In one of the early talks on this subject the division commander said:

"I am sure you hold no doubt from what I have said that an army composed of intelligent and fit men, dominated by rigid discipline, habituated to concerted action and with eagerness for the fight born of justified confidence in themselves, but armed with inferior weapons, would nevertheless quickly overwhelm a force of equal size possessing every device and appliance of modern warfare, but lacking these martial 'man assets.' Unless handicapped by extremely mechanical odds or inferior leadership, an army of real fighting men cannot be stopped except by an army of equal or better 'man character.' "

All training thereafter conformed to this principle, which stressed the importance of physical and moral fitness, combined with a spirit of team-work in the employment of all weapons. It is believed that very much of the later accomplishments of the division during battle can be traced to the attention given these principles during the long training period.

Speaking briefly and generally of these three subdivisions of training above mentioned, it may be said that so far as individual character was concerned, the division had the advantage of possessing an extraordinary personnel. The men were volunteers. They were in the military service of their own volition, because they believed in the country and its institutions and in the cause which had carried the country into the war. Almost wholly the men of the division came from homes where the families led good, healthy, normal lives and where they, the young men, had been brought up to worship God in some form and to believe intensely in the obligation of the citizen to support his government by military service in time of war. The tendency, therefore, of these young men in relation to their habits and conduct was to be law-abiding and well behaved, a tendency quite firmly founded upon some form of early religious training in the home and the church. Obviously this was excellent material with which to build military character. Military character is moral character,

plus a highly developed sense of responsibility to the government and its cause, which prompts the soldier almost automatically, by virtue of his training, to be responsive to orders, prompt and thorough in their execution and ready to endure heavy punishment in the form of fatigue, discouragement or injury without being thwarted or deterred from accomplishing his mission. It may be said that this field of training is the one calling for the hardest and most intelligent work on the part of instructors. Many men readily attain expertness in the use of arms. Many are possessed of such intelligence, perception and zeal that they are able to execute particular jobs at particular times with remarkable success. But in the field of military character building, the process of training meets difficult obstacles almost from the beginning. These obstacles are the confirmed habits of men, which make some shiftless, others inattentive, or frivolous or tardy, superficial, faint-hearted, pessimistic, wilful or garrulous.

In this field of military character development, recourse was had to every available helpful agency for the purpose of insuring the highest possible standards attainable. These were religious influences, which included the chaplains and the local churches and the allied auxiliaries, such as the Red Cross, Y. M. C. A., Knights of Columbus, Jewish Welfare Board, War Camp Community Service, enlisted men's clubs, etc. These agencies in their relations with the men employed methods based upon reason, precept, example and exhortation. The military methods employed in this field were necessarily founded upon compulsion and for the purpose of establishing, by constant repetition, fixed and correct habits of thought and of action. Promptness, for example, developed and stimulated by enforced repetitions, becomes confirmed habit. Men were required to make formations on time and precisely in the uniform prescribed for the occasion, with inevitable punishment for failure in any detail. They were required to salute with most punctilious regard for the position of the fingers, hand, arm, head and eyes, with inevitable punishment for neglect as to any detail. The psychology of the salute played a most important part in the development of military character. There were so many officers at the camp that soldiers were constantly required throughout every day of the training period to render the prescribed salute and by the manner of its rendition to disclose to all who might see, this earmark of their zeal, intelligence, mental and physical alertness, precision and attention to detail.

A system for checking salutes by individuals and units was inaugurated. The results accomplished justified what was done. So much stress was laid upon the salute that in the course of a few months salutes were rendered with such automatic precision that they constituted a continuing demonstration to the mass of the men of their own homogeneity as a division and of the thoroughness and precision of the individual officers and men. Psychologically, the effect was stimulating to their confidence and morale.

In the field of physical training it was laid down as a maxim that

the physical excellence of a command is not to be judged by the athletic prowess of a few champions, but rather by the physical skill, strength and endurance of the mass. Athletic meets were, therefore, not over-encouraged. On the other hand, games employing large numbers were encouraged. So superior seemed the British system of physical training to anything which we had employed in our own army that with slight modifications it was adopted and given over almost wholly to the charge of Major John B. Sharp, the Buffs Regiment, British army, who was one of the able officers sent to the division by the British Military Mission to aid in the training of the troops.

Major Sharp established and maintained a high standard of disciplined efficiency, not only in the work of physical training, but also in all branches of instruction conducted by the British *personnel.* He was ably assisted by Company Sergeant Major William Tector of the Leinster Regiment, who was one of the experienced instructors of the British Army Gymnastic Corps. This man's natural ability as an instructor was so exceptional as to call for some mention. Sergeant Major Tector had been wounded on several occasions during the war and this carried with it a certain glamour for the young men of the division who were training for war. He possessed real qualities of leadership, in that the men developed for him a real affection, although when on duty he was exacting and strenuous in his comments and criticisms.

It was the theory of the British system of physical training that the war had shown the necessity for something more than mere muscular development in the physical training of soldiers. Raids and local combats conducted by groups and detachments of the British army early in the war had indicated the desirability of some form of physical training which would stimulate the attention of the men, as well as develop their muscles and at the same time tighten the relation between the mind and muscle, so that the latter would become automatically and instantaneously responsive to the former and the former instantaneously resourceful in applying methods to aid the latter when hard pressed. British combat experience had indicated that groups of fighting men are most effective when their training is such that at the height of the noise and confusion of local combat they are as a team automatically responsive to commands.

The men trained at Spartanburg will not soon forget the so-called "O'Grady Game," which was one of those introduced by Major Sharp. This game, designed for the purpose of developing the coordination of mind and muscle, requires that the men of the detachment who are to play the game shall not obey any order or command which is not given with the authority of "O'Grady." This authority is indicated by prefixing to the command or order the words "O'Grady says." For example, the officer or non-commissioned officer in charge of the game roars out, "Forward! March!!" without prefixing to the command "O'Grady says." Promptly some men are certain to execute the command in violation of







Physical training at Camp Wadsworth under Sergeant Major Tector of the British Army Gymnastic Corps

the rules of the game. These men are immediately singled out and given some stunt to perform which involves physical exercise and some element of ridicule, such as turning three somersaults or climbing a tree, after which they fall in again. The instructor resumes his commands, sometimes prefixing the warning "O'Grady says" and sometimes not. Men who do not promptly respond to the order when it is given with the authority of "O'Grady," or who respond when it is not given with his announced authority, are summarily disciplined in some such manner as that indicated. When the game is applied to troops who have had considerable training in its application, they are exercised in most violent fashion by a storm of commands, some of which are with the authority of "O'Grady" and others not. The game calls for imagination and ingenuity, as well as a powerful commanding voice on the part of the instructor, while in the men it develops a strenuous readiness for rough-and-tumble action, controlled by a keen and alert responsiveness of mind.



Major Sharp and Sergeant Major Tector, British Army, conducting physical training

There were numerous other games constantly played by every company of every regiment in the division. From every training group, men of exceptional physical fitness and mental alertness were picked and sent to a special training course for the development of physical training instructors. These were subjected to an exhaustive course of physical training under Major Sharp's personal supervision and from this group were selected the best, who were made platoon instructors of physical training throughout the division.

In the field of team-work training, some of the games above referred to were specially adapted to demonstrate the superiority of team-work among men, over the individual efforts of those whose work was uncoordinated. Company wrestling matches, platoon against platoon, were employed for the development of team-work. Opposing platoons of equal strength would stack arms, shed their coats and charge each other. Men thrown down were to remain down until the decision of the instructor

was announced. The platoon with the greatest number of men standing at the termination of hostilities was announced as the winner.

Soon it was found that team-work in pursuance of a plan was more effective in result that a mere mass of unrelated effort on the part of strong men. In march-outs it was the record made by the company with no stragglers that counted, not that of a company which came in first, but with ten per cent. of its strength left to hobble along after the rest of the command. Accordingly, team-work was developed so that the company commander concerned himself largely with the conservation of the endurance not of the best half of his personnel, but of the weaker half, so that at the end of the march he might be enabled to bring into play the full man power of his company.

Training in the use of weapons and in tactics was of course covered by the schools and by the daily drill and evolution of units. The character and diversity of the specialty schools may be understood by enumerating them and giving an outline of their work. They were:

GRENADE SCHOOL (Hand and Rifle). All foot soldiers were put through the hand grenade course and a very large percentage through the course in the use of rifle grenades. The course covered an understanding of the make-up and of all details affecting grenades and their uses, with practice in throwing and firing dummy grenades, finishing with practice with live grenades. This school was in charge of Lieutenant Pierre Forestier, 119th Infantry, French army, who was one of the French officers detailed by the French Military Mission to assist in the training of the division. This experienced officer inspired enthusiasm for the attainment of proficiency in the use of grenades. He was largely responsible for bringing the personnel of the division to a high state of combat efficiency in this specialty. He accompanied the division overseas and continued his valuable services during the early combat training in Flanders. Lieutenant Forestier was assisted by Aspirant Edgard Mercier, Third Mixte Zouave Tirailleurs, French army. Captains William H. Curtiss and Raymond F. Hodgden of the 105th Infantry and First Lieutenant Arthur J. McKenna, of the 107th Infantry, were assigned to this school as instructors, and gave most efficient assistance to Lieutenant Forestier.

BAYONET FIGHTING AND PHYSICAL TRAINING SCHOOL. This was the course through which non-commissioned officers and others specially selected to serve as instructors in platoon were schooled in these subjects. This school was in charge of Major Sharp and has already been referred to. Captains Cleveland L. Waterbury and Harry Vaughn, Officers Reserve Corps, First Lieutenants Harry L. Strattan of the 107th Infantry and Murray Taylor of the 106th Infantry and Sergeant Emil Roth, 107th Infantry, were assigned to this school as instructors, and by their methods and dash put the spirit of the bayonet into all who came under this instruction.

MUSKETRY SCHOOL. The course provided by this school was for the purpose of developing expert instructors in musketry training. The



Foreign instructors. Left to right: Lieutenant Ernest Veyret, French Army; Captain A. N. Braithwaite, British Army; Lieutenant A. Borde, French Army; Major John B. Sharp, British Army; Major General O'Ryan; Captain C. Gaston Veyssiere, French Army; Captain Harold H. Deans, British Army; Lieutenant Charles W. Smith, French Army; Captain H. H. Johnson, British Army

course included theory and practice of rifle fire, methods and effects of fire, and the relation of rapidity, accuracy, distance, cover, shelter, visibility and control, to fire effectiveness in battle. It was in charge of Major Joseph J. Daly, Division Ordnance Officer, who was a graduate of the School of Musketry, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Majors Frederick M. Waterbury, Ordnance Department, Walter P. Gibson, 74th New York Infantry, and William A. Turnbull, 108th Infantry, and Second Lieutenant Waldemar Busing, 106th Infantry, were assigned to this school as instructors. The long experience of these officers in this field of training and their unshakable belief that the rifle would win the war impressed the infantry of the division with the effectiveness and dependability of rifle fire in combat.



Motorcycle detachment of Division Headquarters Troop

AUTOMATIC ARMS SCHOOL. Here were trained the automatic riflemen of the Infantry companies in the technical use of automatic arms. These included the Lewis gun, later used by the division with the British army, the light Browning, used by the American army, and the Chauchat, used by the French army. This school for a time was in charge of Captain Charles G. Veyssiere, Infantry, French army, who was one of the French instructors who assisted in the training of the division. Captain Veyssiere, though a quiet type, had won a very warm place in the hearts of the men and was very popular with them. Much of his work in the automatic arms school was with the French Chauchat rifle, a weapon in which our men did not place much faith.

Later, with the return to the division of some of our own officers who

had been graduated from the School of Arms, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, this work was taken over by them. Among these were Captain Ernest L. Schroder, 71st New York Infantry, and First Lieutenant Thomas J. Coursey, 108th Infantry.

MACHINE GUN SCHOOL. Major Edward McLeer, Jr., commanding the 104th Machine Gun Battalion at the time, and who later became Divisional Machine Gun Officer, with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, had charge of this school after it had been organized by Lieutenant Colonel Henry J. Cookinham of the 1st New York Infantry. The latter in the absence of *materiel* had succeeded in making considerable progress in the theoretical instruction of officers and men. Later, after Major McLeer took charge, the school was furnished with a few Colt machine guns and some Vickers machine guns. Captain Kenneth Gardner, 107th Infantry, was assigned to this school as Executive Officer, and First Lieutenant George L. Schelling, 106th Machine Gun Battalion, as Supply Officer. This school constructed its own machine gun range and provided constant training of a practical character in the solution of machine gun problems and the development of machine gun non-commissioned officers. This school had assigned as instructors, Captain Albert W. Putnam, 105th Machine Gun Battalion, First Lieutenant Robert R. Molyneux and Second Lieutenant Walter G. Andrews of the 104th Machine Gun Battalion.

ONE POUNDER SCHOOL. No one pounder cannon were furnished the division until after its arrival in France and, accordingly, the instruction in this field was confined to theoretical work.

STOKES MORTAR SCHOOL. This school was in charge of Captain A. N. Braithwaite, General List, British army, who had considerable experience in combat with the Stokes mortar. This officer, a winner of the Military Cross, conducted the training of Infantry and Artillery units armed with trench mortars. He was later succeeded by Captain Alfred Hall, also of the British army, who accompanied the division to France, and aided in its battle training in Flanders. The personnel of the Trench Mortar Battery and of the Stokes Mortar Platoons were trained both in theory and practice in the school. Captain Hall was assisted by Sergeant Frank Cookson, 20th London Regiment, British army. First Lieutenant Donald M. Ray was assigned to this school as instructor.

No Stokes mortars were furnished the division until about sixty days before its departure from Camp Wadsworth. In the absence of these weapons mortars were improvised. Light mortars of three-inch gas pipe were constructed by the men while bombs were made of milk cans and other containers. A great amount of practical experience was had in the selection of primary and alternative Stokes mortar positions, the construction of shelters and dugouts and generally in the work of trench and Stokes mortar detachments in combat.

GAS DEFENSE SCHOOL. This school was in charge of Captain Harold H. Deans of the King's Own Scottish Borderers, British army, an exceptionally able and industrious officer, who knew from practical experience and suffering the importance of efficient gas defense, he having

been badly gassed during active service with the British army. Just prior to the departure of the division for France this officer was returned to active service with his regiment and was subsequently killed in action. At Camp Wadsworth great attention to the subject of gas defense was insisted upon and all the officers and men of the division were constantly practised in all phases of this specialty. Officers and men were required at stated periods to drill and work while wearing the box respirator. They were tested practically in detecting various kinds of gas and by constant attention to this important subject were impressed with the dire consequences following inefficiency of defense against gas. Every officer and man of the division was subjected to the effects of both chlorine and tear gas, while wearing the respirator, in order that his confidence in its effectiveness might be stimulated by actual test. This was done in gas chambers erected for the purpose. Demonstrations were also given outdoors of cloud gas. While occupying the trench system at the camp, battalions were subjected to light clouds of lachrymal gas. The excellence of the training of the division in gas defense accounts for the small number of gas casualties sustained by the division during active operations, although most of these operations involved long and violent enemy gas bombardments. Captain Deans was assisted in his work by Company Sergeant Major A. MacFarlane, 7th West York Regiment, one of the British sergeant instructors. First Lieutenants Harry Adsit, 106th Machine Gun Battalion, and O. E. Roberts, Sanitary Corps, and Sergeant Chester M. Scott, Sanitary Corps, were instructors in gas defense, while First Lieutenant Lindsay Peters, Medical Corps, instructed the personnel of the division in the use, care and repair of the gas mask.

CAMOUFLAGE SCHOOL. This school was made up of one noncommissioned officer from every platoon in the division and was in charge of Captain A. W. Palmer, 102d Engineers, and Second Lieutenant Linwood P. Ames, who was at that time acting as aide to the Division Commander, and who proved a most efficient instructor in this field. The school featured the importance of utilizing natural cover with or without modification for securing invisibility of troops, rather than to attempt to construct wholly artificial cover and freak objects concerning which so much had been written in the newspapers. This school was most successful in developing throughout the division an appreciation of the security to be gained by invisibility and the readiness with which invisibility may be attained by imagination, resourcefulness and skill, in the selection of natural features of the ground supplemented by the use of available planks, earth, stones, hedges, netting, weeds, etc.

ENGINEER SCHOOL. This school, consisting of a Sappers and Bombers Section and a Field Fortification Section, was in charge of Captain Ernest F. Robinson of the 102d Engineers, with Second Lieutenant E. Veyret and Aspirant Eugene Dalle, 9th Engineer Regiment, French army, as advisers. Captain George D. Snyder conducted the instruction in sapping and bombing, while the field fortification instruction was con-

ducted by Captain William E. Lane, 102d Engineers, and Second Lieutenant Rexford Crewe, 105th Infantry.

SNIPING, PATROLLING AND RECONNAISSANCE SCHOOL. This school was in charge of Captain (later Major) H. H. Johnson, M. C., the Welsh Regiment, British army, who was a specialist in this field. This officer accompanied the division to France and aided materially in the scout training of the division in Flanders. From every infantry company, non-commissioned officers were detailed for a special course in this work. Training was almost wholly practical. It was in part conducted at the rifle range and in part at night in the no man's land of the camp trench system.

TRANSPORTATION SCHOOL. The course in this school covered the transportation by rail and ocean transport of troops and *materiel* and, as well, the care and supervision of motor cars and wagons. The school was in charge of Major James T. Loree, Assistant Division Quartermaster. All transport officers and supply sergeants, as well as certain other selected officers, were required to take this course. Instruction in rail transportation was given by Captain William T. Starr, 102d Trains Headquarters, motor transportation by First Lieutenant William W. Ackerly, 102d Ammunition Train, assisted by Privates Charles H. Newell and Charles W. Mason, of the 102d Ammunition Train; animal drawn transportation by Captain John D. Webber, 106th Field Artillery, and pack transportation by Captain David D. Mohler, 102d Engineers, assisted by Master Engineer Harry Elkan, of the same regiment.

LIAISON AND COMMUNICATION SCHOOL. This school was in charge of Major William L. Hallahan, commanding the 102d Field Signal Battalion, who was later made division signal officer, with the rank of lieutenant colonel. This course covered theoretical and practical instruction and training in the maintenance of relations between units in battle, both laterally and between front and rear, and an understanding of and practice with the equipment employed in the maintenance of such relations. These included the buzzer, the telephone, pigeons, flares, rockets, panels, radio, runners, message bombs, wigwag, semaphore and balloon observation. Lieutenant Charles W. Smith, 8th Engineer Regiment, French army, assisted by Sergeant Eugene Grand of the same regiment, acted as adviser, while the instructors were First Lieutenants Gordon Ireland, L. J. Gorman and James G. Motley, of the 102d Field Signal Battalion.

SCHOOL OF EQUITATION. This school was in charge of Captain Geoffrey Taylor, 12th New York Infantry, who was assisted by First Lieutenant Harley W. Black, 104th Machine Gun Battalion. This school was intended primarily for such officers and non-commissioned officers of infantry and engineers as were not skilled in horsemanship. The officers and enlisted men of mounted units were generally good horsemen, and where they were newly commissioned or enlisted, their training in horsemanship was provided for in their own units.

SCHOOL FOR BANDS AND FIELD MUSIC. This school was in charge of Captain Henry E. Greene, Adjutant, 105th Infantry; Band Leader Francis W. Sutherland of the 104th Field Artillery Band, a musician, leader and disciplinarian of rare merit, was assigned to this school as instructor. He developed in this school the bands and field music of the division to a very satisfactory standard of excellence. He was assisted by Band Sergeant Charles F. Swarthout of the 107th Infantry. From this school there was developed out of the personnel of all the bands of the division a provisional division band of more than 100 pieces which led the division at home and abroad in important reviews and ceremonies.

SCHOOL FOR TEAMSTERS, HORSESHOERS AND PACKERS. This school was in charge of Captain Richard B. Wainwright, Quartermaster Reserve Corps, and was the agency whereby the teamsters, horseshoers and packers of the division were tested and developed to meet prescribed standards and whereby also their *esprit* was stimulated and they were made to feel that they played an important rôle in the life the division. Much of the unsatisfactory work given the army in the past by teamsters, more particularly, was undoubtedly the result of a practice which obtained in many places of relieving the rougher men from units where they were causing trouble and assigning them for service with the wagon trains.

These schools were all grouped under the general supervision of the Divisional School of the Line, of which Lieutenant Colonel William A. Taylor of the 108th Infantry was the commandant. Colonel Taylor, a graduate of the Field Officers School at Fort Leavenworth some years before the war, was eminently fitted for the task. The function of the Division School of the Line was to coordinate the efforts of the schools mentioned, to arrange schedules and recommend the detail or relief of instructors and students.

On January 5, 1919, when the course at the Third Officers Training School was begun, Colonel Taylor was relieved from the Division School of the Line and placed in command of the Training School. The command of the Division School of the Line was then taken over by Lieutenant Colonel John B. Tuck of the 106th Infantry. Colonel Tuck brought to this important duty long experience as a military instructor, a knowledge of military organization, an acquaintance with the personnel of the division, and a judicial type of mind, which made for impartiality in his relations with subordinates and in the apportionment of time and facilities among the specialists who were always in rivalry over the relative importance of their respective activities.

Reference has been made to the trench system at Camp Wadsworth. This system was laid out by Colonel Vanderbilt of the Engineers and Captain Veyssiere of the French Army. It covered a front of 700 yards, while the linear length of trench excavation totaled eight miles. It was complete in every particular. It was occupied by the troops, a battalion of infantry at a time, supported by one or more machine gun companies, and sanitary detachments. The system included shelters and bomb-proof

dugouts. It afforded opportunity for every unit to engage in practical instruction in the use of the pick and shovel, revetment, trench sanitation, the construction of listening posts, barbed wire entanglements, saps, mines, machine gun emplacements and lines of communication. At first, battalions occupied the trench system in turn for a period of twenty-four hours. Later the practice was extended to seventy-two-hour periods. Much of this service was during the hardest kind of winter weather. An improvised trench representing an enemy front line, faced the front of the system. This trench was occupied at unexpected times during the night by small detachments of troops representing enemy front line forces. These detachments were occasionally formed of parties from the Snipers and Reconnaissance School, which conducted minor operations in no man's land for the purpose of wire cutting, gaining information by raids and listening in. These operations served to keep the troops occupying the trenches in a continued state of readiness. The result of this very practical character of trench warfare training was that the units of the division after their arrival in France were enabled to take over trenches from British forces with little difficulty.

In the Appendix will be found orders and bulletins covering the subject of training at Camp Wadsworth in greater detail than can be given in the text.

An improvised rifle range was established on the Snake Road immediately outside the camp limits. This range was used by the Automatic Arms School, by the Snipers' School and for the target practice of recruits.

The main rifle range was at Glassy Rock about twenty-five miles distant from the camp. It was constructed on a tract of 30,000 acres of land, which included facilities for the fire training of the field artillery. The advantages afforded by this great training tract were many. It



Artillery Camp at Glassy Rock, S. C., winter of 1917-18

covered a very diversified terrain including small villages, woodland, cotton fields and farms, as well as rugged mountain sections. It enabled the fire training of infantry machine gunners and of the Field Artillery to be supplemented by field firing exercises employing the combined arms in action, and it is believed that the field firing exercises carried out there shortly before the division left for France, were the most advanced exercises ever executed in this country by so large a body of troops.

The work of securing leases for this great tract of land was one of considerable magnitude. The tract was made up of a considerable number of relatively small farms, occupied almost wholly by mountaineers, who seldom met or dealt with strangers. The task of securing this property for the government was entrusted to Captain Cornelius W. Wickersham, who was one of the assistant chiefs of staff of the division. By his untiring energy, tact and legal skill, this really difficult problem of securing the land desired was carried out promptly.

Two complete infantry ranges of 100 targets each were constructed by means of soldier labor. The range included firing lines, both open and trench, up to 1,000 yards. All commands armed with the rifle practiced on this range, as well as all officers and enlisted men armed with the pistol. All the infantry regiments of the division completed Special Course "C," Changes No. 19, Small Arms Firing Manual, 1917, twice. The 105th and 106th Infantry Regiments and part of the 108th fired in addition a modification of that course. The field artillery regiments were sent to Glassy Rock and served there during periods varying from seven to ten weeks. The 105th Field Artillery, under Lieutenant Colonel DeWitt C. Weld in the absence of Colonel George Albert Wingate, who was taking the Field Officers' Course at the Army Schools at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, spent most of the very severe winter of that year camped in the mountains at Glassy Rock.

The field artillery had practically an unlimited supply of ammunition and were firing almost constantly under all kinds of terrain and weather conditions. Their practice included battery and battalion problems in open warfare and regimental and brigade problems in firing barrages. Their work also included practice in the construction of gun pits, shelters and dugouts, as well as the occupation of positions by batteries, battalions and regiments.

On one occasion during the practice of Battery E of the 106th Field Artillery, commanded by First Lieutenant William B. Gaskin in the absence of Captain Harry L. Gilchriese who was at the School of Arms at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, one of the 4.7 howitzers used by the regiment burst with a great explosion. It seemed miraculous that a number of officers and men were not killed. Major Guido F. Verbeck, commanding the battalion, was at the time within a few feet of the piece. The cradle and what was left of the gun were thrown directly to the rear for a distance of about fifty feet, passing between the gunner and number one cannoneer without injury to either. One large, heavy fragment of the breach, thrown to a great height fell directly into the centre of a circle

around which were gathered the field telephone operators, lying on the ground with their instruments, the fragment cutting off the corner of one of the telephone instruments. None of the operators were injured. Several men of another gun section were slightly injured and the number six cannoneer was badly wounded by a fragment which drove through his leg.

The machine gunners of the division having completed their elementary course of theoretical and practical training were sent to the Glassy Rock range, where they worked out many problems in indirect machine gun fire. On one occasion, although using the obsolete guns referred to earlier in this chapter, they struck 84 percent of the targets representing enemy forces. These targets were 600 in number and indicated an enemy assaulting in three waves of two lines each. The range to these waves varied from 950 to 750 yards. There were 100 targets to a line, with ten yards distance between lines, and approximately thirty yards between waves. Five machine gun companies, some with two and some with four guns fired the barrage. Five hundred and four of these 600 small targets which were about two feet square were hit. In all, 1,750 actual hits were registered on the targets struck. This problem was one covering distribution of fire.

The 102d Engineers in addition to the construction of roads and bridges in and about Camp Wadsworth and at the rifle range, also aided in the construction of all the ranges at Glassy Rock and furnished detachments of their officers and men to supervise the construction of the trench system at the camp. Detachments of the engineer regiment were also employed in the construction of pontoon bridges at a small lake at Whitney, S. C. On March 4th, 1918, the engineer regiment, less the First Battalion, was sent to Camp Humphreys, Belvoir, Virginia. On March 17th, Company B joined the detachment at Belvoir. They took over the construction of railroad bridges at that place. This latter work in particular won for this regiment considerable commendation from the authorities at Washington. The railroad construction referred to was under general supervision of Colonel Cornelius Vanderbilt and his staff and in the immediate charge of Captains George D. Snyder, Norris P. Stockwell, George H. Johnson and Alexander McC. Barrett, commanding Companies D, E, F and B respectively. The regiment remained at Camp Humphreys until May 10th, when it entrained for Newport News, enroute for overseas.

The 102d Field Signal Battalion maintained good radio communication at all times between Camp Wadsworth and the infantry and artillery ranges at Glassy Rock. They also constructed a telephone line from the two ranges for a distance of twelve miles, to the nearest commercial telephone station.

In the spring of 1918, officers of the division received divisional practice in liaison during battle. Every company and higher unit was represented by its officers, signal detachment and runners, in the conduct of a battle liaison and communication exercise. In these exercises, which covered the country about Camp Wadsworth, communication was main-

tained by radio, wireless, buzzer, earth induction sets, visual signalling, runners and pigeons.

Troops going to and from Glassy Rock were required to march the twenty-five intervening miles. In the Fall of 1917, most infantry commands were required to make this march in three days. Later the march was made in two days, and in spring of 1918 every regiment made the distance in one day without straggling. This indicates the physical excellence of the division prior to its departure for service abroad. On all of these marches complete equipment was carried on the person.

The practical field training of all troops of the division was completed during the months of March and April, 1918. Towards the end of this training period a series of combined arms field firing exercises, already referred to, were executed on the Glassy Rock tract. These exercises included the firing of a barrage by the field artillery brigade for a practice attack by each infantry regiment. Each regiment formed for attack in an outlined system of trenches. Occupation of this trench system took place on a 500-yard front after the artillery had registered its fire for the error of the day. All details of an infantry attack under battle conditions were carried out. At zero hour the artillery fired and a few seconds later the infantry heard for the first time the scream of the "whiz-bangs" as they flew over their heads and burst a hundred yards in front of the infantry start line. In these barrage problems the artillery fired a standing barrage for three minutes with percussion shrapnel. At zero hour plus three minutes the artillery barrage moved forward at the rate of 100 yards per minute in lifts of 50 yards, each gun firing four rounds per minute. At zero hour plus four minutes the infantry in successive waves moved forward. In this manner the advance of each regiment was continued for a distance of 400 yards, when the artillery fire ceased, in order not to expend too much ammunition. The psychological effect upon units which were subjected to these tests was marked. They had in other words, experienced at least, many of the sensations of troops waiting to move forward under a real barrage and then actually participated in an advance behind a rolling barrage. There is no question, but the infantry of the 27th Division, as a result of their rather radical training at Glassy Rock, were very much more effective in their first attack in Belgium, when they went forward behind a supporting barrage.

Other units beside the infantry which participated in these barrage exercises, were one company of military police, part of the engineer regiment, two ambulance companies and the personnel of the Third Officers' Training School, which was then in progress at Camp Wadsworth.

The barrage exercises were followed by open warfare exercises. In order that the training might be thorough, a corps of control officers was constituted of the most capable officers of the division. These numbered about thirty. In order that the demands upon these officers in their conduct of the exercises might not embrace too great an area, the employed troops in each exercise were limited to a detachment of the division composed of one regiment of infantry, one battalion of field artillery,

one machine gun battalion, one company of engineers, one signal company, two ambulance companies, one field hospital, one company from the trains, and a detachment of military police. The control officers were not umpires. They were called control officers because it was their function to make decisions, and, as well, to offer criticism on the spot. At times they made rulings in relation to losses; and occasionally specified particular officers and men to fall out as wounded. This was done by handing the designated officer or soldier a tag, which showed the character of his wound. Such cases were required to be handled as they would be handled in battle, by rendering first aid at the regimental aid post, from which point they would proceed to station for slightly wounded or be evacuated to the dressing station and thence to the Field Hospital. The detachment of troops engaged usually constituted in each problem the advance guard or the rear guard of an assumed division on the march. Infantry troops were supplied with 100 rounds of service ammunition per man, with additional ammunition in the combat wagons. The field artillery carried 100 rounds of service ammunition per gun, both H. E. shell and shrapnel. The machine gun companies were provided with 1,000 rounds per gun. In the exercises the troops advanced as they would advance under actual battle conditions. Obviously no troops could represent the enemy, as the firing was to be conducted with service ammunition. To the non-military reader the absence of targets or other features to represent the enemy may seem like requiring the troops to exercise too great an imagination in relation to battle conditions. Such view, however, is not correct. On the contrary, it is remarkable how little one can see of the enemy in ordinary engagements at distances beyond 100 or 200 yards. The positions of the enemy were, therefore, indicated by each control officer to the unit to which he was attached. His manner of doing this was to state: "Lieutenant, your platoon is now being fired upon from the direction of that hill. The fire thus far has consisted of thirty or forty rifle shots and a machine gun burst apparently from that clump of bushes distant from here about 1,000 yards and about ten mils to the right of that barn. One of your sergeants has just reported seeing smoke of the machine gun from that point." This and similar statements made by the control officers were not haphazard statements made on the spur of the moment, but were all in pursuance of a general scheme for the conduct of the exercise, carefully prepared in advance, after which the entire corps of control officers had gone over the ground in preparation for the parts they were to play during the exercises.

Obviously, it is impossible without using service ammunition in this way, to approximate battle conditions in the training of troops. Without the use of ammunition the element of danger is lacking, which means that a premium upon the exercise of the highest standard of fire discipline is lacking. The noise of the firing is so great that it injects into the maneuver exercise one of the greatest obstacles to command and communication. In no other manner is it believed, than by practical field

firing exercises, can the proper relation between the field artillery and the infantry be burned into the minds of junior officers and enlisted men.

In the first of these exercises and under the stress of the excitement, battalion commanders, checked in their advance, frequently determined to deliver assaults without any reference to supporting artillery or machine gun fire, although these officers theoretically knew the necessity for such supporting fire, as well as the writers of text books on the subject. After frequent participation in such exercises, the technique in relation to these matters which had been correct theoretically, but inefficient practically, developed into dependable and almost automatic responsiveness to the tactical suggestions of the occasion. In no part of the division were these exercises more profitable than in the Field Artillery arm. In the Field Artillery schools of our service, very excellent work had been done in the development of gunnery technique. Batteries had also been exercised and trained in the selection and occupation of artillery positions. They had often participated with infantry troops in maneuver exercises with blank ammunition, but on such occasions the infantry knew nothing of what the artillery was doing, except when they heard a few blank charges fired in their rear, indicating that the artillery was doing something. In practical field firing exercises of the kind mentioned, however, it was vital for both the infantry and the artillery, that correct team work should result, so as to avoid accident to the infantry from wayward artillery fire. In our army artillery schools, where infantry troops were usually lacking, the presence of the infantry was assumed. The psychological effect of this was that the assumed infantry was unconsciously and conveniently made to do the things that the artillery thought the infantry should do. In war, however, the artillery, if it is to be of any use, does what the infantry requires. One artillery officer in the early part of these practical exercises at Glassy Rock, having tried ineffectively three times to place his battery in action to support the checked advance of an infantry battalion, said with disgust that the terrain was entirely different from that of the artillery school at Fort Sill, and, therefore, quite unsuited to the use of artillery. This officer did not seem to appreciate that the ancient days, when opposing armies moved to a previously selected and well adapted battle ground to test the relative efficiency, were passed. In time, however, the artillery of the division learned that the technique of gunnery was more or less of an exact science and that reasonable excellence can be acquired very readily in that field by alert minded young officers, but that the handling of batteries in action so as to support infantry effectively, was apparently a limitless field presenting new problems upon every occasion, problems which called for the exercise of judgment, initiative and great skill in estimating the value of ground and the visibility of approaches thereto. The importance of these very advanced forms of practical training can hardly be overestimated in the development of the division as a combat unit. The troops which participated in the field firing exercises knew the dangers involved. In the open warfare attacks subdivisions of the line were at times one hundred yards in advance of other parts of

the line, due to advantages of cover offered on their immediate front. Such situations called for the automatic suspense of fire by flanking platoons, until they had succeeded in gaining the more advanced front. When service ammunition is being used under such circumstances, and the infantry has parts of its line extended through woods with machine gun units and the field artillery also delivering their supporting fire, it will be obvious that a very high standard of discipline and skill is essential to avoid numerous accidents. Although hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition were fired during these realistic battle exercises, no accident marred their conduct. On April 12th, after the conclusion of one of them, however, a cartridge which had been unaccountably left in a machine gun, became so overheated by the high temperature of the air cooled gun, that it exploded and caused the death of Corporal John Kowalski, Company A, 104th Machine Gun Battalion, a most excellent soldier.

At the conclusion of every exercise the control officers turned in memoranda of their observations and criticisms and these, supplemented by his own observations, were made the basis of critiques by the Division Commander to the officers of the troops participating. The work of the control officers was so effective as to call for mention of at least those who played the more prominent roles. They were Brigadier General James W. Lester, Colonel Charles I. DeBevoise, Lieutenant Colonel William A. Taylor, Major George E. Roosevelt, Major Andrew E. Tuck, Captain William H. Curtiss and Captain Cornelius W. Wickersham.

A feature that affected training in the 27th Division and which later affected in marked manner the fighting efficiency of the division, was the fact that the units of the division were locality units. By locality units is meant that they had existed for many years as National Guard units located in particular sections of the state, from which they drew their recruits. To some extent this condition was modified when the infantry regiments were given their war designations and were brought up to the new prescribed strength by transfers of men from other regiments of the New York Division. But the men so transferred came from locality regiments and so they possessed not only pride of organization, but what was equally important, a sense of responsibility to the people of the locality from which they came. Thus it happened that in the 27th Division, as in other Guard divisions where similar conditions existed, the men in their conduct and in their relations with each other, were not only influenced by their individual moral sense and by the discipline which governed them but also and materially, by the knowledge that dishonorable conduct was bound to be reported and perhaps even exaggerated where it was least desired that such conduct should be known, namely, the home locality. It could not be otherwise where men, all coming from the same place, were striving together in the intimacies of military life in the same command. And so when the time of battle came and the sensibilities of men were shocked or benumbed by the sights and sounds about them, and when the instinct of self-preservation struggled fiercely to loosen shackles of discipline, the decisive factor in the control of conduct was frequently the

warning thought, "What would people say if I am not in with the rest at the finish?" It must be obvious, too, that the ties which bind men together in a military command are greatly strengthened when their military relations are augmented by the relations and mutual obligations growing out of a common home locality. Hundreds of instances are known in the division where the fighting spirit of men was tremendously stimulated by the desire to punish the enemy for the loss of a pal, not only because he was a member of the same unit, but because he was a fellow townsman, to whose family an obligation was created to avenge his loss. These emotions are human, and under the circumstances, become military assets in battle. In the smoke barrage of battle when individuals lost contact with their units, their greatest concern in many cases was the public opinion of the company in relation to the absence, and the fear that the absence might be misconstrued and reported back home. The gang spirit of the division was very exacting in relation to absence from check roll at the conclusion of combats. Slight wounds were not deemed to be justifiable for retirement from action. In great efforts like the Hindenburg Line assault, scores of cases are on record where officers and men of the division, knocked down by shell fragments or bullets, have gone on to be struck again and again before being killed or permanently put out of action.

One remarkable instance of the feeling of the men in relation to absence from their companies in battle is illustrated by the experience of Privates John W. Rawlinson and Eugene Reynolds, of Company K, 106th Infantry, and an unknown corporal of the 105th Infantry. These three, in the attack on the Hindenburg Line, September 27th, became separated from their companies in the smoke barrage, and meeting by chance, proceeded through the enemy's trench system with a view to connecting with their units. As the trenches through which they were advancing seemed to be occupied, they advanced cautiously and with one of their number acting as advance guard. After proceeding a considerable distance, the latter, looking around the corner of a communicating trench, saw about twenty German soldiers sitting on the fire step of the trench eating bread. The three men quietly conferred and determined to make an immediate attack. Rawlinson and the unknown corporal crept over the top and diagonally across to the trench occupied by the enemy. As they began to throw in their hand grenades, Reynolds opened magazine fire with his rifle from the head of the trench. The enemy party who were not killed or wounded either surrendered or broke to the rear. The latter were followed by Reynolds. It then developed that a short distance down the trench there was a considerable party of enemy machine gunners, enjoying a respite from their long period of firing, this being indicated by large piles of empty cartridge shells alongside a large group of heavy machine guns. The sudden firing and the dashing into their midst of the survivors of the first group caused consternation among the second group, who were promptly covered by the rifles of Rawlinson and the corporal on the ground above them. At this moment a German officer emerged from a dugout and admonished the attacking party, whom

he naturally supposed were but part of a larger group, that further killing was unnecessary—that they all surrendered. At this moment and while the three men were getting the prisoners out of the trench, German machine gunners located at a point some distance away opened fire on the party, but immediately desisted when they saw the helmets of the German soldiers coming out of the trench. The three American soldiers then maneuvered so as to keep the party of prisoners covered by their rifles and at the same time between them and enemy machine gun nests. In this manner and rather appalled by the number of their prisoners, estimated by them to include three officers and between 80 and 100 enlisted men, they marched them to the rear. As a matter of fact, the captors had been so turned about that in the smoke which to some extent still prevailed they did not know which direction was the rear. Preserving their composure, they ordered one of the German officers to head the column toward the American lines. Not knowing that the American soldiers were lost, he headed in the correct direction. Soon the party passed other supporting detachments and reached a regimental aid post. At this time the unknown corporal of the 105th Infantry stated that he already had been away from his command too long and headed back for the front. His attitude of mind illustrates the sense of responsibility to the company spirit already referred to. His identity was never learned. In all probability he was killed while trying to find his own company. The two remaining men, Rawlinson and Reynolds, were equally concerned about their absence from their company. Lying about the aid station were numbers of badly wounded American and German soldiers, and the medical officer in charge, Captain Walter C. Tilden, demanded the use of a detachment of the prisoners to carry back the wounded. Fifty-seven prisoners were turned over and employed for this purpose, but so fearful were the two remaining captors of company opinion that, in the midst of the disturbing events which transpire at a dressing station during battle, they nevertheless demanded and secured from Captain Tilden a receipt for the number of prisoners employed by him. The remainder were marched to the rear and turned over to the military police. Instances might be multiplied of the sense of obligation shown by the men to the home locality and to the standards imposed by the public opinion of the company.

In relation to this subject of training, it may be said that due to the relatively thorough training of the mass of the officers of the division, and of a very considerable percentage of non-commissioned officers, for a period of years priod to the war and including the Mexican border service, they were substantially grounded in those essential things which determine dependability in battle, and hence they were enabled to take up with understanding and zeal the details of the work of preparing the division for its part in the World War. What handicapped the division and the American army as a whole in its war preparation was not so much the problem of the men as the problem of equipping them with the material things needed, and the things needed were not only required

for the actual fighting, but also for their effective training. Examples of this condition may be instanced by the fact that the field artillery of the 27th Division, which was complete on the Mexican border and when it went to Camp Wadsworth, was shortly thereafter embarrassed by having taken from it fifty per cent of its guns, caissons and other artillery material for the purpose of sending the same to other camps where artillery units were completely lacking in guns and equipment.

Again, the signal battalion of the division, very well trained and quite experienced in the use of its material, was handicapped not only in relation to their own activities, but in giving instruction to signal detachments of other units, by an almost complete lack of signal equipment. As late as April, 1918, the organizations of the division, less the signal battalion and the field artillery regiments, possessed only five per cent of their authorized signal equipment. In like manner, although one year had elapsed from the time of our declaration of war, divisions ready to leave for France lacked machine guns, automatic rifles, steel helmets, box respirators and a substantial percentage of almost every other article required.

This is interesting to reflect upon, in view of the fact that for some years preceding the war the cry for preparedness was almost always made in support of more military personnel, rather than in adequate supply of the material things essential for the training and use of troops.

CHAPTER X

MOVEMENT OVERSEAS

THE movement of the division overseas began with the departure of a detachment called the Advance Party. This detachment consisted of the following officers:

Major General John F. O'Ryan, Division Commander.
Captain H. Francis Jaeckel, Jr., Aide de Camp.
First Lieutenant Charles P. Franchot, Aide de Camp.
Second Lieutenant Joseph D. Eddy, Aide de Camp.
Lieutenant Colonel Henry S. Sternberger, Division Quartermaster.
Lieutenant Colonel Walter C. Montgomery, Division Surgeon.
Major Joseph J. Daly, Division Ordnance Officer.
Captain William H. Curtiss, Assistant Operations Officer.
Major Walter L. Bell, 102d Ammunition Train.
Captain George F. Terry, 105th Infantry.
First Lieutenant Leaman S. Broughton, 106th Infantry.
First Lieutenant Clarence H. Higginson, 105th Field Artillery.
Second Lieutenant James S. Wadsworth, Billeting Officer.
Second Lieutenant John Wells, Billeting Officer.
Second Lieutenant Georges R. Vlober, Billeting Officer.

This party left Camp Wadsworth April 29th and on May 1st sailed from Hoboken, New Jersey, aboard U. S. S. *Great Northern.* Upon the departure of the Division Commander from Camp Wadsworth, Brigadier General Robert E. L. Michie, 53d Infantry Brigade, was temporarily assigned to command the division. The Advance Party arrived at Brest May 10th. The trip was uneventful, except for regular drills for the prompt abandonment of ship, and for one or two submarine scares. The *Great Northern* was a triple-screw, oil-burning turbine ship, and relied upon its speed for safety. It was, therefore, unaccompanied by any escort until it arrived near the coast of France, when three destroyers were met. These accompanied the transport into the harbor of Brest.

On April 28th the Headquarters, Supply and Machine Gun Companies of the 107th Infantry entrained at Camp Wadsworth for Newport News, Virginia. The following day, April 29th, the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 107th Infantry left Spartanburg, followed on April 30th by the Headquarters, 54th Infantry Brigade, the 3d Battalion of the 107th Infantry and the Headquarters and Company A of the 106th Machine Gun Battalion. In similar manner Companies B, C and D of the 106th Machine Gun Battalion, the Headquarters, Sanitary Detachment, Supply and Machine Gun Companies of the 108th Infantry and the first section of the 105th Infantry entrained at Camp Wadsworth May 1st. On May 2d Companies A, B, C, D, E and F of the 108th Infantry and the second section of the 105th Infantry left camp for the port of embarkation. On May 3d Companies G, H, I, K, L and M of the 108th Infantry and the third section of the 105th Infantry departed from Spartanburg. On May 4th Division Headquarters, less the

Advance Party, the 104th Machine Gun Battalion, the 102d Trains and Military Police, the 53d Infantry Brigade Headquarters, the 105th Machine Gun Battalion and the remainder of the 105th Infantry left Camp Wadsworth. All these units arrived at Newport News, Virginia, the day following their departure.

On May 6th the 106th Infantry entrained at Camp Wadsworth for Hoboken, New Jersey, embarking immediately aboard the U. S. S. *President Lincoln,* which sailed on May 10th.

On the same day the 102d Engineers (less Companies A and C) entrained at Camp Humphreys, Virginia, while Companies A and C and the Engineer Train, together with the 102d Field Signal Battalion, entrained at Camp Wadsworth. All arrived at Newport News the next day.

The embarkation movement of the division, other than that of the Advance Party and the 106th Infantry, already referred to, began with part of the 107th Infantry, which sailed from Newport News, Va., on the U. S. S. *Susquehanna* on May 9th. The following day the remainder of the 107th Infantry, together with the 54th Infantry Brigade Headquarters, the 106th Machine Gun Battalion and part of the 108th Infantry, sailed on the U. S. S. *Antigone.* The same day the 1st Battalion and part of the 2d Battalion of the 108th Infantry sailed on H. M. S. *Kurtz.*

Division Headquarters, the 53d Infantry Brigade Headquarters, and the 104th and 105th Machine Gun Battalions sailed on May 17th on the U. S. S. *Calamares,* while Company B of the 102d Military Police on the same day embarked on the U. S. S. *Madawaska.* On the same day the U. S. S. *Pocahontas,* transporting the 102d Engineers, and Engineer Train, the Headquarters, 102d Trains and Military Police, Company A, 102d Military Police, and the 102d Field Signal Battalion sailed, while the remainder of the 108th Infantry and the entire 105th Infantry embarked on the U. S. S. *President Grant.* All these units left from Newport News.

Mention has not yet been made of the 52d Field Artillery Brigade. Colonel George Albert Wingate of the 105th Field Artillery had been promoted to the grade of Brigadier General and assigned to command this brigade upon the relief of Brigadier General Charles L. Phillips, who had been sent for special duty to the Pacific Coast. General Phillips had carried the brigade through the earlier phases of its training, including extensive target practice at Glassy Rock, so that upon the return of Colonel Wingate as a graduate of the Field Officers' Course at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and his promotion to the grade of Brigadier General, he had taken over the more advanced training of the brigade.

The Field Artillery Brigade and Trains were the last elements of the division to leave Camp Wadsworth. The Field Artillery Brigade departed from Spartanburg on May 18th. Upon their arrival at Newport News two days later, they went into camp and remained there for a considerable period of time before their overseas movement. This was due to the fact that pursuant to the Abbeville Agreement, which will be referred to in detail later, our government was to rush the infantry of the divisions to the British area and send the artillery and trains later. This arrange-

ment was made because the British had ample forces of artillery, and shipping space given up for the transport of our own artillery would have lessened to that extent the carrying capacity for the needed infantry.

Finally, however, the 52d Field Artillery Brigade under General Wingate sailed from Newport News. This movement commenced on June 6th. The brigade debarked at St. Nazaire, June 18th to 27th and July 12th, and went to Camp de Souge, near Bordeaux, for training. There a number of their officers were utilized as instructors at the school. The training of the brigade had been so satisfactory that their stay at Camp de Souge was not long. The brigade, however, never rejoined the 27th Division during the period of active operations. It was not until after the armistice that the division again saw its own artillery. During the period of operations it served with the 33d and 79th Divisions. An account of its activities with these divisions will be found in a separate chapter.

The ocean voyage, which varied in its duration from seven or eight days to fourteen days, dependent upon the speed of the particular ship and whether or not she was one of a convoy, came as a pleasant change from the arduous life at Camp Wadsworth. All officers afterward reported that the spirits of the men at all times were high. There seemed to exist among them no misgivings concerning the dangers of the voyage, nor of the ultimate outcome of the mission of the American army, or of the part they were to play in it. For the first time in many months the men were free to rest. Their duties aboard ship were light, consisting of physical exercises, careful policing of quarters, guard duty, observing for submarines, administration and kitchen police.

On most ships, more than a hundred soldiers were kept constantly on duty observing for submarines, each post having an assigned sector for observation. These posts were connected up by telephone to a central station. In this work of observation, the zeal of most of the soldiers was most commendable. If a tin can bobbed on the crest of a wave, the officer at the central station would receive a stream of reports of an approaching submarine. Gun crews fore and aft would prepare for action. The troops would be roused from their diversions to secure points of vantage from which to watch the coming battle, soon however, to return to their normal occupations when the true cause of the alarm was understood. After a few incidents of this character aboard each ship, it became more difficult to stimulate the interest of the men in these alarms concerning enemy submarines. Some transports, however, were subjected to actual submarine attacks. No transport carrying 27th Division troops was torpedoed, however. On May 29th the Division Headquarters convoy, consisting of the *Calamares, Madawaska, Pocahontas, President Grant,* and several other smaller ships, was attacked at 5:20 P. M. by an enemy submarine. The guns of the transports as well as those of the U. S. Cruiser *Huntington* went into action and the destroyers circled about and dropped depth bombs. The submarine was reported sunk. On May 30th, the same convoy, minus the *President Grant,* which had left the convoy for the port of Brest, was attacked by enemy submarines and was under

forced draft for one half hour. In the action forty shots were fired, while the destroyers dropped depth bombs and a British airplane dropped bombs from the air. Two submarines were reported sunk during this encounter.

Aboard each ship the men who usually furnished entertainment in the companies and battalions helped to while away the time. After dusk no lights were allowed aboard ship except in the chart room and engine room. Aboard some of the transports moving pictures were permitted to be shown in the salon, the windows of which were carefully covered.

Aboard ship there was some change in the character of food served, and on the whole the change was welcome, largely because it was a change. The supply of fresh water was usually available only during stated hours. Men who shaved at other than the prescribed time were compelled to use salt water. Many men discovered for the first time the difficulties involved in salt water shaving.

Aboard the larger ships an effort was made to publish a paper. Most ships had printing presses and arrangements were made for the publication of wireless news and ship's gossip. One of these papers was "The Sea Serpent," published aboard the *Calamares,* which was called "A Mid-Atlantic Issue of the Gas Attack and Rio Grande Rattler," this being the official division paper. At the head of this sheet the weather forecast was announced as, "Dry—Until we Reach France." An announcement concerning uniform of troops appeared, "Uniform—Life Belts Day and Night." A copy of this paper appears on the next page and is a sample of this effort. The number was made up largely of references to the personnel of the 53d Brigade Headquarters and the 104th and 105th Machine Gun Battalions.

Another paper published aboard one of the transports was known as the "Mid Ocean Comin' Thru." Still another published aboard the *President Lincoln* was known as the "Rail Splitter."

The 106th Infantry, which had sailed from Hoboken, arrived at Brest May 23d. Debarkation was completed May 25th, the regiment making shelter tent camp at Fort Boguen, Brest. The regiment left Brest on May 28th and arrived at Noyelles sur Mer May 30-31st. Regimental Headquarters, Headquarters and Supply Companies to Coulonvillers, 1st Battalion to Le Festel and Hanchy; 2d Battalion to Oneux and Neuville; 3d Battalion to Millancourt; Machine Gun Company to St. Firmin.

The Headquarters of the 107th Infantry debarked at Brest on May 24th and proceeded to rest camp. The following day the 54th Brigade Headquarters, the remainder of the 107th Infantry and the 106th Machine Gun Battalion debarked at Brest and moved to Pontanezan Barracks outside that city.

Division Headquarters and other troops in the convoy which sailed from Newport News May 17th arrived at St. Nazaire May 31st. The same day the 105th Infantry and part of the 108th Infantry aboard the *President Grant,* which had left the above-mentioned convoy the day previous, debarked at Brest. The stay of all troops at these ports of debarkation was very short.

Forecast
Dry—Until We Reach France

The Sea Serpent

A Mid-Atlantic Issue of the Gas Attack and Rio Grande Rattler

Uniform
Life Belts—Day and Night

Vol 1; No. 1 | Blame the Censor | May, 1918

EXTRA

Attacked In Mid-Ocean—Eighteen U-Boats Sent to the Bottom After Nine Hour Running Fight. Four Hundred Shots Fired. American Navy Wins Great Naval Battle.

As Seen Through the "EEs" of An Un-Yellow Journalist.

As predicted by The Sea-Serpent, the entire fleet of super-U-boats was hurled, yesterday, at the New York Division as it threaded its way in hundreds of transports across the Atlantic. Torpedo after torpedo struck its mark, but in every instance one of our brave lads was standing ready to thrust his body in the jagged hole and save the ship. Not an American life was lost, whereas it has been conservatively estimated that upward of one thousand four hundred and six Huns were sent to the bottom.

The attack was made at 4:04 sharp. For the first time in history the Germans played fairly, as it was announced by the Sea Serpent that the convoy would enter the danger zone at 4 o'clock. That there were spies on board the transports cannot be denied. The Signal for the U-Boats to attack was given surreptitiously from the stern of the S. S. ——, where twenty-six men, in the pay of the Imperial German Empire secretly gathered and sang "Die Wacht Am Rhine." Immediately periscopes leaped to the surface. Periscopes to right of 'em, periscopes to left of 'em, etc etc.

And it may be added in all seriousness, that during the exciting matinee of Sunday, every man on ship-board walked calmly to his post and stood there silently. The courage shown was of the quality which is to be expected of the finest division of the United States Army.

OVER HERE TO OVER THERE

'Twas a May day, the fourth to be exact, The Sun was shining in full splendor. Intermingled with the happy song of birds in that verdant South Carolina foliage was heard the subdued sounds of heavily loaded trucks as they passed to and fro. Silently, but with eager faces, the Headquarters of this Division and its attached units wended their way to the Camp Wadsworth siding of the Southern Railroad. The day had arrived. We had started "Over Here" for "Over There." Joyfully the men filed aboard the day-coaches. Cheerfully they accepted the inconveniences of a monotonous trip to Newport News. On arrival at Camp Stuart any impending gloom was scattered at the sight of comfortable barracks, munificently fitted with iron cots, showers and convenient messes. Then came several days in which General Rumor held sway in the camp, but on May ----, at 4 P. M. we really boarded our transports. The following morning anchor was weighed and we were "off." It is well that the censor will not permit us to go into details of our trip for we would write at interminable length. However, the boxing bouts, the physical exercise, the library books and the never-ending things of interest at sea, have kept all of us busy and cheerful. Messrs. Coates and Torry of the Y. M. C. A. have

During the short period of time between the debarkation of troops at Brest and St. Nazaire and their departure by train for the training area there was some opportunity, although not much, for some of the officers and men to see something of these interesting towns of Brittany. As the transports entered the harbors, all were pleased and interested with the novelty of the scenes that presented themselves as the ships drew close to the shore. The Breton fishermen, justly noted for their experience and skill as mariners, were to be seen in numbers, in sailing vessels, launches and large rowboats. Most of these craft in their shapes and trimmings seemed odd to our men. The sails of most of the sailboats were stained red or blue or some other color which added to the picturesqueness of the harbor, particularly in the eyes of men accustomed to seeing sails of white. At St. Nazaire the numerous islands, the sparkling sandy beaches and the snowy white lighthouses and stone cottages, created a vivid picture of neatness and comfort. It was hard to believe that this was a port of war. At Brest one received different impressions, for Brest harbored a naval station of France, and the entrance to the bay was crowned by rocky and forbidding looking hills upon which were numerous gun emplacements and coast defense fortifications. As the ships drew close to the quays, the men could plainly hear the sound which they later came to know so well, namely, the resounding knock of the wooden shoes of the townspeople of the waterfront as they moved about on the stone sidewalks and pavement. Soon they could also hear the high-pitched penetrating voices of French people as they looked up from the docks and shouted comments of welcome and enthusiasm to the troops.

The behavior of the troops of the 27th Division must have been rather a surprise to the people of Brest and St. Nazaire who up to that time had found it impossible, in their attempts to welcome incoming American troops, to equal in fervor and intensity the demonstration given by the troops themselves in celebration of their own arrival. In 1917, when the writer went to France as an observer, he with several other general officers took passage on a convoy of transports which landed troops at St. Nazaire. There were five ships in the convoy and for some hours after arrival the troops continued a most violently enthusiastic demonstration in celebration of their coming. This took the form of cheers, blowing of bugles and the playing of bands. As the ships were then docked along the waterfront street of the town, with the buildings spread out below their decks, the noise must have been tiresome to those sad-hearted people to whom the arrival of troops at their port was no new experience. Nevertheless, with that understanding and politeness for which the French are justly credited, they responded with cheers of encouragement and appreciation until they wearied of their efforts to outdo or even equal the volume and persistency of the American effort. At this time a note was made that by the time the 27th Division arrived at the French ports the natives would have been surfeited with demonstrations of this character and that the 27th Division should and would enter and debark without according themselves any demonstration of welcome. In the preparations for em-

barkation this aspect of the arrival in France was explained to officers and men, and orders were given that the arrival and debarkation would be characterized by disciplined quietness. These orders were faithfully executed by the personnel of all units at both Brest and St. Nazaire. As the ships bearing the troops of the 27th Division moved into their berths or anchorage places, designated bands played appropriate airs for a few minutes and the men who lined the rails waved their arms in salutation. That was all.

At Brest there overlooks the harbor a well preserved medieval castle and fortification, part of the foundations of which originally supported a stone fort erected by the Celts in the early part of the Christian era. A number of the officers and men had opportunity to go through this interesting relic of an earlier age of warfare. They entered its numerous chambers, passages, dungeons and assembly rooms. Some whose administrative duties kept them in Brest for a period of several weeks had opportunity to visit historic points on the coast of Brittany near Brest, such as Le Conquest, an ancient and quaint Brittany fishing village set in a framework of rocky cliffs against which the green rollers of the Atlantic dashed themselves into spray. Overlooking the entire harbor of Brest as well as the city itself is the Chateau of Kerstears, the mistress of which is the Countess de Rodellec du Porzic. The mother of Countess de Rodellec was an American. Her father, a noted French soldier, came to America and as a result of his service in the army of the United States during the Civil War became Major General de Trobriand, with whose record and military achievements most readers of military history are familiar. General de Trobriand may therefore be considered as much an American as a Frenchman, and accordingly the Countess de Rodellec may be considered more an American than a French woman, although she lived much of her life in France. She and her granddaughter, Mlle. Marie Antoinette de Maleissye, did their utmost to welcome in true American fashion the troops arriving at Brest. The Countess extended an invitation to all officers and enlisted men to visit Kerstears at any and all times, and always it seemed, there were some who had the time and the opportunity to find themselves the recipients of cordial hospitality at the hands of the Countess and her granddaughter.

Two soldiers, learning of the welcome accorded Americans, but not knowing that the Countess could speak English, walked out to Kerstears. Seeing the Countess in the garden, one of the men addressed her in soldier French, saying, "Bon jour, Madame" (pronounced in soldier French, "Bonn Jaour"). The Countess immediately responded politely in French, whereupon the more highly developed linguist of the two soldiers said, "Nous sommes ici helpé France. No parle very good Francais, mai scrappé tres bein. C'est compris?" Much to the surprise of the men the Countess replied, "Yes, I understand, but, my boy, why do you speak French to me when I am really an American?" Whereupon the Countess, to cover their confusion, and remembering the American Army motto, "When do we eat?" invited them inside to receive the hospitality of her house.

Before the departure of the troops from Brest the band of the 108th Infantry and perhaps forty or fifty officers of the division called and paid their respects to the Countess de Rodellec and expressed their appreciation of her hospitality and courtesy to the division. The band, under Bandleader Carl Oltz, gave a very fine concert on the grounds of the chateau.

Until May 27th no information had been received by the Division Commander as to where the division would be sent. The officers and soldiers rather assumed that it would be ordered to join the American army then in real process of training in the so-called American Sector. There was also a feeling that perhaps the division might be sent to serve with the French army. It had not occurred to many officers or men that their service abroad would be with the British army. It came therefore rather as a surprise, when the division on May 27th, was ordered to entrain for the British area north of the Somme, which indicated quite clearly that the division was to be assigned for service with the British army.


The import of this information cannot be appreciated without some reference to the personnel of the 27th Division. During peace time, about two-thirds of the strength of the division are stationed in and about the city of New York. The remainder are scattered over the state from Malone on the Canadian border to Buffalo on Lake Erie, through the Mohawk Valley and the southern tier of counties, and the Hudson Valley. It is difficult to estimate accurately, but perhaps 50 per cent of the division's personnel on either the father's or mother's side, or both, were of Irish descent. In similar manner, an almost equal percentage laid claim to German ancestry. An almost equal percentage could make claim to English, or more generally speaking, to British ancestry. A substantial percentage could make claim to the blood of other nationalities. The total of these percentages, which greatly exceeds 100 per cent., may seem an anomaly, but is explained by the well-known fact that in America, and more particularly in a cosmopolitan city like New York, most of the people with several generations of American citizenship back of them can lay claim to descent from a number of nationalities. At any rate the point is that the personnel of the division, by inheritance and tradition, and it may be added also, as a result of the teachings of the school histories, were critical in their mental attitude toward Great Britain and her policies. Almost without exception officers and men during their boyhood days had played with soldier toys, and always the toy troops that were knocked down and defeated were British redcoats. Most boys had read "Camp Fires of the Revolution." All in a general way were familiar with the surrender of the British army to the Americans at Saratoga, with the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown and with the great victory of Andrew Jackson at New Orleans. All knew something of the history of the British claim to the right of searching American ships, of the American naval victories of Lake Erie and Lake Champlain and of the naval duels between the *Chesapeake* and the *Shannon*, the *Constitution* and the *Guerriere* and the *Bon Homme Richard* and the *Serapis*. Let

the reader reflect upon these influences and combine with them the fact that our men took it for granted that we were to fight with our own army or with the French, and some notion may be gained of the surprise and of the possibilities growing out of that surprise, when it was learned that we were to be sent, not to help the people of Lafayette and Rochambeau, but the army of Lord Howe, Burgoyne and Tarleton.

Above all else the 27th Division possessed a very high standard of discipline, a discipline furthermore that was based not only upon training and formality, but also upon intelligence and loyalty. At the time of our assignment to the British, it was appreciated that environment does affect accomplishment, and it was determined to seek advantages from the situation rather than to consider that obstacles to the smooth running of the machine had been encountered. Accordingly it was made known to the men that without a doubt our division had been selected for cooperation with the British by reason, not only of its military excellence, but because of the well-known intelligence of its personnel and their ability as New Yorkers to get along with strangers under any circumstances. All were instructed and made to understand that for the purposes of winning the war no soldier could be loyal to America without being loyal to America's partners in the great enterprise, and that all considerations must give way to the accomplishment of the common purpose. It was suggested that if the British, more particularly the English, would appear to them to be cold and undemonstrative, that the Americans must by their greater capacity to mix well, make up for the British shortcomings. It may be mentioned here that the officers and men of the division measured up to the situation in handsome manner, and not only were there no unpleasant incidents in their relations with British troops, but there gradually developed feelings of regard for their soldierly virtues and particularly for the determined and uncomplaining manner in which for four long years they had borne the dreadful hardships and losses of war.

Further reference will be made at appropriate points in the story of the division's history to the personnel of the division and to their relations with the British, but perhaps this is an appropriate place to make some reference to that large percentage of the division who were of German descent.

For three years prior to America's entry into the war, our people had read extensively of the German aims in bringing on the war, and of the German methods of conducting military operations. They had read all sides, the charges and countercharges, recriminations, explanations and denials. Slowly they had come to believe that the German government, with deliberate calculation, had determined upon a course of world conquest, and that the Kaiser was not only a party to this conspiracy against the peace of the world, but was in reality a leader in a movement that would gratify his personal ambition to have occur in his lifetime a war in which as War Lord he might play a leading role and go down in history as a great conqueror. But reaction in America was quickened



Troops of 27th Division aboard transport at Newport News, Va.
105th Field Artillery aboard the Mercury

when the situation was clarified and American thought resulted in conviction that democracy throughout the world was seriously threatened. This reaction unsettled the equanimity of many. It seemed to render some unduly critical of the views of others. Individuals became victims of excessive alarm and were given to unreasonable suspicions. Some there were who gauged American patriotism by the willingness of individuals to abhor everything that was German in music, art, literature, customs and nomenclature. With others the test seemed to be the frequency with which insults were directed towards those Americans who were of German origin. Some of the activities of such people during the early part of our participation in the war now seem grotesque and even humorous, but at a time when the emotions of people were highly stimulated they were disturbing and harmful. When the war broke out in 1914, and for some time thereafter, there was lacking a general appreciation of what was involved in the war, in a moral sense. There had been many wars in Europe. This was another, and one that had been long threatened. It would determine whether Germany on the one hand or France and Great Britain on the other possessed the more efficient army. It would determine also whether the French would get back Alsace and Lorraine. For the military, it would determine many interesting things in relation to the relative efficiency of various conceptions of tactics and the relative worth of types of armament and equipment. Quite naturally Americans of immediate German ancestry were well-wishers of the German side. Obviously, those whose sentiments by reason of inheritance and tradition were largely British, hoped to see early victory for the Anglo-French side. It was only after the late Colonel Roosevelt and other public men had again and again called attention to the real and vital issues involved in the war that people began to consider what was at stake and to study the opposing claims and explanations. As the insincerity of the German explanations concerning Germany's responsibility for the war came to be recognized, and as the ruthlessness of its manner of conducting war came to be understood, a very substantial percentage of those who had been friendly to the German side changed their views, and their earlier sympathies in no way affected their subsequent convictions unless possibly to strengthen them. Among these were to be found large numbers of men and women of German blood. There were, however, many others of German blood who perhaps would also have transferred their sympathies and espoused the Allied cause had they not been affronted by the manners and conversation of the class who professed to believe that everything German or "tainted" with German was anathema. Such phrases as, "The German is a Hun; he always was and always will be. It is in the blood," and many others, were bound to give affront to and delay or balk growing convictions that righteousness was on the side of the Allies.

It is interesting to reflect here how readily masses of people can be changed in their settled views when they are subjected to violent influences which electrify their emotions and create or highly stimulate prejudices. Before 1914, the words German or German-American visual-

ized respect for the law, family life, industry and appreciation of good music and literature. The part played by the Germans and German-Americans of '61 to '65 in the saving of the Union was not only acknowledged but was the subject of frequent eulogy. A few short months after the commencement of the World War, this established and acknowledged record was completely forgotten by thousands of otherwise kindly disposed and fair-minded Americans. What is remarkable about the situation as it existed in 1917 and 1918 is that so few German-Americans were disloyal to the country and the cause. Not only were the vast majority of suspicious persons investigated or interned shown to be innocent of any disloyalty, but the contribution to the American military record made by those of German blood should be most gratifying to them. As a matter of fact, if all those with German blood had been released from the American army, the record of that army would have been very different from what it actually was. In battle none were more intelligent and dependable than this class, and in our own division the roster of the dead who gave up their lives at the extreme front fighting the German menace tells the story most convincingly. The roster of the divisional dead will be found in the Appendix.

The first departure from Brest for the British area was that of the Division Commander and the Advance Party on May 27th, when this detachment left Brest by rail with orders to proceed to Rouen where further orders would be given. Some troops of the 54th Infantry Brigade entrained the preceding day in the vicinity of St. Nazaire. The 107th Infantry had already left St. Nazaire and had detrained at Noyelles sur Mer the day the Division Commander's party left Brest. The trip by rail from Brest to the Rue Area, which was the destination of the division, occupied two days and two nights by reason of the fact that rail lines further east had either been taken by the Germans or were interrupted by exposure to hostile fire as a result of the German advance made in March and April when the Fifth British Army was driven back. This congested rail traffic.

The Rue Area is shown on an accompanying map and included a stretch of territory immediately north of the Somme River extending to the sea.

On the diagram map will be found indicated the several subdivisions of the area to which regimental units of the division were assigned for purposes of billeting and training. The trip by rail to the Rue Area was the first introduction of our men to the French railway rolling stock, every box car of which was lettered with the reassuring information that it had a capacity for "40 hommes—8 cheveaux." Later this phrase, with modifications, became a part of the language known as soldier French. With every rumor of change of station during the service in France came the anxious inquiry of one soldier to another, "do we bus it or hoof it?" and often the answer was, "Neither, we homme it and cheveaux it." Another humorous incident characteristic of the American doughboy occurred one day, when a certain company of the 106th Infantry were as-

signed a number of French box cars. A young lad, tired after a ten kilometer hike, saw the sign "40 hommes—8 cheveaux." Looking at his new resting place, he exclaimed somewhat excitedly, "By golly, 40 homes and no place to sleep." It might be explained here that when troops were transported by motor truck or lorry, as the truck is called in the British army, the movement was referred to as a bus movement. Hoofing it, of course, meant marching, while the homme and cheveaux movement meant transportation by rail. As the troop trains moved from the ports of debarkation northward through Rouen, it could truly be said by the men, "We don't know where we're going, but we're on our way."

The first introduction to war was the sound of hostile airplanes heard at night when the troop trains reached the vicinity of Rouen. Further on and near Abbeville several of the commands had their first experience with the night bombing raids of the enemy. When the trains were halted, and halts were frequent, they would hear the ominous humming of planes, but at that stage of their experience did not know whether they were hostile or friendly planes. At times, however, the doubt would be removed when the night air was punctured by long, searching shafts of light from the ground, shifting hither and thither in the effort to locate the aerial enemy. As soon as any beam of light touched the enemy plane the latter became immediately visible, seeming in the reflected rays to be a thing of silver. When this happened there was instantaneous action from the ground, for every "archie," as the anti-aircraft cannon were called in the British army, was turned loose with shrapnel and bullet at the fast-moving target. Very seldom were the searchlight beams able to keep on the target for more than a fraction of a minute, for the hostile aviator dived or turned so rapidly that his aerial gymnastics, combined with his high speed, enabled him to keep in the dark most of the time. Frequently, while the men were watching this new and exciting spectacle they would see a sudden and tremendous flash of brilliant light on the ground, followed by a great explosion and a rocking of the earth. This happened when the hostile plane dropped a heavy bomb. Frequently, when the hostile aviator was in doubt as to whether he was over his target, he would drop a parachute supporting a powerful calcium light, which was ignited automatically after falling a given distance. This light, as it floated toward the earth, illuminated the surface of the ground so that the aviator could recognize objects that might be characteristic of the locality, thus being enabled to drop his bombs with accuracy. Later, as the troop trains moved north from Abbeville, they could, when the wind was in their direction, hear the continued grumbling of the guns at the front. In this fashion and with the nights punctuated by such occurrences, the units of the division moved from the ports of debarkation to the Rue Area.

The 107th Infantry having detrained at Noyelles sur Mer, marched to the staging camp at Nouvion, and the following day to the area indicated as that of the 107th infantry on the diagram map. The exact loca-

tion of units is indicated in the war diary of May 28th, published in the Appendix.

On May 29th the Division Commander and Advance Party arrived at the picturesque town of St. Riquier and were promptly billeted in residences of the town, the Division Headquarters occupying an entire building near the public square. On the same day the 108th Infantry, less Company D, and the 106th Machine Gun Battalion, detrained at Noyelles and proceeded to Nouvion Staging Camp. The regimental headquarters opened at Canchy.

On May 30th the 106th Machine Gun Battalion moved to Rue, units of the 108th Infantry moved to the places enumerated in the war diary of that date, while the 106th Infantry was detraining at Noyelles and moving to the villages to be occupied by its units. On the same day, which it will be noted was Memorial Day, the 102d Engineers and the Engineer Train arrived at St. Nazaire.

For many years that portion of the division stationed in the city of New York had paraded on Memorial Day in honor of the dead of the Civil and Spanish-American Wars. And so it seemed strange to the officers and men to pass Memorial Day without rendering this honor, so much so that a number of parades in commemoration of the dead were arranged. In the little town of Rue such units of the 107th Infantry as were billeted there, or in reasonable proximity, paraded in the town and were reviewed by the Division Commander, the mayor of the city, and Colonel Willard C. Fisk, the Regimental Commander. This detachment of troops made a fine appearance as they swung down the main street of the town behind the regimental band. The townspeople all turned out to scrutinize these newly arrived soldiers from America, and it was interesting to hear their comments and to observe their enthusiastic appreciation when the detachment of this regiment marched by with their well known precision and smart appearance. Everywhere the French people commented upon the size and obvious physical fitness of the men.



Brigadier General Robert E. L. Michie, commanding 53d Infantry Brigade

On June 3d the remainder of Division Headquarters, Headquarters Troop and Detachment, the 53d Infantry Brigade Headquarters, 105th

Machine Gun Battalion, 102d Trains Headquarters and Military Police, 102d Engineers and Engineer Train, and the 102d Field Signal Battalion, as well as Company D, 108th Infantry, all entrained near their ports of debarkation for Noyelles, while part of the 108th arrived at that place. These troops detrained at Noyelle on June 5th, while the 105th Infantry entrained at Brest. By the 10th of June the real movement of the division to the Rue Area had been completed.

On June 4th Brigadier General Robert E. L. Michie, who commanded the 53d Infantry Brigade, died suddenly while en route by train to the Rue Area. He was buried with military honors at St. Sevier Cemetery, Rouen. General Michie was the first officer of the division to die after the arrival in France. He was an officer of long service in the Regular Cavalry, respected by the officers and men of his brigade and others throughout the division who knew him.

On June 4th Lieutenant Colonel Stanley H. Ford, General Staff, and Major Edward Olmsted, Assistant Chief of Staff of the division, who had just completed the second course of the Army General Staff College at Langres, reported for assignment as Chief of Staff and G-1 respectively.

This period may be considered as having terminated the movement of the division from the ports of embarkation in America to the area in France where it was to begin its service with the British army.

CHAPTER XI

TRAINING WITH THE BRITISH

IN some ways there was no more interesting phase of the division's service abroad than the period immediately following our arrival in France, during which the division made the acquaintance of the British army and with their aid and advice began a rigorous course of training supplementary to that received at Spartanburg.

It may be asked why this additional course of training was necessary or even desirable after so long a period of training at Camp Wadsworth and at a time when the presence of American troops in the line was so urgently needed. The explanation of this is to be found in the condition already mentioned, that the American troops arrived in France short of much of the *materiel* requisite not only for combat, but for training. It was necessary, therefore, that upon receipt of machine guns, Lewis guns, Stokes mortars, one pounders, grenades, wireless, sanitary and engineer equipment, the men should be trained in the use of this British type of *materiel* and armament. Furthermore, it had been found during the war that progress was so rapid in the development by both sides of new methods and *materiel,* that it was essential for troops to be kept up to date by constant training when they were out of the line. The service abroad, therefore, in all arms of the service, consisted of a cycle of phases. Upon relief from the line a division enjoyed a period of cleaning up and rest. This was followed by replacement of *materiel,* armament, equipment and men lost during the active service in the line. The division, thus renovated as it were, moved to an area adapted for training and engaged in exercises best adapted to bring it up to the minute in its methods and skill. While undergoing this training the division was usually considered to be in reserve.

In the case of the 27th Division there was additional need for this training, for the reason that the division was, so far as the British were concerned, a unit of a foreign army, expected to function with them efficiently. To do this it was necessary, by association and official relation, to learn their methods in all fields of military endeavor. There was much in the British army that differed from the American army, and the period of training with the British was not only essential for the reasons mentioned but was, as stated, one of the most interesting phases of the service abroad.

The reader may well imagine the keenness of the officers and men of the division as day by day they came in intimate contact with the sights offered in the area immediately behind the lines by the great and polyglot army of the British, then engaged in the greatest struggle in its history. There could be seen the famous regiments of the British army as they

marched to or from the front, rested in their billeting areas, or engaged in training exercises. Not only did one see English, Irish, Scotch and Welsh troops, but also the soldiers of Canada, Australia and New Zealand, as well as detachments of the Indian army, South Africans, Fiji Islanders, West Indians and large numbers of Chinese coolies. There were also close by, Portuguese, French and Russian troops, as well as large groups of German prisoners employed in various ways. Add to this panorama of military activity the uncertainties and the possibilities of the outcome on the immediate front and the nightly air raids in this new environment, and the reader will grasp the necessity for a period of time sufficient for a foreign division so placed to acclimate itself before being committed to battle.

On June 5th orders were received at Division Headquarters that for purposes of administration and cooperation with the British army, the division would be affiliated with the 66th British Division, a unit of the Third British Army, under General Sir Julian Byng. This division was commanded by Major General H. K. Bethell, and had been quite used up two months previously during the progress of the German drive which began March 21st. The 66th Division had not many more than 2,000 officers and men left. It was, therefore, not much more than a cadre and its *personnel* was largely distributed among the units of the 27th Division in order to assist the latter in getting acquainted with British methods of administration and supply, to give advice and make suggestions concerning training, and generally to aid the preparations to meet the enemy.

At this time Staff Captain Robert W. Hanna of the British army was attached to 27th Division Headquarters as Liaison Officer and Assistant to Major Edward Olmsted, Assistant Chief of Staff (G-1) of the division. Captain Hanna proved to be of inestimable value throughout his service with the division, which was continuous until after the armistice. He brought to his work not only an intimate knowledge of British administration and supply, but a spirit of comradeship which soon made for him many firm friendships.

General Bethell was the youngest Division Commander in the British army. This information was disclosed to the writer by General Bethell personally on the occasion of his first visit, which took place a day or two after the arrival of the 27th Division at St. Riquier. Returning one afternoon from Noyelles, General Bethell was found at the Division Commander's billet. His salutation was: "General O'Ryan, I understand you are the youngest Division Commander in the American army; I am the youngest Division Commander in the British army. Look here, I think we had better get together for mutual protection." This was accomplished in orthodox fashion by immediately sitting down to tea. General Bethell was found to be an officer whose sole object was to make himself, his brother officers and the remnants of his division as helpful as possible to the 27th Division in its new environment. He suggested that it would be well for his brigade, regimental, battalion and company commanders to call upon their opposite numbers; that is to say, upon the commanding



Brigadier General Albert H. Blanding, commanding 53d Infantry Brigade



The gas chamber

officers of similar American units with which they were associated, and then to have them to tea or dinner, after which it might be helpful for the American commanding officers to arrange for similar formalities for the British. General Bethell expressed the view that people were quite the same the world over and would get along handsomely if they would only get together and learn to know one another. This was agreed to and the arrangements carried out.

It is interesting to recall at this time, and in view of the subsequent understanding and accord which obtained between the British and American officers, some of the incidents based upon difference of national customs which threatened in the beginning to create misunderstandings. In the first place the custom is well established in the American army that at a social gathering every officer should at some time during the occasion of the gathering introduce himself to other officers superior to him in rank, stating his name and organization. In this manner officers, without waiting for a formal introduction to others with whom they are not acquainted, meet and chat with practically all those present. In the British army, however, following English custom, the practice is quite different. Not only does no officer introduce himself to any other, but seldom if ever are they introduced to each other by another. In the British army, if an officer has anything particular to say to someone else, he says it, but at the same time keeps his identity a dark secret. Obviously, these widely differing customs were bound to result in some surprises until they became understood and reconciled.

One infantry officer of the 27th Division, visiting headquarters the day following a social gathering at a British battalion headquarters, complained bitterly of what he called English rudeness. He said he went to a British battalion headquarters in pursuance of an invitation to tea, and although he was politely relieved of his cap and escorted to a room by one of the hosts, was not introduced to any other officer in the room. For a time he waited, ill at ease, for something to happen. Shortly he was reinforced by another officer of his own battalion who began to experience the same feelings. In a few moments a British officer present in the room approached, blushed and remarked with considerable embarrassment that it was a "beastly day out," then faltered and retired. This Britisher made no other disclosure except that relating to the weather. Another, a few moments later, approached and, also without disclosing his identity, blushed apologetically and said in the English language, "Look here, do you care for any tea or something?" The two American officers allowed they would try the something, as they felt by that time they needed it. Having been stimulated and encouraged in the manner indicated, and remembering the admonitions given them about "getting along" with our Allies, they determined upon an offensive. Accordingly they advanced to a group of three British officers and the senior of the two, addressing a British colonel, said, "Sir, I am Captain Jones of the 105th Infantry, 27th American Division."

"Oh, really," stammered the colonel. "Yes, yes, I am sure," but needless to remark did not disclose who he was.

"Yes," continued Captain Jones, somewhat flustered, "and this is Lieutenant Smith, also of my regiment."

By this time the Britsh colonel looked particularly distressed, glanced rather helplessly at his associates, both of whom colored deeply and bowed, then with renewed morale, said: "Yes, yes, the 105th Infantry—fine fellows. I saw them on the road yesterday and directly I saw them I knew they were Americans." About this time the power of the offensive waned so rapidly that the two American officers beat a hasty retreat.

Other instances of similar character were of rather frequent occurrence during the first week or two of the division's association with the British army. Soon such incidents became subjects of intense amusement at messes of British and American officers, who chaffed each other unsparingly over their earlier experiences and the relative merits of their national customs.

One British officer whom the writer knew very well asked one day concerning the ungodly custom which obtained in the American army of officers unloading upon others a mass of unrememberable data concerning their identity, military grade, organization, etc., upon the slightest provocation. Our very convenient and simple social custom relating to acquaintanceship of those meeting for the first time was explained to him, and then he was asked for justification of the ice-packed social ceremony of the British service, which places a premium upon embarrassed silence and makes a state secret of identity.

After the first week or two with the British, it was observed that the British officers had evidently been schooled or at least admonished in relation to the American custom, for at subsequent social gatherings, and until they came to understand each other, it was rather a common and extremely amusing sight to see a perspiring and very much flustered British officer introducing with meticulous care British and American officers meeting each other for the first time. "This," said Colonel Atkins of the Nth Dragoons, addressing a brother officer and nodding toward an American officer, "is Captain Jones of the one, ought, five American Infantry, or is it the one, ought, six, captain? Well, at any rate, it is one of the American regiments. He is of the 27th American Division, you know, and he is here with us and all that sort of thing. I say, I want you to meet him." Then after a moment of deep thought as he mentally checks off the details of the American formality, "Oh, yes, by the way, Captain Jones, this is Dados of our 41st Division."

The reader may imagine the chagrin of Captain Jones when, due to the bungling of the American formula by the well intentioned British introducer, he addressed his new acquaintance as "Major Dados," only to find that true to British form the major's name had not been disclosed at all; that Dados does not spell a name but stands for D. A. D. O. S., Deputy Assistant Director of Ordnance Service. Thus Captain Jones, like many other American officers, received his first acquaintance with

another dreadful British custom, namely, the waging of war by a seemingly endless array of mysterious initials.

Some idea of the intricacies of British military conversation may be gathered from the following language employed by a British officer in giving a brother American officer an account of his recent doings. "Yes, I have been out here for quite a bit. I came over as a subaltern in the 6th Don Aac. Directly I got here I was given rather a cushy job. You see I had to inspect property. I visited a lot of places of the R. A. M. C., but hardly was I on the way with this work when I got a chit from the G. O. C., R. F. A., of the 40th Don Aac, who asked me if I would care for a billet with him. You see he knew I was a gunner. As a matter of fact, what I was really interested in were the Tock Emmas, with the Emma G's as second choice, but I felt I did not know enough about them and dreaded the school work. You are not with the Tock Emmas by any chance, are you?"

The American officer, of course, did not know whether he was with them or against them, for he did not then know that the Tock Emmas were the Trench Mortars. All he knew was that he understood the American language, something of the French and almost nothing of the English.

It should be explained here that in the British army language a gunner is an artilleryman; G. O. C., R. F. A. is General Officer Commanding, Royal Field Artillery of a division or higher unit, and the R. A. M. C., the Royal Army Medical Corps. As telephone conversation had disclosed the frequency of error in relation to particular letters of the alphabet, due to their similarity of sound over the wire, a system had been adopted for minimizing such occurrences by using a prescribed pronunciation for particular letters. Under this system a was called aac, b—beer, d—don, m—emma, p—pip, s—esses, t—toc, etc. The 41st Don Aac, therefore, meant the 41st D. A. or Divisional Artillery, Tock Emma meant T. M. or Trench Mortar, while Emma G meant M. G. or Machine Gun. With these keys to the British army language the sample of conversation above given becomes understandable to American ears. In addition, therefore, to acquiring familiarity with British methods of administration, supply and training, it was also necessary for American officers and men to acquire a reasonable degree of familiarity with the English language. At times when our men began to pride themselves upon the attainment of proficiency in this language they received rude setbacks due to some shortcoming in their accomplishment, directly traceable to ignorance of the language medium employed between the two armies.

An example of this may be cited in Major Olmsted's experience with a very helpfully inclined British officer of the corps. This British officer was the corps "Q," which in our language means the corps quartermaster. Major Olmsted wanted twenty motor trucks to transport property from the village of St. Firmin. He asked the corps "Q" to have the twenty trucks report at St. Firmin at three o'clock.

The corps "Q" replied in an amazed tone of voice that it was quite impossible.

"I thought you wanted to be helpful?" countered Major Olmsted.

"I do, to be sure," replied the corps "Q," "but one cannot do the impossible. If you will look at your map you will see there is no railroad at St. Firmin."

"What has that to do with it?" asked Major Olmsted.

"Oh, nothing in the world," answered the corps "Q" sarcastically, "except that railroad tracks are essential for trucks."

"Since when?" asked Major Olmsted, adding hastily: "Say, what language are you speaking anyway, English or American? With us trucks are rubber tired and are propelled by gasoline."

"Oh, my word," responded the corps "Q," "you don't want trucks at all, do you? What you really want are lorries."

It was then made clear that in the English language trucks are railroad carriages and lorries are motor trucks.

Very early in the training period with the British, delivery was made of rolling kitchens, first line transport, motor trucks, automobiles and motorcycles, and all armament required. In relation to the latter it was determined that the 27th and 30th Divisions should turn in their modified Enfield rifles, because they required the .30 caliber American ammunition, and to substitute for them the British rifles, caliber .303. This step was necessary in order that the two American divisions might use British ammunition and thus avoid complications in ammunition supply which would otherwise occur.

It was a task of considerable magnitude to turn in nearly 15,000 rifles in the hands of troops scattered about over a considerable area and to issue in their place an equal number of other rifles. This task, however, was accomplished in most efficient manner and in a surprisingly short time by Major Joseph J. Daly, the Division Ordnance Officer. The efficiency and speed with which the entire work was done made a most favorable impression upon the British ordnance service.

About this time also rigid orders were issued concerning the precise number and kind of articles to be carried by each soldier and to be transported by units. Everything in excess of what was prescribed was deemed surplus and directed to be turned in and stored at Calais. Particularly was it directed that all cameras be turned in. There were numbers of small and valuable cameras in the hands of officers and enlisted men of the division. Many enlisted men had tailor-made clothing in excess of the one uniform prescribed, which had been carried overseas in barrack bags, pursuant to orders.

At the time these orders in relation to surplus property went into effect, other American divisions in addition to the 27th and 30th were still in the British area and were included in the order. It was obvious that the mass of property then to be sent to Calais would be so great that it would cover acres of space and would almost certainly be the subject of theft and damage by the elements. An effort was made in the 27th Division, and it is believed in others also, to secure authority to hire buildings without expense to the government for the storage of divisional sur-



British lorries which transported food and supplies for the 27th Division



Mail for the 27th Division

plus property, and to maintain the same in the custody of the division under guard of a few invalided soldiers. Such buildings were successfully maintained by units of the British army. Had this been done, the division would not only have gotten back the great mass of property thus stored, but could have drawn upon it as new clothing became essential. Authority for this plan, however, was denied and accordingly mountains of barrack bags were piled up at Noyelles and at railroad yards where there were no storage facilities. Due to the demands upon the railroads, this valuable property lay exposed to the elements until much of it was damaged. Later it was sent to Calais, where most of it was looted by parties unknown.

The orders regarding surplus property allowed no overcoat and but one blanket per man. At that period of the war operations were stationary, the nights were cold and frequently wet. It was believed that the men could better conserve their health and fighting qualities if made as comfortable as possible in the trenches, and accordingly authority was asked to retain the overcoats, the request being coupled with the statement that no allowance of extra transport for their movement would be requested. Major General Read, the corps commander, fortunately gave this authority. The result was that our men had the advantage of this extra clothing at times when it was badly needed and were never embarrassed by its presence either on the march or in battle. This was accomplished in the following way:

When the men were ordered to change station the overcoats were bundled by squads, tagged and temporarily stored by companies in some available building, and there were left under guard of a soldier of the company, usually one slightly injured or indisposed. After the company arrived at its new station and had settled down, motor trucks or transport wagons as available moved the company overcoats from the old to the new station. In that way there was no difficulty for each man to get back his own overcoat.

In relation to military property, it may be said that everything thereafter received until the time of the armistice came almost without exception from British sources. The division lived on the British ration and were issued British underclothes and shoes. As the outer clothing of the men became worn and requests upon American supply depots remained unfilled, it was necessary to issue British breeches and to some extent British tunics. The division never could understand its apparent abandonment by the American supply authorities, and accordingly when inspecting officers from the American area found our officers and men unconsciously employing British terms which their close association with the British and their use of British armament and equipment had made unavoidable, and criticized their use of this unauthorized British nomenclature, their criticisms met with little patience or sympathy from the men of the division. Most of these visiting officers were young and lacking in knowledge of the psychology of our situation and of the necessity for our men to cooperate in action and spirit with the great British army, of which the two American divisions, the 27th and 30th, were relatively small parts.

It was not long before the division had settled down to intensive training with the British. The machine gun battalions and companies of the division were concentrated near Rue on the coast. They were outfitted with British Vickers machine guns and engaged in target practice and field-firing exercises under the guidance of experienced officers and non-commissioned officers of British machine gun units. In similar manner every company in the division in every arm of the service had on detached service at British schools officers and non-commissioned officers following short courses in the specialties, so as to gain experience in the use of British armament and the advantage of British experience and advice. These schools included signals, liaison, bayonet, sniping, scouting, grenades, Stokes mortars, field fortification, wiring, Lewis gun, gas defense, preparation of British ration and use of British rolling kitchen.

In conveying the will of the Commander to the more than 25,000 men who constituted the division, it was frequently found to be inevitable that due to the transmission of thought through the chain of command, the subject matter was unconsciously influenced by those engaged in transmitting it. Sometimes, perhaps, the modification lent force to the thought, but at other times very much of what was desired to have reach the men was devitalized. These comments do not apply to orders, but rather to instructions governing the conduct of the men in battle. Accordingly, where it was desired to have the views of the Division Commander in relation to some subject of particular importance get to the men without danger of modification the plan was adopted of presenting such views in the form of a bulletin and of requiring the bulletin to be read to the men at a routine formation. If the subject matter was of vital importance, this reading was required to be made on three such occasions. Technical language was avoided in preparing these bulletins and a special effort was made to present each subject in a manner to attract and hold the attention of the men. A sample of these bulletins is indicated by reference to Bulletins 39 and 41, the first addressed to the enlisted men and the second to the officers of the division, copies of which follow:

HEADQUARTERS 27TH DIVISION, U. S. A.
AMERICAN E. F., FRANCE.

June 9, 1918.

BULLETIN No. 39.

1. A copy of this bulletin will be furnished each squad in the division armed with the rifle and will frequently be read and discussed by the men of the squad. The squad leader will be its custodian for thirty days following its receipt and will be responsible that each soldier in his squad becomes intimately familiar with its contents.

2. At this stage in the training of the division, with the prospect of early service in the line, it is desirable that officers and men devote special thought to the manner in which the knowledge and experience they have acquired are to be applied in combat. During the past year our units have been so actively engaged in reorganization, disciplinary drill, physical training, target practice, field exercises and in the many specialties that the application of their training to the work confronting them may not be sufficiently clear. The moment is therefore opportune to burn into the minds of all a few principles, which, if fully understood and applied, will stand all in good stead in the hour of trial and contribute mightily to the cohesive hitting power of the division in its

first engagement with the enemy. "In war," said a great military authority, "nothing succeeds but that which is simple." Here are a few simple rules which if followed will make you effective soldiers in the fight.

3. WHAT GENERAL PERSHING SAID. In the first place, all will remember the admonition of the Commander in Chief, A. E. F., sent us as far back as last year, namely, that "At no time in our history has discipline been so important," and that "The standards of the American army will be those of West Point." Everything that has happened in the war since that time has justified the importance given this subject. So much has been said and done in our division in support of this standard that it is felt that our men are at least impressed with the necessity for such standard and are desirous of attaining it. But every man should remember that discipline means certainty and precision *in the little things*. For example, saluting *every* officer—not three out of five; shaving *every* morning, *not nearly* every morning; and it means in addition an alert and loyal state of mind in relation to *every* order given, not only the orders of high commanders, but more particularly the routine orders of the platoon and squad leaders. Therefore, in the performance of daily routine let *every* soldier of this division *always* enter upon his particular task with an appreciation of the fact that *his* individual intensity of purpose and *his* thoroughness of accomplishment constitute an important contribution to the mass of effort that is to determine the effectiveness and value of the division.

4. THE RIFLE IS THE STRONG ARM OF THE AMERICAN SOLDIER AND IT HAS AS MANY "WALLOPS" AS THERE ARE CARTRIDGES AVAILABLE—LEARN TO MAKE EACH "WALLOP" A KNOCKOUT. You will remember the orders published at Camp Wadsworth based upon messages from the Commander in Chief, A. E. F., that "The rifle and the bayonet are the principal weapons of the infantry soldier," and that "The principles of combat remain unchanged in their essence." Since that time, and recently, we have read of the German offensives where the fighting was in the open and where nothing counted so much as accurate rifle fire and the correct application of tactical principles of combat. In these attacks, if there were units that did not provide efficiently for flank security, such units suffered heavily for their omissions. If there were units whose fire power was lessened by poor sight setting and aiming, there were to be found the units whose fire did not stop the enemy. An authority once estimated that it requires 50,000 cartridges to hit a man in battle. Instead of belittling the value of rifle fire, this should constitute an inspiration to each soldier in the division armed with a rifle. It should constitute an inspiration because it demonstrates the immensity of the field for improvement which exists and the opportunity we have to develop improvement and turn it to our own advantage. It demonstrates further that if such character of rifle fire can be made to stay and at times stop the enemy's progress, then it must be clear that accurate and rapid rifle fire delivered by disciplined and resolute soldiers should be annihilating. Every infantry soldier therefore owes it to himself, to his family, to his regiment and to the division to become expert in the use of his rifle at all ranges within its effective hitting power. Ranges will be made available as soon as practicable here and elsewhere, but what is needed now and throughout our war service is the fixed determination of *every* soldier continually to improve his marksmanship and become an expert rifleman. If this is done there will soon be born a demonstrated confidence in the soldier that whatever he turns his rifle loose upon will have no further interest in this war. This degree of fire excellence works two ways—it is not only destructive of the enemy, but it is a life-saver to those who possess it; the more accurate our fire, the less accurate does that of the enemy become due to the punishment he is receiving. Let every man who reads this picture in his mind an infantry command splattering the landscape in its front with poorly aimed and nervously fired bullets suddenly coming under the fire of a command shooting with disciplined precision and confidence born of training and skill in marksmanship. Let every man visualizing the picture make up his mind that *his* company will be in the latter class. The rifle is the strong arm of the American soldier and it has as many "wallops" as there are cartridges available. Learn to make each "wallop" a knockout. I want to see our men always,

everywhere, working with their rifles. not only grooming them, but practising aiming and pointing, making rapid changes in sight adjustments, identifying targets at 1,000 and 1,200 yards pointed out by comrades, practising to attain manual dexterity in the rapid manipulation of the bolt, in the delivery of simulated magazine fire *that is aimed fire.* I want to see our men doing this in their own time, between drills and after the dinner hour, as well as at the range and on the drill field.

MORALE

5. THRICE ARMED IS HE WHO KNOWS THE GAME AND HAS THE MORALE ON THE OTHER FELLOW. Make no mistake about it, the German soldier has had his belly full of war. Our common sense and his war losses tell us that he is war weary. His people are more so. He may be scheduled for a six-round bout, but it is doubtful whether he will last through to the fifth. We have the advantage of knowing that sooner or later we will win—it is only a question of time. Never permit any man to hang "war gloom" around your quarters no matter what the circumstances. "Morale," said Napoleon, "is three-fourths of victory." All but our recruits understand that morale does not mean noisy enthusiasm, but signifies zealous confidence based upon discipline and knowledge. Help get the recruits lined up for real morale.

TO MAINTAIN MORALE THERE ARE TWO THINGS TO PROVIDE AGAINST, ALWAYS, EVERYWHERE. These are *demoralization* and *surprise.* First as to demoralization. It is to produce demoralization that the enemy uses gas and all his variety of heavy gun-fire. Get your minds ready for it so you will recognize it for what it is intended to be—*a morale shaker*—and then don't shake. Remember that we send them "morale shakers," and that we are a generous people. Whenever you are uncomfortable during the visitation of a "morale shaker" realize that in all probability the enemy is more so. We will experience many "morale shakers." Always have on hand the determination and the confidence to see it through so as to be there with accurate rifle fire and the bayonet at the critical moment. Instances are recorded where one machine gun or one platoon of infantry with a good field of fire has stopped an entire enemy battalion. This will make it clear how desirous the enemy will be to shake our morale with a view to rendering ineffective the fire of our rifles and machine guns, whether in the attack or in the defense. Whenever you sustain a bombardment remember its purpose, put the lid down on your nerves and be ready for effective fire action at the right moment, for with it you can stop anything.

Demoralization is sometimes effected by the happening of the unexpected. Communications relied upon break down. Leaders depended upon are killed or wounded. Supplies planned to be available are cut off. All these experiences will doubtless be yours and they will determine your value as soldiers. When these things happen recognize them as incidental to war and do not regard them as unforeseen calamities. By preparing your minds now for these incidents they will not surprise you when they occur. Have an alternative for everything—have several. Always resourceful, always aggressive.

As to surprise. Doubtless you have heard stories of how this squad or that company fought well until the enemy came in unexpectedly on the flank or from the rear. Every unit down to the squad when operating against the enemy must have out its feelers to prevent surprise. Most of you know this, but frequently the "feelers" do not go out sufficiently far, do not select the best positions for their observations or fail to report their findings with adequate speed or intelligence.

GAS

6. When gas shells burst about you you will be numbered among the quick or the dead. Be quick always. Be cautious removing the respirator. Many men have died because they removed it too soon.

FINALLY

7. (a) Be disciplined.
(b) Shoot to hit.
(c) Preserve your morale.
(d) Never be surprised.
(e) Know your gas defense.
(f) Read and follow orders governing personal hygiene, sanitation, rules of the road and march discipline.

DO THESE THINGS AND THE ENEMY WILL ALWAYS FEAR THE 27TH DIVISION.

JOHN F. O'RYAN,
Major General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS 27TH DIVISION, U. S. A.
AMERICAN E. F., FRANCE

June 14, 1918.

BULLETIN No. 41.

1. The officers of the division have read Bulletin 39 addressed to the enlisted men. The moment is equally opportune for reflection on the part of the officers, concerning the application of *their* training to the work now confronting them. There are some aspects of this which do not appear in books or pamphlets, but which are of the utmost importance in the maintenance of well-conducted team-work. It is the object of this bulletin to impress some of these points upon the minds of our officers.

2. The technical training you are now receiving is in the nature of a finishing course. It is an important phase, but as most of you have had a number of years of service in the division, this finishing course cannot be expected to make material changes in your professional capacity as officers. The existing course, for example, will not supply military character or the fundamental physical and mental virtues, where these are lacking or are not already developed as a result of previous training. Speaking broadly, we will fight with the character and professional capacity developed in the division through the years and brought here with us. In the past constant criticism has been part of your development, to the end that there might be continued improvement. This criticism, however, never obscured the military virtues possessed by the body of our officers. Doubtless much room for improvement still exists, but certain it is that our officers are loyal, intelligent and zealous in high degree. You have demonstrated these qualities in peace-time and under war-training conditions. Now you must maintain them under the conditions of campaign and battle. You must do this not only for your own state of mind, but because their deterioration will affect the fighting efficiency of the division in most radical manner.

3. War experience indicates that some officers most effective and valuable in peace "blow up" under the stress of battle, while others deemed mediocre in garrison or camp become veritable leaders of men. Some who seem to be slow and diffident in their first fight become live actors in subsequent combats. No doubt the reverse of this is also true. It is also known that the human tendency to visit the consequences of an accident upon some other person is frequently accentuated in war, due to the stimulation of the emotions by losses and other incidents of battle. The injured mind almost instinctively seeks a scapegoat. These points should be understood by our officers. Only such understanding, supported by your discipline and your morale, will enable you to avoid the possibility of becoming either the thoughtless perpetrator or the unhappy victim of unseemly criticism which at times has characterized discussions following the combat wherein losses have been considerable. You cannot have an omelet without breaking eggs. You cannot have a battle without losses—not in this war. In relation to losses, it is idle to charge yourself or others with responsibility for such of them as speculation *in the light of after knowledge* might dictate were avoidable by other methods. Speculations concerning past events are valuable only in relation to the adoption of new ways and means for best conducting subsequent operations. Officers who demonstrate inapti-

tude or lack of leadership in combat will be replaced by others believed better qualified, but such changes will be effected by superior authority after careful consideration of all the facts.

4. Losses will result at times and in particular places from rashness, from timidity, from overconfidence, from lack of confidence, from the exercise of good judgment as well as poor judgment. The leader of every unit will give the best that is in him in decision and in execution. He will seek always to profit by the results of that effort, whether the results be fortunate or unfortunate. He will judge others as he would be judged. Never should he criticize a superior officer or permit in his presence such criticism. Always his attitude should be generous in relation to the efforts of brother officers. All officers should prepare themselves mentally to meet and accept responsibility, and the tendency in this connection should be to share with subordinates responsibility for the results of their honest exercise of judgment. Such an attitude and such relations as these will bind the officers together more closely in good weather and in bad, and will increase the effectiveness of their team-work. This principle should be made known to and developed among the enlisted men. Nothing would give greater cheer to a roughly handled enemy than the knowledge that their opponents were holding "post mortems" and disputing among themselves. Conduct of this character gives aid and support to the enemy, and one guilty of it, be he officer or enlisted man, should be viewed with suspicion and the facts and circumstances reported promptly to superior authority.

JOHN F. O'RYAN,
Major General.

It is believed that this and other similar bulletins exercised a considerable influence in developing a common point of view throughout the division in relation to matters covered by them.

The daily association in this intensive work between our officers and the British officers and between our men and the British soldiers soon developed mutual understanding and comradeship. In spots, our men found that numbers of the British soldiers at this time were most pessimistic concerning the outcome of the war. It was not infrequent for British soldiers to confide in our men their opinion that the Germans could not be beaten and that further attempts to accomplish his defeat would only result in additional and useless losses. In justice to the British officer, it should be said that no instance ever came to the attention of Division Headquarters of a British officer expressing anything but confidence in the ultimate outcome after the American army began to appear in strength in the British area.

It was about this time that Colonel Willard C. Fisk, commanding the 107th Infantry, became seriously ill with stomach trouble. This incident, for in a great war it would seem to be a mere incident, serves nevertheless as a reminder of the part played in the great war accomplishment of the Guard divisions by such men as Colonel Fisk. For more than forty years Colonel Fisk had served in the 7th New York Infantry. Born with a full measure of the fundamental soldierly qualities and possessing educational and physical fitness, he was enabled during the course of his long service in the regiment through all the grades, to exercise a very profound influence upon it. He commanded the regiment during the period of the Mexican Border service, and after the long period of training at Camp Wadsworth took the regiment to France. Colonel Fisk at this time was more

than sixty years of age. He was an ideal leader and the officers and men of the regiment were very happy in their confidence in his experience and skilled leadership. The regiment was at the top notch of its efficiency. The feelings of Colonel Fisk at this period, when he was confined to bed in his billet with his distressing illness, may well be imagined. The great occasion when he might lead his regiment into battle after all the years of preparation was almost within reach, yet Colonel Fisk was never greater, never more dominated by the spirit of self-sacrifice than on the occasion when the Division Commander visited him in his billet in the Rue area for the purpose of discussing with him his continued command of the regiment. He anticipated the subject and with outward calm, but with a controlled distress of mind that could be detected, said, "General, the doctors tell me I am very sick. I think I shall be all right in a short while. You know what I think of this regiment. Even if I were permitted to I would not by any selfish act of mine jeopardize its best interests. I am an interested party, and so you must decide my fate without an opinion from me."

The prompt answer was, "Colonel, you are going home. You have done a great work in the reorganization and training of this regiment. You have brought it to France and now due to your illness you must turn it over to some other man to lead it into battle."

Shortly thereafter Colonel Fisk left for the States for treatment. It was such men as Colonel Fisk, whose lives were devoted with complete self-sacrifice to the interests of the National Guard, that enabled this great body of troops, in the face of many obstacles and much opposition, to develop efficiency and demonstrate their dependability in battle.

Colonel Fisk was shortly thereafter succeeded in the command of the regiment by Colonel Charles I. DeBevoise, who had commanded for several years the 1st Cavalry, and who had just completed the course at the Army School of the Line at Langres, where he was graduated number one in his class.

About this time it was learned that ten American divisions in all had been sent up to support the British army. In order to understand the reason for this action, it is necessary to recall to the reader's mind that on March 21, 1918, the German army made a supreme and almost wholly successful drive against the British army for the purpose of gaining the channel ports and cutting the Allied army in two. The weight of the enemy attack fell upon the Fifth and part of the Third British Armies. Little progress was made against the Third British Army, but against the Fifth British Army the drive was most successful. This army, covering a wide front, and fighting against heavy odds, was defeated and driven back in the general direction of the important city of Amiens. By April 24th the German advance had reached Villers Bretonneux, distant but seven or eight kilometers east of Amiens. Here the Germans were finally stopped by a counter attack made by a part of the Australian Corps which had arrived shortly before the capture of the place by the Germans.

Meanwhile, on April 9th, the German army further north had attacked south of Ypres, had taken Mount Kemmel and had driven in a big

salient toward Hazebrouck, which later became known as the Lys salient. During the months of April and May the British were fighting with their backs to the sea, and it may be added not very far from the sea. It was because of this very grave situation that the leaders of Great Britain's destinies called for immediate help from the United States. It was pointed out that if we were to be of any real assistance we must hurry; that if we delayed it might be too late. The United States Government was handicapped in transporting troops overseas by lack of adequate shipping. It had not been considered practicable up to the time of this crisis for Great Britain to divert ships needed to keep the population of the British Isles supplied with food, to the job of transporting troops from America to France. Now, however, the need for soldiers was paramount. But a further embarrassment to our government was the fact that, although it had several millions of soldiers in training in the United States, it had not even at that late date adequate clothing, armament, equipment, ammunition and supplies necessary for their use. Accordingly, in order to expedite the availability of American troops in aid of the British army, an agreement was entered into between representatives of the two governments which became known as the Abbeville Agreement, because of the fact that the representatives met in the city of Abbeville on the Somme. This agreement was to the general effect that Great Britain would furnish additional ships for the prompt transportation of American troops to France, and would arm, equip and supply such troops immediately upon their arrival in the British area, the British Government to be later reimbursed the cost of material and transportation.

Of this gigantic problem and its solution, Lieutenant Colonel Repington, of the London *Morning Post*, one of the most widely read military critics of the war, wrote:

"The British defeat at St. Quentin on March 21st found the American army in France far from strong. The leading idea of our political War Cabinet—an idea never shared by our General Staff or our Command in France—was that we were overinsured in the West and that the war could be and should be won elsewhere. This conception had now gone the way of other lost illusions, and while our War Cabinet feverishly began to do all the things which the soldiers had fruitlessly begged them to do for months before, they also prayed America for aid, implored her to send in haste all available infantry and machine guns, and placed at her disposal, to her great surprise, a large amount of transport to hasten arrivals. It is a pity that the transport was not sent earlier.

"The American Government acceded to this request in the most loyal and generous manner. Assured by their allies in France that the latter could fit out the American infantry divisions on their arrival, with guns, horses and transport, the Americans packed their infantry tightly in the ships and left to a later occasion the dispatch to France of guns, horses, transport, labor units, flying service, rolling stock and a score of other things originally destined for transport with the divisions. If subsequently—and, indeed, up to the day the armistice was signed—General Pershing found himself short of many indispensable things, and if his operations were thereby conducted under real difficulties of which he must have been only too sensible, the defects were not due to him and his staff, nor to the Washington administration, nor to the resolute General March and his able fellow workers, but solely to the self-sacrificing manner in which America had responded to the call of her friends."

It was in pursuance of this agreement that the Government of the United States was enabled to make the extraordinary record of transporting overseas as many as 300,000 troops a month for a period of several months. This explains the presence in the British area so soon after the arrival of the 27th Division of the large force of American troops aggregating more than 200,000 men. It was during this period and by reason of the crisis referred to that a decision was made by representatives of the Allied Governments to designate a Supreme Commander to direct the operations of the Allied armies. When Marshal Foch received his commission to act as General-in-Chief of all the armies, one of his first orders was to direct the transfer of American troops in the British area to other localities. It was stated at the time that Field Marshal Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force, protested against this withdrawal of American troops and that he was finally allowed to retain two American divisions and to select the two to be retained. He chose the 27th and 30th Divisions. The other divisions soon left the British area, but not before the 33d Division, also a National Guard division, largely from Illinois, had won distinction with the Australian Corps at Hamel. It was the first action when American troops serving with the British had taken part in any important offensive operation and all watched the result of the proposed attack with keen interest; we of the 27th with confidence, the British with concern, as to what would be disclosed of the real battle value of untried American troops.

A British staff officer agreed to let the officers at the 27th Division Headquarters know promptly of the outcome. Shortly after the operation was concluded, and it will be remembered that it was a finished success, this British officer hastily came into Division Headquarters. His joyous manner indicated what the general result had been. Some officer present, more impatient than the rest, immediately demanded, "What about those Yanks of the 33d? Did they make good?" The British officer replied, "I asked the identical question a moment ago over the phone to the Australian headquarters and the Australian officer's reply was, 'These Yanks are certainly good fighters, but, my God, they are rough.'" This coming from an Australian was praise indeed. This incident was the origin of the widely circulated story about the roughness of American troops in battle.

Thus the departure from the British area of the mass of American troops left the 27th and 30th Divisions as the representatives of the American army with the British. It is believed by the division that one of the determining factors in the selection of the 27th Division for continued service with the British was the impression gained by Field Marshal Haig when he inspected and reviewed a detachment of the division during the first week in June at a place near Rue on the coast. On that occasion the detachment consisted of the 107th Infantry and the fourteen machine gun companies of the division. Marshal Haig made a careful inspection of each company and spoke a word or two to each of the battalion and company commanders.

The officers and men, by their soldierly appearance, exceptional physical fitness and steadiness in ranks, presented an appearance sufficient to stir the blood of any soldier, and the Field Marshal upon completing the inspection, and as he walked with the writer toward the point from which he was to take the review, expressed his admiration of the appearance presented by these troops. Because he had spent so much time in making the inspection and had talked with so many officers in the hearing of the companies, the men had opportunity to estimate Marshal Haig. It was later learned that the officers and men who took part in this review developed a very decided respect and liking for him. What impressed them, and in fact all who had the opportunity of meeting him, was his fine soldierly presence, coupled with his frank, simple and enthusiastic manner. But it was not until the detachment began to pass in review that the Field Marshal gave vent to the fullest measure of his approbation. The regiment passed in column of half companies with bayonets fixed. The alignments and the slope of the pieces were as near perfect as could be seen outside of the Military Academy. At this time it will be remembered these units had no recruits and had sustained no casualties. As with perfect precision they swung by, the Field Marshal turned to the writer and said, "My, but these are seasoned troops. This is certainly no war-raised division. What magnificent chaps they are!"

During the inspection about twenty airplanes had been circling about overhead, probably as a measure of security against the possibility of an enemy air raid. As the column of troops got under way for the passage in review, one of these aviators in a spirit of deviltry, which seemed at times to be characteristic of the air service, shot his plane toward the ground at a point behind the rear of the column, and having attained a height of not more than six or eight feet above the points of the bayonets, flew at high speed and with a deafening roar from the rear to the head of the column and then high into the air. It was a very severe test of discipline to have this aerial cyclone, which could not be seen by the men until it had passed, approach them from the rear and so short a distance above their heads. Not a head in the marching column moved, however, and so far as could be seen, not an eye moved. The Field Marshal made some severe comments concerning the action of the aviator, but these were lost in his approval of the discipline shown by the troops.

A decided difference was found between the American point of view and that of the British in relation to what might be termed routine military existence. It was perhaps natural that this should be so. We had come into the war but recently. Our troops were filled with confidence and pride in their ability to win, and this confidence and pride had had no opportunity to suffer a setback at the hands of the enemy. In all probability the British army had experienced the same emotions in 1914, when they first entered the war, but between 1914 and 1918 four long years of bloody suffering had chilled their enthusiasm. War to them had become the routine of life and there was no prospect of any immediate change. They discussed and planned and executed with deliberation and



A Stokes mortar platoon of the 107th Infantry



Target practice for the "one pounders"


a matter-of-fact manner that seemed to the impatient Americans to be lacking in intensity of purpose. The British, furthermore, had been so surfeited with the horrors of the battlefield that they made special effort in their life behind the lines to approximate the normal or peace-time existence as closely as possible. Every British division had its divisional show and nightly these shows entertained the troops in some part of the divisional area. There were athletic contests between regiments and divisions. There were frequent horse shows and dinner parties, while every afternoon at five o'clock there was tea at every point where British officers and British troops were located. All these features aided in enabling officers and men, on each occasion after they were withdrawn from the bloody and muddy human abattoirs of battle, to persuade themselves that they were still human, and had not passed on into some other and very horrible life. After our division had been in action a few times, all were very willing to avail themselves in similar manner of these helpful and distracting influences.

These features not only furnished diversion to those who participated, but for both British and Americans were, in a broad sense, in furtherance of the amalgamating process so necessary in the cause of efficiency.

Reference has been made to the intensive work which went on in the British training area in relation to the specialties. This training, however, was not carried on to the neglect of practice in coordination of the efforts of the several arms of the service. Division exercises were held at stated times. Some of these were most profitable, particularly in training for the maintenance of battle liaison. On Saturday, June 15th, for example, a divisional exercise prescribed by the corps involved the march of the 27th Division to attack an assumed enemy occupying Gapenne Ridge. The exercise employed all units of the division.

Shortly before this, the command of the Second American Corps was given to Major General George W. Read. This assignment was welcomed by the Commanding General of the 27th Division and by others who knew General Read. He and the writer had been members of the same class at the Army War College during 1913-14 and had become well acquainted.

A word or two is in order here concerning the organization of the Second American Corps. When American divisions were sent to the British area early in the spring of 1918, General Pershing did not immediately designate a corps commander. He created by order the Second American Corps and designated a corps staff for the purpose of getting its organization under way, but retained in his own person its command. In the first instance, he detailed as Chief of Staff of the corps, Lieutenant Colonel (later Brigadier General) George S. Simonds of the regular infantry, who had been on duty in the G-3 (operations) section of the staff at General Headquarters. Colonel Simonds was known to the division as the co-author with Captain Marshall of a very instructive primer on military topography, which had been used in the schools of the New York Division a number of years before the war. The efficiency of Colonel Simonds as Chief of Staff of the corps was marked and he combined with



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
that efficiency a complete understanding of the many little problems involved in our mission with the British.

In our relations with the British the corps had a mission more difficult than either of the divisions which composed it, for the reason that the best interests of the joint British and American effort called for a most intimate and direct relation between the American divisions and the British units, with which they were associated. General Read at no time permitted his authority over the American divisions to interfere with this desirable relation. On the contrary, he furthered it by a complete subordination of what might be called the pride of command to the practical demands of the time. In the military operations which followed the training period, when the 27th and 30th Divisions were parts of British and Australian corps, this policy was continued, and it was not until the Le Selle River operations in October that the 27th and 30th Divisions operated under the direct command of Major General Read as the Second American Corps. In relation to the remarkable spirit of cooperation and loyalty which existed between the 27th and 30th American Divisions throughout their service in Belgium and France, and which will be more particularly referred to elsewhere, the headquarters of the Second Corps must be included as an important element in the make-up of this happy military family.

Reference has been made to the bombing activities of the enemy which occurred during the training period. This bombing took place every night when the weather conditions offered the enemy opportunity to reach their targets. The town of Abbeville marked an important railroad crossing over the Somme and this place was a constant target for enemy aviators. Further west the cities of Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne received constant attention. The Division Headquarters at St. Riquier was but a short distance from Abbeville and every evening about dusk one could see the inhabitants of the town leaving for places of shelter in the near-by hills. Many narrow escapes were had by officers and men in these bombing raids, but no casualties occurred while the division was in the Rue training area.

St. Riquier, among other things, is noted for the fact that in one of its towers still standing the great Joan of Arc was held prisoner for a considerable period of time before her trial and execution, which occurred at Rouen. The town itself is surrounded by steep, rolling hills and presents a very ancient and quaint appearance. In the Rue area and northwest of the town of St. Riquier is located the famous Forest of Crecy. North of this forest in the year 1346 was fought the famous Battle of Crecy, which was the first big battle in which gunpowder was used. The location of the battlefield is marked by a monument. There were, therefore, many places and features of historic interest to attract the attention of men during their stay in this area.

Finally, on June 16th, orders were received that the division would leave the Rue area and proceed to the St. Valery area south of the Somme. This area is shown on the diagram sketch and adjoins the Rue area on the south. Division Headquarters was directed to be established in the town of Escarbotin, near Frieville. At the same time the Division Com-



Church at St. Riquier

mander was notified that the stay in the St. Valery area would be for a few days only and that the division would shortly be ordered to the vicinity of Doullens in support of the Third British Army. The change from the Rue to the St. Valery area was made by marching.

On June 20th, at the invitation of Major General Bethell, the writer dined with him for the purpose of meeting General Rawlinson, the Commander of the Fourth British Army. It was under General Rawlinson that the division later made its famous breach of the Hindenburg Line.



Division Headquarters at St. Riquier

General Rawlinson is the type of soldier who appeals strongly to Americans. A very different type in many ways from the Field Marshal, he possessed the same simplicity of manner and genuine enthusiasm. It seemed to be rather characteristic of all the British officers of high rank that they were men devoid of formality or in fact of anything tending to inspire awe or build up importance.

True to the advance information given, the stay in the St. Valery area was very short. On Friday, June 21st, the troops of the division were again on the march from their billeting areas to staging billets and camps toward the new area, where the division was to be in support of General Byng's Third Army. On Saturday, June 22d, Division Headquarters closed at noon at Escarbotin and opened at the same hour at Beauval.

For the benefit of the non-military reader, it should be explained that a division headquarters during time of war is always open, and in order that important messages may at all times receive attention at headquarters, it is the practice when a change of station is to be made, to send to the new station an advance party to establish the new headquarters and to function there after a given hour, up to which time the division headquarters continues to function at the old station. With notice of such change and of the hour given in advance to all units of the division, it is possible to maintain uninterrupted relation with all units of the division while on the march.

The move from the St. Valery area did not, of course, terminate the training period with the British, but from that period on there was, in addition to the work of training, a tactical mission. As the move from the St. Valery area into the area of the Third British Army carried with it the mission of constituting a part of the Third Army reserve, the continuation of the story of the training with the British will be continued in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XII

SERVICE WITH THE THIRD BRITISH ARMY

UPON the arrival of the division in the new area, units took stations mentioned in Field Orders No. 6 and in the march table attached thereto, which appear in the Appendix as Exhibit 15. The new area covered an attractive stretch of country west of Arras shown on the accompanying map, which also shows graphically the location of divisional units.

Arras, a destroyed city of some importance, was still held by the British. In preparation for defense against further enemy pressure in that sector several systems of trenches had been indicated in the rear of the line held by the 3d British Army. These positions were in various stages of development. Some had been not much more than outlined. A great deal of work had been done by large forces of coolie laborers in digging the trenches to a depth of about two and a half feet, leaving them to be completed by troops designated to occupy them.

When the division arrived in this area of the 3d British Army, the Division Commander, accompanied by Colonel Stanley H. Ford, Chief of Staff, visited General Sir Julian Byng, commanding that army, and received from him personally an outline of the situation and the possibilities of the German attempt to drive through in that vicinity.

While with the 3d British Army, Division Headquarters was located in the town of Beauval. The locations of other units of the division are shown on the accompanying map.

On June 24th the Division Commander received from the VI Corps of the 3d British Army a secret memorandum, of which the following is a copy:

SECRET

VI Corps G. S. 26/102

27th Division, U. S. A.

1. In the event of the enemy penetrating the first and second defensive systems on the VI Corps front the 54th Brigade, U. S. A., will be prepared, on receipt of orders from VI Corps, to occupy the fourth (Beauquesne-Pasbarly, or General Headquarters) system in the VI Corps area, in order to give time for reinforcing troops to arrive and for troops withdrawing from the forward area to reform; also to collect all stragglers and small parties withdrawing from the forward area and reorganize them for the defense of the line.

2. The fourth system will be held by the 54th Brigade, U. S. A., with a line of outposts. All six battalions will be in the line. The front (observation) line will be the line which will be fought for.

3. Four copies of a map showing the third and fourth systems, with the latter system divided into suggested subsectors, and showing the location of headquarters, are forwarded for issue as follows:

27th Divisional Headquarters, U. S. A.—1 (issued personally on 23d June)
54th Brigade Headquarters, U. S. A.—1 (issued personally on 23d June)



View of Church at Beauval. In the foreground to the left will be seen a portion of the building used as the Headquarters of the Division Commander and General Staff Sections of the Twenty-seventh Division, during the service of the division with the Third British Army.



View of Town Hall at Beauval, used as offices by portion of 27th Division Headquarters, during the service of the division with the Third British Army in the Doullens Area.

107th Regimental Headquarters—1
108th Regimental Headquarters—1

These maps will not be in the possession of a lower formation than a regimental headquarters. In addition, six maps showing the third and fourth systems are forwarded for issue to battalion headquarters. Only sufficient detail should be entered on these to enable each battalion to know the extent and headquarters of its own subsection and the subsection on either flank.

4. In the event of the first and second systems being penetrated, the third (red) system in the VI Corps area has been organized to be held by four divisions with headquarters at Grenas, Couturelle, Warluzel and Barly. In addition, the Gouy Switch (shown in blue on the attached maps) will be held by the 4th Guards Brigade from Laherliere to Gouy (both inclusive). Headquarters of the 4th Guards Brigade will be at P. 20. b 2.0 (Barly Wood).

5. The following dumps will be available for the supply of S. A. A., etc., for both the third and fourth systems:

Sus St. Leger.....0.26.a
Barly .....on Barly-Saulty road, P. 21a and c.
La Bellevue.....U. 22.b (Doullens-Arras road).
L'Esperance .....Doullens-Arras road, half a mile west of l'Esperance Farm.

6. In order to be able to occupy the fourth system at short notice, the 54th Brigade, U. S. A., will carry out the necessary reconnaissances of the line and the approaches thereto as soon as possible. On completion of the reconnaissance of the fourth system, the 54th Brigade, U. S. A., will carry out a reconnaissance of the third (red) system in the VI Corps area, and of the approaches to it, to enable them to reinforce this system should the necessity arise.

On application to the VI Corps, two buses are available for conveying reconnaissance parties to and from their billets daily.

7. As soon as the necessary reconnaissances are completed a map showing proposed dispositions will be forwarded to VI Corps.

Should the 54th Infantry Brigade wish to practise entrenching, arrangements can be made through the VI Corps for this to be done in the General Headquarters system.

A. W. STERICKS,
Major.
For B. G. G. S.

VI Corps

24th June, 1918

Copies to:

66th Division
199th Infantry Brigade (with map)
3d Army
IV Corps
XVII Corps
VI Corps R. A.
VI Corps Heavy Artillery
VI Corps "Q"
Guards Division
2d Division
32d Division
2d Canadian Division
4th Guards Brigade
54th Infantry Brigade, U. S. A.
4th Tank Brigade

It may be interesting for the reader to follow the execution of a mission of the above character. This can best be done by reading the division order (Field Order No. 6) and the accompanying march table, which appear in the Appendix. This should be done in connection with the accompanying map of the Doullens area. The division order was followed by an appropriate order of the 54th Infantry Brigade to the 107th and 108th Infantry Regiments and the 106th Machine Gun Battalion. The

regimental order of the 108th Infantry and the battalion orders and defense scheme of the 2d Battalions of the 107th and 108th Infantry Regiments are given herewith as samples of the manner in which the mission was directed to be carried out by the infantry battalions:

HEADQUARTERS, 108TH INFANTRY
27TH AMERICAN DIVISION

June 27, 1918, 9:00 P. M.

FIELD ORDERS
No. 5

MAP REFERENCE, SPECIAL MAP, 1/20000

1. In the event of an attack by the enemy our brigade has been assigned to defend the General Headquarters line on the whole front of the VI Corps, B. E. F. The General Headquarters line is the fourth line of defense on the front of the 3d Army, B. E. F. In case the enemy breaks through the forward systems, the brigade is charged with the collection of stragglers from the front, their reorganization for the defense of the line and with the holding of the enemy until certain designated reinforcing divisions arrive. The 53d Brigade will be on our right and the 107th Infantry on our left.

2. This regiment (less machine gun company) will, on June 28, 1918, march to the General Headquarters line and occupy it for purposes of instruction.

3. (a) Each battalion will assemble at 7:30 A. M. at its alarm post, and will immediately proceed to occupy the sector assigned as follows:

1st Battalion will occupy from a point V 15 e 3, 5-6.5 on observation trench to point V-2-6-8-3.
2d Battalion will occupy from a point V-2-6-8-3 to P 27-a 4.5-6.
3d Battalion will occupy from a point P 27 a 4.5-6 to P 15-5 7-5.

(b) Commanding officers will assign their respective units to battle positions, station their troops therein, advance posts will be located and occupied. Line of communication by means of visual signaling, runners, motorcycles and any other means available will be established between units on right and left and regimental headquarters.

4. First line transports will accompany units and rations for the day will be carried; field kitchens will be taken to a point to be designated by battalion commanders and troops will be withdrawn from trenches for meals. Troops will withdraw from trenches and march to billets at 6:00 P. M.

5. Regimental headquarters will be established at 0-28-B-7.5.

E. S. JENNINGS,
Colonel.

Copies to:

1st Battalion
2d Battalion
3d Battalion
Headquarters Company
Supply Company
Medical Department
War Diary
File

HEADQUARTERS 2D BATTALION, 107TH INFANTRY

June 27, 1918.

DEFENSE SCHEME

REF.: MAP 51C 1/20000

1. The 107th Infantry will occupy the trenches of the General Headquarters line, which is the fourth line of defense of the 3d Army front on the VI Corps front. The sector assigned is C.18.B.7, inclusive, to V.15.D.1.3., inclusive.

2. This battalion will occupy the sector V.26.D.3.3., inclusive, to V.15.D.1.3, inclusive. The sector on its right will be occupied by the 3d Battalion, 107th Infantry, and the sector on its left by a battalion of the 108th Infantry.

3. The enemy has made preparation for an attack on this front, with probable objective Arras and the Vimy Ridge, by a turning movement in northwestern direction on the south of Arras. Two switches have been constructed on the VI Corps area.

4. The ground includes in this sector important tactical features of the hill to the southeast of Warliecourt-Labazeque-Saulty.

5. The line is organized as follows:

(a) POSTS IN ADVANCE OF FORWARD LINE—Have been constructed or sited with accommodations for about one section with Lewis gun.

(b) OUTPOST LINE—First line constructed on forward slope of hill, and therefore as a line of observation. It has been ordered that this line is to be held as a line of resistance.

(c) SUPPORT LINE—Constructed in many places on reverse slope of hill, and therefore screened from ground observation.

(d) RESERVE LINE.

(e) COMMUNICATION TRENCHES—At points tactically important are arranged in more than three lines and for all-around defense.

(f) MACHINE GUN POSITIONS—Have been sited and will, where suitable, be used for Lewis guns.

(g) WIRE—Along most of front one or two apron fences have been erected in front of advanced posts, first line and second line.

6. The line will be held as follows: Three companies in the line, each occupying same with three platoons and one platoon in support. Each company commander is responsible for the holding of all probable approaches and tactical features as strongly as possible.

The following sectors are assigned:

(a) COMPANY E—V.26.D.3.3., inclusive, to edge of wood V.26.B.7.6., inclusive.

COMPANY G—Edge of woods V.26.B.7.6., exclusive, to angle of trench at Labezeque V.21.D.6.3., inclusive.

COMPANY H—Angle of trench at Labazeque V.21.D.6.3., exclusive, to V.15.D.1.3., inclusive.

(b) COMPANY F—Will be in reserve, right resting at V.20.B.4.2.

(c) BATTALION HEADQUARTERS—At dugout V.19.D.2.0.

(d) BATTALION AID STATION—At Battalion Headquarters.

(e) REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS—At U.21 B.2.4.

There will be no brigade or regimental reserve.

7. During the occupation of these trenches reconnaissance of the line of trenches in advance will be made with a view to their possible occupation.

8. WORK—Brush and undergrowth in advance of all fire positions will be sufficiently cut away to furnish field of fire.

Communicating and fire trenches to be deepened and fire steps and parapets completed.

Wiring to be reconnoitered and strengthened.

9. FIRST LINE TRANSPORT—Will be placed along road at edge of woods V.20.C.4.0. to V.20.B.5.0. and there remain for further orders.

10. At command "Man Battle Stations," the battalion will assemble at Alarm Post and will be marched to its position by Le Souich-Lucheux-Hombercourt-Couturelle-La Bezeque Farm.

BY DIRECTION OF CAPTAIN NESBITT,
Commanding 2d Battalion.

Copies to:

Companies E, F, G, H
Supply Officer
Transport Officer
Medical Officer
C. O., 107th Infantry.
Battalion File

On June 28th the 54th Infantry Brigade marched to the General Headquarters line and actually occupied it. The day was spent in supervising the manner in which the occupation was made. The approach marches were checked up by numerous staff officers. Plans for delivering the necessary tools for deepening the trenches and constructing the necessary shelters were also checked, and all concerned made acquainted with their particular functions in relation to the mission of the division should the contingency arise for its occupation of the General Headquarters line.

During the time the division was in this area it was subjected to constant bombing at night by enemy planes. One bomb was dropped back of the Division Commander's billet among animals of the 105th Infantry. The bomb was fragmented laterally with great violence, cutting off the legs of a number of horses and mules. This explosion resulted in the death of about a dozen animals. One soldier of the 105th Infantry was sleeping in an escort wagon at the time and, although the wheels of the wagon were badly damaged, the soldier was not injured. No other soldiers were injured at this time.

Two bombs were dropped close to the chateau occupied by Colonel James M. Andrews, commanding the 105th Infantry, without injuring any of the occupants of the building.

It was while the division was in this area and on July 2d that General Pershing paid us a visit of inspection. He lunched with the Division Commander at the latter's billet in Beauval. After lunch, accompanied by the Division Commander, he motored about and inspected various units of the division, some in their billeting areas and some on the march. More detailed reference to this visit is made in another part of the book.

While in this area, also, the Division Commander, accompanied by Colonel Ford, was invited to witness an attack by two battalions of the 12th British Division on a 1,200-yard front against the German position near Bouzincourt in the vicinity of Albert. At that time of the year and in that latitude it is not dusk until about 10 o'clock at night. The attack was directed to be made at 10:00 P. M. on the evening of Sunday, June 30th. The Division Commander and Chief of Staff of the 27th Division joined General Higginson, commanding the 12th British Division, early in the evening of June 30th and proceeded to a point well forward from which a clear view of the front could be had. For an hour preceding the time set for the attack there was very little fire. At exactly 10 o'clock the earth shook with the roar of hundreds of guns and almost immediately the bursting shells could be seen falling on the enemy trenches and on positions in rear, throwing great columns of mud and earth into the air. Simultaneously with this were seen rockets of many types thrown into the air from the German line. Soon the foreground was clouded with the approaching darkness, through which could be seen the innumerable flashes of bursting shells and the path of tracer bullets fired from the British side to make clear to the attacking infantry the direction of their advance. The attack was a success.



Building used as Battalion and Regimental Headquarters, 105th Infantry, within the citadel at Doullens

The opportunity to observe and informally to participate in British operations of this character, prior to the actual participation of our own division in similar engagements, was of the greatest value in furnishing experience in the preparation for battle and conduct of operations. The British afforded us many opportunities for such experience during the period preceding the time when the 27th Division first took over a divisional sector.



27th Division Headquarters at Beauval, France, June, 1918

The division had engaged in much reconnaissance of the defensive sector which it was to take over in the event of enemy attack and had practised the actual occupation of the line. Orders were received to the effect that the division would shortly be relieved and sent for service with the 2d British Army, at that time holding an important part of the line in Flanders. The movement to Flanders began on July 3d. The first divisional orders were in the form of a warning order sent out on June 30th. These orders, Field Orders No. 10, may be found in the Appendix as Exhibit 16. The following day Field Orders No. 11, also to be found in the Appendix as Exhibit 17, were issued prescribing the details of the movement which was largely to be made by rail.

The circumstances governing the movement of a body of troops as large as a division are complicated, and it may be of interest to the reader to learn something of the details to be provided for in orders when a movement of this character is to be undertaken. In the case of the movement of the division from the Doullens area to Flanders, such details appear substantially in Orders Nos. 22 and 26 and these orders, together with Field Orders No. 13, will be found in the Appendix as Exhibit 18.

The reader will note that in paragraph 7 of Orders No. 22 directions were given that the 27th Division would carry their overcoats. This was believed by the Division Commander to be a very desirable modification of the prescribed field equipment which eliminated overcoats and provided for two blankets per man. The weather in northern France, particularly in the Flanders areas, except for a few short spells during the summer, was ordinarily cold and raw. It was believed that by substituting the overcoat for one blanket the men would be kept in better health and maintain a higher resistance to disease than would otherwise be possible. In moves of the character referred to, the overcoats were baled by squads and tagged. They were then left in the area under guard and transported to the new area as lorries became available. This system worked most satisfactorily throughout the entire period of active operations, with the result that when in the trenches the men of the 27th Division always had the additional protection and warmth of the overcoat.

Pursuant to the orders mentioned above, the division, without any incident, left Doullens area for Flanders. Division Headquarters moved in part by rail and in part by lorry. En route the Division Headquarters stopped for two nights at the little village of Nieurlet, a most attractive, almost medieval hamlet, located near St. Omer, a town about midway between Calais and Ypres. Nieurlet was connected with St. Omer by a canal and travel between these places was largely by this waterway, the people poling their boats up and down the canal in the transport of all kinds of farm produce. While at Nieurlet enemy bombing was very active, particularly against St. Omer, Calais and Boulogne. At times less important places were also bombed. Night was made attractive or hideous, dependent upon the state of mind of the observer, by the panorama of hundreds of searchlights scanning the skies with their accusing beams for the elusive enemy bombers, whose ominous engine throbs could plainly



View of the hamlet of Nieurlet showing the little canal on the right

be heard from above. Frequently one of the beams would disclose an enemy plane. When this happened other beams were immediately turned on the aerial target, while from the ground about the "archies," as the anti-aircraft cannon were called, belched their shrapnel into the air in an effort to destroy this most dreaded of all nocturnal disturbers. The



Remains of the building where the bomb dropped on the billet of 106th Machine Gun Battalion at Nieurlet. Photograph taken during summer of 1920 when the débris of the building had been largely removed

roar of the guns, the dropping of shrapnel and shell fragments on the tiled roofs of the houses, the swinging searchlight beams, the occasional view of the enemy planes, the blinding flashes and severe detonations when the bombs were dropped, constituted a scene and an experience that nothing short of another such war will ever produce.

It was here in this little village of Nieurlet a night or two after Division Headquarters left that one of the companies of the 106th Machine Gun Battalion while billeted in a barn on the one village street suffered its first losses. An enemy plane made a direct hit on the building, which was crowded with sleeping soldiers. The result was one man killed and about twenty wounded. It seems miraculous that more men were not killed. The building was badly shattered.

By the 4th of July the main body of the division had arrived in the new area. There were, however, no formal celebrations of the day, as many of the units were on the march, while others were in process of establishing themselves in their new billets. In a number of regiments, however, games were held in order that the anniversary of American independence might not pass unnoticed.

On Sunday, July 7th, Division Headquarters moved forward to the Flemish town of Oudezeele, east of Cassel.

CHAPTER XIII

SERVICE WITH THE SECOND BRITISH ARMY



N the last chapter the story of the division was carried up to the point where Division Headquarters was moving from the village of Nieurlet to the town of Oudezeele. En route to the latter place, the Division Commander lunched with General Sir Herbert Plumer, commanding the 2d British Army, and was informed in a general way of the conditions on the front of the 2d Army as they might affect the 27th Division. This distinguished General of the British army became a very good friend of the 27th Division, and all in the division who had the good fortune to make his acquaintance will always remember his kindness of heart and his interest and confidence in American troops.

In order that the conditions affecting the problems of the 2d British Army at this time may be understood by the reader, it is desirable to review in a brief way the military operations which shortly before the arrival of the 27th Division in Flanders so vitally affected that army. It will be remembered that Ludendorff toward the end of March, 1918, began a great offensive for the purpose of terminating the war before the American army could grow sufficiently to make itself a determining factor. The attack of March 21st fell in part upon the 5th British Army and in part upon the 3d British Army. The attack was made between Fontaine-les-Croisilles and La Fere. The 3d British Army resisted with some success, but the 5th British Army was driven back. The attack in the days following the 21st of March continued with successes which resulted in a breach in the line between the right of the 5th British Army, which was the right flank of the British army itself, and the left of the French army. As the British were primarily concerned with the defense of the channel ports, their tendency was to retire to the west and north, while the tendency of the French army, which was fundamentally concerned with the protection of Paris, was to retire west and south. It was only the decision arrived at about this time, making Marshal Foch the General-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France, which served to correct these perhaps natural tendencies and to produce unity of command and effort. Under his leadership, liaison between the two armies was reestablished, French and British divisions were moved about under his orders as if they belonged to one army, and the great German drive was stopped; but not until it had reached the vicinity of Villers Bretonneux, a short distance east of Amiens. All this happened south of the sector of the 2d British Army which was in the vicinity of Ypres.

After stopping the German offensive in Picardy, Marshal Foch succeeded in getting together the nucleus of a reserve force. He had deter-

mined upon a counter-offensive when, on the 9th of April, the Germans launched another offensive, this time in Flanders. This attack was made against General Plumer's 2d Army between the Lys and Canal de la Bassee. The first day of this attack the Germans made considerable advance. The attack was pushed south of the Lys and on the north of Ypres. Messines and Ploegstert were taken. Armentieres was evacuated. Marshal Foch directed that the British forces in Flanders hold tenaciously without retirement, and at any price defend and hold Mt. Kemmel, Neuve Eglise and Pont-de-Nieppe. The initial success of the Germans in Flanders stimulated them to renew efforts in that region. Marshal Foch was obliged to give up his plan for a counter-offensive on the Somme in order to send troops to the support of the British in Flanders. On the 11th and 12th of April French troops were sent to the vicinity of St. Omer for this purpose. German attacks along the British front in Flanders continued more violently than ever.

On the 16th of April Marshal Foch went to Flanders for personal observation of the situation. At Abbeville he conferred with Lord Milner, Marshal Haig and General Wilson of the British army. From that place he went north, stopping at Blendecques, which was then the Headquarters of the 2d Army. The next day an additional French division, the 34th, was sent to the support of the British army. About this time the British were forced from Wytschaete Ridge, immediately east of Mt. Kemmel.

On the 17th of April Marshal Foch directed two more French divisions, one to move by bus and the other by rail, in further support of the 2d British Army.

German attacks in the north continued without let-up and additional ground was gained. It seemed as if the important channel port of Dunkirk would fall before the German advance. Again the importance of holding Mt. Kemmel was stressed. Marshal Foch urged that the arrival of the American troops be expedited, and that in their transportation nothing but infantry and machine guns be sent over until the situation could be relieved. This was in order that valuable space aboard the transports might not be taken up with artillery and other material. Arrangements were made for some thousands of Italian laborers to be furnished the British army to aid them in the adequate preparation of their defensive line to resist further advances by the Germans.

On the 24th of April the important and dominating hill known as Mt. Kemmel, which was defended by one British and two French divisions, was assaulted and taken by the Bavarian corps. In spite of the capture of this important height, the Ypres salient immediately to the north continued in the hands of the British. More French troops were sent into Flanders. On this day Marshal Foch discussed with Generals Pershing and Bliss of the American army the employment of the American divisions as they became available. German attacks continued between Ypres and Bailleul.

On the 30th of April six more French infantry divisions and three divisions of French cavalry were sent north to Flanders. At this time

the force of the German attacks began to diminish, while at the same time, by reason of the reinforcements received in the Flanders region, the power of the defensive was increased. Thus during the first week in May very considerable bodies of French troops were operating in the territory of the 1st and 2d British Armies, and their presence there weakened to the extent of their numbers and the fatigue and losses resulting from their use, the strength of the French army under Marshal Petain, holding the area south and east of Montdidier. Accordingly, on the 10th of May, Marshal Petain warned Marshal Foch that the French army had arrived at the extreme limit of its ability to render further aid in the north. By the combined efforts of the French and British armies under the supreme leadership of Marshal Foch, the great German offensive of March 21st towards Amiens had been stopped, liaison between the French and British armies maintained and the second great German offensive in the vicinity of Ypres brought to a standstill. Again Marshal Foch planned immediately for a counter-offensive, but again Ludendorff maintained the initiative by commencing a third offensive, this time against the French army holding the line of the Chemin des Dames.

On the 27th of May the German army began its assault in the south. It will be noted that this offensive in this sector came shortly after large numbers of French troops had been sent north into Flanders, near the extreme left of the Allied line, where they had been more or less used up in stopping the German effort in that locality.

The attack in the south was between Anizy le Chateau and northwest of Rheims. The two German armies of von Boehm and von Bülow assaulted the eight French and three British divisions which held that line.

On the 27th of May the German army gained the line of the Vesle. In certain places their advance was for a depth of more than fifteen kilometers. On the 28th and 29th their successes continued. Soissons and Fere en Tardenois were taken. On the 30th they gained the line of the Marne, east of Chateau Thierry.

It is not germane to this account to narrate the incidents following the German offensive in the direction of Chateau Thierry. It is sufficient to say that at no time was the cause of the Allies so seriously threatened as when following the two great offensives further north, with all the shock they entailed to the British and French armies, the Germans successfully drove through during the last days of May and the first part of June, almost to striking distance of Paris. As a result of the great efforts made by both French and British armies during the months of March, April and May, there was available not much of a reserve of rested, fit troops, with which to meet this third German effort.*

On the 1st of June there had been held at Versailles the first meeting of the superior council of war. Then it became clear to those most con-

*It was on the Marne at this time that the American Army was able to push into the struggle the fresh divisions that stopped the German drive.



Temporary bridge at Oudezeele. Bridges like the above were carried over all streams in the Flanders area by the British to facilitate expected forced retirement



"Au Coc Hardi," Oudezeele's leading hotel

cerned that both British and French reserves were almost expended as a result of the long-continued and heavy fighting. It was realized that the speedy transportation to France of more American troops was vital. It will be remembered from a preceding chapter that at this time the 27th Division had arrived in France and was in part in the Rue area and in part on its way there from Brest and St. Nazaire. By the end of the first week in June the German army was within sixty kilometers of Calais and Abbeville on the British front and actually within gun range of Paris on the French front. The great concern at this time was that the Germans might renew their offensive in Flanders. In that event it was probable that the French army, as a result of heavy losses sustained in Flanders and again on the Marne, would not be able to spare a sufficient number of effective divisions to reinforce the British in a manner needed to stop another enemy drive in Flanders. It was under these circumstances that the 27th and 30th American Divisions were pushed up into Flanders in support of the 2d British Army, then facing the enemy with their backs literally to the sea.

The stay of the division at Oudezeele was for so considerable a period of time that some description of the town would seem to be warranted. Oudezeele was ancient—very ancient, and it was Flemish—all Flemish. The people spoke French indifferently, but Flemish fluently and volubly. There was the usual large and attractive church, a number of quaint stores, a blacksmith shop or two, several mills, and, of course, a number of estaminets, which became to the extent of their capacity, club-rooms for detachments of the men who were billeted in or bivouacked near Oudezeele. The rest of the village consisted of stone or brick houses, harboring a simple farmer class, who were nothing if not industrious. Although this



The billet of Colonel Montgomery at Oudezeele



Division Commander and Staff of 27th Division, taken at Oudezeele, August 18, 1918. From left to right: First Lieutenant Edward B. King; First Lieutenant Henry A. Morriss; Second Lieutenant Robert G. Monroe; Captain Tristram Tupper; First Lieutenant James S. Wadsworth; First Lieutenant Edward C. O. Thomas; Lieutenant Colonel Theodore B. Taylor; First Lieutenant Auguste B. Peterson; Major William L. Hallahan; Major James L. Kincaid; Lieutenant Colonel J. Mayhew Wainwright; Major Mortimer D. Bryant; Major Homer N. Battenberg; Captain Davis T. Dunbar; Colonel Stanley H. Ford; Captain Albert N. Towner; Major General John F. O'Ryan; Captain J. S. Jenkins, B. A.; Major Edward Olmsted; First Lieutenant Joseph D. Eddy; Major Joseph W. Farrell; Captain William H. Terry; Major Lefferts Hutton; Major Benjamin J. Williams; Major R. R. Johnson, B. A.; First Lieutenant Matthew F. Carney; Captain Robert W. Hanna, B. A.; Major Walter L. Bell; Major Joseph J. Daly; First Lieutenant Harold T. Clement; Captain Raymond T. Moniz; Second Lieutenant James H. Doyle; First Lieutenant William J. Grange; Second Lieutenant Archie B. Gwathmey; Second Lieutenant William J. Halloran; Second Lieutenant Herbert Forsch; Second Lieutenant Perry S. Newell



Division Commander's Headquarters at Oudezeele

village was within range of the bigger German guns, and all of the region was bombed nightly by German airplanes, the village life went on in normal manner. Crops were cultivated in every direction right on out to the vicinity of the Poperinghe Line.

The war was regarded by the mass of these people as an unauthorized interference with their farming activities. When the defensive position known as the East Poperinghe Line was established, it cut across the front of the XIX British Corps, through the cultivated fields of the Flemish farmers of near-by villages. When this line was being constructed, and the construction was carried out by the Engineers of the 27th Division under harassing enemy shell fire, positive instructions were given by the British authorities that the greatest care must be exercised to interfere as little as possible with the growing crops. When the threatened German drive seemed imminent a little later in the month of July, and inspections of the East Poperinghe Line showed that the fields of fire from the front line trenches were masked by the growing crops immediately in front, it was arranged, only after much protest on the part of the Division Commander, that the foreground might be cleared of the crops for a short distance in front of the wire.



The four "leading ladies" of the Divisional Theatrical Troupe: Privates Krebs, Crawford, Pauly and Burns. Note the hats—they are the regulation steel helmets



The same "ladies" minus their stage make-up

It was not an uncommon sight to see old men, women and even boys and girls hoeing and working in the fields almost on the edge of the heavily shelled area, where it was impossible for anything but a few weeds to grow. They worked away with little interest in the cannonading or the shelling going on about them, unless, as sometimes happened, shells fell very close. On these occasions they took cover as best they could until the conditions again prompted them to continue their work.

This will give the reader an idea of the people as they impressed us at this time in Flanders. For the most part they were a flaxen-haired, stolid people, bearing little resemblance to the French in other sections. They seemed to be orderly, neat, industrious and very religious. In Flanders apparently most men, and all women and children, go to church on Sunday. The sermon is usually delivered in both Flemish and French. While the men and women of Oudezeele and the neighboring towns of Watou and Cassel seemed stolid and more or less indifferent to the coming of the American troops, the children in large measure made up for this attitude. It was obvious that these children liked the Americans, who paid attention to them, and made companions of them. Opposite the billet of the Division Commander in Oudezeele there was a large field surrounded by poplar trees. At the far end of this field there was erected a series of shower baths, while in the adjoining field there was usually bivouacked one or more companies of one of the infantry regiments. On the near side



Performing at Oudezeele. Privates Hughes and Marion



The quartette: Privates Whitman, Unger, Johannes and Hamilton (at piano)

of the field a small stage was erected and in this field every evening between 8 and 10 P. M., which at that season and in that region meant during daylight, the divisional show performed for the entertainment of the troops within walking distance of Oudezeele. True to American form, the soldiers saw to it that the boys and girls of Oudezeele occupied the front rows on the grass in front of the stage. The troops were constantly being moved about, as they went in and out of the line, and so the soldier audiences were constantly changing. Not so with the boys and girls of this ancient village. They were there every night, the same group of forty or fifty. At first they gazed in almost dumb wonderment at the nonsense of the clowns, or the dancing of the "girls," and listened intently to the divisional jazz band and the popular Broadway songs. After a week or two they got to know the leading men and leading "women" of the troupe, and great was the pride of the little urchins when during the day their friendly greeting was returned by one of these great personages. Before the division had been at Oudezeele a month one could hear the boys of the village whistling such songs as "Wait Till the Cows Come Home," "My Heart Belongs to the U. S. A.," "Mother Machree," and other melodies. In two months they were singing the songs in English, without, of course, understanding very much of the meaning.

But a few kilometers from Oudezeele was the much larger town of

Steenevoorde. The Germans did not appear to like Steenevoorde, for they shelled it daily, the result being that before the 27th Division arrived in the area, it had become a deserted city. A reference to the accompanying map will show no direct roads leading from Oudezeele forward to the center of the sector held by the British division on the immediate front of the 27th Division.

In going forward it was necessary to move to the southern part of the 27th Division sector, through the town of Steenevoorde to the main road running east and west through Cassel and Abeele and then turn east towards Abeele or, on the other hand, to proceed north to the town of Watou and then turn east on the main road. The Germans, knowing this, kept these roads under harassing fire. At unexpected times throughout the day a rain of shells would descend on Steenevoorde in the vicinity of the junction of the Oudezeele-Steenevoorde road and the Cassel-Abeele highway.

Very frequently as one traveled either of these roads, particularly in the vicinity of Steenevoorde, there could be seen the bloodstains and wreckage of one of the numerous little tragedies that almost daily marked the advent of this harassing enemy fire.

On July 4th the 54th Infantry Brigade, less the machine-gun units, was directed to march to the Arneke Zermezeele area the following day.



Jack Roche and "girls" singing "Wait Till the Cows Come Home"

On July 5th the 105th Infantry, less machine-gun company, was directed to march the same day to the Tilques area for range practise. On the same day Field Orders No. 15 and Orders No. 26 were issued for the units of the division, less those engaged in target practise, to move forward for the occupation and defense of the East Poperinghe Line. These orders and the march table are included in the Appendix as Exhibit 19.

While the principles governing the conduct of war have remained unchanged for a long period of time, the tactics employed in the application of these principles have varied in accordance with the kind of troops employed, the topographical features to be encountered, the climate, the available resources of the army and the opposing tactics of the enemy.

As a result of the recent successful German offensive, Marshal Foch had prepared and sent to all the Allied armies a memorandum prescribing the tactics which should be employed to meet successfully a repetition of such enemy methods. In this memorandum he stressed, among other things, the importance in defensive operations of disposing the available troops in depth. The idea of this was that when the enemy thrust pierced the defensive front line, their task would not be completed, but on the contrary, would only have begun, because of the necessity in their continued advance of overpowering continued resistance. It was believed that dispositions of troops made in depth would insure an effective resistance after the initial effort of the enemy had caused him to suffer a reaction from such effort. The psychology of such a defense was that the enemy, after successfully piercing the first defensive system and believing himself free to maneuver, would be disheartened to find himself opposed by additional defenses and continued resistance. It was felt that the enemy advance would be forced to slow down by reason of casualties and the need for ammunition and supplies to be pushed forward to sustain the renewal of the advance against such resistance, all of which would afford time for the higher command to send reserves to the threatened point to further strengthen the resistance and to counter-attack.



Private Harry Gribble. This soldier was largely responsible for the success of the divisional show

It was in pursuance of this conception of a proper defense that the East Poperinghe Line was established. The first defensive position extended from the Scherpenberg Hill on the south in a northeasterly



Hotel du Lion Blanc, Cassel, once used as headquarters by Marshal Foch. In right front of photo may be seen the Hotel du Sauvage

direction through the villages of La Clytte and Dickebusch to the area of the II British Army Corps adjoining on the north. This defense system consisted of several lines of entrenchments, the front line extending from the valley immediately east of the Scherpenberg, in a northeasterly direction to the intercorps boundary, passing to the east of Dickebusch Lake. Behind this system there was a second defensive system, known as the Westoutre Line, constituting the zone which included the villages of Westoutre, Meath Farm, Ouderdom, Wellington and Ottawa Farm. Behind this second defensive position



The church at Steenvoorde

was a third in course of preparation, known as the East Poperinghe Line. This latter system consisted of three lines of entrenchments extending on the north from the vicinity of Anjou Farm south through Hooggraaf Farm to Condiment Cross and thence to Mersey Cross. This third system was a very well laid out scheme, but was not more than half completed. It was recognized, at least by the higher ranking officers, that any great enemy thrust in this section would carry the enemy through the first and second defensive positions and that the real defensive effort would be made in the East Poperinghe Line.

Accordingly, the 27th Division, which was assigned to the XIX British Corps, and the 30th American Division, which had been assigned to the II British Corps, adjoining on the north, were given the task of further preparing for defense the East Poperinghe Line and of occupying and holding it in the event of attack. The general plan called for a constant study and reconnaissance of the line to be made by officers of all ranks in order to familiarize themselves with the topographical features of the ground and the approaches to their own sectors of occupation, while at the same time three missions were to be carried out by the American troops. The first of these missions was to dispose the mass of the troops for prompt occupation of the line in the event of an alarm. The second was, by rotating the units, to feed small detachments, for purpose of advance training, into the British divisions holding the front system. The third mission was, by rotating the regiments, to give each infantry regiment opportunity for a finishing course in rifle practise at the British ranges in the Tilques area, well to the rear, in the vicinity of St. Omer.

In order that these missions might be carried out, frequent changes were made in the locations of organizations.

The following bulletin, published to the division on July 12th, explains the several methods used during the war upon the Allied side for locating points on military maps:

HEADQUARTERS, 27TH DIVISION

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, FRANCE

July 12, 1918.


BULLETIN
No. 2

MAP COORDINATES

1. Three principal systems of map coordinates are in use in France: French, British and American.

2. BRITISH SYSTEM.—This is the system of coordinates used in connection with the maps recently issued to this division. It consists of lining off areas on a gridiron system, each grid or square receiving a letter and being divided into thirty-six squares numbered consecutively from left to right, in groups of six. The numbered

squares are in turn divided in four equal squares, always presumed to be lettered as follows:



In order to locate a point on the map with precision, the small lettered squares are assumed to be divided into tenths each way. The point is then located as follows (as an example):




L 32 d 5.3.

The figure "5" represents the number of tenths along the "X" coordinate, the figure "3" the number of tenths along the "Y" coordinate.

3. FRENCH SYSTEM.—This differs from the British in that figures only are used. The Plans Directeurs are divided in squares, one lineal kilometer on a side. Lines creating this division are numbered consecutively, left to right and from bottom to top. The system consists in finding the kilometric coordinates of the point in question, dropping off figures not necessary for accuracy or clear understanding, and reading the figures beside each other ("X" coordinate first) without pointing them off.

For example:



The kilometric coordinates of point "A" are:

X = 196.783; Y = 263.724.

For ordinary purposes, locations to closer than the next tenth of a kilometer are unnecessary; therefore the locations made to the nearest tenth and the coordinate of the above point are:

X = 196.8; Y = 263.7.

The last two digits of each number are taken and the point is described thus:

6837

4. AMERICAN SYSTEM.—When location to units and tenths of kilometers will designate the point accurately enough, the French system of coordinates, without the dot, will be used. In all other cases, the point will be indicated by writing the two coordinates on a line, X first, properly pointed off and separated by a dash. Thus, the point given above may be indicated under the French system as follows:

6837

or

96.8 —63.7

or

6.78 — 3.72

or

96.78 —63.72

or

6.783— 3.724

or

96.783—63.724

etc., depending upon the degree of accuracy with which it is desired to locate the point.

5. Distribution of Plans Directeurs are as follows:

1/20,000 down to include Battalion Commanders of Infantry and Battery Commanders of Artillery;

1/10,000—(non-secret) down to include Company and Battery Commanders; (secret) down to include Battalion Commanders;

1/5,000—down to include Battery Commanders and in the Infantry to include Company Commanders, except during the period of attack, when the distribution is down to include Chiefs of Sections.

6. AEROPLANE PHOTOGRAPHS.—Aeroplane photographs are increasingly used to obtain information of the enemy's positions, works, artillery emplacements, communications, etc. Their interpretation and use should be known to all officers.

7. Further information may be obtained from "Instructions Concerning Maps," American Expeditionary Forces, 1918.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL O'RYAN:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S., Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

FRANKLIN W. WARD,
Adjutant General, Adjutant.

On July 16th Field Orders No. 19 were issued, covering disposition of the 105th Infantry Regiment in the East Poperinghe Line. Copy of this order is included in the Appendix as Exhibit 20.

On July 19th there were changes in disposition, all made by marching. These resulted in the 3d Battalion of the 107th Infantry going to R.2.d.6.8. and the 3d Battalion of the 105th Infantry to L.22.a.3.1, while the Headquarters of the 105th Infantry was directed to move the following day to the vicinity of Trappiste Farm at K.17.b.2.1. These references are to the accompanying map of this area.

Map showing

EAST POPERINGHE LINE DEFENSES

Scale of Yards

500 0 1000

Ypres

Kruisstraat

Busseboom

Track D1

Track C

Track B1

Track A

Ouderdom

Reninghelst

Dickebusch

Dickebusch Lake

Vijverhoek

English Wood

Kruisstraathoek

Elzenwalle

Voormezeele

St. Habertushoek

Warburg Camp

Surrey Camp

Hallebast Corners

Hallebast Fm.

Melon Copse

Melon Fm.

Milekruisse

Eksternest Fm.

Bristol Camp

Liverpool Camp

Wiltshire Fm

Gordon Fm

Redoubt Fm

Old Fm

Dead Dog Fm

New Fm

Major's Post

Fort Toronto

Godezimme Fm

Milky Way Jc.

Willebeek Jc.

Vierstraat

Berghe Fm.

Grand Bois

Rod Chateau

Northern Brickstacks

Ft Halifax

La Clytte

Westoutre

G H

M N

H I

N O

DEFENDED LOCALITY

REFERENCE

- Left Cov MGs — L
- Right " — R
- Support " " — S
- Reserve positions
- 6" Newton TMs ■ — Stokes TMs ○
- A A Guns
- Tracks
- Arty S O S Barrage
- M G " "
- Flank M Gs — F
- Forward Posts
- Observation Posts — OP
- Pillboxes
- Pillboxes & O Ps under construction

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As the years go on it will become increasingly interesting to those who participated in the operations of the division during the war period to refresh their recollections concerning the features of the routine which occupied the attention of the officers and men at that time. Reference is made more particularly to such matters as bathing, laundry, gas respirators, excess baggage, tentage, regular reports, cemeteries, refilling points, dumps, gasoline, empty containers, etc. For this purpose there is included in the Appendix as Exhibit 21 copies of Orders Nos. 36 and 38 of July 19th and 20th, respectively, dealing with these subjects under the conditions as they existed at the time.

It has been mentioned that the 27th Division was a part of the XIX British Corps. For those readers who may be interested in the organization of a British corps headquarters, there is included in the Appendix as Exhibit 22 a table showing the crops organization of the British army with a statement of the duties of each staff officer. The XIX Corps was commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Herbert Watts. The Corps Chief of Staff was Brigadier General C. N. MacMullen, D. S. O., 15th Sikhs. The relations of the division with the XIX British Corps continued for so considerable a period of time that some mention of General Watts and his Chief of Staff should be made.

General Watts was a young man about seventy years of age. He is referred to as a young man advisedly. He looked young, he rode his horse as a young man would ride, he covered his corps area with the thoroughness and industry of a young man, and his mind and manners were those of a young man, for he was receptive, optimistic, quick to think and to act. He was all of these things naturally and without effort. After carefully inspecting the 27th Division he expressed, and soon showed, the greatest confidence in its ability to hold the East Poperinghe Line should the Germans undertake a renewal of their attack.

His Chief of Staff, General MacMullen, was a giant in stature, possessed a highly organized mind and an imperturbability of manner that breathed confidence into those with whom he was associated, because that exterior seemed to be backed by great resources of latent imagination, energy and determination.

On July 16th General Plumer, the Army Commander, made a personal inspection of the 54th Infantry Brigade, while in the vicinity of Abeele and Beauvoorde Wood. There was no shelling there on that occasion and in a field defiladed from enemy obervation Captain Sandberg's company of the 108th Infantry gave a demonstration of a company in attack. This company, always noted for its excellence, and as well for the exceptional physique of the young giants who constituted it, made a most favorable impression upon the Army Commander.

On the 19th of July Major General Tasker H. Bliss of our army made a short call. During this period the infantry commands designated for prompt occupation of the East Poperinghe Line in the event of attack, actually held their sectors of the line with detachments and were engaged in observation, reconnaissance and the construction of shelters and lines

of communication. This work, of course, was visible in places to German observation by airplane and from balloons, and in consequence the detachments occupying the line were constantly subjected to harassing artillery fire. The first battle casualty of the division, other than from aerial bombs, occurred in the 102d Engineers on July 13th, when, due to this harassing fire, Private Robert Friedman of Company A was killed and a number of other men of the regiment wounded.

On the 19th of July the Division Commander was notified by telegram that Colonel Cornelius Vanderbilt, commanding the 102d Engineers, had been promoted to be Brigadier General in the National Army and was directed to proceed to the States to take over the command of an infantry brigade. Colonel Vanderbilt, as a result of his long service and experience in the division, had won a much-merited promotion, the inevitable consequence of which was his separation from the division.

On the 20th of July a conference was called by the XIX Corps Commander, the result of which was that the Commanding General of the 27th Division was directed to make a study for the purpose of planning the taking of Mt. Kemmel. This study occupied some time and resulted in the formulation of plans for the capture of Mt. Kemmel by the 27th Division. The execution of the plan was postponed from time to time by reason of threatened renewal of the German offensive on our front, and as will be seen later, became unnecessary when the enemy evacuated Mt. Kemmel on August 31st.

On Monday, July 22d, Miss Elsie Janis visited Division Headquarters and entertained more than a thousand soldiers of the division in the field of Oudezeele, where the divisional show gave their nightly entertainments. Her visit was greatly appreciated. She was the first American woman we had seen in several months.

In the Appendix as Exhibit 23, will be found copies of General Orders, Nos. 63 and 68, of July 24th and August 12th, prescribing the details of training in the front line with British divisions.

During this part of July all officers were busy inspecting and checking up the preparations for the defense of the East Poperinghe Line, and these inspections afforded opportunity to the Division Commander, whose duty it was to cover all parts of the line, to observe the state of mind of the men in the ranks concerning their ability to stop an enemy offensive at what had come to be known as the "East Pop Line." It was plain to be seen that there was no need for stimulating confidence. On the contrary, the men quite generally seemed to feel that with their rifle and machine-gun fire they would stop the enemy as fast as they were willing to come on. This confidence, of course, was in some measure affected by the fact that up to this time the mass of the men had not experienced the demoralizing influence of a concentrated artillery bombardment. The harassing fire to which they were almost daily subjected did not, in spite of occasional casualties, seem to dampen their enthusiasm, but rather served to annoy them, because they could not return the fire.

It was very evident that the entire personnel of the division had

resolved to expend itself completely if necessary in resisting an enemy break through the East Poperinghe Line. The machine guns of the division had been very carefully placed, so as to cover by their fire every avenue of approach. Similar arrangements had been made for the use of Stokes mortars and one pounders. Alternative positions had been selected for all of these auxiliary weapons, while dumps of ammunition had been placed and camouflaged. Very complete plans had been made for counter-attack to meet every conceivable condition that might develop as a result of temporary enemy lodgment in any part of the line. It was felt in relation to the defense of the East Poperinghe Line that the division would give a successful demonstration of its skill, determination and dependability.

There will be found in the Appendix as Exhibit 24 the defense scheme of the 54th Infantry Brigade for the defense of its part of the East Poperinghe Line, which will serve to indicate in greater detail what was contemplated by the defense. It will be noted from the plan mentioned that, under certain conditions, action by the division was contemplated east of the East Poperinghe Line. This action was prescribed in a secret memorandum issued from Division Headquarters on July 17th, copy of which appears in the Appendix as Exhibit 25.



Major General George W. Read, commanding II American Corps

On June 14th Major General George W. Read, having been designated to command the II American Corps, consisting of the 27th and 30th Divisions, assumed such command, but, as has already been stated, left

the actual command of the two divisions with the two British Corps Commanders in whose corps they were then serving.

On July 25th General Read visited the 27th Division and inspected a number of units. The inspection continued on the following day.



Brigadier General Palmer E. Pierce, commanding 54th Infantry Brigade, 27th Division

On July 24th Field Orders No. 22 included in the Appendix as Exhibit 26, were issued. These orders were important. The Headquarters of the 53d Infantry Brigade was moved to L.26.4.7.7. and it was prescribed that the command of the center subsector of the divisional front would pass to the Commanding General of that brigade at 9:00 A. M. on the following day. This officer already was responsible for the left subsector. Command and responsibility, therefore, became vested in the Commanding General, 53d Infantry Brigade, for the left and center subsectors and in the Commanding General of the 54th Brigade for the right subsector. In each case the troops consisted of the brigades, less the machine-gun units. These, in view of the needs of the proposed defense, were consolidated and organized as a machine-gun corps, temporarily commanded by the Divisional Machine Gun Officer. The Infantry units disposed in depth retained, of course, the Lewis machine guns with which each of the infantry companies was armed. One regiment of infantry was kept at target practise in the Tilques area and constituted the divisional reserve.

About this time there had been received from the American General Headquarters copies of a document for distribution to officers of the division for the purpose of study. This report described the effective manner in which enemy forces, by the coordination of light and heavy machine guns, artillery fire and infantry assault, had captured positions in some other part of the front that were fully prepared and supported by machine guns adequately installed, doing all this with little loss to themselves and with heavy casualties to the defenders. In accordance with orders this memorandum was distributed to the officers of the division, but, as the memorandum did not point out the defects in the plan of defense referred to, which resulted in the reverses reported, and did not indicate the additional methods and measures which, if applied, would have smashed the German attack, it was feared by the Division Com-

mander that too much significance might be attached to this memorandum and that it might indicate to the division a belief on the part of the American General Headquarters that such German successes were to be expected. Accordingly, the Division Commander prepared a written critique covering the paper referred to and caused this critique to be distributed with the least possible delay to all officers of the division. As this critique indicates the problems that confronted the division in the proposed defense of the East Poperinghe Line, it is included in the Appendix as Exhibit 27.



Sergeant "Al" Van Zandt in impersonation of Bert Williams

On the 24th of July detachments of the division as large as battalions began their service with the 6th and 41st British Divisions, then holding the front line. The necessary movements to carry out this service were contained in Field Orders Nos. 23, 24, 25, 26 and 29 and in Orders Nos. 42, 43, 44, 45 and 46, covering administration and supply, all of which appear in the Appendix as Exhibit 28. It was in this area about this time that the story was heard of the British Tommy, who, placed out in a listening post in no man's land, standing in water up to his waist, commiserated with himself concerning the never-ending tortures of the war. In a fit of despair, he murmured to himself, "O Gawd, 'ow I 'ates this cold and 'ow I 'ates this mud." Finally, as if desiring to end it all, he said, "O Gawd, I wishes I was dead." At that moment a big shell struck near him and, bursting, heaved upon him large masses of mud, which knocked him down. Gathering himself together and looking toward the heavens, he quickly and beseechingly ejaculated, "O Gawd, cahn't you tike a joke?"

During this period the relations between the 27th Division and the 6th and 41st British Divisions on our immediate front naturally became close and intimate. The fact that detachments of our troops were in the front line with the two British divisions made necessary daily supervision of their work by the higher officers of regimental, brigade and division organizations, which brought such officers in close and intimate contact with the personnel of the two British divisions. There were frequent social occasions when the officers of these divisions messed together and discussed their common problems.

Many cases of heroism marked the daily relations between the officers and men of the 27th Division and the 6th and 41st British Divisions. Sometimes the act was performed by a British soldier and sometimes by an American soldier. One of the British officers told the writer that a night or two before the conversation a British patrolling party had been attacked in no man's land and driven back with losses. He called for volunteers from the group about him to go out and get one of their wounded who had been left behind. Heavy firing was in progress and the prospect was not attractive. Among the group of soldiers was an American, Sergeant Edgar F. Anderson of 53d Brigade Headquarters. He, accompanied by a British soldier who was the other volunteer, proceeded into no man's land and successfully brought in a badly wounded member of the patrol. In miraculous manner they had escaped being hit. It then promptly developed that still another member of the patrol was missing and again the officer called for volunteers. Again Sergeant Anderson volunteered. This time the British officer protested, stating that it was



Fallon and Brown in "Me and Mickey"



King George inspects Company L, 108th Infantry, commanded by Captain James Riffe, at Oudezeele, August 6, 1918. Left to right: Brigadier General McMullen, Chief of Staff, XIX British Corps; Aide de Camp to Lieutenant General Sir Herbert Watts, commanding XIX Corps; Lieutenant General Sir Herbert Watts; Brigadier General Palmer E. Pierce, commanding 54th Infantry Brigade, 27th Division; Major General John F. O'Ryan, commanding 27th Division; His Majesty King George



His Majesty King George reviews troops of the 2d British Army during church parade held at Terdeghem, August 11, 1918. Detachment of 27th Division passing in review. King George and Major General O'Ryan are on the reviewing stand.

primarily the duty of the Britishers to look after their own wounded. The Sergeant seemed surprised and saying, "Sir, this sort of thing is what we're here for," took one end of a litter and accompanied by another British soldier, returned to no man's land and successfully brought in the last of the wounded. It was this spirit of comradeship, contributed to in handsome manner by the British, which cemented so firmly the friendly relations which existed between the 27th Division and the XIX British Corps.



"Kitty" Crawford

On another occasion Captain Jerome F. Langer, who commanded Company I of the 106th Infantry, with eighteen of his men was on a tour of duty with the 41st British Division on the Scherpenberg, facing Mt. Kemmel. His tour of duty was over and he was about to return with his party accompanied by a British soldier as guide. The area was subjected to a hard hammering by the enemy guns. Captain Langer, however, was directed to proceed with his party. He did so and had reached the bottom land west of the Scherpenberg, when a veritable rain of shells fell about them. Several of the party were killed outright, including the British guide, while most of the others were badly wounded, among them being Captain Langer, who was struck in sixteen places by shell fragments. It is narrated by the survivors that Captain Langer succeeded in gaining his feet, and badly wounded though he was, maintained the discipline and morale of the survivors of his party. Several badly wounded were carried in by the more fortunate survivors, Captain Langer himself salvaging two rifles which had been carried by two of the American dead; he also aided in carrying one of the wounded. Fortunately Captain Langer, after a long course of treatment in the hospitals, recovered from his wounds.

One of this party was First Lieutenant Albert V. Clements, who was severely wounded in the right foot. Seen in the casualty clearing station shortly thereafter by one of the Division Headquarters staff, his only comment was, *"Another pair of shoes gone to the devil!"* Lieutenant Clements also recovered and is now commanding one of the companies of the 14th New York Infantry, in which regiment he served prior to the reorganization of the 27th Division at Camp Wadsworth.

On August 1st the Division Commander, upon invitation of the Australian Field Artillery Brigade, then camped in the vicinity of St. Omer, visited that unit for dinner and to witness the appearance of the 27th Division show in an entertainment given for the Australian troops. This occasion was perhaps the first social one of importance, which brought the 27th Division in close relations with the Australians and marked the beginning of later affiliations which became very close.

The show by the divisional troupe was much appreciated by the Australians, including the story told by one of the troupe to the effect that a certain Irishman, visiting the zoological park in London, saw for the first time a kangaroo. Being mystified at the odd conformation of the animal, he expressed great surprise and asked what it might be. The reply was, "That's a kangaroo—a native of Australia." "A native of Australia," gasped the Irishman with alarm. "My God, my poor sister married one of thim."

On the 6th of August His Majesty, King George, visited Division Headquarters, arriving at 11:30 A. M. He was met by the Division Commander and Staff and entered the field opposite the billet of the Division Commander, where Company L of the 108th Infantry, commanded by Captain James Riffe, was bivouacked. The King inspected this company, which made an excellent impression.

The Division Commander had received advance information of the visit of the King, and never previously having entertained a king, the staff were somewhat in doubt as to what was required by custom in the British army on such occasion. The British Corps Headquarters, with their accustomed good will, stated that they had no suggestions to make; that they were quite sure the King would like to stop for a few minutes and perhaps see some small formation of the American division before passing on. Pressed for a suggestion as to how the program might be improved, one of the British staff thought it might be well to have all "other ranks," as enlisted men are called in the British army, who were close by and not in the formation, directed to cheer spontaneously as the King drove off. This suggestion was adopted and it was directed that upon the departure of His Majesty the King the cheering would be "spontaneous." The reader will observe from this that our preparedness left as little as possible to chance.

This day was saddened by the news received in the evening that Lieutenant Colonel Morris N. Liebmann of the 105th Infantry had been killed by shell fire while at Walker Farm.

On Sunday, August 11th, the 2d British Army held a church service



Grave of Lieutenant Colonel Morris N. Liebmann at Abeele Airdrome

at Terdeghem, which was attended by the King. Every division sent a provisional detachment to attend this service. The service was to commemorate the anniversary of the entry of the British army into the war. After the service, the troops which had taken part were reviewed in column formation. The detachments represented many divisions of the British army, as well as the 27th and 30th American Divisions, and presented a most picturesque and interesting appearance. As each divisional detachment appeared, the Division Commander concerned joined the King and answered whatever questions might be asked concerning the troops which represented his division.



Corporal L. K. Knowlson, 105th Infantry, the first man of the division to win a decoration

On the 15th of August notification was received that the division would relieve the 6th British Division in its sector in the front line, beginning on the night of August 21st. The divisional field order covering this relief, No. 33, together with Orders Nos. 64 and 65, covering the details of movement and supply, appear in the Appendix as Exhibit 29. The relief was effected without material incident, the Division Headquarters going forward from Oudezeele to a hutment camp, known as Douglas Camp, in a field near Abeele. Its location was at L.14.a.2.0.

During most of the time that the battalions of the 27th Division were operating with the 6th and 41st British Divisions in the front line they were opposed by an Alsatian division. Our troops had been extremely aggressive in patrolling no man's land and had prevented much activity on the part of the enemy. About the time that the 27th Division took over the front line from the 6th British Division the Alsatian division was relieved by the 8th Prussian Division, a very excellent organization, and this division immediately undertook aggressive steps to secure identifications of the organizations in their front. Accordingly, at 5 o'clock in the morning of August 22d, the 8th Prussian Division put down a heavy minnenwerfer barrage on a section of the front line held by Company L of the 107th Infantry. Out in front of this company was a small detachment of seven or eight men under Corporal Charles R. Henderson. This group was located in two connected shell holes. Having sought to demoralize the defense through their severe bombardment, the enemy pushed out two flanking machine-gun groups, which immediately went into action to cover the dash of their center group which was composed of about forty raiders. In the face of this strong force, which had but a short distance to advance, Corporal Henderson's detachment stood fast and those who had not been put out of action by the barrage opened fire with their rifles and later supplemented this fire by the use of grenades. The attack broke down with severe loss to the raiders, who also suffered from the supporting fire of the remainder of Corporal Henderson's company, which was commanded by Captain Fancher Nicoll. Of the seven or eight men who thus gallantly held their ground and inflicted these casualties on the enemy but two remained uninjured. The rest were either killed or wounded. The unwounded survivors were Corporal Henderson and Private George Delehay, who later died of wounds received in the attack of September 29th on the Hindenburg Line.

In this minor engagement Private Donald Emery of the Sanitary Detachment, 107th Infantry, also distinguished himself by his courage and resourcefulness in attending and evacuating the wounded.

Corporal Henderson and Private Emery, with other gallant soldiers whose names appear elsewhere, were awarded British decorations acknowledging their gallantry, skill and determination as exhibited in this engagement.

The experience had by all officers and men of the division up to this time was diverse and trying, but at the same time valuable. It constituted a real preparation for the first major engagement of the division which took place shortly thereafter in the attack on Vierstraat Ridge. The experience of officers and men during the months of July and August included constant harassing shell fire in the back areas, almost nightly bombing from enemy planes, constant machine gunning and sniping for those in the forward trenches, with frequent patrolling and raids.

Not soon will the survivors of the division forget such names as Scherpenberg, The Bund, La Clytte, Scottish Wood, Ridge Wood, Gordon Farm, Milky Way, Hallebast Corners, Indus Farm, Gretna Farm, Ouderdom, Reninghelst, Busseboom, Anjou Farm, Walker Farm, Hague Farm, Long Barn and Remy Siding. Every relief on its way forward, every detachment of troops coming out, messengers, runners, carrying parties and supervising officers going forward and returning, at one time or another have passed through or visited most of these places during their service on the Flanders front. All will remember the ghastly nights with the pyrotechnic display which marked the actual front, the constant banging of our own eighteen pounders as they barked from some unexpected place, past which men were picking their muddy way, the deeper roar of the heavier guns as they flashed their missiles into the night, the throbbing of the enemy bombers overhead, the barking of the "archies" as with the aid of the searchlights and supplemented by the usually fruitless hammer tapping of the machine guns, they sought to bring down the enemy planes. But most enduring of all will be the memory of those nights when the enemy shells came crashing down on the roadways at important crossings like Hallebast Corners, Ouderdom and Busseboom, when the enemy sought to harass the movements of our troops.

For the information of the reader interested, there are shown in the Appendix as Exhibit 30, Extracts from British General Headquarters Summaries containing copies of German documents captured about this time.

On one of these occasions Lieutenant Colonel J. Mayhew Wainwright, known to many of the soldiers as "the shell hound" because of his apparent desire to abide as much of the time as possible in this environment, was supervising the movement of reliefs and was following one of the tracks toward the village of Dickebusch, occasionally lighted by star shells. Ahead of him was an Italian American soldier of the Field Signal Battalion carrying a basket of pigeons on his back, which were destined for the front line. Shells were falling about. Both were expert in detecting the caliber and probable proximity of impact. They proceeded with the apparent unconcern of those featured in war stories, until their practised ears detected the much-heralded approach of a 5.9 Howitzer shell. Their tense senses warned them that this shell would get them. As a matter of

fact, it struck within ten feet of the pair. It did not burst—it was a "dud." Colonel Wainwright confesses that he was transfixed, at first with dread and then with thanksgiving. The effect upon the Italian American soldier, however, was quite different. He crouched for a second as the shell struck and then when it did not explode, looked over his shoulder and said, with an evident air of disgust, "What'sa mat', no good?"

As will be told in the next chapter, the routine warfare of position was terminated about this time and the division went forward into battle.

CHAPTER XIV

BATTLE OF VIERSTRAAT RIDGE

ON the 30th of August information was received that south of us the enemy were giving up the Lys salient and that British patrols had been enabled to advance for a considerable distance and had captured Bailleul. Accordingly the 27th Division was directed to push out patrols on the following day to determine evidences of retirement on our own front. About the same time the 41st British Division on our right discovered that the enemy had given up Mt. Kemmel, and accordingly this important position was occupied by their advance elements. Field Orders No. 36, of the 27th Division, which appears in the Appendix as Exhibit 31, were issued on August 31st, directing the advance of the 53d Infantry Brigade on Vierstraat Ridge. This advance was begun at 11:30 A. M. on the same day by patrols of the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, advancing through the 3d Battalion of that regiment commanded by Captain Stanley Bulkley. Thus began the engagement known as the battle of Vierstraat Ridge. In this attack the 53d Infantry Brigade advanced with the 106th Infantry on the right and the 105th on the left.

The same day, Field Orders No. 38 were issued, covering the continuance of the operations on the following day. These orders are included in the Appendix as Exhibit 32.

By reference to the attached map it will be noted that at the commencement of this action the front line occupied by the 27th Division faced in a southeasterly direction. It was the object of the Army Commander in making the advance to swing the line so that it would face almost due east. The 30th American Division on our left was called upon to make a short advance for the purpose of taking the village of Voormezelle. This division in a sense therefore acted as a pivot while the 27th Division moved forward. Correspondingly the advance of the 105th Infantry was to extend from this pivot and conform to the greater advance to be made by the 106th Infantry on its right. The boundary between the two regimental sectors was the road running from Hallebast southeasterly through Vierstraat to Wytschaete. On the afternoon of August 31st the 105th Infantry advanced successfully, taking Captain's Post and Major's Post, which appear on the accompanying map, and consolidated their position in the trenches running along the easterly side of the York Road, advancing its left beyond Middle Farm. In similar manner south of the highway above referred to, the 106th Infantry advanced in their sector across the Cheapside Road, and crossing the York Road, occupied and consolidated the enemy trenches known as Vierstraat Switch, running along the easterly side of York Road. The attack of the 106th Infantry covered a greater depth than that of the



Douglas Camp, taken during the summer of 1920. It was here that Headquarters of the 27th Division was located during the Battle of Vierstraat Ridge

105th, as will be seen from an inspection of the map, the southern boundary line of their advance extending from the Milky Way to the V. C. Road east of Rossignol Camp. By 5:00 P. M., both regiments were engaged in consolidating the new line, which included what was left of the village of Vierstraat. Both regiments had taken a number of prisoners and had captured considerable booty in the way of machine guns, anti-tank rifles, grenades, ammunition and other supplies.



Hallebast Corners

Map showing

Disposition of Units of 27th Division and Advances made during

Battle of VIERSTRAAT RIDGE

Belgium, Aug. 31 to Sept. 2, 1918

Scale of Yards

VIERSTRAAT RIDGE ENGAGEMENT, AUG. 31 - SEPT. 2, 1918

Front Line on Morning of Aug. 31-1918

5 P.M. Aug. 31, 1918

11.30 P.M. Sept. 1, 1918

Reported Taken by 4 P.M. Sept. 2, 1918

Trois Rois

Swan Chateau

Melon Fm

Melon Copse

Walker Fm

Indus Fm

Hondo Fm

Vijverhoek

English Wood

Kruisstraathoek

The Gebund

Dickebusch

Dickebusch Lake

Gretna Cross

Scottish

Preston Camp

Bristol Camp

Liverpool Camp

Elzenwalle

Voormezeele

Wiltshire Fm.

Warburg Camp

Hallebast Corners

Surrey Camp

Gordon Fm

Eksternest Fm

Hallebast Fm

In de Vandeling Cab't

New Fm

Middle Farm

Brasserie Fm.

Dead Dog Fm.

St. Eloi

Old Fm.

105 Inf.

Millecruisse

Cheapside Road

Captains Post

Majors Post

York Road

Bois Carré

Redoubt Fm

Fort Toronto

Vierstraat

Godezmme Fm

106 Inf.

Milky Way Jc

Willebeek Jc

Trench

Byron Fm

Berghe Fm.

Chinese

Red Chateau

Grand Bois

Northern Brickstack

Ft. Halifax

Ft. Mt. Royal

K.C. Road

Petit Bois

Bois Wytschaete

Wytschaete

Kemmel

WYNKOOP HALLENBECK CRAWFORD CO., NEW YORK, PRINTERS AND BINDERS

The following day the 105th Infantry were to hold their position, while the 106th Infantry, with their left as a pivot, connecting with the 105th at the village of Vierstraat, were to advance on the right from Ft. Halifax until their line ran due north and south. This movement was successfully made by the 106th Infantry, which had completed its task by 11:30 on the morning of September 1st. The enemy's defense from this time on was considerably strengthened. The 105th Infantry, having extended its left beyond Middle Farm, now attacked Redoubt Farm and the trenches in Carre Farm, and later the railway and that part of the Chinese Trench within its sector. At the same time the 106th, with its front extending north and south, attacked and took Chinese Trench on both sides of the Vierstraat-Wytchaete road, within its sector. Captain Harry F. Sullivan's company, M of the 106th Infantry, with other detachments from the same regiment, got into the Chinese Trench but were subjected to a severe enemy artillery bombardment, preliminary to a counter-attack. The casualties were such that Captain Sullivan withdrew the troops under his immediate command for a short distance and the enemy counter-attacking troops regained Chinese Trench. Orders having been issued for the retaking of Chinese Trench, an attack was made after artillery preparation and the trench was regained and held by parts of the 106th Infantry. By hard fighting the 106th Infantry on the same day advanced to the line of the railway near the foot of Wytchaete Ridge.

On the following day, the divisional line was advanced to Northern Brickstack on the south and thence due north along the ridge from Northern Brickstack to Middle Farm. This line was secured late in the afternoon of September 2d.

For the reader who is interested in knowing something of the information that came to the division during this period from the Intelligence Sections of the British army, there is included in the Appendix as Exhibit 33 extracts from various intelligence reports received during this period.

By reference to the accompanying graphic diagram showing the order of battle of the 53d Infantry Brigade, one can observe the order in which units down to companies entered the battle. Company H of the 105th Infantry was detailed to the 3d Battalion of the 106th Infantry, under command of Major Harry S. Hildreth, for this operation.

The diagram also gives the names of all officers of the 105th and 106th Infantry Regiments commanding units of the attacking force. It may be stated in relation to this first major operation of the division that the attitude of officers and men was one of confidence and eagerness, perhaps too much so. Orders from the XIX Corps prohibited the use of a barrage and directed that the advance be made with the front covered by patrols pushed well out.

Pursuant to these directions, when the patrols advanced across the Cheapside Road on the afternoon of August 31st, they did not go far before they came under the fire of snipers and light machine gunners who had been left in position for the purpose of inflicting casualties.



Hague Farm

Right here some comment should be made of the manner in which the German soldiers on this and other occasions, who were called upon to perform such duty, carried out their missions. Except toward the very end, such detachments stuck to their jobs with the greatest courage and spirit of self-sacrifice. Indeed, some of them refused to surrender even when our men were upon them, and were killed at their posts. It has been stated that the conduct of our troops in this battle was marked by con-



A close-up view of one of the buildings at Hague Farm. Photo taken summer of 1920

105th Infantry

K	I	D
Capt. Robert S. Hall. 2d Lt. Walter W. Slayton.	1st Lt. Alexander Granat (w). 2d Lt. Ramon L. Hall. 2d Lt. Harold J. Hobbs.	1st Lt. Leo F. Giblyn. 2d Lt. Frank J. Baumert. 2d Lt. John T. Clissett, Jr.

M	L	B	A	C
1st Lt. William B. Turner. 2d Lt. John J. Rudin.	1st Lt. Thomas G. Carlin. 1st Lt. Harold F. Smith (w). 2d Lt. Henry J. Cammann.	1st Lt. Kevney O'Connor. 2d Lt. Clement A. G. Feldt.	1st Lt. John J. Callahan. 2d Lt. Stephen B. Elkins.	1st Lt. Harry Merz. 2d Lt. Charles J. Doyle.

3d Battalion	1st Battalion
Capt. Stanley Bulkley, 1st Lt. Carl G. R. Ross, Adj. 1st Lt. Cary Walradt, Int. Off. 2d Lt. John C. Cipperly, Gas Off. 2d Lt. Frank B. Howe, Jr., Trans. Off. 1st Lt. Leonard J. Howard, Sig. Off. 1st Lt. James R. Lisa, M. C.	Capt. Henry Maslin. 1st Lt. Ogden J. Ross, Adj. 2d Lt. Harold O. Blakeley, Gas Off. 2d Lt. Christopher B. Degenaar, Int. Off. 1st Lt. Donald D. Campbell, M. C. 1st Lt. Michael J. Connery, Trans. Off. 1st Lt. Arthur H. Norris, Sig. Off. 2d Lt. Summerfield S. Curtis, Attd.

E	F
Capt. James S. Slosson.	Capt. Frank R. Potter (w). 1st Lt. Eben P. Armstrong. 2d Lt. Lawrence P. Clarke (w). 2d Lt. Edward Van Holland (w).

G	H
1st Lt. Earl W. Maxom. 1st Lt. Edward Warschauer.	Capt. Raymond F. Hodgdon. 1st Lt. James T. Bergen. 2d Lt. Arthur H. Cunningham. 2d Lt. Harold B. Morris.

2d Battalion		
Capt. Charles A. McArthur. 1st Lt. Harry L. Conway, Adj. (k).	2d Lt. Llewellyn H. Davis, Int. Off. 2d Lt. Frank P. Buck, Gas Off.	Capt. Elmer H. Ormsby, M. C. 1st Lt. Charles G. Dodd, Trans. Off. 1st Lt. George F. Ramsay, Attd.

		M. G.
Colonel James M. Andrews. Major Charles W. Berry, Attached Capt. John W. Frost, Oper. & Int. Off. Capt. Lewis H. Gibbes, Adj. Capt. Stephen H. Fifield, Pers. Adj. 1st Lt. Benjamin Buckley, Gas Off. Capt. George W. Papen, Jr., M. C. 1st Lt. James C. Donovan, M. C.	Capt. Jacob S. Clinton, Hq. Co. 1st Lt. Edwin B. Gore, T. M. Off. 1st Lt. William Innes, Int. Off. 1st Lt. H. E. Burke, One Pounders 1st Lt. Paul A. Florian, Sig. Off. Capt. Roscoe B. Trumble, Sup. Off. 1st Lt. John F. Mahoney, Sup. Co.	1st Lt. Howard Bird. 1st Lt. Lester C. Higbee. 2nd Lt. Glenn C. Wasson. 2nd Lt. George F. Evans.

106th Infantry

K	L	M	C	G
1st Lt. Edward A. Gray (k). 1st Lt. Willard M. Webster.	1st Lt. H. C. Stevens, Jr. 1st Lt. Ira A. Hodes (w).	Capt. Harry F. Sullivan. 2d Lt. Horace B. Scanlon (w). 2d Lt. Edward L. Bonney (w).	Capt. John T. Sheehan. 1st Lt. John A. Nelson. 2d Lt. James A. Malloy.	1st Lt. Albert G. Reinert. 2d Lt. Frank A. Knowles (k).

I	D	B
1st Lt. Louis Peterson. 2d Lt. John R. Clark (w).	1st Lt. Matthew J. A. Wilson. 1st Lt. Edward L. Ryan. 2d Lt. Frederick W. Rozeck.	1st Lt. Charles Ostberg. 2d Lt. George W. Turner (w).

3d Battalion			1st Battalion (Less A, Plus G)
Major Henry S. Hildreth. 1st Lt. Chester P. Jones, Adj.	6 T. M. 3 37mm.	Attached 1st Lt. Erdmann Brandt.	Major Ransom H. Gillet. 1st Lt. Ames T. Brown.

H	A	E
1st Lt. Lennox C. Brennan. 2d Lt. Frank P. Ulrich (w).	1st Lt. Gilbert P. Rudkin. 1st Lt. James B. Post, 3d.	1st Lt. Thomas F. Ward, Jr.

F
Capt. Foster G. Hetzel. 1st Lt. York W. Brennan.

2d Battalion (Less G, Plus A)
Major Sidney G. de Kay. 1st Lt. Frederic K. Long, Adj.

		M. G. Co. at Busseboom (Not in this operation)
Colonel William A. Taylor. Capt. Joseph A. S. Mundy, Adj. Capt. Arthur V. McDermott, Op. Off. Capt. William E. Blaisdell, Sup. Off. 1st Lt. William A. Hunter, Int. Off.	Major Lucius A. Salisbury, M. C. (w). Capt. Nils A. Larsen, M. C. 1st Lt. Joseph L. Gilman, Gas Off. Capt. G. W. B. Witten, 6 Div. R. F. A.	Capt. George E. Bryant. 1st Lt. Leaman S. Broughton. 1st Lt. Ivan L. Smith. 2d Lt. William E. Brill. 2d Lt. William B. Behrens. 2d Lt. James F. Curtis.

Note:—After the commencement of the action Company D was moved to the right of of Company G. Later Company B went in on the left of Company C.

105th Machine Gun Battalion

A (Support B)	B	D	C (Support D)
Capt. Lucius H. Biglow, Jr. 1st Lt. Joseph F. Cook. 1st Lt. William C. Barthman. 2d Lt. Harry B. Jennings. 2d Lt. Harold L. Downey.	Capt. Nathaniel H. Egleston. 2d Lt. George Matthews, Jr. 2d Lt. Robert D. McCaskey. 2d Lt. Richard G. Lyon.	Capt. Stanton Whitney. 1st Lt. Alwyn Ball, 3d. 2d Lt. Bert R. Anderson (w). 2d Lt. Hugh de Y. Stillman (w).	Capt. Robert R. Molyneux. 1st Lt. Edward S. Flash, Jr. 2d Lt. Ward H. Farnham.

Major Kenneth Gardner. 1st Lt. Theodore Crane, Adj.	1st Lt. Knowlton Durham, Int. Off. 1st Lt. Raymond A. McLeer, Sup. Off.	2d Lt. Frederick Snare, Jr., Trans. Off. Chaplain Archer B. Bass.	Capt. Charles D. Kayser, M. C. 1st Lt. Joseph Mulcahy, D. C.

Order of Battle

OPERATION AT

VIERSTRAAT RIDGE

AUGUST 31st to SEPTEMBER 2d, 1918

K—Killed or died of wounds.
W—Wounded.

fidence and determination. Perhaps to this should be added that some of them displayed impatience in getting forward. This is illustrated by the fact that when enemy machine gun nests were located there was a tendency with some of the attacking groups to abandon the deliberate methods for attacking such points, which they knew so well, and to resort to the quicker but much more dangerous method of rushing such points of opposition. Accordingly losses were voluntarily incurred by some of our groups which it is believed were avoidable.

The terrain lying between Cheapside Road and the top of Wytschaete Ridge is an open stretch of valley which afforded excellent observation to the enemy from their position on the forward slopes of Wytschaete Ridge, and accordingly it was in most cases impossible for the attacking groups to conceal themselves from observation. It is true that the ground was pitted with shell holes and scarred by numerous trenches, which, when occupied during the advance, temporarily screened the attacking groups from the immediate observation of any enemy groups in the valley, but left them subject to the fire of enemy guns controlled by the artillery observers on Wytschaete Ridge, whenever such fire could with safety to enemy groups be turned upon our men. The effect of this hostile fire was to a considerable extent minimized so far as our leading elements were concerned, because of their aggressiveness in pushing hard upon the outlying groups of the enemy forces.

Were this chapter a professional critique, covering the operations of August 31st-September 2d, there might be much to comment upon that would be of value from the professional point of view. In the conferences following the battle it was most satisfactory to observe that none were more eager to point out such matter than the actual participants. All the officers displayed a marked modesty in relation to their own activities, were generous in commending the gallantry of others, and seemed most interested to be of service to their brother officers by frank discussion of their experiences. All the officers were keen in their appreciation of the continued aggressiveness of the men, while from personal contact with the men, the Division Commander learned that they felt inspired by the dashing leadership of their officers.

It is a most difficult thing in a work of this character to undertake to apportion praise for exceptional gallantry or accomplishment. In fact, it cannot be done and will not be attempted. Every participant in battle is naturally impressed by the things he personally sees or which have come to his knowledge first hand under the stress of extraordinary conditions, and the tendency is to accord greater importance to them than to incidents and occasions which may merit equal or greater commendation, but of which he has had no personal or intimate knowledge. None will better appreciate and understand this than the officers and soldiers who read it, and accordingly, when mention is made of particular officers and soldiers, commending them, it is with the knowledge that there are many others in the division who during active operations acted with equal or greater gallantry, but whose fine conduct, under the complex circumstances involved



View of Dickebusch Lake from The Bund

in the command of an organization as large as a division, did not come to the personal attention of the Division Commander.

On the morning of August 31st, the day of the opening of the attack on Vierstraat Ridge, the Division Commander and Chief of Staff went to



View of Mt. Kemmel from Scherpenberg

the forward area of the 105th Infantry to a place known as The Bund, bordering Dickebusch Lake. They were there primarily for the purpose of checking a special shoot of the divisional artillery, and accordingly the earlier movements of the leading elements of the 105th Infantry came under their observation. The 53d Infantry Brigade on this day was under the aggressive leadership of Colonel James M. Andrews, of the 105th Infantry, who was succeeded the next day by Brigadier General Albert H. Blanding, who reported as Brigade Commander. This temporary command of the brigade by Colonel Andrews placed the 105th Infantry under the command of Major Charles W. Berry, the senior battalion commander, it being remembered that shortly before, the Lieutenant Colonel, Morris N. Liebmann, had been killed.

The 105th Infantry was eager to come to grips with the enemy on their front. The patrols of the regiment from the 2d Battalion were there ready for their advance through the 3d Battalion, commanded by Captain Stanley Bulkley. Captain Bulkley's instructions to his men given in the presence of the Division Commander were confident and to the point. The first prisoners taken and the first machine guns captured in this battle were secured by a patrol from Company I of the 105th Infantry two days before. Throughout the three days of fighting the battalions of the 105th Infantry were at all times well in hand and their successive missions were skilfully and satisfactorily executed.

The 106th Infantry was commanded by Colonel William A. Taylor, in whose leadership the officers and men of the 106th Infantry had the greatest confidence. Colonel Taylor's conduct of this operation was marked by coolness under fire and a profound sense of responsibility. His men seemed to understand that the loss of any of them was to Colonel Taylor a matter of sincere personal grief.

The regimental operations officer was Captain Arthur V. McDermott, who seemed during the action to bear a charmed life, for he probably covered more ground in the battle area than any other officer in the brigade. His reports were accurate and comprehensive.

On the first day of the Vierstraat Ridge Battle, Major Ransom H. Gillet reported at Division Headquarters at Douglas Camp, having come by way of Paris from one of the army schools, this being the customary though not prescribed route for officers returning to their divisions from detached service. This aggressive officer seemed to feel as though he had been imposed upon because the battle had been started during his absence from his regiment. Accordingly he was assigned to command the 1st Battalion of the 106th Infantry. He left at once for the front and reported during the night, having walked most of the way there in the darkness. During the battle he maintained his record for fearless aggressiveness.

Shortly before the battle of Vierstraat Ridge, Major Sidney G. DeKay, who had been convalescing from an attack of pneumonia, reported for duty and had been assigned to the 106th Infantry. When his battalion went forward in the attack, Major DeKay advanced his headquarters and took over three enemy dugouts, one of which he used as post of command.



102d Engineer Train constructing dugout for telephone and telegraph for the 105th Infantry Headquarters during the Battle of Vierstraat Ridge



102d Engineers finishing "Nissen" huts at St. Laurent, for use of Headquarters 27th Division. Due to changes in orders, however, Division Headquarters did not occupy these huts

Having occasion to supervise a part of his line, he left his dugout but had not proceeded far when he heard a muffled roar. Looking about he saw one of the dugouts had been blown up, evidently by a mine left there for that purpose. The dugouts had been inspected and passed "clear" by the personnel of one of the British tunneling companies, operating with the 106th Infantry. The clerical personnel of Company K's headquarters had moved into the dugout and been there but a few minutes when the explosion occurred. As a consequence of this enemy trap, we lost the following named men, all of Company K, 106th Infantry, who made up the detachment:

First Sergeant William J. Doherty,
Corporal James A. Harrington,
Corporal John A. Tyack,
Private First Class John J. Michaels.

Reports from the 105th Infantry seemed to agree that among the numerous officers who distinguished themselves were First Lieutenant William B. Turner, who was later killed in the attack on the outworks of the Hindenburg Line, September 27th, and posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor; First Lieutenants Alexander Granat, who was wounded in this engagement; James T. Bergen, later killed on October 17th; Leo F. Giblyn, later wounded, October 18th; Harry Merz, later wounded, September 29th; E. W. Maxon, later killed on September 29th; and the Medical Officers, Lieutenants Lisa, Donovan and Campbell.

Among those in the 106th Infantry who especially distinguished themselves were First Lieutenant Lennox C. Brennan and his brother, Second Lieutenant York W. Brennan, and Second Lieutenant Edward A. Gray. Captain Sullivan, whose company had very hard fighting in and about Chinese Trench, spoke most highly of First Lieutenant Willard M. Webster, who was later killed in the battle of the Hindenburg Line.

The activities of the one-pounder guns may be illustrated by reference to the work of the one-pounder detachment of the 106th Infantry, under command of 1st Lieutenant Erdmann Brandt. The following is an extract from his report: "When the regiment first went into the line as a complete unit, the 37 m/m platoon moved to Busseboom a battered collection of sheds and Nissen huts that had once been a workshop of the Royal Engineers. It was about two miles back from Ouderdom, on the Ouderdom-Watrach Road. There we stayed for two days without getting any closer to the line, as our preceptors, the British, did not use the 37 m/m in their army, and considered them the handiwork of the devil and an invitation to the enemy for retaliation, to the distress of the infantry. As it turned out, we were never able to prove or disprove their theory, as we only got into action when the actual advance began, and not in trench occupation.

"About August 26th, Colonel William A. Taylor and Captain Murray Taylor visited us, bringing with them Captain Witten, R. F. A., British Artillery Liaison Officer, attached to Regimental H. Q. After inspecting the personnel and equipment, a demonstration was given, which included



Aerial photograph showing trails made by carrying parties at night behind the front line trenches. (Note shell craters resulting from night bombardments directed at these trails)

the dismounting, carrying and setting up of guns, carrying of ammunition, etc. That night Colonel Taylor, Captain Witten and the Platoon Commander made a complete tour of the front lines to determine how the guns could be used to the best advantage. After this reconnaissance Colonel Taylor ordered us up into the line.

"The next night we took two guns up to the lines and placed them back of 1st Bn. H. Q., and thereafter each night one gun team was brought up from Busseboom, a gun carried down to the front lines and an opportunity sought to use it. Unfortunately, none presented itself until the opening of the Battle of Vierstraat Ridge. The evening of the first advance we were ordered by Captain Sheehan, commanding the 1st Battalion, to get into position, covering a gap between our right wing and the British left, as they had lost contact. This we did, though nothing developed. At dawn I received word to move to the left Battalion and report to the Major commanding. Two guns and gun teams were moved forthwith to Iodine Crossing (B. H. Q.) and personal reconnaissance made. The Battalion Commander having given orders for us to use our own judgment as to going into action, one gun was left in reserve at Iodine Crossing, the other was moved forward of Cheapside, and the gun put in position about 100 yards back of Vierstraat crossroads and 50 yards to the left of Vierstraat-Hallebast Road. While forward with Sergeant Perley and



Micmac Farm (photo taken summer of 1920)

Private Moeller, on personal reconnaissance, I met Lieutenant Jones, Battalion Adjutant, who reported need for reinforcement of troops in York trench. Lieutenant C. Brennan appeared as his company was moving forward to effect the reinforcement. His company, at that time, was just back of the ridge, and to advance in the open without supporting fire



A close-up view of Micmac Farm (photo taken summer of 1920)

would subject him to severe machine-gun fire. I asked him to wait ten minutes and give my guns a chance to silence hostile machine guns. Lieutenant Jones was able to give enemy locations—in fact, the enemy could be seen without glasses. The gun was immediately put into action, firing over open sights as speed was essential and the slope was so steep that using the ridge as a mask would have met with doubtful success. The 37 m/m gun silenced the two major machine-gun nests before they had a chance to change their targets and sweep our gun position. We had the satisfaction of knowing Lieutenant Brennan's company reached York Trench without a casualty.

"During the next two days we were able to silence several more machine-gun nests, once under the observation of Captain McDermott, Regimental Operation Officer. Enemy artillery constantly endeavored to wipe out our gun position and machine-gun fire and snipers made it difficult at times to function. It was the only position, however, that offered opportunities and it was decided to keep on using it. Enemy artillery knocked one gun out of action, but we suffered no casualties. The third gun had been brought from Busseboom and was at Iodine Crossing at the service of Battalion Commander, as the second gun had replaced the first which was out of action.

"During the time before the advance, different gun teams had been brought up each night, so that all three were accustomed to being under fire and each gun team had an opportunity to get into action and acquitted themselves like veterans. The gun team sergeants, Perley, Liddell and Hagner, did exceptionally well. We rationed ourselves, transporting rations from regimental ration dump by our own mules and caissons."

One interesting incident that happened in this battle occurred when two seriously wounded men of Captain Sullivan's company of the 106th Infantry were necessarily left in Chinese Trench when the company withdrew. When the counter-attacking German forces entered the trench they found the two wounded soldiers of the 106th Infantry lying there. The latter apparently expected to be killed. Promptly their first aid packets were confiscated, but their wounds were dressed with German paper bandages and the men made as comfortable as could be under the circumstances. A German officer, who spoke English, notified the men that his command were Saxon troops, who always treated their enemies in chivalrous manner. He added that the Americans were apparently preparing to retake the trench; that the Americans did not seem to care whether they were killed or not, and that the trench was not worth holding anyway. He added that his force would anticipate the counter-attack by retiring and that soon they would again be in the hands of their friends. Thereupon he and his men withdrew. Shortly thereafter, supported by artillery fire, through which the two wounded men happened to survive, the detachment of the 106th Infantry, as already narrated, retook the trench and heard from the wounded men the foregoing account of their experience.

On the third day of the battle, the Division Commander having occasion to pass through the Advance Dressing Station at Longbarn, which



Buildings at Trappiste Farm, where the battalions usually went first after leaving the line

place will be remembered by the wounded who received initial treatment there, noted the spirit of the wounded of the 105th and 106th Infantry, which typified the attitude of the personnel of these regiments. Shells were dropping about, but the wounded seemed oblivious, at least so far as their own safety was concerned. One group of about a dozen wounded men were seated with their backs to a building waiting their turn to have their wounds dressed. On the ground about were a score of others lying on



Vierstraat Ridge

litters, some of them unconscious. The sitting wounded, in answer to questions, assured the Division Commander that their comrades had given good accounts of themselves in terms of damage to the enemy. One of them, asked who was the bravest man in his company, responded, "General, the bravest man in our company was that little Wop behind you." Turning about, the Division Commander saw lying on a cot immediately behind him an Italian American, who seemed to be nearing death. A blanket covered all but his head. His eyes were closed and his face wore a blue-white pallor. Asked how he felt, he slightly opened his eyes and with evident difficulty, forced his face into a smile, and said: "I feel-a fine." This was the spirit of the men on this and later occasions of battle. They not only were calm in battle, but their effort was to make light of their hardships and wounds.

The division was relieved on the night of September 2d-3d by the 41st British Division. In this first major operation, the division had acquitted itself most satisfactorily. They had been aggressive and resourceful in the fight and had profited much by their experience.

The casualties in the 53d Brigade in this battle were:

Killed and died of wounds	40
Shell wounds	126
Gunshot wounds	150
Gassed	33
Total	349

Forty-seven German soldiers were taken prisoner in this battle.

During the battle of Vierstraat Ridge the following material was captured:

63 Machine Guns
11 Minnenwerfers
1 Field piece (artillery)

Much more material than enumerated above was captured but the division upon conclusion of the battle, immediately left the sector for the Beauquesne area and before all captured property could be collected, tagged and reported.

Shortly before the battle of Vierstraat Ridge and while the Division Headquarters was at Douglas Camp, the XIX British Corps sent word informally that John S. Sargent, noted as being the world's greatest living portrait painter, was with the British army in the field for the purpose of doing some military art work for the British Government and had expressed a desire to see something of the 27th American Division. Accordingly the Division Commander invited him to spend a few days at the Division Headquarters. Mr. Sargent arrived promptly and became a member of "A" Mess. It soon developed that his idea of seeing something of the American troops involved a search for appropriate subjects amid the scenes of front line activities. With difficulty the Division Commander dissuaded him during the first few days of his visit from going farther forward than



the Division Headquarters. Later it was learned, however, that he had succeeded in persuading one of the Staff to take him along to the front and that he had visited trenches, smelt gas and been under a bombardment while in the remains of the city of Ypres. During the second day of the Vierstraat Ridge Battle he came into the hut of the Division Commander and asked permission to make a sketch portrait, stating that it would take but a short time and would not involve any distraction from the work in hand. His request was acceded to and this sample of the skill of this great artist is shown on the accompanying page.

The relief marked the termination of the service with the 2d British Army. When the division was about to sail for home from France, after the completion of its services abroad, the Division Commander received from General Sir Herbert Plumer, commanding the 2d British Army, the following communication referring to the service of the 27th Division with that army in Flanders:

HEADQUARTERS, SECOND ARMY

COLOGNE

February 9, 1919.

Dear General:—

I should like, before the division returns to the United States, to convey to you and to your officers and men my appreciation of the service rendered by the division while they were with the 2d Army.

The wonderful spirit which animated all ranks and the gallantry displayed in the minor engagements they took part in with us foreshadowed the successes they would achieve later.

Our regret was that the period of their service with the 2d Army was so brief.

Believe me,

Yours sincerely,

HERBERT PLUMER.

To G. O. C.,
27th American Division.

About the same time, the following letter, addressed to the Editor of the Division news magazine, was received from Lieutenant General Sir Herbert E. Watts, commanding the XIX British Corps, with which the 27th Division served during the Flanders operations:

HEADQUARTERS, XIX CORPS

BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

February 9, 1919.

Dear Sir:—

I hear that on the return of the 27th American Division to New York it is proposed to issue another number of your leading organ, *The Gas Attack*, and as the first British Corps Commander who had the honor of having the 27th in his command, I should like your permission to set down my great appreciation of the splendid soldierly qualities of the officers and men of your division and my very happy reminiscences of the time we spent together—from the days around Oudezeele with their military training and social meetings—culminating with the memorable dinner at the Hotel Sauvage at Cassel on the occasion of General O'Ryan's birthday—to the more serious work and fighting around Kemmel.

We British were all very eager to see some of the American army—and I remember on returning to my headquarters after my first visit to your division being asked: "What are they like?" and my reply, "Oh, you needn't worry; they look like business and mean it." Apart from the fine military bearing and physique, I was struck by the tremendous keenness of all ranks to learn as much as possible, as quickly as possible and to waste no time before getting to real business—and they didn't—and what the 27th achieved when they did get there is now well known, and are not their praises writ large in the congratulations and appreciations received from Commander in Chief downwards?

May the best of luck attend all members of your division and may they have as kindly and friendly remembrances for their old comrades of the XIX Corps as the latter have for them.

Faithfully yours,

HERBERT E. WATTS,
Lieutenant General, Commanding,
XIX Corps, B. E. F.

The Editor,
The Gas Attack.

After the return of the division to New York, Lieutenant Philip Barbier of the Belgian army, on duty with the Belgian Military Mission, came to New York with a letter from the Belgian Legation, addressed to the writer, relating to the service of the 27th Division in Belgium. The letter transmitted a cablegram, addressed to the Division Commander and sent by His Majesty Albert, King of the Belgians. The letter and cablegram follow:

I have the honor to communicate to you under this cover the copy of a cablegram addressed to you by His Majesty, the King of the Belgians, and which this Legation has been directed to transmit to you.

I have instructed Lieutenant Barbier, Acting Military Attaché, to go and hand over to you the enclosed copy.

Accept, sir, the asurances of my high consideration.

Telegram sent on behalf of King Albert of the Belgians to the Belgian Legation at Washington, for General O'Ryan, Commander of the 27th Division:

Chargé d'Affaires Belgique, Washington,
For General O'Ryan, New York, N. Y.

Having been informed of the triumphal return of the 27th Division of the American army, I address to you and to your valiant and victorious men who fought so bravely in Flanders the grateful greetings of the whole Belgian nation.

ALBERT.

Since the war, the writer has had some correspondence with Lieutenant General von Hamann, who commanded the 8th Prussian Division, and this officer and his Chief of Staff, Major von Kolaczek, have furnished information concerning these operations as they appeared from their side of the line.

Referring to the period following August 21st, the date when the 27th Division went into the line in that sector, Major Kolaczek writes:

"During these days our numerous night patrols always encountered strong and extremely alert garrisons in the opposing trenches. They did not succeed in bringing in any prisoners."

Referring to the battle of Vierstraat Ridge, Lieutenant General von Hamann writes:

"Reports reaching me from all sources, particularly from our artillery observation posts, were that your infantry was unusually energetic in their attack."

The relief and movement of the units of the division were covered by Field Orders Nos. 39, 40, 41 and 42 and by Orders Nos. 79 and 80, copies of which appear in the Appendix as Exhibit 34.

The rail movement carried the division to a new area, known as Beauquesne area. Its mission there will be taken up later in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XV

SPECIAL TRAINING IN THE BEAUQUESNE AREA AND PREPARATION FOR THE BATTLE OF THE HINDENBURG LINE

AT the time the division left Flanders for the Beauquesne area, no one had any information concerning the object of the change, except that we were going as General Headquarters Reserve to an area of the 3d British Army. The new area embraced part of the old area known as the Doullens area, where the division had been located when it served for a short time with General Byng's 3d Army. In the new area, Division Headquarters was located in the Chateau Valvion, a short distance from the village of Beauquesne. The 106th Infantry occupied the town of Doullens, including the citadel. The location of units in this area will be found in Orders No. 80, which appear in the Appendix as Exhibit 34.

On the 6th of September, Harry Lauder, the Scotch comedian and singer, arrived at Beauquesne and lunched with the Division Commander and staff. The same day available troops were assembled, and, accompanied by a small portable piano, Mr. Lauder sang his inimitable Scotch songs. At the conclusion of his program he delivered a very forceful address, in which he told of the death of his son, an officer in the British army, and of his hatred for the enemy and the enemy methods of conducting war.

The Division Commander was notified about the middle of September that tanks would be available so that special training might be given the division in the use of these auxiliaries. It was also intimated that in the near future the division might be called upon to carry out a mission of great importance which would require its use as what was popularly known as a "shock division." As will be seen later this mission became one in which the 27th and 30th Divisions jointly headed the great column of attack designed to break through the Hindenburg Line east of Ronssoy. In anticipation of such use, the division was designated as a part of the General Headquarters Reserve.

One of the first steps taken by the Division Commander was to hold critiques, attended by as many officers as possible. These critiques covered the experiences of the officers who took part in the Vierstraat Ridge battle, so that all might have the benefit of the experiences and suggestions of those who participated. Immediately thereafter the infantry brigades were practised in battle tactics, so that the lessons of the previous experience might be applied.

It having developed that the Stokes mortars and one pounders had not been used to the fullest advantage, according to reports received from many American sources, and our own experience being in accord with such reports, these units of the several infantry regiments were



Main Street, Peronne, France



Cathedral at Peronne, wrecked by Germans

concentrated for purposes of special intensive training. Suitable ranges were found for both Stokes mortars and one pounders. The Division Commander spent as much time as practicable with these units, stimulating their resource and skill in the technical field of their gunnery, but more particularly in the more difficult field of their tactical employment.

On these practise occasions one of the most zealous young officers was 1st Lieutenant Franklin J. Jackson, commanding the Stokes mortar platoon of the 106th Infantry, who was killed in action soon thereafter in the battle of the Hindenburg Line.

These auxiliary detachments profited much by their special training while in this area. Training together as they did, it was found that their association stimulated keenness and rivalry.

In every great attack fiercely contested by the defenders, there usually comes a time in the advance behind the barrage when parts of the line have been stopped while other parts continue to go forward. The result of this is that toward the end of the attack the front line consists of numerous salients which may be regarded as entrants into the enemy line, while on the other hand the reentrants between them may be regarded as enemy salients projecting into the line of the attacking force. The troops who occupy the points of these opposing salients, both friendly and enemy, usually feel that they can go no farther, because the troops on their right or left are held up. This situation develops a very critical phase in a battle. In the case of the attacking side, the men who constitute the points of the salients which have been driven in the enemy line, have the opportunity by maneuvering to the right or left, to encapsulate the enemy troops who constitute the points of the enemy salients. Such action would also serve to relieve the pressure on the groups of attacking troops which have been held up in front of such enemy salients. But in a similar manner, the enemy troops who are holding the points of the enemy salients have a like opportunity by determination and skilful action, to encapsulate the attacking troops thrust into the defenders' line. Much depends upon the relative initiative, skill and determination of the opposing troops. In executing such measures, troops must not only possess determination and courage, but they must maintain direction, taking skilful use of cover and provide for their own local security against surprise.

For the purpose of intensively practising infantry units in this work and of demonstrating more particularly to company and platoon leaders the correct and incorrect methods of accomplishing such missions, the infantry regiments were intensively occupied in the field in the Beauquesne area, from the time they arrived there until shortly before their departure three weeks later for the front.

One battalion of the 107th Infantry was selected for special demonstrations in the attack. This was the 3d Battalion, commanded by Captain Raphael A. Egan. This battalion became very expert, and on the 13th of September a demonstration was given by it, first of incorrect methods often employed in attempting to advance against hostile machine-gun nests, and finally of the correct methods. The demonstration was attended

by Major General Read, commanding the II American Corps; Major General Edward M. Lewis, commanding the 30th Division, and by a large number of the officers of the 27th and 30th Divisions. The observing party occupied what would have been enemy ground, so that they might witness the attack as the enemy would see it. The incorrect methods were pointed out as they occurred. Finally, when the battalion was withdrawn and gave its demonstration of correct methods, the difference was clearly to be observed by all present. Small groups and detachments of the battalion got forward in remarkable manner without being observed by any of the hundreds of spectators. Enemy machine-gun posts were indicated by small red flags and these were reduced by fire action from the front, while the place was enveloped or attacked from the rear, sometimes by fire action and sometimes with grenades.

Other demonstrations were made with tanks after every regiment had had opportunity to practise attacks, using the tanks as auxiliaries. These exercises with tanks took place where practise trenches and wire entanglements existed. The men therefore had opportunity to observe the complete manner in which the tanks leveled the wire under their treads. In most of these exercises smoke bombs were employd to cover the advance of the infantry groups.

At this time there began a series of conferences in preparation for the move of the division to the front and for the part it was to play in the coming attack. At first, instructions to the Division Commander prevented his disclosing to subordinates other than the Chief of Staff, the fact that the division was to play a leading part in a proposed offensive. From the intensive character of the special training, however, the officers and men of the division knew from their experience that the division was shortly to play some important rôle of an offensive nature.

In order that the reader may have a more comprehensive understanding of the battles to be described in the next chapter, a résumé of what preceded the operations of September 27th to October 2d will be given.

It will be remembered that the German thrust toward Amiens was stopped just short of that city, the Germans for a time holding the village of Villers Bretonneux. This was on April 24th. On the same day, however, the place was retaken by the Australians. Following this date there was no other resumption of the offensive by the Germans in this sector. About the middle of July the British planned a counter offensive in this vicinity. This offensive was launched on August 8th. This was the attack referred to so feelingly by General Ludendorf in his memoirs as "the black day" of the Germany army. The offensive was made between Albert and Moreuil. The enemy divisions in the line were overwhelmed. Even some of the German divisional staffs were surprised in their headquarters by British tanks. The battle of August 8th was continued until the 11th. Between the 11th and 15th of August there was a lull for further preparation and the relief of divisions. After the 15th of the month there were numerous minor engagements. From the 22d to the 29th the 4th Army advanced to the general line, Combles-Brie, threatening Peronne. The



Training with tanks, Beauquesne area



Chateau Val Vion, near Beauquesne, used as Division Headquarters. The officer in the foreground is Captain H. F. Jaeckel, Jr., aide to Major General O'Ryan

third phase of their advance covered the period from August 30th to September 15th. At the end of this latter phase the line had been advanced to a point opposite Epehy on the north and Holnon on the south. By the 18th of September the line had been advanced to include Lempire, Ronnsoy, Hargicourt and Villeret, or about where it had been at the time of the German break through on March 21st. This brought the line so that it faced the outworks of the famous Hindenburg defensive system.

A detailed description will be given later of the defenses that constituted the Hindenburg Line. Suffice it to say here that this system consisted really of several systems of trenches, strong points and tunnels, protected by vast networks of wire. There was, for example, the so-called outworks of the Hindenburg Line, composed of a complicated system of trenches extending through The Knoll, Guillemont Farm, Quinnet Copse, Quennemont Farm, Malakoff Farm, Ruby Farm and Villeret. This system was strengthened by highly organized strong points covering the high ground known as The Knoll, Guillemont Farm and Quennemont Farm. Behind this system of outworks and connected with it by covered ways and tunnel approaches was the main defensive system extending from Vendhuile on the north along the westerly side of the St. Quentin Canal tunnel to and beyond Bellicourt on the south. Each of these systems consisted of several lines of trenches, each protected by a great mass of wire.

Because the outer defense occupied high ground, the possession of which would afford good observation of the main system, it was most desirable in preparing for any attack on the main system to first gain possession of the outworks and to prepare and launch the final attack from this line.

About September 11th, General Rawlinson recommended that he be allowed to undertake the operation to gain possession of the outer defenses. He desired to make such attempt before the enemy would have time to reorganize his troops or the enemy troops which were to defend the system to become intimately familiar with the defenses. It was believed that every day given the enemy would be of the greatest value to him. It was also believed by the 4th Army commander that so great an undertaking as the breaking of the Hindenburg Line would require much preparation and the resting of the troops in preparation for the final attack, and that with the outworks in the possession of the 4th Army, the necessary time based upon these considerations could be given without disadvantage. General Haig approved General Rawlinson's recommendations. The IX British Corps, which was on the right of the 4th Army sector, had occupied the greater part of Holnon Wood and Villecholles. On the night of September 13th the 6th British Division relieved the 32d British Division on the right of the IX Corps front. On the left of the IX Corps was the Australian Corps. On the left of the Australian Corps was the III Corps. On the night of the 12th of September the 4th Australian Division advanced the corps line so as to include the road between Bihecourt and Jeancourt. On the 17th of September, in order to gain a start line for

the attack on the outer defenses of the Hindenburg Line, the 6th British Division, which was on the right of the IX Corps, attacked Holnon village and Badger Copse in cooperation with the 34th French Division of the 1st French Army on its right. The 6th British Division encountered strong opposition on the edge of Holnon Wood and suffered heavy casualties. The French, without very much opposition, secured the right flank of the IX British Corps by the capture of Savey Wood. Meanwhile the IX British Corps, the Australian Corps and the III British Corps in the order named from south to north were perfecting their preparations for the attack on the outer defenses of the Hindenburg Line. Numerous airplane photographs were obtained of the enemy's defenses and every precaution was taken to secure secrecy. The date for the attack was fixed for September 18th and the hour 5:20 A. M. It will be remembered that at one time, that is, prior to the German offensive of March 21st, the then British front line ran along in front of the outer Hindenburg Line defenses. The German front line trench on the 18th of September was, in fact, the former British main line of resistance. The proposed attack was to consist of several phases. The first of these was to include the capture of the enemy's first line of defense. The second phase included the taking of the second line of the German outworks, which formerly had been the old British outpost line. This line included the villages of Gricourt, Berthancourt and Pontru, Ascension Farm, Villeret, Cologne Farm, Malakoff Farm, Sart Farm, Tombois Farm and Little Priel Farm. The third phase, dependent upon the extent of the enemy's opposition, consisted of the capture of the last line of the outer defenses. This included the taking of Thorigny, Pontruet, Quennemont Farm, Guillemont Farm and The Knoll. The 4th Army did not believe that the three phases could be concluded in one day. The time required was to depend upon the stubbornness of the opposition. The Australian Corps in the center of the 4th Army held a front of 7,000 yards, from the northern boundary of the IX Corps to the Cologne River, near Templeux-le-Guerard. The front of the Australian Corps was covered by the 4th Australian Division on the right and the 1st Australian Division on the left. The III British Corps continued the line in a northerly direction to a point opposite Epehy, where it joined the 3d British Army. The front of the III Corps was held by the 74th, 18th, 12th and 58th Divisions in the order named from south to north. The attack was to be made behind a rolling barrage to be fired by 750 eighteen-pounder guns and 225 4.5-inch howitzers. Tanks were allotted to support the attack.

The attack started as planned. The Australian Corps was successful in its attack. On the right the first objective was secured by the IX Corps, but with considerable difficulty.

On the III Corps front it was originally planned to attack the outer defenses of the Hindenburg Line with three divisions, but due to the known strength of this sector of the enemy defenses, decision was made to attack on the III Corps front with all four divisions of the corps in the line. This was the front later to be taken over by the 27th Division. The divisions of the III Corps met with stubborn resistance. While the 18th and 12th

Divisions were engaged in heavy fighting around Basse Boulogne and Epehy, the 74th Division continued its advance, keeping in touch with the Australians on the right. East of Ronssoy, the 18th Division made little progress, so that the 74th Division, which had been able to advance with the Australians on their right, was compelled to form a defensive flank on their left along the Bellicourt road running southeast from Basse Boulogne, in order to maintain contact with the 18th Division. On the right front of its line the 74th Division reached the enemy position known as Benjamin Post.

At the conclusion of this first phase of the attack, therefore, the situation was that the 18th and 12th Divisions after hard fighting had made little progress. As already stated this was the front later assigned to the 27th Division, and this failure and the failure of the later efforts of the III Corps to take the outworks of the Hindenburg Line in this sector of their front made necessary the preliminary attack of the 106th Infantry Regiment of the 27th Division on September 27th, with little opportunity for reconnaissance and at a time when the enemy morale had been stimulated by their success in having shattered all the British attacks made against these positions. It contributed also to the difficulties of the task assigned to the 27th Division on September 29th, which was the attack on the main defenses of the Hindenburg Line.

On the morning of the same day, September 18th, the 74th Division, keeping in close touch with the Australians on their right, went forward for the second objective which they had been unable to gain on their left. The second objective was gained as far north as Benjamin Post. North of Benjamin Post the line of the 74th Division was refused so as to maintain contact with the 18th Division, whose line ran through Basse Boulogne and Quid Copse. At 5:00 P. M., on the afternoon of the same day, the 18th Division made another attack in an attempt to get forward on the second objective. This was a prepared attack behind a moving barrage. The second objective included Zebra Post, Yak Post, Sart Farm and X, Y and Z Copses. The attack failed. On the left the 12th Division succeeded in capturing Malassise Farm, but later was driven out.

On the following morning, September 19th, the Australians, who had taken the entire system of outworks of the Hindenburg Line on their front, continued the work of consolidation. As the IX Corps on the right of the Australians and the III Corps on the left, with the exception of the 74th Division, had failed in their attacks of the preceding day, a renewal of their effort was made. In the morning, therefore, a well-prepared attack was made by the 18th and 12th Divisions. Again the attack failed, except that the 18th Division succeeded in taking Lempire, Yak and Zebra Posts, while the 12th Division took Malassise Farm.

On the following day, September 20th, the enemy withdrew from X, Y and Z Copses, which were outposts in front of Guillemont Farm. Practically no progress was made as a result of the attacks on this day on the front of the 18th and 12th Divisions toward securing the outworks of the Hindenburg Line in their sectors. As a result, therefore, of all of these

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attacks on the front which was ultimately assigned to the 27th Division, the III Corps was still facing the outer defenses of the Hindenburg Line. On the right divisional sector of the corps, however, the 74th Division and the Australian Corps on its right had gained and secured the outworks which covered the southern half of the tunnel sector, later taken over by the 30th American Division.

In view of the importance of securing the entire outworks of the Hindenburg Line defenses before any attack should be made on the tunnel sector, the 4th Army commander determined that still another attack should be made in an effort to gain them. The importance of securing Quennemont Farm, Guillemont Farm and The Knoll was recognized and stressed. Preparations were immediately taken to launch this attack without delay.

It will be necessary to digress at this point in order to make clear the relation of subsequent happenings. About this time Marshal Foch had decided that four great offensives would be launched simultaneously by the Allies. One was to be made by the American army in their sector, one by the French, a third by the British through the Hindenburg Line, and the fourth by Belgian and Allied troops in Flanders.

The attack of the British army was directed to be made on September 29th and was to be launched against and through the Hindenburg Line across the tunnel sector of the St. Quentin Canal between Bellicourt on the south and Vendhuile on the north. This tunnel sector of the main defense system lay behind the outworks which were the subject of the attacks above described. The British offensive of September 29th was to be headed by the 27th and 30th American Divisions, followed by the 3d and 5th Australian Divisions, with the 2d Australian Division in reserve. In order that this main attack might be made on the date fixed for it, namely, September 29th, it was essential that the troops to constitute the attacking forces should, if possible, be placed in the line in ample time to take over and reconnoiter their fronts and as well to become familiar with the great problem confronting them. The plans for the British offensive of September 29th were based on the assumption that prior to the attack the outworks would be in the possession of the 4th Army, and would be turned over to the troops which were to lead the offensive so that they might start the attack from a line which included the formidable strong points of The Knoll, Guillemont Farm and Quennemont Farm. But as has already been narrated the outworks of the Hindenburg Line, the possession of which was so important a requisite for success in the main attack, had not been secured on the front facing the northern half of the tunnel sector. The orders of Marshal Foch directing that the main attack be made on September 29th, however, were imperative, as the several offensives planned by him were to be synchronized. Therefore, wholly aside from the outcome of the preliminary attacks being made by the III Corps, the troops which were to make the main attack were ordered to the forward area in order to take over the positions assigned them in the plan for the main attack of September 29th. This necessitated the relief of the 74th

and 18th British Divisions by the 27th Division and the 1st Australian Division by the 30th American Division. The front of the III Corps was therefore to be greatly reduced. It was directed that this redistribution of troops was to be complete by September 25th.

Now to return to the account of the activities of the III Corps in their efforts to capture the outworks of the Hindenburg Line. It will be remembered that September 20th saw the continued failure of the III Corps to take the outer defenses fronting the northern half of the tunnel sector and that it had been determined to launch still another attack in the attempt to gain The Knoll, Guillemont Farm and Quennemont Farm. This attack was made on the morning of September 21st, supported by an attack along the whole of the III Corps front. The 74th Division, holding the right sector of the III Corps front, was given as its objective Quennemont Farm, Quinnet Copse and Guillemont Farm, while to the 18th Division was entrusted the capture of The Knoll. Tanks were assigned to aid in the attack. The attack was launched behind a rolling barrage at 5:40 in the morning. The fighting was severe throughout the day. The attack of the 18th Division broke down before the annihilating fire of the enemy holding The Knoll and Tombois Farm. Small detachments of the 74th Division are believed to have reached Guillemont Farm and Quennemont Farm, but in any event were driven out. Troops of the 18th Division which had gained Duncan Post and Doleful Post were driven out by enemy counter-attacking troops. Thus, this well-prepared attack, gallantly carried out, broke down as had all previous attacks before the strength and resistance of the outworks, which covered the northern half of the tunnel sector.

On the night of September 21st-22d there was bright moonlight, and accordingly it was directed that still another effort be made to take these formidable outworks from the enemy, this time by a night attack. At fifteen minutes after midnight, therefore, the attack was resumed, the artillery firing a rolling barrage. The 74th Division retook Cat Post, the 18th Division again gained Duncan Post and Doleful Post. Efforts to take Tombois Farm and Egg Post were unsucccessful and all attacks to capture The Knoll, Guillemont Farm and Quennemont Farm broke down with loss.

This last attempt to capture the outworks of the Hindenburg Line, in the northern section of the tunnel, had therefore like all previous attacks resulted in failure. The two divisions were exhausted. Their losses had been considerable. They were necessarily to be relieved. The time had arrived when the troops designated for the main attack of September 29th must take over the front.

Pursuant to the 4th Army Orders already referred to covering the troop dispositions required to be made in preparation for the main attack, scheduled for September 29th, the 27th and 30th American Divisions began to arrive by bus and train in the III Corps area on September 22d and 23d. On the night of September 23d the 30th American Division relieved the 1st Australian Division, its front running from a point immediately south of Buisson Gaulaine Farm, north to Malakoff Farm. The 30th American

Division therefore took possession of the outer defenses of the Hindenburg Line on the south half of the tunnel sector, which had been previously captured by the Australian Corps.

On the night of September 24th the 27th Division took over the sector held by the 74th and 18th British Divisions fronting the outworks of the Hindenburg Line and which had not been captured by the III Corps or the divisions composing it. The 27th Division, with the 106th Infantry Regiment in line holding its entire front, therefore faced the formidable outworks of the Hindenburg Line, which had recently given such remarkable and repeated demonstrations of invulnerability against attack.

In order to give the reader an uninterrupted account of the events that were transpiring along the front facing the outer defenses of the Hindenburg Line, between September 18th and September 24th, no digressions were made in the account to describe the conferences being conducted during that period preliminary to the proposed operations of the 27th and 30th American Divisions and which were held for the purpose of explaining the plans for the attack on September 29th. This will now be done.

On the 19th of September, while still in the Beauquesne Area, the 27th and 30th Divisions were engaged throughout the day in conduct of a corps exercise followed by a critique. On this occasion Major General Read, the Corps Commander, notified the Commanding General of the 27th Division that the two divisions composing the corps would in all probability shortly be called upon to participate in a British offensive against the Hindenburg Line in the vicinity of Ronssoy. He did not know the details of the proposed attack, but stated that while the proposed operations were up to that time secret, the Division Commanders, while waiting for details, should study the situation and the probable field of action from maps as they became available.

One copy of a map on large scale was with some difficulty obtained by the 27th Division Headquarters for this purpose, and this with the intelligence reports and all other information obtainable were intensively studied during the next few days before the division left for the front.

On the 21st of September, Field Orders No. 44 were issued from Division Headquarters at Beauquesne. These orders covered the movement of the division from the Beauquesne area by rail, bus and marching to the Haut Allaines area. It was therein prescribed that the troops would detrain at Peronne. Orders No. 92, with "Changes," covered the administrative details of this movement. A copy of these orders will be found in the Appendix as Exhibit 35.

On Monday, September 23d, Division Headquarters moved from Beauquesne to a hutment camp in the Bois de Buire, near Tincourt, with a rear echelon at Templeux le Fosse.

At the time the division was moving to the front, Major General Read called into conference at his headquarters the Commanding Generals of the 27th and 30th Divisions and outlined to them the character of the offensive proposed for September 29th, and that the 27th and 30th Divisions

were to be assigned to the Australian Corps for the purpose of leading the attack. General Read's spirit of cooperation in subordinating for the occasion his own rôle as Commander of the II American Corps, and placing his two divisions at the disposal of the Australian Commander, created a most favorable impression at the time upon all who knew of the arrangement. General Read stated to his two Division Commanders that to him was left the decision as to which of the divisions would take over the northern half of the sector for the attack of September 29th, and explained that in all probability the difficulties to be met there would be much greater than in the southern sector, because the British had up to that time been unable to capture the outworks on the northern sector, and also because of the strength and importance of the German flank position at Vendhuile, which would cover the extreme left of the advance. He asked for the views of the two Division Commanders, as to which of the divisions should be assigned to the northern sector. Both replied that they had no preference to express. General Read then stated that in view of the training and experience of the 27th Division he felt that it would be wiser to impose upon that division the problems of the attack against the northern half of the tunnel sector, which might also involve a preliminary battle for the possession of the outworks. The two Division Commanders agreed that the suggested arrangement was the best for the disposal of the two divisions. It was, however, stated that there would shortly be held a conference at the headquarters of the Australian Corps Commander, where all the details of the plan for the attack would be discussed, and that in view of the short period of time before the divisions would probably be engaged, it would be well to have the divisional conferences immediately follow the Australian Corps conference, so that commanding officers might be made acquainted as soon as possible with the details conveyed to the Divisional Commanders. Following this conference with the Corps Commander there was a meeting called by the Division Commander of the 27th Division and attended by certain members of the divisional staff and the brigade and regimental commanders of the division. These officers were then and there made acquainted with the information which the Division Commander had gained up to that time, which in brief consisted of a reading of intelligence reports concerning the character of the defenses of the Hindenburg Line and its outworks; the fact that the two American divisions were to be part of the Australian Corps for the coming battle and were to lead in the attack, the 27th Division on the northern sector; the uncertain situation along the northern sector in respect to the attacks upon the outworks. The importance of the coming operations were stressed. The fact that we would probably have considerable losses was also mentioned. Finally, all were impressed with the necessity for prompt action in the distribution of maps within the regiments when such maps became available, and the importance of personal supervision by brigade and regimental commanders in order to insure that all to engage in the attack down to the privates in the ranks would understand their mission and the important features governing their employment. In this connec-

tion it was pointed out that in all probability little time would elapse between the receipt of final instructions and the commencement of the attack, and that the lack of time allowed must be made up by the excellence of the organized effort and the energy and foresight behind it to insure a clear understanding by all of what was to be expected of them.

On the 25th of September the first conference was held at the headquarters of Lieutenant General Monash, commanding the Australian Corps, a hutment camp on a hill between Barleux and Assevillers. This conference was attended by Major General Read, commanding the II American Corps; Major General Lewis, commanding the 30th American Division, and Major General O'Ryan, commanding the 27th American Division, and their respective Chiefs of Staff. The other officers present were Australian general officers. The Australian Corps Commander stated that the 4th Army was to launch an attack on its front on September 29th, for the purpose of pushing through the Hindenburg Line defenses across the tunnel sector of the St. Quentin Canal. He explained that for the purpose of making this attack the 27th and 30th American Divisions had been assigned to the Australian Corps and that these two divisions would head the column of attack. They were, in other words, to constitute the spear head of the thrust. All plans for this attack had been based upon the assumption that the outworks of the Hindenburg Line defenses would be in possession of the IV Army prior to the day of the attack. This, however, was not the fact on the northern half of the sector; that is to say, on the half of the front to be taken over by the 27th Division. A discussion of the plans, however, proceeded upon the theory that the outworks would be in our possession before the date of the main attack, and it was explained that for the purpose of accomplishing this, the 27th Division two days before the main attack would capture these outworks. It was, however, prescribed by the Australian Corps Commander that the Commanding General of the 27th Division in the preliminary attack to be made for the purpose of capturing the outworks would limit the force assigned to make the attack to one regiment of his division. The remainder of the division was not to be committed to the preliminary battle for the reason that the division as a whole must be preserved for the effective employment of its full power on the occasion of the main attack on September 29th. For the purpose of supporting the attack of the 106th Infantry, it was stated that the remaining regiment of the 53d Brigade, namely, the 105th Infantry, might be used in support, but with the importance in mind of committing to the preliminary battle no more of that regiment than circumstances might indicate to be essential. It became evident, therefore, that it was to become the mission of this one regiment of the 27th Division to do what two divisions of the III British Corps had been unable to do after repeated efforts and heavy losses.

General Monash asked what regiment of the 27th Division was to make the preliminary attack. He was informed that the 106th Infantry would be assigned for that purpose and would take over the front of the northern sector on the night of September 24th-25th in pursuance of

Australian Corps orders. He then stated that the attack by the 106th Infantry would be made for the capture of the outworks of the Hindenburg Line. He stressed the importance of the three strong points, The Knoll, Guillemont Farm and Quennemont Farm, the necessity for careful mopping up, so as to insure continued possession of the ground gained, and the importance of establishing the start line for the main operation on September 29th. He explained that the IV Army had concentrated a great mass of artillery on its front, and that for a period of forty-eight hours immediately preceding a like period of forty-eight hours before the main attack, this British artillery would deluge the German positions with mustard gas. He mentioned that for the first time in the history of the war the British were to use mustard gas fired by shells and that it was believed that the Germans, being unaccustomed to receiving this type of gas, would not be as alert in applying the best gas defense measures as, for example, were the Allies, who were constantly subjected to visitations of mustard gas fired at them by the Germans. As is probably known to the reader, mustard gas is not volatile, and in the absence of strong sunlight clings to the ground, shell holes, trenches, wooded areas, etc., so that it is capable of inflicting casualties many hours after it has been distributed. Because of this quality it was necessary after a bombardment by mustard gas to permit a forty-eight-hour period of time to elapse before assaulting troops were sent over the area which had been covered by the mustard gas bombardment.

Following the mustard gas bombardment, and preliminary to the proposed attack, the guns were to continue their fire with high explosive shells mixed with ordinary gas shells and shrapnel.

The Australian Corps Commander then took up the details of the plan for the main attack. The general plan for the main attack of September 29th has been stated in a general way. To state the plan in detail would be to repeat the requirements of a very comprehensive order. Accordingly, instead of doing this, the order itself is included in the Appendix as Exhibit 36.

In a book written by Lieutenant General Monash describing the Australian victories in 1918, he refers to his conference with the Americans, and states that on the occasion of the conference the plan elicited such a rain of questions that in the end he found himself compelled to embark upon a very detailed exposition of the fundamental principles of his battle practise.

The recollection of the writer is that there were not more than five or six questions asked in all by the American officers present, and these were not asked until a very complete exposition of the plan had been concluded by General Monash, who used diagrams and charts already prepared for the occasion in illustrating his explanation. General Monash's conversation and explanations were so lengthy and detailed that there did not seem to be necessity to ask many questions. Two questions were asked on behalf of the 27th Division. The first was as to whether in the preliminary battle the 106th Infantry, in view of the fact that it was to make the attack single

handed on a front of nearly 4,000 yards, could be supported by other troops of the division to make good its gains in the event that such support became necessary. It was in answer to this question that General Monash indicated the necessity for preserving the remainder of the division uncommitted to the preliminary battle, in order that they might participate with unimpaired strength in the main attack of September 29th, adding that the remaining regiment of the 53d Brigade might, as was planned by the Division Commander, be used in local support with particular reference to the necessities involved in the protection of the left flank. The other question related to the practicability of that part of the plan for the main attack, which prescribed that at the height of the battle the 105th Infantry, having followed the advance of the left regiment of the 54th Brigade, would find it possible, under the conditions as they probably would then obtain, to maneuver in such manner as to change direction to the left and attack, to the north, so as to envelop Vendhuile and relieve pressure against the British on that front. General Monash replied that the plan would be carried out in that manner.

General Monash had prior to this conference organized a group of Australian officers to aid in the coordination of the American and Australian effort. These were constituted as an Australian mission in command of Major General E. G. Sinclair MacLagan. This group of officers rendered very efficient and valued service to the Americans troops during these operations.

In anticipation of full information of the proposed attack being given at this conference, all brigade, regimental and battalion commanders had been notified to attend a conference at Division Headquarters in the Bois de Buire on the afternoon of this same day. At this divisional conference the Division Commander explained to the assembled officers, with the aid of maps and diagrams, similar to those used at the Australian Corps Headquarters in the morning, all features of the plan as they had been unfolded and explained by General Monash.

This divisional conference was of several hours' duration. At this time, it will be remembered, the 106th Infantry was already in the line and the battalion commanders of this regiment were not available for this first conference. The Regimental Commander, Colonel William A. Taylor, however, was present with several of his staff officers, and at the conclusion of the conference left to inform his battalion officers, not only of the general plan concerning the main attack, but of the details available up to that time affecting the preliminary attack to be made by his regiment on the morning of the 27th.

Before continuing with the narrative of the preparations for battle, which were being made within the division, the account of the Australian Corps conference will be concluded. When the conference was finished on September 25th, General Monash stated that on the following day there would be a conference at his headquarters attended not only by the Commanding Generals and staffs of the American corps and of the divisions which were to lead in the attack, but also by the Commanding Generals and

their staffs of the Australian divisions, which were to go through the American divisions in continuation of the attack. This second conference was fixed for 11 A. M. the following day, Thursday, September 26th. The conference lasted for about an hour and a half. In a general way it covered some of the ground discussed the day before, but related more particularly to the coordination of the efforts of the large number of organizations which for the time constituted the Australian Corps. Toward the conclusion of this conference Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander in Chief of the British Expeditionary Forces, dropped in and addressed to the assembled officers a few words of confidence in the outcome.

Now to return to the time of the conclusion of the conference of Commanding Officers of the 27th Division held at the Bois de Buire on the afternoon of September 25th.

Following the conference, the Operations Section of the division staff immediately commenced the preparation of Field Orders No. 47, covering the preliminary attack to be made by the 106th Infantry supported by the 105th Infantry.

During the conference at the Bois de Buire the assembled officers made full notes of the features and details of the plan, as they were explained. But to insure an understanding of the more important of them, the Division Commander prepared a memorandum supplementary to the field orders then in course of preparation, and accompanied by the Chief of Staff went, on the afternoon of September 26th, to the post of command of Colonel Taylor, commanding the 106th Infantry, where there was held a conference of the officers of the 53d Brigade. This P. C. was located in a dugout near Ronssoy. The Regimental Commander had been instructed to have present as many of his officers as could be made available from their line duties, and where they could not be made available, that they be represented. These officers attended, as did also Brigadier General Blanding, commanding the 53d Brigade, with officers of his staff, and Colonel Andrews, commanding the 105th Infantry, with one or more of his staff officers.

At the dugout conference all features of the preliminary attack were explained to the assembled officers. Opportunity was given them to ask questions at length, which they did. The Division Commander's memorandum, as well as the attack order, was read to them. Copies of these as well as of the barrage maps were in their possession.

At the earlier general conference of commanding officers, Colonel Taylor had called attention to the shortage of officers in his regiment. This condition, however, existed quite generally in the division. It was not so much the result of casualties as it was due to the custom which obtained at that time in the American army of relieving officers from duty with combat units for attendance at schools and for other purposes, without always recognizing the imperative need for units going into battle possessing an adequate number of commissioned officers.

On this occasion Colonel Taylor called attention to the fact that he had but one Major actually with his regiment. The importance of the



Site of Division Headquarters in the Bois de Buire, France. Picture taken in the summer of 1920 after removal of "Nissen" huts

coming operations made it imperative that at least one additional Major should be given him. Major J. Leslie Kincaid, Division Judge Advocate, learning of this condition, applied personally to the Division Commander to be assigned to command one of the battalions of the 106th Infantry. Major Kincaid having at one time commanded a Squadron of the 1st N. Y. Cavalry and by his demonstrated courage, coolness and marked ability being especially well adapted for the mission suggested, was detailed to



Grave of a German soldier near Villers Faucon, France

the 106th Infantry as a battalion commander. Incidentally it might be remarked that no authority, except the President, has the power to assign to line duty an officer of the Judge Advocate General's Department. The conditions, however, seemed to warrant the assumption of such authority. At any rate Major Kincaid led the 2d Battalion of the 106th Infantry in a most efficient and satisfactory manner.

The battalions were to be led, the right battalion by Major Gillet, the center battalion by Major Kincaid and the left battalion by Captain William E. Blaisdell. At this conference the Division Commander was much impressed with the quick understanding and marked zeal of Captain Blaisdell, who was later killed in the main attack on the Hindenburg Line, September 29th. During the conference the Division Commander stressed the importance of the successive waves of the 106th Infantry lining up close to the tape, which would mark the start line, in order that they might better avoid the enemy counter-barrage when it fell. But it was also pointed out and stressed that when the leading elements went forward behind the barrage, successive waves should not start until proper distances had been gained, in order to insure disposition in depth of the attacking troops. The importance of the leading wave following the barrage closely was pointed out, as well as the necessity for the leading wave to continue in its advance, leaving to successive waves and mopping-up parties the task of taking over prisoners and clearing out trenches, dugouts, machine-gun nests and similar places. Special attention was directed to the vital necescity for thorough mopping up, and that mopping-up parties properly organized should be assigned specific areas for their work. All officers were instructed to notify the men under them that heavy shelling and counter-attacks would not be considered reasons for withdrawal from any position gained. Responsible officers were admonished then and there to secure possession, in readiness for use in each company, of the necessary rifle grenades, rockets and flares. Men were to be warned to keep themselves fit by getting all the sleep possible prior to the attack. In fact company and platoon commanders were directed by adequate supervision to insure that their men slept as much as possible prior to the time of the attack. In this connection attention was called to the fact that men get along better with loss of food than loss of sleep. Provision was made to get hot food to the men of the 106th Infantry shortly before the zero hour. Each unit of the regiment was directed to send a liaison agent to the unit on its left The importance of having the men avoid the tendency to "herd" during the attack was referred to. Message maps were arranged to be furnished all officers and line sergeants. These were to be used to indicate the line reached by each unit with the time marked thereon, after which they were to be sent back through battalion to regimental headquarters.

At 9:15 P. M., on September 25th, the division attack order, Field Orders No. 47, had been reproduced by mimeograph and was ready for distribution. This order, together with the administrative instructions, Orders No. 93, with Appendices A, B, C and D, are included in the Appendix as Exhibit 37. Orders No. 94, dated September 26th, which appears in



Colonel William A. Taylor, commanding 106th Infantry

the Appendix as Exhibit 38, will give the location by map reference of all units of the division at this time. During the night and the following morning these orders, barrage maps and message maps were distributed to the officers and non-commissioned officers of the 53d Infantry Brigade. There was no problem concerning the distribution of these orders to the remaining troops of the division. The 106th Infantry having received their orders and special instructions immediately immersed themselves in the work of reconnaissance and the arrangement of all the details affecting the attack. This comment applies to the 105th Infantry, which was to be the supporting regiment in the attack, and to the 53d Brigade Headquarters. As soon as the orders for the preliminary attack were out, the detailed work of preparing for the main attack was immediately begun at Division Headquarters.

This work was very considerable and complicated, not only by its diversity, but by the haste attendant upon the short notice given the division for a task of such magnitude. Its difficulties were augmented by the fact that the advance echelon of Division Headquarters at this time

moved forward from the Bois de Buire to some shelters in a quarry between St. Emilie and Ronssoy, where the Battle P. C. was established.

The story of the attack made on the outworks of the Hindenburg Line, referred to as the preliminary attack, will be told in the next chapter. For the purpose of continuing the narrative in its relation to the work preliminary to actual battle, we will now turn to the preparations to be



Major J. Leslie Kincaid, commanding 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry

made by the remainder of the division and as well in a measure by the 53d Brigade, for the main attack, which was scheduled to take place two days after the preliminary attack.

On September 26th a warning order was sent out stating that the 53d Brigade would prepare to relieve the 106th Infantry in the front line on the night of September 27th-28th, while the 53d Brigade would prepare to move both its regiments somewhat to the rear and to the left of the 54th Brigade.

Later in the day, Field Orders No. 48 were issued, which directed that in preparation for the main attack the 54th Brigade would relieve the 53d



Tunnel entrance, Hindenburg Line defenses, north end



Quarry at St. Emilie, France, used as Division Headquarters, during the Battle of the Hindenburg Line

Brigade, as stated in the warning order, and that the 108th Infantry would occupy the right regimental sector and the 107th Infantry the left regimental sector. The relief order placing the 54th Brigade in the line preparatory to the main attack order was followed at 1:55 P. M. on September 27th by Field Orders No. 49 and Orders No. 95 with Appendices, covering the main attack. These orders are to be found in the Appendix as Exhibit 39.

Following the general divisional conference in the Bois de Buire, there were numerous conferences between officers of the division staff and officers of divisional units directly concerned with the subject matter of the particular conference. At these meetings numerous difficulties were ironed out. These affected such matters as ammunition supply, transportation, battle stores, signal communication, artillery and machine-gun support, mission and functions of the engineers, evacuation of wounded, burial of the dead, etc.

In the next chapter will be described in greater detail than has already been mentioned the character of the defense constituting the Hindenburg Line and a description of the battle of the 53d Infantry Brigade for possession of the outworks.

CHAPTER XVI

BATTLE FOR THE OUTWORKS OF THE HINDENBURG LINE



N the previous chapter an account was given of the numerous and unsuccessful attacks made by the III British Corps to take the outer defenses of the Hindenburg Line. The narrative also included the conferences which led up to the order for the 106th Infantry, supported by the 105th Infantry, to make the attack to capture these outworks on September 27th.

Perhaps this would be the logical place to describe the character of the defenses that constituted the so-called Hindenburg Line. In a general way they have already been described as consisting of a main defensive system along the St. Quentin Canal, protected by a line of outworks, these two systems of defensive works being supplemented by the so-called Beaurevoir Line in the rear.

The Hindenburg Line was originally organized for defense toward the end of the year 1916, and work was continuous in its preparation for a long time thereafter. It will be remembered that in March, 1917, following the British offensive on the Somme, the Germans made what they called a strategic retirement in order to shorten their line. This retirement was to the Hindenburg Line. In March, 1918, occurred the German offensive, which took the Germans out of their defensive system in their drive through the British 5th Army, already referred to. The power of the defensive was well understood by the German High Command. They expected to win the war by offensive action, but failing in that, it was their plan to fall back behind the impregnable defenses of the Hindenburg Line, and as a result of unsuccessful attacks against it to make peace upon terms satisfactory under the conditions, though not of course as satisfactory as could be made following a completely successful offensive.

In the battle of August 8, 1918, already referred to, the British captured from a German Corps Headquarters an undated document describing in detail many of the features constituting the Hindenburg Line defenses. The document showed the trenches and wire, the positions and calibers of batteries, the approach lines and observation posts. There were also indicated the location of artillery and infantry headquarters and all battle stations, as well as concrete dugouts and machine-gun emplacements.

The following is an extract from this document. The Siegfried Line referred to was part of the Hindenburg Line in the tunnel sector:

"The Siegfried Line makes full use, along extended stretches, of the front line of defenses afforded by the Bellicourt-St. Quentin Canal. . . . The strength of these defenses, increased as it is by inundated areas, the very extensive possibilities of mutual flanking support by the different



View of St. Quentin Canal



View of St. Quentin Canal Tunnel

sectors, and the generally considered good artillery observation, render the line very strong. Added to this is the advantage that the Siegfried Line, having been reconnoitered without interference from the enemy, and plans having been drawn up for its occupation by troops of all arms, a systematic withdrawal from the outpost can be effected.

"The Siegfried Line is considered to afford the most favorable conditions for a stubborn defense by a minimum garrison. It is therefore adapted to the requirements of obstinate close combat.


"Its position behind the natural defenses offered by the Bellicourt-St. Quentin Canal affords the enemy free use of many favorable points of observation close in front of it.

"The use of these points by the enemy must be hindered as long as possible. For this reason outposts will be established before the Siegfried Line, with the object of maintaining contact with the enemy and obstructing his reconnaissance. These will retire on the Siegfried Line before an enemy attack. It is the duty of the command to prevent any decisive action being fought further forward than the first line of defense of the Siegfried Line, which is prepared for a stubborn defensive. It must be clearly understood by units of all arms that the battle will be fought from the first line trenches of the Siegfried Line."

Since the captured plan was made, German methods had been materially modified as a result of experience. The original idea of strong defense on the extreme front line, supplemented by close support, had been modified in favor of the theory of dispositions of defensive troops in depth, which has already been explained in the account of the service of the division in the East Poperinghe Line.


The St. Quentin Canal in the area of the 4th British Army ran generally in a north and south direction, with the flow of water from north to south. It constituted a formidable obstacle. The best feature of its defensive quality was that tanks could not cross it. A short distance south of the town of Bellicourt, the canal, meeting the high ground of that region in its trace toward the north, enters a tunnel, from which it does not emerge until it has traversed a distance of 6,000 yards. The point of exit is situated about 1,000 yards west of the village of Le Catelet. Shortly after leaving this northern exit the canal turns in a northwesterly direction and passes through the town of Vendhuile, having cleared which, it again turns to the north. As a result of this turn at Vendhuile, the canal as it proceeds north from that town follows a trace approximately 2,000 yards farther west than the trace of the canal through the tunnel. By holding the line of the canal at Vendhuile, the Germans, in the event of an advance against the tunnel south of that point, would hold an important flank position against an enemy making such an advance. It would be well for the reader interested in the operations against the Hindenburg Line to glance at the map and note the importance of this flank position for purposes of enfilade fire and for flank counter-attack against forces moving in an easterly direction against the tunnel defenses.

The average width of the canal at the surface of the water is 39 feet,



Boats about to enter the northern entrance of the St. Quentin Canal, taken during the summer of 1920. Note the chain

the average width at the bottom 32 feet 10 inches, and the depth of water 6 feet 6 inches. A tow-path exists on either side of the canal, which for a considerable distance both south and north of the tunnel exits runs through deep cuts, which consequently provide very high embankments adapted



View of interior of St. Quentin Canal Tunnel, south end

for defensive purposes. The canal was constructed in the early part of the nineteenth century and was one of Napoleon's projects.

Canal boats are towed through the canal in rather an unusual manner. A heavy iron chain lies along the bottom of the canal from end to end. The canal boat that supplies the pulling power to the column of boats to be towed, is provided with a heavy windlass, operated by electric power. The electric current is taken by means of a trolley pole on the boat from a wire along the tow-path. The heavy chain is passed over the windlass from a hawsehole in the bow provided with a roller over which the chain moves. Upon leaving the windlass the chain passes over another roller and hawsehole at the stern of the towboat, from which it drops back into the bottom of the canal. When the power is applied the windlass turns, and winding and unwinding the chain, pulls itself forward. The following boats are connected to the towboat by lines, the leading boat in the column having lines to the towboat of such length that there is no interference with the drop of the chain into the canal from the stern of the towboat.

During the war, with the preparation and occupation of the Hindenburg Line, the canal was not in use.

South of Bellicourt and near Bellenglise the canal had been dammed in order to keep a sufficient depth of water in the canal north of that place, which included the area between Vendhuile and Bellicourt. The normal flow of the water in the canal was, as has been stated, from north to south.

The main defenses of the Hindenburg Line in the tunnel sector were a short distance west of the tunnel. These defenses consisted generally of three strong lines of trenches, protected by an extraordinary mass of wire. The roof of the tunnel averaged fifty or sixty feet below the surface of the ground. In the construction of the tunnel, shafts had been sunk through the ground to the roof of the tunnel for the purpose of providing air. These air shafts were about 100 yards apart. Early in 1918 there were twenty-five barges in the main tunnel and these were used by the Germans as billets for reserve troops. There were a number of chambers connected with the tow-path within the tunnel, which were used in the operation and maintenance of the canal. Some of these were for storage and others for electric power production. These chambers were supplemented by others built by the German troops when the defenses were under construction. Along the easterly side of the tunnel there had been sunk through the ground above a number of approaches to the tunnel tow-path. These approaches resembled dugout stairs. They enabled troops to have ready access to and from the tunnel and the defiladed ground immediately to the east of it. In similar manner passageways had been excavated from the westerly side of the canal within the tunnel to the main line of resistance constructed in the ground above and a short distance westerly of the line of the tunnel. No bombardment, no matter how severe, could affect reserve troops stationed or billeted within the tunnel. The entrances to the tunnel were blocked by heavily reinforced concrete walls, defended by machine guns.


No German map was available showing the details of galleries leading



Another view of interior of St. Quentin Canal Tunnel, showing barges used as billets by the Germans. The tunnel at this point is 300 feet underground



One of the many passages cut from the tunnel to the trenches



WYNKOOP HALLENBECK CRAWFORD CO., NEW YORK, PRINTERS AND BINDERS

to the tunnel between Bellicourt and Vendhuile. Among the prisoners taken by the British prior to the operations against the Hindenburg Line was one who had served as an electrician in the engine room of one of the chambers which had been cut into the east wall of the tunnel near Bellicourt. From him some information had been secured concerning the details of the tunnel. From other prisoners it was learned that there were at least fifteen underground galleries leading from the Gouy-Bellicourt Road into the tunnel, which would enable troops to enter or leave the tunnel unobserved. These entrances, later inspected, did not show in early photographs, as they were camouflaged with brushwood. From other prisoners it was learned that there were nine galleries leading from the tunnel toward Bellicourt and Bony. With the tunnel a safe haven for reserve troops, it became possible to maintain such reserves in perfect security during the height of the battle close to the point where they would be needed for reinforcement or to counter-attack, until required for such purposes, when they could be fed through covered ways into the trenches on their immediate front. The block walls at the exits of the tunnel were built of thick ferro-concrete, containing an upper chamber with a platform. The blocks were provided with slits for machine guns to command the entrance and were each equipped with a ventilating shaft containing an electric fan.

On the easterly side of the tunnel and directly in rear of the strong point at Bony, there was a quarry which had been organized for the accommodation of at least a battalion of troops. This accommodation included a large gallery with three entrance shafts and three large rooms. Several dugouts had been constructed in the westerly face capable of holding a considerable number of men.

If the reader will again glance at the map it will be seen that Bony was about midway between the northern and southern portals of the tunnel, but nearer the northern exit. With its stone buildings and its commanding position it was ideal for organization as a field fortification to stiffen the line. Its fire commanded a wide front, including Dirk Valley, Claymore Valley and part of Macquincourt Valley, with the ridges between, while at the same time it afforded observation of the forward strong points at The Knoll, Guillemont Farm and Quennemont Farm. It will also be seen that the main defensive system was connected with the outer system by numerous communicating trenches which took full advantage of the ground in the trace followed by them.

General Monash has the following to say in relation to the strength of the Hindenburg Line defenses in the tunnel sector between Bellicourt and Vendhuile:

"The great Hindenburg system, by which name it has come to be known to English readers, or the 'Siegfried Line,' as it is called by the Germans, was brought into existence during the winter of 1916 and early spring of 1917 in order to fulfil a very definite strategic purpose. Thus was put into effect, on a stupendous scale, a very elementary principle of minor tactics, namely, that field works are constructed for the purpose of reducing the number of men required to defend a given front or locality.



One of the air shafts of the tunnel near Bony. Colonel Hallahan, Division Signal Officer, on right



A type of dugout in the Hindenburg Line defenses made of ferro-concrete. Colonel Wainwright, Division Inspector, in foreground

"In themselves, field fortifications have, of course, no offensive value whatever, but their use permits a reduced number of men to defend one place in order that a greater number of men may be available to attack another place.

"The German High Command proceeded to make use of this principle on a scale previously unknown in history. The whole of the Western Front, in Belgium and France, was to be held defensively throughout 1917. The military resources required to defend that front were to be reduced to a minimum by the provision of a line of defenses protected by powerful field works, believed to be impregnable. This would liberate the greatest possible resources for the Eastern Front, where an end could be made of the Russians and Roumanians there. As soon as these were disposed of, those troops, guns and aeroplanes, could again be transferred to the West, in order, similarly, to dispose of the remainder of our Alliance.

"This great strategic plan was carried out in its entirety until the middle of 1918. It was the great Hindenburg Line which had been the kernel of the whole conception, and until the days which we are now approaching, it had remained practically over its whole length an impregnable barrier against the assaults of the French and British.

"It is to be remembered that the very basis which justified the expenditure of such enormous labor on the erection of these defenses was the saving in man-power. It is an accepted principle of tactics that in any given battle the advantage always rests heavily on the side of the defense. Where numbers, resources and morale are equal no attack can hope to succeed.

"If, in the teachings before the war, it was correct to say that a Commander should hesitate to attack unless he had a preponderance of men and guns of at least two to one, such a dictum assuredly did not take into account field defenses of the permanent and elaborate character of the Hindenburg Line. I should hardly venture to fix a ratio of relative strength appropriate in such circumstances.

"But this much is clear. The Germans had once already relied successfully upon the impregnability of this great work. They had every justification for believing that it would once again serve them to keep us at bay for just a few weeks longer. Winter was very near and the Entente peoples might not have been able to hold together to face another year of war.

"We, on our part, had as much justification for the resolve that every sacrifice must be made to overthrow these defenses before the end of 1918 and for believing that it would require a great, concerted and intensive effort to succeed in this.

"It is quite necessary, for a due appreciation of the magnitude of the effort which was actually made, and of the wonderful success with which it was rewarded, that the nature of the defenses of the Hindenburg Line should be clearly understood. This can best be done, I think, by making an endeavor to realize the sense of security which the possession of such a line of defense must have afforded to the enemy. We are here inter-

ested only in that portion of the line which extends from St. Quentin northward toward Cambrai.

"Between these two cities the country is higher than that adjoining it on the north and the south. It forms, therefore, a watershed, dividing the basin of the Somme from that of the Scheldt. Early in the nineteenth century Napoleon realized the ambitious project of connecting these two river systems by a great canal scheme, cutting right through this high country from south to north.

"The canal is called, in its southern reaches, Canal de St. Quentin. Before Cambrai is reached it merges into the Canal de l'Escaut. Throughout the whole of that portion which concerns us, it runs in a deep cutting, reaching for great stretches a depth of fifty to sixty feet. In certain places where the ground rises still higher, the canal passes through in great tunnels. The southernmost, or Le Tronquoy Tunnel, near St. Quentin, is but short; the northern, boasts of the imposing length of 6,000 yards, and extends from Bellicourt, at its southern portal, to Le Catelet, at its northern one. From that point northward the canal flows in 'open cut,' which gradually becomes shallower as Cambrai is approached.

"The canal excavation—except where the tunnels occur—itself affords an excellent military obstacle, the passage of which could be stoutly contested by resolute troops well dug in on its eastern banks, for the descent and ascent of the slopes could be obstructed by wire entanglements and swept with fire. The water alone, which is too deep to be waded, would seriously impede infantry, while the passage of tanks, guns and vehicles would be impossible, once the few high level bridges over the canal had been destroyed.

"Such an obstacle would not, however, of itself fulfil the requirements of modern war, with its searching and destructive artillery fire. It was to be regarded as the foundation upon which a complete system of defenses could be built, and as a last line of resistance *a l'outrance.*

"The canal had been, naturally, located by its engineers in the lowest ground available, so that its course closely follows the lines of the minor valleys and depressions of the ground. On both sides, therefore, the canal is flanked by somewhat higher ground, from which its immediate banks can be overlooked. On the western side particularly, there is a regular line of such higher plateaus on which the villages of Villeret, Hargicourt and Ronssoy once stood.

"It was clearly desirable both to deprive a besieger of such vantage ground, and also to provide the canal defenses with a stout outpost defense. For these reasons the Germans had constructed an elaborate system of trenches on a line generally parallel to and on the average a full mile west of the canal. These trenches had been perfected with dugouts, concrete machine-gun and mortar emplacements and underground shelters. They were protected by belt after belt of barbed wire entanglements, in a fashion which no one understood better or achieved more thoroughly, than the Germans.

"But much more remained. Deep communication trenches led back

106th Infantry—Assaulting Troops Covering Entire Front of Division Sector

K	I	L	F	H	C	B	A
Capt Harry F Sullivan (w) (c). 2d Lt Willard M Webster (k).	2d Lt Louis Peterson (k)	2d Lt Frederick W. Rozeek (k).	1st Lt. Alfred J. Hook (k). 2d Lt. York W Brennan (w).	1st Lt. Lennox C. Brennan (w)	2d Lt James A. Malloy (k).	1st Lt. Charles Ostberg (k)	1st Lt. Gilbert P. Rudkin (k).
M Capt. John F. Callahan (k). 2d Lt Horace B. Scanlon (k).			**E** 1st Lt. Thomas F. Ward, Jr. (w). 2d Lt. William H. Boullee (w).	**G** Capt. John C. Hardy (k). 2d Lt. Lane S. Anderson (k).	**D** 1st Lt. Matthew J. A. Wilson (w). 1st Lt. Edward L. Ryan (w).		
3d Battalion Capt. William E Blaisdell. 1st Lt Chester P. Jones, Adj. ATTACHED 4 M G. 1st Lt. Ivan L Smith. 2d Lt. James F Curtis (k). 2 T M. 1 37mm. (Lemphire Post)			**2d Battalion** Major James L. Kincaid 1st Lt. Albert G. Reinert, Adj ATTACHED 4 M. G 2d Lt. William B. Behrens (k). 2 T. M. 1st Lt. Franklin J. Jackson (k). 1 37mm. (Duncan Post)		**1st Battalion** Major Ransom H. Gillet. 1st Lt. Ames T. Brown, Adj. ATTACHED 4 M G. 1st Lt. Leaman S. Broughton. 2 T. M. 1 37mm. (Pimple Post)		

Colonel William A. Taylor
Capt. Murray Taylor, Act. Adj.
Capt. Arthur V. McDermott, Op. Off.
1st Lt. W. A. Hunter, Jr., Int. Off.

Capt. George E. Bryant, M. G Co. (k).
2d Lt. Frank S. Paris, Sup. Off. (k).

2 Companies 105th Infantry — Flank Protection

K	M
1st Lt. John D. Snedeker. 2d Lt Walter W. Slayton.	1st Lt William B. Turner (k). 2d Lt John J. Rudin (k).

Reinforced 3 00 P M by balance 3d Battalion.

Det. 102d Engineers

1 officer, 71 men D Co. for wiring
No wire placed. Used for stretcher bearers and ammunition supply.
1st Lt. Edgar M. Whitlock (k).
3 squads E Co. finding and clearing dugouts for Bn. P. C.'s.

12 Tanks of 4th Tank Battalion B. E. F.

105th Infantry — Support — Co. H to support 2d Battalion 106th Infantry — Co. B to support 2d Battalion 106th Infantry

L	I	H	G	F	E	D	C	B	A
1st Lt. Thomas G Carlin. 2d Lt. John C. Cipperly.	1st Lt Alexander Granat 2d Lt Harold J Hobbs	Capt. Raymond F. Hodgdon. 1st Lt James T Bergen.	1st Lt. Earl W. Maxson. 1st Lt. Edward Warschauer.	Capt. Frank R. Potter. 1st Lt. Lawrence P. Clarke. 2d Lt. Henry E. Van Holland.	Capt. James S. Slosson. 1st Lt. Eben P. Armstrong (w).	1st Lt. Leo F. Giblyn. 2d Lt. Frank J. Baumert.	1st Lt. Harry Merz. 2d Lt. Clement A. G. Feldt.	1st Lt. Kevney O'Connor. 2d Lt. John T. Cissett, Jr	1st Lt. John J. Callahan. 2d Lt. Stephen B. Elkins.
3d Battalion Capt. Stanley Bulkley. 1st Lt. Carl G. R. Rosa, Adj. 1st Lt. Cary Walradt, Int. Off. 2d Lt Frank B Howe, Jr., Trans Off. 1st Lt. Leonard J. Howard, Sig. Off. 1st Lt. James R. Lisa, M. C. 1st Lt James R Haigler, M C. 1st Lt H E. Burke, 37mm. (k)		**2d Battalion** Capt. Charles A. McArthur. 1st Lt. Robert Williamson, Adj. 2d Lt. Llewellyn H. Davis, Int. Off. 2d Lt. Frank P. Buck, Gas Off. 1st Lt. Charles G Dodd, Trans. Off. Capt. Elmer H. Ormsby, M. C. 1st Lt Maurice Exiner, M. C				**1st Battalion** Capt. Henry Maslin 1st Lt. Ogden J. Ross, Adj. 1st Lt. Harold O. Blakely, Gas Off. 2d Lt. Charles J. Doyle, Int. Off. 1st Lt. James C Donovan, M C 1st Lt. Donald D. Campbell, M. C.		

Colonel James M Andrews
Capt. John W. Frost, Op. & Int. Off.
Capt Lewis H. Gibbes, Adj.
Capt Stephen H. Fifield, Pers Adj.

Capt Robert S. Hall, Attd.
Capt. George W. Papen, Jr, M. C.
1st Lt. James C. Donovan, M. C.
2d Lt. Paul A. Florian, Sig. Off.

Capt. Roscoe B. Trumble, Sup. Off.
1st Lt. John F. Mahoney, Sup. Co.
1st Lt. Arther H. Norris, Sup. Co.

1st Lt. George F. Ramsey, Sup. Co.
1st Lt. Michael J. Connery, Sup. Co
1st Lt. Leonard J. Howard, Sup. Co.

M. G.
Capt Howard Bird
1st. Lt. Lester C. Higbee
2d Lt. Archibald B. Gwathmey
2d Lt. Glenn H. Wasson
2d Lt. George F. Evans

105th Machine Gun Battalion — M. G. Barrage and Special Target Fire

A (62C. F.17.a.)	B (F.10.b.)	D (F.17.b.	C (F.10.c.)
Capt Lucius H Biglow, Jr 1st Lt. Joseph F. Cook 2d Lt. Harold L. Downey. 2d Lt. Harry B. Jennings.	Capt. Nathaniel H. Egleston. 2d Lt. George Matthews, Jr. 2d Lt. Richard G. Lyon. 2d Lt. Richard D. McCaskey.	Capt. Stanton Whitney 1st Lt. Alwyn Ball, 3d. 2d Lt. Bert R. Anderson	Capt. Robert R. Molyneux. 1st Lt. Edward Flash, Jr. 2d Lt. Joseph G. Galvin.
Major Kenneth Gardner. 1st Lt. Theodore Crane, Adj.	1st Lt. Knowlton Durham, Int. Off. 1st Lt. Raymond A. McLeer, Sup. Off.	2d Lt. Fred. Snare, Jr., Trans. Off. 1st Lt. Archer B. Bass, Chaplain.	Capt. Chas. D. Kayser, M. C. 1st Lt. Joseph Mulcahy, D. C.

106th Machine Gun Battalion — M. G. Barrage and Special Target Fire

D (Benjamin Trench)	C (Switch near Bellicourt Road)	B (Switch near Artaxerxes Alley)	A (Artaxerxes Post
Capt. Charles N. Morgan. 1st Lt. George C. Donnelly. 2d Lt. Reginald H. Wood. 2d Lt. Everett B. King.	1st Lt. Nicholas E. Devereux, Jr. 1st Lt. Walter L. Glass. 2d Lt. John S. Perkins. 2d Lt. Horace Zimmer.	Capt. Harold W. Bousfield. 2d Lt. Randolph M. Fuller 2d Lt. Paul D. Selby. 2d Lt. Harry Von Der Leith	1st Lt. Edgar T. Beamish. 1st Lt. Roger R. Wellington. 2d Lt. Myles McDonell. 2d Lt Earl G. Hawkins.
	Major Mortimer D. Bryant. 2d Lt. Lawrence Beattie, Jr.	1st Lt. Harry K. Tebbut, D. C. 1st Lt. Clarence H. K. Blauvelt.	

107th Infantry — Div. Res.

From Haut Allaines (11:00 a. m.) to Ronssoy (11:00 p. m.)

Colonel Charles I. DeBevoise.

108th Infantry — Div. Res.

From Tincourt (11:00 a. m.) to Templeux le Guerard (5:30 p. m.)

Colonel Edgar S. Jennings.

104th Machine Gun Battalion — Div. Res.

A	B
1st Lt Joseph B. Vanderbilt. 2d Lt. John B. Cummings.	1st Lt. Harley W. Black. 1st Lt. Clarence E. Hancock. 2d Lt. Donald Armstrong.

Ste Emilie

Major Chester H. King.

102d Engineers

F	E	D	C	B	A
Preparing 2 Reg. P. C.	(Roisel) 3 squads to 106th Inf.	1 off., 71 men to 106th Inf.	(Lieramont) Companies engaged in road repair and water supply.		
2d Battalion Capt. Geo. D. Snyder			**1st Battalion** Major Harvey Garrison		

Lt. Col. William S. Conrow

Order of Battle

PRELIMINARY OPERATION

HINDENBURG LINE

SEPTEMBER 27, 1918

K—Killed or died of wounds W—Wounded
C—Captured

to the canal banks, in the sides of which tier upon tier of comfortable living quarters for the troops had been tunneled out. Here, support and reserve troops could live in safety, and defy our heaviest bombardments. They could be secretly hurried to the front trenches whenever danger threatened.

"There was, indeed, a perfect tangle of underground shelters and passages. Roomy dugouts were provided with tunneled ways which led to cunningly hidden machine-gun posts, and the best of care was taken to provide numerous exits, so that the occupants should not be imprisoned by the blocking of one or other of them by our bombardment. But it was the barbed wire which formed the groundwork of the defense. It was everywhere, and ran in all directions, cleverly disposed so as to herd the attackers into the very jaws of the machine guns.

"The Germans had collected large numbers of canal barges and had towed them into the interior of the tunnel, mooring them end to end. They served as living quarters and as depots for stores and munitions. It was no great business to provide electric lighting for the tunnel. Indeed, the leads for this purpose had been in existence before the war. Here again underground shafts and ways were cut to enable the troops rapidly to man the trenches and machine guns, and as rapidly to seek a safe asylum from the heaviest shell fire.

"The whole scheme produced in fact, a veritable fortress—not one, in the popular acceptation of the term, consisting of massive walls and battlements, which as was proved in the early days of the war at Liege and Namur can speedily be blown to pieces by modern heavy artillery, but one defying destruction by any powers of gunnery and presenting the most formidable difficulties to the bravest of infantry."

It will be remembered that the 106th Infantry in preparation for the attack on the outworks took over the entire divisional front. In order to visualize the disposition of the troops of the 53d Infantry Brigade, the reader is referred to the accompanying graphic chart, showing the order of battle of the 106th and 105th Infantry Regiments on the day of the attack.

From this it will be seen that the 1st Battalion, under command of Major Ransom H. Gillet, covered the right third of the divisional sector, with three companies in line and one in support; that the 2d Battalion, under command of Major J. Leslie Kincaid, with two companies in line and two in support, held the center of the regimental line; while the 3d Battalion, commanded by Captain William E. Blaisdell, with three companies in line and one in support, faced The Knoll on the left. The regimental machine-gun company was commanded by Captain George E. Bryant, who was killed in the afternoon of September 27th; the Stokes mortar platoon by First Lieutenant Franklin J. Jackson, also killed on the 27th; the 37 m.m. platoon by First Lieutenant Emann Brandt, wounded on September 29th. The regimental operations officer assisting Colonel William A. Taylor was Captain Arthur V. McDermott; the Acting Adjutant, Captain Murray Taylor, and the intelligence officer, First Lieutenant William A. Hunter, Jr.

The 105th Infantry, as will be noted from the diagram, had furnished Companies K and M to cover the left of the advance of the 106th Infantry,



Ferro-concrete cap on ground above dugout to make shells burst

the remaining companies of the 3d Battalion, which was commanded by Captain Stanley Bulkley, being held in support, with the remainder of the regiment constituting the brigade reserve.

The attack was to be supported by the 105th Machine Gun Battalion, under Major Kenneth Gardner, and the 106th Machine Gun Battalion, commanded by Major Mortimer D. Bryant. Twelve tanks of the 4th Tank Battalion were to advance with the leading infantry waves, while a detachment of one officer and seventy-one men from Company D, 102d Engineers,



Another type of dugout used in the Hindenburg Line defense near Bony

under First Lieutenant Edgar M. Whitlock, and a detachment of Company E, of the same regiment, were to aid the infantry in consolidating their positions and in the clearing and preparation of dugouts for battalion posts of command. A detachment of the 102d Field Signal Battalion was assigned for the maintenance of communication, repair of wires, etc.

For the benefit of the reader who has not the time nor the inclination to study the orders covering the attack, and which appear in the Appendix, the following summary is given of the features of the attack:

1. The start line for the attack, the objective line and the sector boundaries are shown on the accompanying barrage map. Zero hour was fixed at 5:30 A. M., September 27th.

2. The artillery barrage fired by nine brigades of field artillery, to advance at the rate of 100 yards in three minutes, was to consist of 50 per cent. shrapnel, 35 per cent. high explosive shells and 15 per cent. smoke.

3. The artillery barrage was to be supplemented by a machine-gun barrage fired by two machine-gun battalions of ninety-six guns.

4. Upon the attainment of the objective, the artillery was to provide a protective barrage lasting for thirty-nine minutes to allow for consolidation of the position.

5. Each battalion commander was required personally to see that his start line was marked by tape pegged to the ground. This was to be done under the supervision of the regimental operations officer, the workers being protected by strong patrols along the regimental front. These patrols were to remain out until fifteen minutes before the zero hour, when they were to be withdrawn.

6. Mopping-up parties were detailed from the battalions to deal with machine-gun nests, strong points and dugouts passed over by the advancing troops.

7. The 37 m.m. guns and Stokes mortars were directed to advance with the battalions, so that the fullest use might be made of these auxiliary arms.

8. The supporting machine-gun battalions were to advance their barrage in 200-yard lifts. Four guns from the Machine-Gun Company, 106th Infantry, were to accompany each of the battalions in the advance.

9. Twelve tanks were to move, three with the leading elements of each battalion, and one in close support.

10. Battalion commanders were to select advanced posts of command close to the then present front line, which would be suitable as posts of command after the attainment of the objective.

11. A regimental message center was established in the area of the center battalion.

12. A contact aeroplane was provided to fly over the objective line one and one-half hours after the zero hour, to report position of the leading troops, who were directed to indicate the same by red ground flares, flashing of tin disks and groups of three or four rifles laid parallel across the trench and about one foot apart.

13. Ground taken was to be occupied and organized in depth.

14. Picks and shovels were to be carried in every squad for purposes of consolidation.

15. All extra property, such as overcoats, blankets, shelter halves, extra shoes, etc., were left at company headquarters. Each individual man carried the following:

200 rounds of small arms ammunition.
6 grenades in pockets.
4 sandbags.
1 pick or shovel.
1 extra water bottle filled.

In addition to the foregoing, each company carried a supply of flares, rifle grenades and S. O. S. rockets.

16. Wagons were detailed to the regiment from the divisional trains for the purpose of conveying ammunition from regimental dumps to the battalions in the line at the rate of four L. G. S. wagons per battalion.

17. Main dressing station was established by the 105th Field Hospital, commanded by Major Moses A. Stivers, at Driancourt.

18. Advance dressing stations were established at St. Emilie, by Ambulance Companies No. 106 and 107, and were in charge of Major William J. Cranston.

19. Regimental aid posts were established on the right, two at f.28.a, two at F.28.d, one at L.b.4; and on the left, one at f.16.b, one at F.22.d and two at f.21.b. The station for walking wounded was established at F.13.c.02. See map.

20. Prisoners were all to be conducted to regimental headquarters, from which point they were to be turned over to Military Police detachments, to be marched to the prisoner-of-war cage.

21. Watches were to be synchronized twice the day before the attack.

22. Success signals, consisting of rifle grenades bursting into three white lights, were issued for use, to be fired by officers when troops had arrived at objective.

23. Brigade Headquarters were established at the old post of command of the 106th Infantry, at F.21.b.2.1. at Ronssoy.

In accordance with the program strong patrols were pushed out during the night of September 26th and the tape was laid as prescribed. Watches were synchronized, extra property stored, and necessary supplies, tools and ordnance stores issued. Zero hour was fixed at 5:30 A. M. on the morning of September 27th. At 4:30 the troops were on the tape ready to advance. While going over this battle-field last summer (1920) the writer found a piece of the start-line tape, still stretched out where it was placed on the night of September 26th. A twenty-yard strip of it was kept as a memento. The tape found, stretched along the front of Benjamin Post. It was precisely where it was prescribed by orders to be placed.

At zero hour the ninety-six heavy machine guns of the 105th and 106th Machine Gun Battalions began to fire the machine-gun barrage, each gun firing at the rate of 200 shots per minute. The output of these ninety-six machine guns must have sounded like the buzzing of millions of wasps as they passed over the heads of the infantry lying on the start line. At least this deluge of bullets would have sounded in such manner except for the fact that at the same instant the machine guns opened fire, nine brigades of supporting British artillery flashed out the announcement that the barrage was falling. It may be stated here that German prisoners taken in this attack reported that this combination artillery and machine-gun barrage was very demoralizing to them, as a perfect rain of bullets and shrapnel, accompanied by high-explosive shells, kept them under cover. The eighteen-pounders fired at the rate of three rounds per minute, while the 4.5 howitzers fired at the rate of two rounds per minute.

The 106th Infantry, up to the time of the start, had fared rather fortunately. They went into the battle about 2,000 strong. They had sustained casualties during the taking over of the line and during the day preceding the attack, but these casualties, when one considers how formidable was the position they faced, and how aggressive and determined was the enemy resistance, were not considerable. They were considerable, however, when one considers the regiment's available numbers for the task it was called upon to perform.



One of the British guns at Division Headquarters in the St. Emilie Quarry, firing on the Hindenburg Line



Another of the big guns firing on the Hindenburg Line


Simultaneously with the falling of the barrage, the smoke from the bombs began to mix with the mist rising from the ground, and soon the advance was smothered in a heavy pall of misty smoke, which rendered visibility impossible. All reports indicate that all the companies got away on time and in good spirit.

As soon as our barrage fell, the enemy's S. O. S. rockets, calling for their protective barrages, went into the air. The enemy had been expecting an attack for several days and had kept the foreground well illuminated with star shells during the hours of darkness. In accordance with instructions, the support and mopping-up parties in forming up, were close to the leading elements, in order to avoid, if possible, the effects of the enemy counter-barrage, and in the hope that it would fall behind them. In most parts of the line this resulted.

It is obviously impossible to attempt to describe in any detail or sequence, or with any accuracy, the events which transpired in each platoon during the advance that followed. No survivor of the battle can even attempt to tell what transpired except within the range of his own vision. Throughout the advance the range of vision of the participants was practically nil, due to the mist and smoke. Officers had been provided with luminous compasses, in order to aid them and their commands in maintaining the proper direction. A connected account of the battle of September 27th, so far as details of the fighting are concerned, can only be given by piecing together and analyzing the messages as they came in, the later reports of platoon, company, battalion and regimental commanders, conversations with wounded and prisoners, and the results accomplished.

It might be said at the outset, and speaking generally, that the tanks failed. Those assigned to the division in this battle were British tanks manned by British personnel. In the main attack of September 29th British tanks manned by American personnel were employed. Those assigned to the right battalion failed to get into action. Those assigned the other battalions got into position, but accomplished little. One or more of them with the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 106th Infantry moved around Guillemont Farm and The Knoll and then returned.

The first message of importance received at Division Headquarters was from the 53d Infantry Brigade Headquarters at 6:46 A. M. September 27th. This message reported that the left battalion had fired its success signal from The Knoll. At 8:40 A. M. another message from the same source, timed at 7:15 A. M., confirmed the first message and reported that 125 to 150 prisoners were coming in. About the same time another message from the same source reported that enemy artillery retaliation on the 106th Infantry was heavy. At 9:30 A. M. a message was received stating that the right and center battalions were on their objectives, but that heavy fighting was going on about Guillemont Farm and Quennemont Farm. Messages also stated that bombing in these localities was continuous. At 9:25 A. M. an observer from the 4th Australian Division, with the left battalion of the 106th Infantry, reported 130 prisoners coming



WYNKOOP HALLENBECK CRAWFORD CO., NEW YORK, PRINTERS AND BINDERS



One of the tanks which started with the 106th Infantry on September 27th



German machine-gun pit in outpost of Hindenburg Line defense

in. At the same time reports from another Australian observer with the right battalion showed troops of that battalion on the objective in trenches running from A.26.c. to A.26.a, north to the grid line between A.20 and A.26 on the map, but that bombing and hard fighting were still going on. At 11:40 A. M. word was received that the enemy had appeared in force in Guillemont Farm and to some extent in the south Guillemont trenches. At noon Major Kincaid's battalion reported that they occupied Claymore trench from A.19.a to A.20.a, but that Guillemont Farm had not been cleaned up and was giving them trouble; that mopping-up detachments were trying to clear the situation. At 12:20 P. M. the left battalion occupying The Knoll were heavily counter-attacked and driven back, taking up a line in Tombois Farm. Following this, supporting artillery and machine-gun fire was brought to bear on the sunken road in F.12.a. The 106th troops of the left battalion then counter-attacked and drove the enemy into Tombois trench at 12:50 P. M. At 1:25 P. M. the 106th Infantry Headquarters reported that the enemy had counter-attacked the right battalion twenty minutes before and that the situation was not yet clear. In the afternoon the contact aeroplane reported that at 11:15 A. M. it had called for flares, but that none were seen.

The situation along the front continued to be obscure for some time. All reports and observations indicated that very heavy fighting was continuous along the front. This fighting largely consisted of rifle and machine-gun fire and bombing combats. It became obvious that in addition to numerous counter-attacks which had been made by both sides, there were being carried on throughout the acres of the enemy's complicated system more or less continuous combats between small detachments of the 106th Infantry and enemy detachments which had come out from cover after the attacking waves had passed over, or which had been fed into such positions aided by covered ways and the heavy smoke which obscured the field.

Operations officers in forward positions checked by their observations the organization reports received. At 6:30 P. M. one of these officers definitely stated that at 5:00 P. M. The Knoll was again in our possession, as were also Guillemont Farm and Quennemont Farm, but that in all of these places pockets of the enemy remained and were still to be dealt with.

The leading companies in each battalion had followed the barrage to the objective. It might be stated more correctly that the survivors of the leading waves followed the barrage to the objective, for there were many casualties en route, which sadly thinned the line. Due to the heavy fire about Guillemont Farm, the farm itself was rather enveloped than entered, the men getting into the trenches about this place. Usually they were counter-attacked by enemy bombing parties.

From the best information at hand The Knoll was taken three times by the left battalion of the 106th Infantry, aided by Companies K and M of the 105th Infantry, and later by the remaining companies of the 3d Battalion of the latter regiment.

There is no doubt whatever that the survivors of the leading elements gained the objective along the entire front. Numbers of those who went

through the fight reported that they found consolidation extremely difficult, due to the sparsity of their numbers, and the intensity and frequency of the counter-attacks to which they were subjected. In many instances the groups which gained the objective line held on with the greatest tenacity and courage against great odds. In some cases, more particularly on the left, where the fighting was heaviest, some of these groups were surrounded, bombed into submissiveness and taken prisoners. Other groups counter-attacked enemy groups, destroying them, or where possible, taking prisoners.

The objective line, which was attained on the morning of September 27th, was not, however, consolidated, held and made good throughout its length. This comment applies to the 106th Infantry, and as well to the battalion of the 105th Infantry which was to take and hold the trench known as Crellin Avenue in order to protect the left (northern) flank. Whether or not the failure of these units to hold their gains constitutes a ground for criticism of them is another matter; but the fact is that on the night of September 27th a consolidated line had not been established on the objective. The situation along the front out to the objective line might be likened to an inferno, dotted with opposing groups of fiercely contending men. Some of these groups were in the remains of trenches. Some were in concrete pits. Others fought from scattered shell holes.

One explanation of the failure to hold and consolidate the objective line is that the regiment did not completely mop up the territory covered by its advance. This is true. They did not mop up completely or adequately for the following reasons:

The front to be covered, 3,500 yards, necessarily made the leading waves very "thin." As these waves advanced, followed by succeeding waves and the mopping-up parties, and heavy casualties began to be inflicted, gaps were caused in the line, which were filled up by men from the succeeding waves and probably in places by men from the mopping-up parties as well. In some cases this resulted from the action of succeeding elements following on through the heavy smoke screen without encountering others of their own command in advance of them. In other cases the action was probably the result of orders given by platoon commanders in order to prevent too great gaps in the line. Again, the regiment in its forward movement was traveling through such a torrent of machine-gun bullets, shrapnel and shell fragments that the losses were sufficient to practically obliterate some of the mopping-up detachments and in other cases to reduce their combat power to a minimum. These circumstances in themselves would explain the failure of some of the mopping-up parties to cover the areas assigned them.

As has already been pointed out, the regiment was attacking what was probably the most formidable field fortification ever constructed, and which had successfully resisted all previous attempts for its capture. Its defense contemplated that numerous groups of its defenders, occupying screened vantage points, would keep under cover during the artillery bombardment and the passage over them of the leading attacking elements, so that they

might deal effectively from their hidden positions with the very mopping-up parties whose duty it was, advancing in more or less exposed fashion, to locate and destroy them.

Quennemont Farm on the right presented very great difficulties, but due to its distance from the strong flank position at Vendhuile, there was lacking on its front the same intensity of enfilading fire that swept the ground about The Knoll and Guillemont Farm. Three companies of the 3d Battalion of the 106th Infantry, namely, Companies C, B and A, in the order named from north to south, attacked on the right battalion sector. They were supported by Company D, which furnished the mopping-up parties across the battalion front. The battalion line extended from Malakoff Farm on the south to Cat Post on the north, both exclusive. It later developed that the mopping-up company had been reduced by one platoon, which had been fed into Companies C and B by the battalion commander in order to furnish replacements to enable the leading companies to cover their front. The leading companies shortly before the attack had sustained a number of shell casualties, which apparently made this action on the part of the battalion commander necessary. Company A and the right platoon of Company D found themselves under terrific fire from Malakoff Wood, as they neared the objective line. Most of the wood was outside the divisional sector and immediately forward of the objective line. They found it necessary to mop up this position in order to insure consolidation. This was done successfully, but First Lieutenant Gilbert F. Rudkin, commanding Company A, was killed while directing a patrol to connect up with the 30th American Division on the right.

One group of Company A, composed of Sergeant Minder, Corporal Arthur L. Giles, Mechanic Gidian Anderson and Privates Walter H. Burry and Leon Davidman, reached the junction of Paul trench and Quennemont Pit Lane at A.20.c.81. They held this piece of trench until Sunday morning, September 29th, at 7 o'clock, when the 108th Infantry passed over them on the way to the tunnel, and they were relieved.

First Lieutenant Matthew J. A. Wilson, commanding the mopping-up company, was wounded about thirty yards in front of Zoo trench, south of Quennemont Farm. Company C, which held the left of the battalion line, and the left platoon of the mopping-up company which followed it, had hard fighting at Quennemont Farm proper. Second Lieutenant James A. Malloy, who commanded Company C, was killed while establishing an outguard to block one of the trenches. Captain Ostberg, commanding Company B, was killed, and Lieutenant Wilson, commanding Company D, was wounded. In fact, all company officers of the battalion were killed or wounded except Lieutenant Ryan, who went through and somewhat beyond the objective. Lieutenant Ryan had succeeded to the command of Company D when Lieutenant Wilson was wounded. His group were counter-attacked from front and flanks and fell back to trenches and shell holes a short distance west of the first position and there held on.

Major Ransom H. Gillet, commanding this battalion, and his Adjutant,

First Lieutenant Ames T. Brown, had carefully supervised the preparations of the right battalion for the attack.

In the center battalion, Major J. Leslie Kincaid and his Adjutant, First Lieutenant Albert G. Reinert, in like manner had supervised all details affecting a proper start for the battalion. Guillemont Farm was the critical place to be faced by this battalion. Major Kincaid's post of command was at Duncan Post. At one time during the day an enemy counter-attack came through a gap in the decimated line of this battalion, but was stopped by fire action of Major Kincaid's headquarters group, Major Kincaid himself firing a Lewis gun.

Major Kincaid for his exceptionally efficient and meritorious service in this battle was awarded the Distinguished Service Order by the British authorities and the Order of the Crown by the Belgian Government.

During the battle of September 27th the division lost a very capable and brave officer, when Captain John C. Hardy of the 106th Infantry was killed. Previous to the war Captain Hardy, while commanding a company of the 14th New York Infantry during maneuver exercises at Pine Plains, N. Y., was awarded the New York State Medal for Valor for rescuing a soldier from drowning at the risk of his own life. At the time he was killed he was commanding Company G. The only other officer with the company was Second Lieutenant Lane S. Anderson, a very gallant young officer, who was mortally wounded and shortly thereafter died. He was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his conduct on this occasion.

In Company F of this battalion First Lieutenant Alfred J. Hook, commanding the company, was killed and the remaining officer with the company, Second Lieutenant York W. Brennan, was wounded. In Company H First Lieutenant Lennox C. Brennan, the only officer with the company, was wounded. In Company E the two officers, First Lieutenant Thomas F. Ward and Second Lieutenant William H. Boullee, were both wounded.

No reports of the battle were made by company officers of the 2d Battalion after the battle, for the reason that all of them had been killed or wounded. In the same battle Lieutenant William B. Behrens, commanding the four machine guns assigned the battalion, and First Lieutenant Franklyn J. Jackson, commanding the Stokes mortars, were both killed.

On the left, the alert young Captain Blaisdell, who commanded the 3d Battalion, was confronted with the most difficult of all the problems as the situation developed, namely, the taking and holding of The Knoll. The Knoll is not an abrupt elevation, but a great flat-topped rise of the ground, nearly every part of which can be dominated by fire from the heights northeast of Vendhuile, while from Vendhuile itself reinforcements could be conveniently fed when counter-attacks were to be made. The battalion post of command was located in a dugout on the southeast side of Lempire Road in F.16.a.1.9.

First Lieutenant Chester P. Jones was Adjutant of this battalion. He reported that the first message received at the Battalion Headquarters was from Captain John F. Callahan, commanding the mopping-up company of the battalion, one short hour after zero. The message stated that

Company K on the extreme left of the line was badly shattered and that he was moving forward to their support. During the early morning Lieutenant Jones observed the attack from Rose trench at P.10.c.5.5. He later made a personal reconnaissance as far forward as Tombois Road northwest of The Knoll, arriving there at noon, where a considerable portion of Company M were found dug into the bank on the southeast side of the road facing The Knoll. Men of the 105th Infantry were also in this group. Upon returning to the battalion post of command after covering other parts of the line, he found the Battalion Commander had just left to make a personal reconnaissance. When Captain Blaisdell returned he informed Lieutenant Jones that he had gotten shortly beyond Tombois Road and had personal contact with the enemy. It was this part of the line that was subjected to the heaviest counter-attacks.

In the course of one of these counter-attacks Captain Callahan was killed. His body was not found by the burial parties which later went over the field. The current belief is that it was either obliterated or buried by a heavy shell.

Captain Stanley Bulkley, who commanded the 3d Battalion of the 105th Infantry supporting the advance, displayed in this battle the same coolness, force and determination which had characterized his work in Flanders.

Company K of the 105th Infantry, commanded by First Lieutenant John D. Snedeker, which was the left of the two leading companies of the 3d Battalion of that regiment, left their dugouts south of Ridge Reserve, which was immediately north of Ronssoy in F.15.a. and b, at 3:15 A. M., on September 27th. They moved down the trench known as St. Patrick's Avenue, running northeast from Lempire through F.10.a and c. When about one hundred yards past Zebra Post the company left the trench and assumed their attack positions, extending from Braeton Post in F.5.c, to about the northern divisional boundary line. The company therefore was substantially within the area of the 12th British Division on the left. The company connected on the right with Company M of their regiment. Lieutenant Snedeker reported that as the barrage fell and began to move forward, the two companies of the 105th followed it successfully to the objective line, and that he personally sent up the success signal already referred to at 6:05 A. M. They maintained themselves in position throughout the morning. At 11:55 A. M. he received word that the enemy were preparing to counter-attack and almost at the same time our defensive barrage came down. Lieutenant Snedeker, however, reported that the counter-attack did not materialize. He reported that the company was considerably harassed by low-flying enemy planes which shot up their position with machine-gun fire. About noon he received a message from Lieutenant Walter W. Slayton, the other officer with the company, and in response he crawled to Tombois Road and was informed by the lieutenant that the 3d Battalion of the 106th Infantry was disorganized as a result of the attack, and that he, Lieutenant Slayton, was holding Tombois Road with a number of Lewis guns and about thirty riflemen. Later it was found, according to

Lieutenant Snedeker, that his company was well in advance of the British on the left and of the remainder of the battalion on the right; that he feared a counter-attack on the flank would cut them off and enable the enemy to get into the trenches behind them running from Tombois Farm to Braeton Post; that shortly thereafter the Battalion Commander, Captain Bulkley, with Lieutenant Carl G. R. Ross, his Adjutant, reached his position and he secured the Battalion Commander's consent to withdraw his company to the trench immediately in his rear, so as to connect up with the units on his right and left. It is not clear what trench the report refers to, but apparently it is Tombois Road.

Officers of this supporting battalion report that one of their embarrassments was the failure of the left battalion of the 106th Infantry to make good the possession of The Knoll, which left their right uncovered. Reports referred to enforced retirements of detachments of Companies K, M and I of the 106th Infantry. On the other hand, officers of the latter companies report that their difficulties were added to by the failure of Companies K and M of the 105th Infantry to protect their left flank in accordance with the requirements of the mission assigned them.

These divergent views seem to be inseparable from a hard-fought battle. The reports submitted by the battalion did not, however, seem to justify the withdrawal of Companies K and M of the 105th Infantry.

During this battle the 53d Brigade was commanded by Brigadier General Albert H. Blanding, formerly of the Florida National Guard. His Adjutant was Captain Davis T. Dunbar. Both of these officers, as well as Captain Euston F. Edmonds, who was detailed to Brigade Headquarters, performed their battle functions in most determined and satisfactory manner. General Blanding, who also participated in the other battles and engagements of the division, and who remained with the division until about the time of the Armistice, was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal for his distinguished and exceptionally meritorious services.

The intensity of the fighting may be sensed from the losses among the officers of the 106th Infantry and the battalion of the 105th Infantry supporting the attack on the left.

In the 1st Battalion all company officers were killed, except Captain Sullivan, who was wounded.

In the 2d Battalion every company officer was killed or wounded.

In the 3d Battalion every company officer but one was either killed or wounded.

In the 105th Infantry Battalion both officers of Company M were killed.

After the battle the men were unanimous in their commendation of the gallantry and determination of the officers who led them, but they all referred to the embarrassment to their coordinated efforts, at the most critical time of the battle, resulting from these losses. It is true that in most companies non-commissioned officers, with great initiative and determination, took over the command of platoons and even companies, and maintained the fight, but from no source will the testimony be stronger than from the enlisted men themselves, of the vital importance in combat

of the commissioned officer in whose experience and judgment the men have confidence.

The division sustained 1,540 casualties in this battle. Detailed statement of these casualties will be found among the statistics in the Appendix.

Some remarkable accomplishments by individual officers and men marked the conduct of the troops engaged, and at the same time throw light upon the fierce character of the fighting.

Sergeant Frank J. Farrelly with a detachment of men of Company D, 106th Infantry, having seized part of an enemy trench and being fiercely opposed, sprang from the trench and advanced rapidly over the open for a short distance to a Lewis gun lying beside a wounded soldier. He seized the gun and promptly attacked the enemy group with its fire, successfully driving them out. For this he received the Distinguished Conduct Medal of the British Army.

Corporal Harry M. Close of Company D, as the smoke screen began to lift, found himself alone in close proximity to a group of thirteen enemy soldiers. Single handed and alone he promptly attacked them, killing three and taking the remainder prisoners. For this he received the Distinguished Service Cross.

Lieutenant Horace B. Scanlon of Company M, 106th Infantry, finding his detachment about to sustain an enemy counter-attack, without awaiting its delivery organized about forty men who were in the vicinity and counter-attacked the enemy force. While conducting this attack he was mortally wounded, calling out to his men as he fell, "Go on fighting, don't mind me." For this he was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

First Lieutenant William B. Turner of Company M, 105th Infantry, led a small group of men forward after they had become separated from the rest of the company in the darkness. He put one enemy machine-gun nest out of action single handed and killed one of the crew of another nest. He continued to lead his detachment over three lines of enemy trenches although wounded three times, and killed several of the enemy in hand-to-hand encounters. Upon reaching the fourth line of enemy trenches, which was his objective, he captured it with the nine survivors of his group and resisted counter-attack until finally surrounded by the enemy and killed.

Sergeant Leon R. Matson of Company M, 105th Infantry, was awarded a Distinguished Service Cross for effectively taking over the command of his company after all the officers became casualties.

Sergeant George Schuessler and Corporal Alonzo Holdon, both of Company M, 105th Infantry, at one critical time placed in action a captured enemy machine gun and materially assisted in breaking up an enemy counter attack.

It was in this battle that Sergeant Reider Waaler of the 105th Machine Gun Battalion won the Congressional Medal of Honor for crawling forward under heavy artillery and machine-gun fire and successfully rescuing two men from a burning British tank. He was also awarded the Croix de



Types of German prisoners captured by the 27th Division during the Battle of the Hindenburg Line



The Poilu, the Yank, the Tommy, the Fritz and the Ausie discuss the news

Guerre with palm, the British Distinguished Conduct Medal and the Montenegren Military Medal for his extraordinary valor on this occasion.

An indication of how the leading elements felt throughout this battle may be gathered from the experience of Sergeant Joseph A. Cook, of Company F, 106th Infantry. His platoon was part of the leading wave. They followed the barrage to its conclusion and at the termination he found himself with twenty-five or thirty survivors of the platoon about 150 to 200 yards south and east of Guillemont Farm on the objective line. Looking his men over he found that among them were men from succeeding waves. As the smoke began to lift, he found his platoon out of touch with elements on the right and left and that parties of German troops were in the trenches about him. With these his party was soon engaged in a fierce struggle. An organized counter-attack was broken up and repulsed by the excellence of the rifle fire of his little command. Later, however, the attacks were renewed in the form of bombing attacks down the trenches which the sergeant held. Nevertheless they maintained their position until darkness. They could see and hear the firing in their rear and their experience told them that they were cut off. The sergeant from his position could see German troops filtering their way down the trenches to reinforce the German detachment at the front. Others continued their attempts to surround and close in upon his party. Finally giving up hope of reinforcement and relief by other detachments of the 106th Infantry or by troops of the 54th Brigade, and knowing that destruction or capture was inevitable if he remained, he fell back until he met a patrol of the 107th Infantry which passed the survivors of his party on to the rear.

Privates John H. Rawlinson and Eugene Reynolds of Company K, 106th Infantry, were awarded Distinguished Service Crosses for their extraordinary accomplishment during this battle. They became tangled in a mass of wire and separated from their command in the heavy smoke on the morning of September 27th. Upon disengaging themselves from the wire they came upon an unknown corporal of the 105th Infantry and all three advanced into one of the trenches of the outworks system which they followed cautiously, Private Rawlinson preceding the others, as an advance guard. Coming to a communicating trench, Private Rawlinson looked around and discovered about a dozen enemy soldiers sitting on a fire step. Heavy machine funs were in the parapet. The three soldiers then conferred, with the result that the Corporal and Rawlinson crossed diagonally over the top of the communicating trench, throwing in hand grenades, while Private Reynolds advanced through the trenches and opened fire with his rifle. The surprise was most effective. Several of the enemy were killed or wounded, the survivors crying for quarter. At that moment one or more German officers and a considerable number of men came out of a dugout calling out that they surrendered. They all apparently believed that larger forces of American troops accompanied the soldiers. Private Rawlinson directed the senior German officer to assume command of the detachment and march them to the American lines. The

German officer, unaware that his captors were lost and did not know where the American lines were, marched the prisoners to the rear.

About the time the three soldiers were getting the prisoners out of the trench and to the top, one or more German machine gunners some hundreds of yards distant discerned the men through the lifting smoke and opened fire. A moment later, however, evidently seeing the German soldiers emerging from the trench and not wishing to hit them, fire was suspended. It was necessary for the three soldiers to keep intimidating their prisoners, who, upon gaining the top, were surprised to see no supporting American troops about. The Germans as they emerged from the trench were required to leave their arms behind them. Much to the amazement of Reynolds, Rawlinson and the Corporal the dugouts continued to disgorge men until they had secured somewhere between 80 and 100 prisoners. No attempt was made to count them at that time. They quickly moved off with one of the guards near the head of the column, one near the center and the other bringing up the rear, all with their rifles in readiness. After moving to the rear for several hundred yards they came to an aid station about which were lying a large number of wounded American soldiers. The officer in charge, Captain Walter C. Tilden of the Medical Corps attached to the 106th Infantry, hailed the appearance of the prisoners with satisfaction, for to him they meant litter bearers. Accordingly, he demanded of the captors a sufficient number of prisoners for the purpose indicated. It is not known the exact number of the prisoners used for this purpose, but what is known is that the remainder that were not so employed, numbering 52, were taken further to the rear, where the party met Captain Lewis H. Gibbes, Adjutant of the 105th Infantry, from whom Private Rawlinson asked for a receipt for the prisoners, in order that he might have evidence justifying the absence of himself and his comrades from their commands. This receipt was given on a scrap of paper and read as follows:

"Private Rawlinson, J. H., was detailed by me to guard 52 prisoners to P. O. W. cage. He was at all times on duty."

Whereupon the 105th Infantry corporal started forward to find his command. In this effort he was evidently killed, for a later attempt to identify him, in order that he might be rewarded for his part in the affair, failed to locate him among the living. Private Reynolds and Rawlinson reached their company and were honored as indicated after the return of the division to the United States.

It has been stated that through the day of September 27th, the fields covered by the attack were the continued scene of hard fighting. With the approach of darkness, the work of evacuating the wounded began. These were scattered all over the battle-field, both Americans and Germans. Many of them were brought in by litter bearers of the 105th and 106th Infantry Regiments, and later during the night by parties from the 54th Infantry Brigade, which took over the line on the night of September 27th. Similar work was being carried out by the Germans, but neither side let up their sanguinary efforts for control of the field. Numerous mêlées continued throughout the night between isolated opposing parties, with the

result that many of the wounded were again hit, while relief parties, which could not be distinguished by either side from combat patrols, were fired upon with machine-gun and rifle fire, when they were observed in the darkness.

It will be remembered that the 54th Brigade were not to be committed to this battle and were not to take over from the 106th Infantry and the supporting battalion of the 105th Infantry until the night of September 27th-28th. Promptly as directed by orders, the 54th Brigade moved forward for the purpose of effecting the relief. The approach to the front when relief is to be made must take place under cover of darkness, and often a relief is not completed until shortly before dawn, particularly when the territory to be taken over is strange to the relieving troops and as well to the troops to be relieved. Accordingly when troops of the 54th Brigade reached the front line from which the 53d Brigade had launched its attack on the morning of the 27th, they found themselves under machine-gun and rifle fire from enemy posts on their immediate front, which prevented further advance without committing the brigade, in violation of orders, to a night attack. The events as they affected the 54th Brigade, properly belong to the story of the attack of September 29th on the main defenses of the Hindenburg Line. Suffice it to say here that patrols of the 54th Brigade spent the night in reconnoitering their front, locating enemy points of resistance which still existed on the battle-field, evacuating wounded of the 53d Brigade and picking up and relieving detachments of the latter brigade still in their front.

Under these circumstances, a night attack delivered by the 54th Brigade as early as possible during the night of September 27th-28th would probably have cleared the field of the remaining points of resistance and would have established and resulted in the consolidation of the objective line for the main attack of September 29th. Such an attack by fresh troops following closely upon the heavy fighting of September 27th would have overcome the fatigued German survivors of the day's battle and would have secured all points of resistance before they could have been secured by fresh German troops.

The plan for September 29th, however, was not to be a divisional or even a corps battle. The entire 4th Army was to make an attack, and the attack itself was but part of a great offensive directed by Marshal Foch. Hence the dominating importance of preserving with unimpaired strength the 54th Brigade, which was scheduled to play so important a rôle in this great coming battle. During the night of September 27th and 28th the German defensive system already described in detail, proved the efficiency of its layout. Under cover of darkness, the German relief troops were pushed out from the main system through the various approach trenches to reinforce the German points of resistance still existing at The Knoll, Guillemont Farm and the Quennemont Farm and as well at other places in the forward positions. In similar manner groups of the 106th Infantry still held on to isolated points in the outworks system where the close of the day's fighting had found them.



Temporary graves of two soldiers of the 27th Division who were buried where they fell, near Le Cateau, France



American plot in British Cemetery at St. Emilie, France, where a number of the 27th Division soldiers killed in the Hindenburg Line Battle were buried. In the foreground Second Lieutenant Summerfield S. Curtiss, Division Burial Officer, checking up graves. To the left may be seen a burial party at work.

The 106th Infantry and the support battalion of the 105th Infantry made a record in this battle for gallantry and determination of which they may well be proud. It is a record which reflects honor upon the manhood of the state of New York, for it is to be remembered that until the active operations were concluded, the personnel of the entire division were almost wholly from the state of New York. These men had gone into battle against the strongest position ever constructed in the field by any army. They had undertaken their mission with a knowledge of the previous failures and losses which had fallen to the lot of the British divisions of the III Corps to bear. They did so with confidence in their ability to win and with keenness for the test of their worth, although they must have believed that their numbers were hardly equal to the demand. The survivors came out of the battle but a remnant of the fine regiment that had so gallantly entered it a short time before. They came out grieved by their losses, fatigued almost beyond description by lack of sleep and nervous strain, many of them suffering slight wounds which they had not thought of sufficient consequence to call for medical attention.

The attack on the outworks of the Hindenburg Line, while not a clean-cut and decisive success for the reasons that have been mentioned, nevertheless constituted a most effective contribution to the great task of breaking through the Hindenburg Line. The enemy's defensive organization of the outworks system was badly shattered. Their communications were largely destroyed. Heavy losses had been inflicted upon them, particularly in and about The Knoll. On the right half of the regimental sector, the ground was quite generally cleared of enemy troops, except for the isolated machine-gun posts in the ruins of Guillemont and Quennemont Farms and at odd places between these two strong points.

The brigade had given a magnificent demonstration of valor and determination on a field which will become memorable in history as the place where one of the fiercest and most important battles of all times was fought.

In the next chapter will be described the battle for the cleaning up of the outworks and for the possession of the main defenses of the Hindenburg Line. But as a part of the story of the effort of the 53d Brigade, it may be mentioned that on September 28th the survivors of the 106th Infantry were informed that they were to be given no opportunity for rest and recuperation, but were to be organized as a provisional battalion to aid in mopping up for the 107th Infantry on the occasion of the attack of September 29th. The details of this will be explained in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XVII

BATTLE FOR THE MAIN DEFENSES OF THE HINDENBURG LINE

IN Field Orders No. 49, to be found in the Appendix, it was provided that one battalion of the 106th Infantry was detailed to the 54th Brigade in the attack of September 29th for the especial purpose of aiding in mopping up the territory assigned the 107th Infantry. But as has been stated, there was so little left of the 106th Infantry in the way of effective strength that it was necessary to form this battalion as a provisional unit constituted of the effective survivors of the regiment. So important was the coming mission of this unit that the Division Commander felt called upon to supervise personally the preparations for its organization. Accordingly during the morning of September 28th the Division Commander went to the vicinity of Villers Faucon, where the provisional battalion of the 106th Infantry was being organized. Colonel Taylor, the Regimental Commander, was found there with the work under way. It must be said that the prospect for organizing an effective battalion looked at first most unpromising. Scores of men of the 106th Infantry were lying about apparently exhausted. Many of them were in a stupor of sleep. Others, suffering from temporary shell shock and strain, apparently could not sleep and were comparing their experience with other survivors. All were muddy and unkempt-looking after their terrible ordeal, which of course had afforded no opportunity for anything but fighting. It was obviously a time for rather summary action, and Colonel Taylor was directed personally and with the aid of such officers as were immediately available to assemble the men with the least possible delay so that the Division Commander might talk to them. This was done. Within ten minutes there were perhaps 150 enlisted men standing about the Division Commander. They presented an appearance that would have appealed to the sympathy and indulgence of almost any heart. They were silent men. But in spite of their apparent exhaustion the faces of most of them, for the first few moments at least, wore looks of inquiry mixed with surprise. Indignation would be too strong a term, but nevertheless the officers present keenly sensed that these men felt they had done all that men should be called upon to do, and that they suspected that some additional and impossible demand was now to be made upon them. They were all brought sharply to attention and then ordered to relax and to listen. The psychological effect of their response to the command for attention was noticeable, while at the same time the direction to relax must have appealed to them. In a few words they were told of the result of their attack, of the disorganization they had created in the enemy's defense, of the numbers of the enemy they had slain, of the prisoners and war materiel captured, of the enemy points of resist-

ance that still existed, of the vital importance to the 4th Army of the coming attack, of the imperative need for thorough mopping up behind the advance of the 54th Brigade, of the lack of other troops for this purpose and of the necessity for calling upon the survivors of the 106th Infantry for another supreme effort. The faces of the men were carefully watched while this harangue was being delivered. Their bloodshot eyes showed respect and attention, but not an appreciation of the reasonableness of any further demands upon them, until the Division Commander added the following:

"And another thing, men, you must not forget that scattered about in the fields around The Knoll, Guillemont Farm and Quennemont Farm are numbers of your pals still lying there wounded. You don't propose to abandon them, do you? I think not; not even to the willingness of the 54th Brigade to look after them. You are going to get them yourselves. One other thing. If I know the 106th Infantry they will do even more than that. They will mop up in such manner that their work will leave nothing to be desired by the comrades lost in the attack of yesterday."

It was this last appeal that developed the spirit of responsiveness—the appeal on behalf of the buddy and the pal for vengeance. When men are acting in the mass, and particularly when they are emotional, they are peculiarly responsive to the impulse of imitation. Standing near the Division Commander was a strapping big soldier splattered with mud and blood, who had followed the exhortation with gravest attention. When reference was made to the wounded men of the regiment still on the field and to the duty of the survivors to rescue them and as well to visit adequate punishment upon the enemy, it was noted that the face of this man suddenly displayed an intense emotion responsive to the suggestion. Accordingly the Division Commander turned to him and said, "How about you—do you prefer to hang around here and sleep, or will you be one of those to get out behind the 107th and tear things up?" The men all turned to watch his response, which was immediate and of the most positive character. He said he had personally killed a number of the enemy the day before, but that he did not consider his job finished and would go back behind the 107th or anywhere else to get another crack at the Hun. Quickly the influence of his example spread, until there existed a fine responsive spirit to the order. Colonel Taylor, Major Gillet, Captain McDermott and other officers of the regiment immediately continued their work of organizing the provisional battalion. All men not required for labor details were directed to sleep, and the preparations continued apace. Colonel Taylor and his surviving officers are entitled to very great commendation for the successful manner in which they organized this battalion under the conditions which then obtained. Anyone who has witnessed with his own eyes the aftermath of a battle can appreciate what this work entailed. Nothing so saps the vitality of men, tends to make them more irritable, forgetful and disheartened, than lack of sleep. These officers and their men had had no sleep since the morning of September 25th. Combine with this the experience in battle which had been theirs, the loss of so many of their comrades, and the natural feeling

that they were entitled to a period of rest, and the reader will have some conception of the task which Colonel Taylor and his surviving officers met in such soldierly and effective manner.

The provisional battalion was organized, equipped and supplied, and under command of Major Ransom H. Gillett reported for its duty on the following morning, as will be told in greater detail later in this chapter.

The foregoing account of the appeal made to the survivors of the 106th Infantry on this occasion may at some time in the future be read by some officer without battle experience who will ask himself why, if these men were soldiers, it was necessary to ask them whether they would obey an order which had been given. The psychology of discipline in war differs greatly from that of peace. The unemotional formalities of peace-time military routine are suitable for that period. Indeed they constitute a necessary background for an occasion such as has been described, for without such background the occasion would lack the character of the unusual. It is this feature of such an appeal which gives it much of its strength. Such appeals, made under such extraordinary conditions, are appreciated by soldiers; and the better trained and more dependable they are the greater will be the understanding and responsiveness. What is essential in battle is something more than a technical obedience of orders. There must be a loyal and understanding determination to execute them in accordance with their spirit. Peace-time training in leadership which fails to visualize the minds and hearts that exist beneath the armament and equipment of the soldiers is faulty training. History is replete with incidents in war illustrating the effectiveness of such appeals under the conditions given, but there is also evidence that during a long period of peace there is apt to develop a false military orthodoxy of the "hard-boiled" variety, which repudiates the necessity or desirability of recognizing any agencies for the execution of an order other than its expression and punitive action for its disobedience or neglect.

The morning of September 28th found the 54th Brigade in the line occupying the trenches from which the 106th and 105th Infantry Regiments had launched their attack of the 27th, with patrols working forward in an effort to connect up with combat groups of the 106th in their front.

In order to understand the difficulties of accomplishing this during daylight, the attention of the reader must be called to the very great power of the defensive in relation to the offensive when the conditions are favorable for the defensive rôle. Conditions are most favorable for the defensive rôle when the defensive positions are screened from observation and when the garrisons occupying them possess the security of dugouts and shelters and when their fields of fire offer ample and effective opportunity for the destruction of an approaching enemy. These were the conditions which obtained on September 28th. Always remembering that superior orders prohibited the commitment of the 54th Brigade to battle prior to the morning of the 29th of September, it was not permissible to direct the advance of the 54th Brigade by battle tactics, for example with the aid of a smoke screen and a supporting artillery barrage. Whatever was to be accom-



Crest of ridge at Guillemont Farm, looking east toward Bony. The clump of trees in the distance marks the German strong point at Bony. Picture taken during the summer of 1920

plished was to be done by infiltration and patrolling. With their accurate knowledge of their own defensive system, German combat groups had been pushed through the various gaps which existed in the objective line as established by the 106th Infantry, and following the paths of least resistance had established themselves in various places on the immediate front of the 54th Brigade. Patrols of the 54th Brigade from the moment they left the



Main Street, Bony

protection of their front line trenches were immediately under fire from one or more of these enemy groups. There were two ways for the patrols of the 54th Brigade to work their way forward. These were to advance over the top from shell hole to shell hole, or to secure a footing in the trenches and to fight their way forward by bombing. The difficulties involved in the first method accentuated the superiority of the defensive over the offensive under conditions of daylight. The offensive patrol must necessarily disclose its movements to a greater or lesser extent and must afford at least fleeting targets to enemy fire. The defensive groups, on the other hand, with good visibility, were relatively secure in their position. They could see without being seen. The second method required that the offensive groups should have with them a large supply of hand grenades. One man cannot carry many of these grenades without imposing too great a handicap upon his movements. In a bombing contest the number of grenades that can be carried is soon expended. The defenders, on the other hand, do not have to disclose their positions by movement. Indeed it is their mission to remain stationary. They have also at their immediate disposal grenades in large numbers, conveniently dumped for their use. As late as the summer of 1920, when the writer visited and inspected the Hindenburg Line defenses, there were still to be found in most all of the more important trenches hundreds of boxes filled with German grenades, while in pockets constructed in the trench walls there still remained small dumps of grenades ready for immediate use. Our men had become familiar with the German grenade, and it was their practice in bombing combats to use German grenades wherever they could be found, reserving for a crisis the more effective "Mills grenade" of the British service.

The night of September 27th-28th was a most anxious one at Division Headquarters. All were hard at work perfecting and supervising the details preparatory to the attack scheduled for September 29th, and at the same time were following the course of events then transpiring in relation to the attack of the 53d Brigade. When it developed that the 53d Brigade had not held the objective line throughout its length, and was not in complete possession of the three strong points, the question arose as to whether the barrage start line for the attack of the 29th should be pulled back to the start line of September 27th, so as to enable the 54th Brigade to make its advance with the protection to which, by all rules of the modern attack, it was entitled. To do this would be to abandon to chance the gallant men of the 106th Infantry and some of the 105th as well, who were still clinging to their exposed positions, and to subject the wounded who still remained on the field to the danger of destruction when the barrage passed over them. In favor of the plan it could be said that the fighting groups in front had doubtless been able to consolidate to some extent the positions held by them, that they would have the same opportunity for survival as would the enemy groups about them, and that in any event it would be better to risk the sacrifice of some of these men rather than to suffer the greater casualties that would be inflicted upon the 54th Brigade when without a proper barrage it began its advance against the

German machine gunners lying on its immediate front. On the other hand it was to be remembered that the detachments of the 53d Brigade which were gallantly holding their gains were entitled to every consideration even though some sacrifice were involved. To voluntarily assume the risk of destroying them because of a decision to increase the security of the 54th Brigade, no matter how logical it might be in the tactical sense, would be repulsive to the mass of the officers and men of the division, and destructive of morale.

The conditions were reported to the Australian Corps Commander and it was decided that the barrage for September 29th would fall at zero hour as originally planned and that it would be the duty of the 54th Brigade to fight its way forward so as to establish its start line as closely as possible to the prescribed infantry start line, before the arrival of the time for the troops to form up.

This decision came in the form of the following message received at 2:10 P. M. September 28th;

"In view of the uncertainty of the situation on the front of the 27th American Division, the Army Commander has decided that there will be no substantial alteration in the plan. The tanks will be reinforced as much as possible. The infantry will be formed up in attack order as far forward as the situation permits one hour prior to zero. The tanks will advance with the infantry, who will be prepared to fight their way if necessary to the forming up line. The barrage will come down as already arranged at zero and will remain for four minutes. It will then lift in accordance with the barrage map, except that all lifts throughout will be of four minutes per 100 yards. The halt will be at the place and for the period already arranged.

"AUSTRALIAN CORPS."

This decision was promptly communicated to the Commanding General, 54th Brigade, and the importance of his securing, by determined patrolling and infiltration, a start line as far forward as possible was urged.

Brigadier General Pierce early in the afternoon of September 28th thought his brigade was making progress in getting forward to the start line through the efforts of combat patrols, and that there was every prospect that the brigade would be within 200 yards of the start line in time to form up for the attack. This expectation, however, was not realized, and the brigade, as will be seen later in the story of the attack, was compelled to begin its advance more than 800 yards behind the barrage.

The orders for the battle of September 29th were prepared by the Australian Corps as already stated. Pursuant to these orders, zero hour was fixed for 5:50 on the morning of September 29th. The 30th American Division on the right and the 18th British Division on the left were to attack simultaneously, the 18th Division going as far as the canal. The operation was divided into two phases. Within the 27th Division sector the first phase was to commence with the advance of the 54th Brigade accompanied by tanks behind a rolling barrage. This was to progress a distance of 2,500 yards, which would carry the barrage about 400 yards east of the line of the tunnel as indicated on the accompanying map.

There the barrage was to halt for fifteen minutes. This halt was for the purpose of facilitating the mopping up, to allow for the reorganization

BARRAGE MAP

issued under

Australian Corps

Battle Instructions

September 27, 1918

Scale of Yards

0 500 1000

Combined Sheet, 57C S.E.-57B S.W.-62C N.E.-62B N.W.

27TH AM. DIV.

27TH AM. DIV.

30TH AM. DIV.

30TH AM. DIV.

3RD AUST. DIV.

5TH AUST. DIV.

AM. CORPS

AUST. CORPS

RED LINE

Final Corps Boundary

Divisional Boundary

GREEN PROTECTIVE LINE

BARRAGE HALT LINE

ARTILLERY FORMING UP LINE

START LINE

Flank Exploitation of Green Line

Smoke Screen Zero to +6

Smoke Screen +6 to +9

Smoke Screen +9 to +12

Smoke Screen +12 to +15

Smoke Screen +15 to +18

Smoke Screen +18 to +21

Smoke Screen +21 to +25

Smoke Screen +25 to +29

Smoke Screen +29 to +33

Smoke Screen +33 to +37

Smoke Screen +37 to +41

Smoke Screen +41 to +45

Smoke Screen +45 to +49

Smoke Screen +49 to +53

Smoke Screen +53 to +57

Smoke Screen +57 to +61

Smoke Screen +61 to +65

Smoke Screen +65 to +69

Smoke Screen +69 to +73

Smoke Screen +73 to +77

Smoke Screen +77 to +81

Smoke Screen +81 to +85

Smoke Screen +85 to +89

Smoke Screen +89 to +93

Smoke Screen +93 to +96

Smoke Screen +96 to +100

Smoke Screen +100 to +104

Smoke Screen +104 to +108

Smoke Screen +108 to +112

Smoke Screen +112 to +116

Smoke Screen +116 to +120

Smoke Screen +120 to +124

Smoke Screen +124 to +128

Smoke Screen +128 to +132

Smoke Screen +132 to +136

Smoke Screen +136 to +140

Smoke Screen +140 to +144

Smoke Screen +144 to +148

Smoke Screen +148 to +152

Smoke Screen +152 to +156

Smoke Screen +156 to +160

Smoke Screen +160 to +164

Smoke Screen +164 to +168

Smoke Screen +168 to +172

Smoke Screen +172 to +176

Smoke Screen +176 to +180

Smoke Screen +180 to +184

Smoke Screen +184 to +188

Smoke Screen +188 to +192

Smoke Screen +192 to +196

Smoke Screen +196 to +200

Smoke Screen +200 to +215

Smoke Screen on this line 11.15 to 8.30 A.M.

Exploitation of Green Line

Exploitation of Red Line

←--No Heavy Artillery West of this Grid Line after +188

The Knoll

Fleecegill Post

Tombois Fm.

Lowland Post

Egg Post

Plateau Trench

Doleful Post

Lempire

Sart Fm

Guillemont Farm (Ruins)

Duncan Post

Cat Post

Ronssoy

Bull Post

Little Benjamin

Benjamin Post

Quennemont Farm

Riflemen Post

Hussar Post

Valley Post

Malakoff Wood

Hargicourt

le Catelet

Gouy

Bony

Bellicourt

Estrees

Wiancourt

Joncourt

Beaurevoir

Ponchaux

Airshaft

Tunnel

Valley

Road

Trench

WYNKOOP HALLENBECK CRAWFORD CO., NEW YORK, PRINTERS AND BINDERS

of the line, and to give time for the 105th Infantry to follow the 107th Infantry on the left half of the divisional sector and to form for attack to the north for the purpose of enveloping the area about Vendhuile. The barrage was to consist of 10 per cent. of smoke, and the remainder, one half shrapnel and the other half high explosive shell. A glance at the map will show that the open canal lay on the front of the left half of the sector assigned to the 107th Infantry. It was therefore provided, in order that it might avoid the open cut of the canal, that the 2d Battalion of the 107th Infantry would follow the 3d Battalion until the tunnel had been crossed, when it would extend its left to the north boundary of the divisional sector, come abreast of the 3d Battalion on its right and continue east to the objective line. The 1st Battalion of the 107th Infantry was to attack on the front covered by the open cut going as far as the canal cut. The 3d and 2d Battalions of the same regiment were to be followed by the composite provisional battalion of the 106th Infantry already referred to which had been assigned to aid in mopping up. The 105th Infantry was to follow in rear of the 106th Battalion until it had cleared the tunnel, when, as stated, it was to change direction to the left and exploit toward the north. The 108th Infantry was to go through to the objective line in the sector between the right of the 107th Infantry and the left of the 30th American Division.

The second phase of the battle provided that the 3d Australian Division would follow the 27th Division as the attack progressed, and after the 54th Brigade was halted on the "Green," or objective line, would pass through it and attack to the east.

The remainder of the 106th Infantry had been directed in the order to follow the 3d Australian Division across the tunnel and then to act in accordance with orders to be given at the time. However, on account of its losses sustained in the attack of September 27th, the regiment could do no more than furnish the provisional battalion already referred to.

Nine brigades of British artillery were allotted to the 27th Division sector for firing the barrage. One interesting feature of the preparations for this attack, and one not generally known, is that forty-eight hours prior to the commencement of the attack the British artillery bombarded enemy gun positions and the area of enemy machine gun nests for the twelve preceding hours with mustard gas, and that this was the first occasion when this type of gas was used by artillery of the British army. It was believed that the German gas defense would not prove effective against this form of gas, for the reason that they had not theretofore been subjected to it. This view was confirmed by statements of German prisoners.

The 105th and 106th Machine Gun Battalions were to fire the machine gun barrage, the 105th being assigned to fire on the left regimental sector and the 106th on the right regimental sector. The 104th Machine Gun Battalion was assigned to support the left flank of the advance, one company to go forward when the Hindenburg Line was made good and to form west of the canal, facing north.

The details prescribed for the conduct of the attack appear in Field

Orders No. 49 and Orders No. 95 of the Division, which appear in the Appendix.

In preparation for the attack of September 29th, a final conference was held at noon on September 28th at the post of command of the Commanding General, 54th Brigade, at Lempire, F.10c.3.5. The conference was attended by the Division Commander, Brigadier General Brand representing the Australian Corps Commander, Colonel Ford, Chief of Staff of the division, and Brigadier General Palmer E. Pierce, commanding the 54th Brigade. At this conference there was discussed from every angle the problem presented by the presence on the front of the brigade of the combat groups of the 106th Infantry still holding on to the positions they had gained. As has already been stated, the representation of this condition to the Australian Corps Commander resulted in the message already quoted to the effect that the barrage would fall as originally ordered.

It was at 6 P. M. on September 28th that the Division Commander received a message from the Commanding General 54th Brigade that he had already pushed out his line beyond Egg Post and expected to be ready to jump off at zero hour the following morning within 400 yards of the barrage line and with the possibility of making the start on the prescribed line. As already mentioned, this message was most assuring, but the expectation of the Brigade Commander was not realized.

The combat patrols of the 54th Brigade were unable during daylight on September 28th to make any appreciable advance. Some of the German machine gun nests which had been established on their front were successfully enveloped and reduced. Others, however, maintained their position, and inflicted casualties whenever targets were presented.

Let us now turn to the units of the 54th Brigade and follow their activities in detail as they moved forward on the night of September 27th-28th to take over the front of the 53d Brigade.

On September 27th the 108th Infantry marched from its bivouac camp at J.10.b.8.3. on Ronssoy, approximately eight and one half miles. They rested at F.25.c.2.4 west of Templeux le Geurard. From there a detail from each company and battalion scout section reported to the 106th Infantry for the purpose of facilitating the details of relief of that part of the 106th Infantry which was to be made by the 108th Infantry. Approach roads were reconnoitered and all possible information gathered as to location of units of the 106th Infantry and the company and battalion headquarters that were to be relieved. On the night of September 27th-28th the regiment marched the remaining six miles to the front over roads and trails subjected to very heavy enemy shell fire and gas concentration.

The regiment went into the line with the 2d Battalion, commanded by Captain John S. Thompson, extending from F.29.d.1.0 near Valle Post, in the vicinity of Malakoff Farm, where it connected up with Company H of the 119th Infantry of the 30th Division on the right, north to the vicinity of Bull Post F.23.d.8.8. Battalion Headquarters were located at F.28.b.8.1. in Templeux Switch. Attached to the 2d Battalion was one

platoon of the regimental machine gun company, one section of one pounders and two Stokes mortar sections.

The 3d Battalion, commanded by Captain Frank J. Maldiner, extended the line north from the vicinity of Bull Post to the vicinity of Duncan Post at F.17.d.7.5. The headquarters of this battalion were located near Duncan Avenue Trench, in F.17.d.4.2. Two one pounder sections, four Stokes mortars and one platoon of the regimental machine gun company were attached to this battalion.

The 1st Battalion, commanded by Major Frederick S. Couchman, was to follow the leading battalions, covering the entire regimental front and mopping up the area covered by the advance.

Regimental Headquarters of the 107th Infantry was established near Pimple Post at F.28.c.8.5.

It was daylight by the time the battalions of the 108th Infantry were in their positions. The 3d Battalion sustained a number of casualties from machine gun fire while going forward. As soon as the relief had been completed, an immediate effort was made by the Regimental Commander, in pursuance of orders already mentioned, to gain contact with detachments of the 106th Infantry far to the front. Combat patrols were pushed out. They brought in one officer and seven enlisted men of the 106th Infantry, all wounded. Later in the day patrols which had succeeded in getting forward in some points were reinforced by other patrols. On parts of the front patrols could make no headway due to the intensity of opposing machine gun fire. At 6 P. M. a conference was held, attended by the field officers of the regiment, for the purpose of determining the recommendation to be made in relation to the start line. The result was a recommendation by the Regimental Commander that the start line be the definite and certain one they then held. Arrangements were made for pegging and taping the departure line for the following morning. Zero hour was announced to the Battalion Commanders. Supplies and ammunition were checked, as were the tactics to govern the advance of the various regimental units and detachments. The recommendation made in relation to the start line was approved and adopted by the Brigade Commander.

The 107th Infantry extended the line north from Duncan Post through Doleful Post at F.17.b.6.6. to the vicinity of Tombois Farm at F.11.b.4.4.

This line in a general way was about 1,000 yards west of the line fixed as the infantry start line for September 29th, and conformed to the original start line of the 53d Brigade in this sector.

The 1st Battalion of the 107th Infantry, commanded by Captain Clinton E. Fisk, took over the front held by the 105th Infantry on the left of the divisional sector. Captain Fisk's post of command was located at Lempire. Lieutenant Hellquist of this battalion had gone forward during the battle of the 27th to reconnoiter and make arrangements for the relief of the 105th Infantry by his battalion. The relief was completed about 4 A. M. on September 28th. This battalion had received its orders to push out patrols with a view to advancing the line as far as possible. It was found impossible to do this during the daylight

hours of September 28th. The battalion commander reported that part of the 105th relieved was in Sart Lane in F.11.a. Companies C and B of the 1st Battalion of the 107th Infantry were deployed and moved forward to London Road and Fag Support Trench as well as to the trench running parallel with Fleet Street toward Doleful Post. Companies A and D were in support in Sart Lane. During the process of the relief twenty-one casualties were inflicted by shell fire on Company A. When daylight arrived, patrols of the battalion found the enemy in close contact, with a strong force directly in their front at Fleeceall Post at F.10.b. Along the rest of the front there appeared numerous snipers and machine gunners. It was on this front that First Lieutenant Samuel Crump, Jr., commanding Company B, with five or six men captured three enemy machine guns, including those at Egg Post.

Due to the haste necessarily imposed upon the division in taking over the line, a considerable portion of the night of September 28th-29th was occupied in completing the supply of iron rations, ammunition, grenades, water and ordnance stores for the troops at the front. This necessitated the use of a large number of men as carrying parties, and in turn delayed the relief as stated until shortly before daylight, making it impracticable for the relieving regiments to get forward during the night of the relief. The start line for the 1st Battalion of the 107th Infantry was pegged out from F.11.a.9.6. to F.11.d.3.1. in a straight line connecting with the 3d Battalion on the right. The tape was not laid until the night of September 28th-29th.

Now as to the 3d Battalion of the 107th Infantry, commanded by Captain Raphael A. Egan, which extended from the vicinity of Egg Post to Duncan Post. This battalion completed the relief about one o'clock on the morning of September 28th, and Captain Egan's post of command was established at Duncan Post. Company K of this battalion was deployed in shell holes and trenches about Duncan Post from F.12.d.8.9 to F. 17.d.9.4. On the left of Company K, Company M was deployed in shell holes and trenches extending the line to and beyond Doleful Post. Behind Company K, Company I was in support in Kent Lane, while behind Company M was Company L, also in Kent Lane from F.17.a.4.1. to the vicinity of Sart Farm. The Battalion Headquarters was at F.17.a.4.2. During the night First Lieutenant Carey J. Walrath of Company M led a strong patrol forward to a point about 200 yards in front of Doleful Post. At 10:30 A. M. on September 28th both Companies K and M of this battalion sent patrols out in an effort to infiltrate forward. Enemy machine gun fire against them was very heavy, and the patrols suffered casualties. At 4 P. M. Captain Egan directed Lieutenant Walrath to again get forward with a strong combat patrol. Similar instructions were given Captain George B. Bradish, commanding Company K. Lieutenant Walrath's command was stopped after an advance of about 200 yards. Captain Bradish's combat group reached a position extending from F.18.c.7.8. to F.18.c.8.2, when they were stopped by heavy machine gun fire.

The decision as to the exact position of the start line for the morning

of September 29th was necessarily dependent upon the extent of success of the effort to get forward, and hence was necessarily to be made by the Regimental Commanders, subject to the approval of higher authority. The Brigade Commander reported that after the efforts of the day were made known to him, he approved the recommendations of his Regimental Commanders that the forming up line be practically coincident with that of the 53d Brigade on September 27th, in order that there might be no confusion due to enemy machine gun fire shortly before the start. In these recommendations the Australian officers serving with the 54th Brigade joined. The forming up line of the 107th Infantry therefore conformed in a general way with the line from which the 106th Infantry had started two days before.

The 2d Battalion of the 107th Infantry, commanded by Captain Rowland Tompkins, had moved from Allaines at 11:30 on the morning of September 27th. After a hot meal at St. Emilie the battalion moved to Ronssoy, where they went into a support position with Company E in Shamrock Trench, Company F in Thistle Trench, Company G in Rose Trench and Company H near Yak Post. The relief was effected without casualties except that Captain George P. Nichols of Company F was wounded about 6 P. M. The headquarters of this battalion was located at F.10.c.4. 5. This battalion was to follow the 3d Battalion in the attack.

The 105th and 106th Machine Gun Battalions, then commanded by Majors Kenneth Gardner and Mortimer D. Bryant respectively, succeeded in occupying the positions assigned them strictly in accordance with orders. These units accomplished this under the same extraordinary and difficult conditions that affected the forward movement of all the other units, namely, roads crowded with troops, wagons, ammunition columns, ambulances and motors, all moving in the darkness through shell fire and gas.

The provisional battalion of the 106th Infantry, comprising about 350 officers and men, were delayed in their advance to their battle position behind the 2d Battalion of the 107th Infantry, because some of the units composing the battalion lost their way in the darkness. The officers in charge, however, found the strayed detachments and the latter rejoined the battalion shortly before the zero hour.

The 105th Infantry reached its battle positions as prescribed by orders. The battalions moved forward in the following order: 2d, 1st, 3d Battalion. A one pounder was assigned to each battalion. The Stokes mortars went to the 1st Battalion. The pioneer platoon went to the 3d Battalion.

All other units of the division, including engineer, signal and sanitary troops, assumed their battle stations on time and in an efficient manner.

On the morning of September 29th the artillery and machine gun barrage fell precisely at 5:50 A. M., the zero hour. It is impossible in a word picture to portray the impressions of those who have witnessed and heard a bombardment of so formidable a character as the one of September 29th. Not only were all the machine guns of the division, more than

100 in number, engaged in firing the machine gun barrage, but there were also engaged twenty-three brigades of British light artillery and ten brigades of British heavy artillery. Nine of the brigades of light artillery were firing on the front of the 27th Division. After a bombardment of four minutes the artillery barrage began to lift its fire in increments of 100 yards, after four minutes of fire during each period of rest. A few moments after the barrage started the enemy's counter barrage fell along the divisional front. The attacking troops in forming had been closed well up for the purpose of avoiding, so far as possible, the effects of the enemy counter barrage when it would fall. The enemy counter barrage apparently did no great damage to the 107th Infantry. On the front of the 108th Infantry it fell in part across the line and inflicted a number of casualties.

One of the first messages received at Division Headquarters after the attack opened was from Corporal William E. Warren, one of the divisional observers, reporting that the barrage fell at 5:50 and that the attacking troops promptly advanced.

In battle, all organizations had code names which were employed in the transmission of messages. For example, the 54th Infantry Brigade on this occasion was known as "Fuzu," G-3 of the division as "Fuju," the 107th Infantry as "Tuve," the 106th Infantry as "Fuki" and the 108th Infantry as "Tumo."

At 6:05 A. M. on the 29th a message was sent from the 54th Brigade Headquarters to the G-3 of the division as follows:

From reports available Tuve (107th Infantry) and battalion Fuki (106th Infantry) in position when barrage came down at 5:50 A. M. Enemy promptly sent up S. O. S. flares, single green bursting into double green. Situation seemed normal for one hour before zero. Prior to that enemy seemed nervous and displayed extra activity.

A few moments later another message was received from the 54th Brigade as follows:

Tuve (107th Infantry) and Fuki (106th Infantry) Battalion in position at zero hour and Fufi (105th Infantry) formed up. Tanks on hand. Tuve (107th Infantry) got off to good start. No reports from Tumo (108th Infantry).

At 8.04 A. M. a message was received at Division Headquarters from the 54th Brigade, reporting that at 7:00 A. M. the attack was progressing satisfactorily, the 107th Infantry fighting its way forward successfully. The message reported the retaliation barrage was light and fell well back of our troops. The message also reported that thirty-one prisoners had already been taken from the 27th and 84th German Infantry Regiments, and that eight tanks were out of action.

Colonel Charles I. DeBevoise, commanding the 107th Infantry, reported at 9:00 A. M. that troops of the 3d Australian division, which were to pass through the 27th Division on the morning of the attack, were halted on the left at Kent Lane for thirty minutes, about 8 o'clock in the morning. At 8:35 they moved on.

At 9:10 A. M. Captain H. F. Jaeckel, Jr., Aide to the Division Commander, who was one of the forward observing officers, reported that he had just met Major Gillet commanding the mopping up battalion of the 106th Infantry and that the Major was returning, having been wounded in the arm by a machine gun bullet. The major reported his battalion at 7:30 A. M. making satisfactory progress in its advance and that he himself had crossed two lines of enemy trenches before he was wounded. He also reported machine gun fire very heavy, but enemy artillery fire falling in their rear.

At the same time Captain Tristram Tupper of Division Headquarters Troop, a forward observing officer, reported that the 3d Battalion of the 108th Infantry had suffered heavy casualties by fire from Guillemont Farm, but had continued their advance; that the enemy counter barrage at the start had fallen behind our leading elements, and that the 108th Infantry were reported to be on the objective.

At 9:35 A. M. a message was received from Lieutenant Colonel J. Mayhew Wainright, who was liaison officer with the British division on the left, stating that the 54th British Brigade reported that it was 500 yards west of Vendhuile and that on their front they were opposed by the 8th and 54th German Divisions.

At 10:30 A. M. the 133d Field Ambulance (British), which was attached to the 27th American Division, reported that up to 10 o'clock they had handled 1200 wounded.

At 10:35 A. M. the 54th Brigade reported the situation on the front of the 107th Infantry obscure and that reports being received were conflicting; that the leading battalion of the 107th Infantry had gained their objective, but were compelled to withdraw; that more than sixty prisoners were then being evacuated; that the leading battalion of the 108th Infantry was then in the Hindenburg Line.

Shortly thereafter an airplane reported that at 10:30 A. M. our troops were seen in the vicinity of both Bony and Gouy.

At 11:00 A. M. a message was received from Major Turnbull, the 54th Brigade Adjutant, reporting that enemy counter barrages fell behind the left battalion at the start, and that at 8:10 A. M. the regiment (108th Infantry) was reported to be in the main defenses of the Hindenburg Line.

At 11:07 A. M. a message timed at 8:30 A. M. was received from General Blanding, commanding the 53d Brigade, stating that Lieutenant De Loisselle of the 106th Infantry, returning wounded, reported that he personally reached enemy trenches in A.8.d.central, where he and his command had been dealing with enemy machine gun nests passed over by the leading elements of the 54th Brigade.

At 12:45 P. M. General Pierce reported the situation in the vicinity of The Knoll dangerous; that Colonel Jennings, commanding the 108th Infantry, reported he was dealing with the situation at Guillemont Farm, from which heavy fire was falling on his support troops.

Shortly thereafter, Colonel Stanley H. Ford, the Divisional Chief of

Staff, visited the headquarters of the 108th Infantry and there joined Colonel Jennings, the Regimental Commander, and Captain Harry H. Farmer, commanding the 3d Battalion, who were in conference to determine the situation on the front of the 108th Infantry. Colonel Ford, accompanied by Captain James F. Oakleaf, Regimental Intelligence Officer, went forward to one of the Battalion Headquarters to check up the situation on the front of the 108th Infantry.

At 1:40 P. M. a message timed 12:30 P. M. was received from Captain Tupper stating that there was considerable gas shelling in the area occupied by the machine gun battalions, and that Major Bryant, commanding the 106th Machine Gun Battalion, had been slightly gassed, but was continuing on duty.

At 3:15 P. M. Captain Stanley Bulkley, commanding the 3d Battalion of the 105th Infantry, reported his battalion occupying Knoll Support Trench in A.7.a and that some men of the 107th Infantry were also there.

At 3:17 P. M. a message was received, timed at 2:45 P. M., from Australian Corps reporting as follows:

> Contact machines report flares called for at 1:20 P. M. No reply. Our troops seen in trench system A.9 to A.27. At 1:15 P. M. three tanks were astride trench A.21.central and stationary. Apparently O. K. Crews in trench alongside. Five tanks burning on road A.14.8.8. Our guns in action A.20.c.2.6. Pilot reports 1:20 P. M. our guns firing from old enemy posts A.11.d.5.5. Fairly heavy machine gun fire encountered over canal tunnel, A.15.b.2.2. At 1:40 P. M. smoke bombs dropped on B.1.a, and B.15.b.4.6. Pilot reports two groups of men about fifty to sixty moving southeast B.28.a, thought to be ours.

The three tanks referred to in the above message were close to the position then held by the 2d Battalion of the 108th Infantry, immediately south of Bony, which will be referred to later.

The following untimed message was received from Captain Mort, an Australian observation officer:

> Have only found 49th Battalion Australians. Tried to open up communication with outpost, but without success. A party of Americans in the canal mopping up machine guns in Bony. Shells of big caliber in A.26 and 27, mixed with gas. Majority of Australians are wandering about, not knowing where other parts of their battalions are.

At 4:10 P. M. Lieutentant Colonel Crowther of the Australian Corps reported that the 3d Australian Division in support of the 27th Division had closed up with the 10th Australian Brigade, extending from Cat Post at A.24.A.8.8 to 100 yards west of Guillemont Farm to Valley Street. He also reported "possession at The Knoll obscure. Was held by Americans at 1 P. M. Elements 108th Infantry reported on green line. Our troops certainly in Bony, but so are the Boche."

The foregoing messages and extracts from messages are samples of the conflicting information that comes to the divisional message center during a battle.

Let us now turn to the march of events as observations at the time and subsequent reports indicate they occurred.



Men of Company M, 105th Infantry, bringing in German prisoners, among the first to be captured during the Hindenburg Line Battle. Prisoners are being used as stretcher bearers



German prisoners aiding in the evacuation of wounded

Taking up the story of the attack, beginning on the right, the 2d Battalion of the 108th Infantry, which held the extreme right of the divisional front, got away as soon as the barrage opened. They had, as has already been pointed out, a considerable distance to go before gaining the barrage. Shortly after they started forward they encountered heavy machine gun fire from a number of machine gun nests at A.25.central. These were silenced by outflanking and bombing them with hand grenades. This naturally caused a delay in the advance, but as soon as possible the forward movement was resumed. Several small parties of the 106th were found holding parts of the objective line of September 27th and these were passed over. During the progress of the continued advance of this battalion numerous casualties were inflicted by machine guns and shell fire, though no resistance by massed enemy forces was met until the troops arrived before the main defenses of the Hindenburg Line. There the wire entanglements were very thick, and at this place the leading elements met extremely heavy fire from the garrison in possession. By this time heavy smoke had settled over the field. Many officers and non-commissioned officers had fallen. It was here that less than 200 men, all that remained of the 2d Battalion, commanded by Captain Sandberg, accomplished the seemingly impossible. Prior to the battle the writer had never seen a more formidable looking company of infantry than this command. That opinion, shared by many officers, existed as far back as the Mexican Border days.

On this occasion the command forcibly demonstrated justification of the regard in which it was held. Facing the mass of wire for a few seconds, during which they received a veritable barrage of hand grenades as well as rifle fire, they assaulted by common impulse, every man getting through the best way he could. This was done with a recklessness, valor and determination that proved irresistible. They rushed forward in small groups and as individuals, through the wire, through passes existing in the wire, and in some cases over the top of the wire where it was very thick, all through a heavy pall of smoke. Many of them threw hand grenades when well within range of the trenches. A moment later they were in the trenches and there followed an orgy of fighting and killing. Their numbers were not great—less than 200. Lieutenants Samuel A. Brown and Harrison J. Uhl distinguished themselves by their conduct on this occasion. Their detachment succeeded in capturing over 100 prisoners, four field pieces, a large number of machine guns, anti-tank rifles and other military property. For his action on this occasion Lieutenant Brown was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

Sergeant Frank Gaffney, an automatic rifleman of Company G of this battalion, was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for his part in this fighting. Witnesses report that he was a veritable human hurricane, using rifle, pistol and bomb. He pushed forward alone with his gun after all the members of his squad had been killed or wounded, and killed the crew of an enemy machine gun, captured the gun, bombed several dugouts, killed four more enemy soldiers with his pistol and held the

position while reinforcements arrived, when eighty prisoners were taken. Many individual soldiers of the garrison fired directly at Sergeant Gaffney before they were killed or subdued and taken prisoner, but none hit him. In a later battle this very gallant soldier received a wound which resulted in the loss of an arm.

The survivors of the 2d Battalion of the 108th Infantry, which gained access to the main trenches of the Hindenburg Line south of Bony, after killing or subduing the enemy defenders, blocked the trenches of the sector held by them, established outguards and systematically mopped up. The result was that they gathered 159 prisoners, survivors of their attack. Hardly had they organized their defense when they were subjected to a fierce counter-attack which broke down under their fire. This attack was later supplemented by other bombing attacks directed from Bony, a short distance north of their position. This battalion held the main defenses of the Hindenburg Line from the divisional boundary to a position immediately south of Bony in A.21.central.

Having maintained its position successfully against all counter-attacks, the battalion evacuated their prisoners to the rear under cover of darkness. It is to be remembered that hand in hand with the work of repulsing the enemy counter-attacks there devolved upon this small force the task of keeping their prisoners in subjection, and the prisoners almost equaled in number the effective strength of the unwounded men of the battalion.

Throughout the day the battalion was subjected to very heavy enfilading field artillery and machine gun fire from Bony. About noon, however, troops of the 3d Australian Division, in their progress forward and in the process of "leap-frogging" the 27th Division, arrived in the trenches held by the battalion. Promptly thereafter detachments were formed including Australians, and the work of attacking Bony from the south down the approach trenches was gotten under way.

The left battalion, that is to say the 3d Battalion of the 108th Infantry, almost immediately after the start met heavy fire from Guillemont Trench and Guillemont Farm.

The first wave was badly cut up while crossing the trenches south of Guillemont Farm and Claymore Valley. Succeeding waves of this battalion also suffered heavy losses while crossing the same area and in mopping up. Elements of the battalion, however, got through and into Dirk Valley, where they established themselves in the sunken roads immediately in front of Bony at A.14.d.9.0. and A.14.d.8.2. It is within the confines of this road fork that the present Bony cemetery is located. Due to the severity of the fire directed on them from Bony and to the sparsity of their numbers, they were unable to make any further advances until late in the afternoon, when they were joined by the leading elements of the 3d Australian Division. Thus reinforced, they reduced a number of machine gun nests which had up to that time stopped their further advance, and established their line so as to connect up at intervals with the battalion of their own regiment on the right.

Many acts of heroism marked the conduct of the 3d Battalion during

the progress of the attack. Space permits reference to but one of such cases. It is that of Sergeant William H. Burke, of Company M, and is mentioned because of the very exceptional fighting record of this soldier. While a private of the Company, he had been specially commended for his gallantry in action while the regiment was in Flanders. On August 12th, when his Company was in the line near Mont Kemmel, Belgium, an enemy patrol made a raid. Private Burke, seeing their advance, left his trench and counter-attacked the enemy party single-handed and alone. With his rifle he wounded several of the enemy, resulting in the flight of the remainder. This was a forecast of the conduct of Burke in later engagements. On September 29th, he then being a sergeant, he was acting as compass guide for the 3d Battalion of his regiment. While in advance of the battalion during the progress of the attack, he was wounded and ordered to the rear. At the aid station his wounds were bandaged and he was ordered to the casualty clearing station. He avoided evacuation, removed the hospital tag from his blouse, and worked his way forward to his own battalion headquarters, where he was again ordered to the dressing station, this time in arrest. He then left the battalion headquarters and, going forward, rejoined his own company, where he pleaded with the captain for permission to remain with the command. As the company at this time was very short of men, his plea was granted. Shortly thereafter he resumed the job of compass bearer in another advance. During this advance he was again wounded. Against his protests he was again evacuated, this time on a stretcher. Captain James Riffe, whose courage and cool judgment are well known in the division, reported that he had never seen a man in action who showed such complete disregard for his own safety. The Regimental Commander reports that Sergeant Burke was recommended for a Distinguished Service Cross. The papers, however, through some mishap, never reached Division Headquarters, so this very gallant soldier was not awarded this honor. He was, however, awarded the Belgian Croix de Guerre.

The first battalion of the 108th Infantry, covering the entire regimental front, and following the supporting companies of the 2d and 3d Battalions at a distance of approximately 100 yards, advanced over the area covered by the forward battalions and reduced a number of machine gun nests which, carefully camouflaged, had evaded the attention of the leading battalions. They also gathered a considerable number of individual prisoners. Many of the latter were used as stretcher bearers for the evacuation of the wounded, which work was immediately gotten under way.

In the 108th Infantry, practically all wire communication was constantly interrupted by hostile fire. Visual signaling was not possible, due to the dense banks of smoke that hung close to the ground. The sole reliance in the field of communication was therefore the runner.

Most of the tanks assigned to cooperate with the 108th Infantry were put out of action shortly after the start. It is reported that they rendered little assistance to the Infantry.

Very careful consideration had been given in this regiment to the problem of adequate mopping up. The personnel of the regiment was highly trained, well disciplined and intelligent. They thoroughly understood the importance of mopping up. The difficulties and the importance of the task had been impressed upon them by the experience of the 106th Infantry two days before. Nevertheless, so complex was the enemy's defensive system and so resourceful and determined were the enemy machine gunners who had been placed at isolated posts, that a number of these machine gunners succeeded in evading detection and destruction during the earlier phases of the attack. Later in the day they began firing from nooks and crannies upon support parties, ration and carrying parties moving to the front, and as well upon stretcher bearers and wounded going to the rear. They were ultimately cleaned out.

The Machine Gun Company of the 108th Infantry was commanded by Captain Clarence S. Martin, and as already stated was divided for purposes of the attack. The first platoon was commanded by First Lieutenant Ralph W. Laughlin and was assigned to the 2d Battalion. The second platoon, commanded by First Lieutenant Henry O. Somer, went with the 3d Battalion, while the third platoon, commanded by First Sergeant Charles Bates, went to the 1st Battalion. Each platoon had four heavy Vickers machine guns, each gun being provided with fourteen belt boxes of 250 rounds per box. In the first platoon Lieutenant Laughlin was killed early in the advance. Sergeant Holahan, the next in command, was also killed. Sergeant Miller was severely wounded in the shoulder, but continued with the platoon throughout the day. The second platoon, under Lieutenant Somer, first went into action about 200 yards in advance of Benjamin Post in Mill Lane against enemy machine gun nests. From this point the platoon later advanced. Sergeant Dower had gone ahead for the purpose of identifying troops on their immediate front. These were found to be of the 107th Infantry. Lieutenant Somer then directed the platoon to side-slip to the right so as to cover the troops of the 108th Infantry. It was during this movement that Lieutenant Somer was killed. Sergeant Dower then assumed command of the platoon, but in the heavy smoke cloud he and Sergeant Trowbridge became separated from the platoon. They later went forward with Australian troops and rejoined the platoon the following day. The command of the platoon for the remainder of the battle fell to Sergeant Clarence M. Olsen, under whose command it went forward with the 39th Australian Battalion, operating with it until relieved the following day.

The third platoon, under Sergeant Bates, being with the reserve battalion, had to pass through the enemy's counter barrage. Thirteen casualties were inflicted upon the platoon in this advance.

One of the most important phases of battle preparation has to do with the matter of rations, battle stores, ammunition and supplies. Accounts of battle preparation in this field of effort are not interesting to the non-military reader. They are of vital importance, however, to the welfare and efficiency of the troops. Battle preparations change with the time and

with the conditions, and no true story of a battle would be complete without at least an outline of what was done to keep the troops supplied with the material things needed by them in combat.

As a sample, therefore, of the supply arrangements for the modern battle, the reader who is interested is referred to the Division Order No. 95 and to the following account of the application of this order to the 108th Infantry. This account will suffice as an example of what went on throughout the division.

The rations were issued by the regimental supply officer to the battalion supply officers. While the regiment was in the line, the company kitchens and water carts remained at the transport lines about two miles in rear of regimental headquarters. Company rations were cooked at the transport lines and carried to the battalion headquarters at night on limbers drawn by mules and horses. From these points, carrying parties from the companies carried the rations forward to the men in the trenches.

In preparation for battle all troops were furnished with assault rations. These were issued to the battalions on the morning of September 28th. One of the battalion dumps containing assault rations was destroyed by a direct hit by an enemy shell before the carrying parties had reached it.

Troops in battle must have water, and water fit to drink is seldom if ever available on the battle-field, except when it is transported there in containers. Such water as exists in shell holes is usually polluted and permeated with gas. On September 28th, 1,500 water bottles were delivered at the transport lines of the 108th Infantry. Even there, water was so scarce that these bottles, which were to contain an extra supply of water for the troops in the line, were filled and delivered to them with greatest difficulty.

In the British army troops in the line are supplied with petrol tins in which to transport water and hot coffee. Three hundred of these petrol tins were issued to the 108th Infantry and divided one hundred to each battalion. Each tin carried water for seven men or hot coffee for fourteen men. The number of petrol tins allowed the division was insufficient for its strength, although adequate for a British division. Accordingly they had to be supplemented by powder cans, although the latter were not as readily transported or handled as the petrol tins.

In order to keep the food hot in transit from the company kitchens to the front, the food, after preparation, was carried forward in hot food containers. These were of various types, but in principle were constructed like fireless cookers. These, supplied by the British, held hot food for thirty-two men. A battalion of 700 men should therefore be allowed twenty-two of these containers. Less than that number, however, were available on September 28th. Nevertheless, a hot meal was insured at least once a day for every man in the regiment. One of the difficulties in relation to the use of containers, petrol tins, etc., is getting them back in time to be filled and sent forward again for the next meal.

Wire cutters were issued to the regiment shortly before the assault.



Graves of 27th Division dead in Bony Cemetery. Picture taken in the summer of 1920

Battle stores, such as rifle and machine gun ammunition, hand and rifle grenades, smoke bombs, flares, rockets, Very light pistols, etc., were, in similar manner, carried forward on limbers during the night to battalion dumps, from which points they were distributed to the companies by means of carrying parties.

From the foregoing it will be seen that during trench warfare and in preparation for an assault thousands of soldiers were employed as carry-



View of 27th Division graves in Bony Cemetery. Picture taken during the summer of 1920

ing parties, moving about over shell-swept areas, in trenches and over shell-pitted fields, carrying heavy burdens of food, ammunition and other supplies, while handicapped by darkness and mud.

In the 2d Battalion of the 108th Infantry First Lieutenant Frank L. Simes of Company H and First Lieutenant John J. Welch, commanding Company G, were killed, and First Lieutenant Delancey King, commanding Company F; Captain A. M. Barager, commanding Company H, and First Lieutenant Edward H. O'Rourke of Company G were wounded.

In the 3d Battalion the four officers with Company I, namely, Captain Joseph W. Smith, First Lieutenants Harold G. McKay and Harry H. Crosby and Second Lieutenant Thomas T. Kerr, were killed. Second Lieutenants Benjamin Fuller and John E. Lathrop of Company L and First Lieutenant Harry B. Bently of Company M were also killed, while Captain James Riffe and First Lieutenant Jesse I. Varney of Company L and Captain William L. Hodder, commanding Company M, were wounded.

In the 1st Battalion, First Lieutenant Edward F. Winneck of Company B was killed, and Captain Arthur T. Smith, commanding Company A, and First Lieutenant Edward M. McCabe of Company C were wounded.

The Regimental Signal Officer, Second Lieutenant Cecil H. Page, was also wounded during this attack.

Officers of the 27th Division and of the 3d Australian Division, who had opportunity to witness the conduct of the 108th Infantry in this battle, are unanimous in their praise of the magnificent morale displayed by all ranks from the time they assumed their attack positions until the termination of the engagement. The regiment in this battle captured 16 German officers and 594 German enlisted men. A large number of enemy soldiers were slain. The regiment also captured a large number of machine guns, field pieces and mortars. The losses of the regiment on September 29th and 30th were 12 officers and 174 enlisted men killed, 1 officer and 25 men died of wounds, 9 officers and 557 men wounded and 1 officer and 144 men gassed.

Let us now turn to the 107th Infantry. This regiment was also most thorough in its preparation for the attack. All of its units were in their battle positions on time, and at zero hour swept forward in their effort to overtake the barrage. The enemy counter barrage, as already stated, fell behind the 107th Infantry, but immediately the advance began, the enemy machine gun nests on the front, promptly supported by the enemy defensive machine gun barrage, began to cause casualties. The leading waves of the 107th Infantry swept across the enemy trenches known as Fag Trench, Causeway Lane, Island Traverse and the trench running south therefrom toward Guillemont Farm. From this line they swept on to Willow Trench, which runs across the head of Macquincourt Valley from Lowland Post south to Guillemont Farm. While the moppers up were engaged in cleaning out Island Traverse, Fag Trench, Causeway Lane and the trench leading to Guillemont Farm, the leading and supporting elements swept into and through Willow Trench. A considerable number of the enemy were killed or taken prisoner in this area. The leading ele-

ments continued east, but as they approached Lone Tree Trench, running from The Knoll Support Trench south to Grub Lane and thence on to the east of Guillemont Farm, they sustained such severe machine gun fire from this trench that this part of the line was brought to a halt, taking cover in shell holes and in Willow Trench.

The 3d Battalion of the 107th Infantry, commanded by Captain Raphael A. Egan, had reached its position on the tape before 5:30 A. M., sustaining some casualties in the maneuver. As indicated on the graphic, Companies I and L were the leading units of the battalion from north to south, with Companies K and M in immediate support. The support companies followed sixty yards in rear of the leading companies. Captain Egan established his post of command between the support companies. The battalion was deployed in combat groups. From the moment the barrage fell, the enemy machine gunners lying in the foreground between this battalion and the barrage opened up a heavy fire. Nevertheless the battalion immediately began its advance, moving off with great precision and steadiness. Enemy machine gunners and snipers encountered in this advance were bayoneted or shot unless they promptly surrendered. At Lowland Post in A.7.b.6.1 and about Guillemont Farm the battalion ran into highly organized and heavily manned posts. Here heavy casualties were inflicted upon it. Captain Egan and his Adjutant, First Lieutenant Charles H. Floyd, were both wounded by machine gun bullets. Captain Fancher Nicoll, commanding Company L, and First Lieutenant Percy M. Hall, commanding Company I, First Lieutenant Murray Cramer, commanding Company M, Second Lieutenant Ben M. Rambo of Company K, First Lieutenant Carey J. Walrath of Company M, and Second Lieutenant H. W. Robinson, Battalion Intelligence Officer, were all killed, while First Lieutenant Robert A. Byrns of Company L was seriously wounded.

At 11:30 A. M. Captain George F. Bradish, who had succeeded Captain Egan in command of the battalion when the latter was wounded, crawled from his position at the extreme front to secure the aid of Stokes mortars or tanks in an effort to reduce enemy opposition. He found the tank captain and arranged for the support of several tanks. These were guided to a point opposite the objective by Captain Bradish personally, who then organized his troops into small detachments for the purpose of following the tanks in another assault. When the tanks began their advance they were soon destroyed by enemy shell fire and mines. In the organization of this effort, Captain Bradish was most efficiently assisted by First Lieutenant Griswold B. Daniel of Company K and First Lieutenant Claude G. Leland of Company I. The troops made their effort most gallantly, but sustained very heavy casualties. A number of the survivors fell back to the trench in F.11.d.7.4 and F.18.a.6.7, near Tombois Farm. Captain Bradish stopped this retirement and reorganized the line in the vicinity as a support group. In about twenty minutes they were reinforced by a company of the 105th Infantry and again went forward and occupied Willow Trench from A.7.b.6.2 to A.7.d.7.2. Here they were counter-attacked several times, but repulsed with heavy casualties all enemy efforts

to oust them. In the afternoon the leading elements of the 3d Australian Division joined them in Willow Trench. At 6:30 P. M. troops of this battalion with Australians made some further progress.

At 5:30 A. M. on the following day, September 30th, Australian detachments took over the battalion front and the battalion occupied support positions, disposed in depth. On October 1st at 1:30 P. M. the battalion was withdrawn, proceeding to St. Emilie, from which point it moved to a point one mile south of Saulicourt, where it bivouacked for the night.

The 1st Battalion of the 107th Infantry was the left battalion, designated to move forward to the line of the open canal. The departure line having been established by Lieutenant Hellquist, Battalion Scout Officer, with a detachment of men, the battalion occupied its battle position in ample time for the attack. The start line ran from F.11.a.9.6 to F.11.d.3.1, connecting with the third battalion on the right. On the left, Fleeceall Post, in the hands of the enemy, was not more than 200 yards distant. The occupation of battle position was effected without serious casualties. Companies C and B were the assaulting units, with Companies D and A in support in the order named from north to south, the latter companies furnishing mopping up detachments. Company D was especially charged with the protection of the left flank. The start was made more than 1,000 yards behind the barrage. The battalion went forward, however, with precision and determination, although from the beginning they began to suffer casualties. Enemy groups encountered were quickly overcome until the battalion reached the general line, Knoll Support Trench-Willow Trench, when they were stopped by a tornado of machine gun fire from the north and east. En route to this line, Fleeceall Post was quickly overrun and a considerable number of machine guns and sixty prisoners captured. Prisoners and guns were also taken in Fag Support, Fag Trench, Egg Post and Island Traverse. A great number of enemy dead were found on and about The Knoll as a result of the fighting during the previous battle. Parties of this battalion reached Macquincourt Trench in A.2.c.3.4. These detachments were from Company D. One platoon of Company C held for some time a position in front of the Lone Tree Trench, but were counter-attacked and forced to fall back. Other detachments in the heavy smoke fought their way to Hidden Trench in a.2.D and to the wire in front of trenches in A.3.a and c. Some wounded men of this battalion were later evacuated from positions immediately south of Vendhuile.

The 1st Battalion of the 107th Infantry had the hardest task imposed upon any unit in this great attack. Not only were they to advance against the open cut of the canal, between which and their start line lay that formidable position known as The Knoll, but they were to constitute the left flank guard of the division in its advance. It is not known whether any high ranking officer believed at the time that any single battalion of troops could fight its way to the open cut of the canal between Vendhuile and the north mouth of the tunnel under the conditions as they existed on the morning of September 29th. However that may be, it was essential that in the attempt to drive through the tunnel system

skilled troops of the greatest resolution should occupy this critical part of the line, and by their confidence, determination and willingness to bear sacrifices, insure the security of the left flank of the corps against the avalanche of fire and powerful counter-attacks which it was known would be directed against the flank from the vicinity of Vendhuile.

During the early part of the attack the writer questioned an educated and efficient-looking German officer who had been taken prisoner while making an inspection at the extreme front near The Knoll. Like many German officer prisoners, he was at first reticent, but having permitted himself to become engaged in an argument concerning the possibility of any troops breaking through the Hindenburg Line, finally stated with some warmth that he hoped they would be successful in advancing as far as the tunnel, for in that event it would mean the destruction or capture of all attacking troops, by reason of the ability of German forces to roll them up by flank drives from Vendhuile which nothing could stop. The boast is mentioned as indicating the confidence of the enemy in the strength and possibilities of the natural flank position of Vendhuile. The confidence in this flank position would have been well justified had ordinary troops been interposed against the tide of counter-attacks which drove down from the north for the purpose of rolling up the assaulting lines. But the 1st Battalion of the 107th Infantry were not ordinary troops. They were more than seasoned veterans, for in addition to battle experience and technical training they possessed in fullest measure pride of organization, high sense of honor and a strong sense of accountability to the home land and the family. The roster of the dead contains the best names of the city of New York—best in the sense of family tradition and all that stands for good citizenship in the history of the city. This comment applies as well to the dead of the remainder of the regiment and in the same way to the remaining units of the division, which represented other cities and localities of New York State.

Throughout the day and night of September 29th and the morning of September 30th this battalion, and companies of the 105th Infantry under Captain Jacob S. Clinton, withstood a series of the fiercest and most determined counter-attacks designed to sweep down behind and through the length of the corps line. The earlier of these counter-attacks were made after artillery preparation, by masses of troops attacking in the open. So deadly was the rifle fire of the 1st Battalion of the 107th Infantry and the troops of the 105th Infantry, and so tenaciously did they hold their positions, that these counter-attacks were broken down with heavy losses to the enemy. The losses sustained by our troops, however, were so considerable that soon additional companies of the 105th Infantry sent to reinforce them became merged with them. The losses were so numerous among the officers, the system of shell holes and demolished trenches which the troops occupied were so complicated, and the shelling and machine gunning so constant, that it was only with greatest difficulty, amid the tangle of trenches, wire, corpses, wounded and fighting men, that the surviving officers were able to establish any kind of dispositions in depth. And this

latter action was imperative, because even the soldiers in the ranks then knew that the mission of the battalion was no longer to continue to attempt the impossible, but to provide at any cost for the security of the left flank of the corps.

Later in the afternoon of the 29th and during the early evening, enemy counter-attacks took the form of carefully organized bombing expeditions down the available trenches of approach. Apparently these bombing attacks were headed by expert bombers, who were supplied with grenades by a chain of men to the source of supply, the advance being supported by the fire of rifle grenadiers and light minnenwerfers. The defenders were largely dependent upon the available supply of captured German hand grenades in making their resistance, and obviously could not be as well organized in their scattered positions as were the attacking columns. The result was that in some places detachments of the 105th and 107th Infantry were forced back under the assaults of the enemy bombing parties. In this way the enemy made more progress in their counter-attacks than they had earlier in the day with massed formations of troops.

It is to be remembered that in resisting bombing attacks through trenches the rifle is of little value. The attacks were finally stopped by the initiative and daring of individual non-commissioned officers and private soldiers of the two regiments who left their positions and with grenades in their hands rushed over the open to the flanks of the enemy bombing parties and bombed them from right and left.

The 1st Battalion of the 107th Infantry with the aid of detachments from the 105th Infantry was successful in securing the left flank, not only of the division, but of the corps; and it was the sacrifice and the valor and the skill of these troops which made it possible for the divisional units further to the south to overcome the enemy resistance in the tunnel sector and to capture and break through the famous Hindenburg Line. As will be told further along in the story of the division's activities, with this break through accomplished, and with the left flank refused and firmly held, the attack on succeeding days was launched, not to the east, but towards the north from the easterly side of the tunnel. It was the progress of these later attacks which compelled the enemy to evacuate Vendhuile in order to avoid envelopment.

One of the best company officers in the division, First Lieutenant Samuel Crump, Jr., of Company B, was killed in this attack of the 1st Battalion. The remaining two officers of the company, First Lieutenant Ford M. Terry and Second Lieutenant John McAnerney, were wounded First Lieutenant Ralph P. Buell, who commanded Company C, and who was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his great gallantry during this action, was also severely wounded. Captain Kenneth C. Wilson, who commanded the one pounders, was wounded. Out of five officers on duty with the Machine Gun Company, all were killed or wounded except Second Lieutenant Kenneth Gow, who was the transport officer. These were Captain Walter G. Andrews, First Lieutenant Harry Adsit and Second Lieutenant Paul H. Gadebusch, all wounded, and First Lieutenant

Edward Willis, killed. Lieutenant Gow was later killed in the battle of Le Selle River. The conduct of the Machine Gun Company of the 107th Infantry was exceptionally commendable. Prior to zero hour the company assumed its battle position in Sart Lane with one of the lieutenants in charge of each platoon. It was behind the 1st Battalion. As the company reached the rise of ground at the end of London Road, it came under heavy machine gun fire from the vicinity of Guillemont Farm and Lone Tree Trench. The advance continued through the valley although heavy casualties were sustained at Willow Trench. The company could get no farther. It was here that Lieutenant Willis was killed and Lieutenant Gadebusch wounded, as well as fifteen enlisted men killed and wounded. Lieutenant Adsit advanced part of his platoon across this trench toward Lone Tree Trench. There he was lost to view in the smoke cloud. After severe and close fighting, his platoon was forced back to Willow Trench, where a support position was organized. Lieutenant Adsit's platoon remained in Willow Trench as the forward echelon of the company, the remaining two platoons being disposed at Castle Bar Sap in F.12.a.0.6. Determined counter-attacks were made against the position of the forward platoon, the enemy using bombs and pistols. These attacks, however, were repulsed. In this position were about thirty soldiers of the Northampton British Regiment, who had strayed from their own sector. In attempting to retire to their own units at about 2:30 in the afternoon this detachment was almost completely wiped out. It was for their gallant action in this battle that Sergeants Alan L. Eggers and John C. Latham and Corporal Thomas E. O'Shea of the Machine Gun Company were awarded Congressional Medals of Honor. Upon hearing a call for help from a comrade when they were well within the enemy's lines, they left their shelter and, under heavy enemy machine gun and trench mortar fire, proceeded in the open for a distance of thirty yards, and rescued a wounded officer and assisted two soldiers from a burning tank to the cover of a nearby trench. Crossing this shell-swept area Corporal O'Shea was killed. The other two soldiers returned to the tank, dismounted the Hotchkiss gun, and with it covered the wounded officer and men throughout the day. Under cover of darkness they brought the gun with the wounded back to the support lines.

At 1:30 P. M. about thirty Australians constituting advance elements of the 3d Australian Division joined the troops in Willow Trench. During the night of September 29th two enemy attacks were made against the position held by Lieutenant Adsit's platoon, but were shattered by his fire.

At 7:30 on the morning of September 30th a detachment with several Australians patrolled to the front and successfully bombed several enemy positions. At 8:00 A. M. a number of wounded of the Machine Gun Company were successfully evacuated. On October 2d the company was withdrawn and furnished burial details for its regiment.

The 2d Battalion of the 107th Infantry, commanded by Captain Rowland Tompkins, lined up about 100 yards in rear of the 3d Battalion in

order to allow room for the forming up of the provisional mopping up battalion of the 106th Infantry. In the 2d Battalion of the 107th Infantry, Companies H and E were the assaulting units, G and F the supporting units, in the order named from north to south. All were in position by 5:20 A. M. No casualties were sustained while awaiting the zero hour, although six casualties occurred while the battalion was moving forward to the line. Battalion Headquarters at 5:00 A. M. had been moved to F.17. c.3.9. One tank accompanied the battalion at the start. The battalion moved off promptly when the barrage fell. It was stopped in front of Lone Tree Trench and Guillemont Crescent Trenches in the heavy smoke screen. Heavy machine gun fire came from the north as well as from the east. A number of groups of this battalion succeeded in continuing on with groups from the leading battalion. One of these, consisting of about thirty men under Sergeant John H. Napper of Company G, reached the main Hindenburg line in A.9.a.5.5, near the north end of the tunnel. Other groups of both battalions got forward to the tunnel, but finding themselves unsupported fought their way back from The Knob to Willow Trench. Early in the attack Captain Harry W. Hayward and First Lieutenant Benjamin T. Hammond and Stephen M. Schwab, all of Company E, were killed, while Captain George P. Nichols, and First Lieutenant Roe M. Dennis of Company F, Captain Marston E. Drake of Company G, First Lieutenant Arthur J. McKenna of Company H, as well as First Lieutenant David C. Bull, medical officer of the battalion, were wounded.

Captain Kenneth C. Wilson of the Headquarters Company organized a detachment and occupied and held South Guillemont Trench. Trenches such as Willow and South Guillemont were used as the basis of the line when it became immobilized, the troops being disposed in depth. The front line troops were in trenches and shell holes in front of the trenches named, while supporting groups were established in rear. Heavy fighting with bombing attacks and counter-attacks continued throughout the afternoon and night of September 29th. Toward morning enemy snipers were withdrawn. This position was held by the battalion until 1:30 P. M. on October 1st. The depleted strength of this battalion had been reorganized in its position on September 30th into three provisional companies of about eighty men each, these companies being commanded respectively by Second Lieutenant Marsh S. Lockyear, Battalion Intelligence Officer, First Lieutenant James T. Bergen of Company H, 105th Infantry, who had been with the battalion, and First Lieutenant Beverly L. F. Burnham, Battalion Gas Officer. On the morning of October 1st troops of the 3d Australian Division, continuing the attack, were supported in this part of the line by the survivors of the 2d Battalion of the 107th Infantry until early afternoon of that day, when the battalion was withdrawn, first to Ronssoy and thence to a hut camp near Bussu.

Major Raymond A. Turnbull, Medical Corps, commanded the Sanitary Detachment of the 107th Infantry. Shortly after the attack commenced, walking wounded began to appear at the aid stations. These came not only from the battalion of the 107th Infantry, but on the right from the

108th Infantry, from the Tank Corps and from British and Australian units as well. For a time there was considerable congestion at the aid station located in F.16.c.3.3. The ambulance head was located in Ronssoy at F.21.a.8.4. A forward dressing station was established on the Bellicourt Road in F.22.b.9.4 by Lieutenant Benedict. At 10:00 A. M. the forward station was opened by Lieutenants Gray and Bancel in a shell hole at F.17.c.5.3 and was used by them throughout the day under rather heavy fire. This station was later moved into a dugout near by and remained in operation until 2:00 P. M. on October 1st. At 4:00 P. M. Lieutenant Bancel established a collecting point for wounded on the London Road near Egg Post. Due to machine gun fire much difficulty was experienced at this place in evacuating wounded. Wounded here were evacuated via Pomponius Lane, through Lempire Post to the battalion aid station at F.15.d.8.8. At 5:00 P. M. a volunteer detail of sixty stretcher bearers searched the areas in F.16, 17, 18 and 19 for wounded and secured and evacuated approximately sixty men. During the afternoon of September 29th the 3d Battalion aid station was taken over by the 105th Infantry. One of the aid stations was advanced to F.23.b.4.2. The wounded were evacuated by ambulances which came up the Guillemont Road. The Sanitary Detachment was kept on duty until 4:00 P. M. October 1st, when the regimental aid station was closed.

The one pounders and Stokes mortars assigned to the 1st Battalion reached the vicinity of Willow Trench, when they were held up by machine gun fire from Lone Tree Trench. Three Stokes mortars fired on the enemy position and obtained hits. One Stokes mortar was put out of action by an enemy hit on the base plate. Due to casualties, the separation of the squads in the smoke, and to the great expenditure of ammunition, an adequate supply was not on hand on one or two critical occasions. The one pounder squad under Sergeant O'Gorman was in Willow Trench with the infantry. In the smoke one of the tanks crossed Willow Trench and drove the trail of the one pounder gun into the ground, disabling it. Sergeant O'Gorman's squad thereafter fought as infantry. They took part in local attacks and in repulsing counter-attacks and successfully used a great number of German hand grenades in these combats. The Stokes mortar squad with the right battalion was located at Doleful Post, and with the two one pounder guns there came under heavy enemy fire shortly after the start. The infantry of the battalion to which they were assigned advanced with such speed that these guns could not keep up and soon the thick smoke cloud obscured everything. Captain Wilson went forward on a personal reconnaissance to Guillemont Farm and the mopping up by detachments of the 107th and 106th Infantry going on in that vicinity came under his personal observation. He reported it was being most systematically carried out and that large numbers of enemy soldier had been killed as well as taken prisoners.

Second Lieutenant John C. Freeman, Regimental Signal Officer, reported that lines to brigade headquarters were constantly broken by shell fire, but that one line had been established at 6:45 A. M. on September

29th. Continual touch was maintained by the regiment with the 1st and 2d Battalion Headquarters. Communication was not maintained with the 3d Battalion Headquarters after it went forward. Visual signals were attempted, but the thick smoke rendered them useless. Lamp signals were also found to be useless because of the smoke. Lateral telephone communication with the 108th Infantry and with the 54th British Brigade on the left was maintained without much difficulty.

A reference to the map will indicate the line gained by the 107th Infantry, with the help of the 105th Infantry. In estimating the results of the great valor, skill and sacrifice displayed by this regiment during the battle of the Hindenburg Line, it must ever be kept in mind that while its prescribed mission was to reach the canal with one battalion and to cross the tunnel near the north end with the remaining two battalions, its vital mission was to secure the left flank not only of the division, but of the corps, and to insure this in the face of obstacles and conditions which had been carefully prepared by the enemy to make such accomplishment impossible.

Subsequent to the battle several veteran British officers of wide experience told the writer that in their opinion the success of the Hindenburg Line thrust was the result not only of the discipline and skill of the troops that headed the attack, but also their willingness and ability to bear heavy losses with unimpaired morale. They referred further to the fact that troops with long experience in war would have recognized the magnitude of the task imposed upon them, and that their tendency would be to shrink from suffering losses which very easily they could persuade themselves to believe would be useless.

We all remember the incident at Cold Harbor during the Civil War, when the tremendous losses sustained in two previous assaults caused the veteran Union troops to refuse, by common impulse, to make the third attempt when it was ordered.

The 107th Infantry soldiers, during preparations for this attack, reported to their Regimental Commander that soldiers of the adjoining British division had told them that they were to attempt the impossible and that the only result would be heavy losses. The Regimental Commander reported that these direful prophesies had no apparent effect upon his men, whose confidence and morale were at the highest pitch. The incident, however, serves to indicate that perhaps the regiment would not have been as efficient for the purposes of this battle had it, prior thereto, been subjected to experiences such as had been suffered by divisions of the British army in their long war trials.

The losses in the 107th Infantry in this attack were great. There were 11 officers and 332 enlisted men killed; 34 enlisted men died of wounds; 15 officers and 721 enlisted men wounded; 53 enlisted men gassed and 7 missing in action.

As already stated, the provisional battalion of the 106th Infantry, commanded by Major Ransom H. Gillet, reached its battle positions immediately before the zero hour, as mopping up units for the 3d Battalion

of the 107th Infantry. In the fierce fighting which took place shortly after the advance commenced, some of these detachments became merged with platoons of the battalion in their front. Others in the heavy smoke cloud diverged to the right and followed the left battalion of the 108th Infantry. One of the latter groups was commanded by Sergeant Joseph A. Cook of Company F, 106th Infantry, who had reached the objective of September 27th to the south and east of Guillemont Farm and who had survived that experience. On this occasion after most of his platoon had been killed or wounded, the Sergeant ultimately found himself in a trench of the main Hindenburg Line system and a short distance south of Bony. As the smoke lifted, his party came under machine gun fire from a concrete machine gun emplacement in the trench they occupied and a short distance to the north of them. An attempt to bomb this position from the trench failed. Their rifle fire seemed ineffective. Thereupon the Sergeant, while the remainder of his detachment kept the emplacement under rifle fire, left the trench and jumping from shell hole to shell hole gained one within bombing distance of the enemy post. From this point he successfully threw four bombs into the pit. Advancing cautiously he found two of the enemy soldiers expiring and two others badly wounded. Enemy soldiers who may have been survivors, together with some others who had occupied adjoining positions, ran off toward Bony, and as the Sergeant expressed it, "made some fine targets for the rest of our men."

This position was secured and was probably the most northerly point in the main Hindenburg Line defenses held by our troops. The point was located in the vicinity of A.21.b.central. Later the Sergeant accurately described the position, including the tunnel immediately in his front. In the afternoon of September 29th the survivors of his party were connected up with a small party of the 108th Infantry on their right and still later by several Australian soldiers of the 3d Australian Division. During the day, however, numerous efforts were made by enemy parties to dislodge them from their position, but without success.

First Lieutenant Franklin J. Jackson, Stokes Mortar Officer of the 106th Infantry, a very capable and energetic young officer, was killed while making a personal reconnaissance east of Ronssoy. He was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his extraordinary gallantry in this action.

Another gallant young officer of this regiment, First Lieutenant Alfred J. Hook, was killed leading his company in attack. He was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his extraordinary gallantry in taping off the line of departure for his company under heavy enemy fire just prior to the attack.

Considering the small numbers composing the mopping up parties of the 106th Infantry Battalion, the heavy casualties sustained by them, and the great fatigue under which they labored as a result of their efforts on September 27th, it is remarkable that they accomplished as much as they did. Wherever these detachments found themselves in the smoke, they fought and bombed enemy groups with the greatest determination and



Another view of 27th Division graves in Bony Cemetery, taken during the summer of 1920

gallantry. Dead soldiers of their units were found at formidable points in and about Guillemont Farm in close proximity to enemy dead where they had fallen in combat with the latter. The losses of this battalion were 1 officer and 11 enlisted men killed or died of wounds, 8 officers and 29 enlisted men wounded, 4 enlisted men gassed and 8 enlisted men missing.

Captain William E. Blaisdell, who had commanded the 3d Battalion on September 27th, and who in this attack commanded the left company of



Another view of 27th Division graves in Bony Cemetery, taken during the summer of 1920

the composite battalion, was killed. Two of the other officers of his company, First Lieutenant Edward L. Ryan and Second Lieutenant Harold C. De Loiselle, were wounded. In the center company made up from the 2d Battalion of the regiment, three of the four officers were wounded. They were Captain Arthur V. McDermott, First Lieutenant Erdmann Brandt and First Lieutenant L. H. Doty. The company from the 1st Battalion had two of its officers wounded, namely, First Lieutenants Arthur B. Elliman and Joseph L. Gilman. The commander of the provisional battalion, Major Ransom H. Gillet, was wounded early in the morning by a machine gun bullet.

In this battle Sergeant Thomas Armstrong of Company H won the Distinguished Service Cross for his extraordinary heroism in alone attacking and driving off an ememy patrol and later remaining with his Captain, who was wounded, and preventing his capture by the enemy, in which combat he killed two enemy soldiers who attacked them.

The 105th Infantry under Colonel James M. Andrews was to follow the 107th Infantry and the battalion of the 106th Infantry across the canal, and then change direction to the north so as to deploy and exploit the territory northwest of Le Catelet, and, threatening Vendhuile, compel its evacuation. Colonel Andrews had imposed upon each of his battalions a separate and special mission.

When the barrage opened, the battalions moved forward as planned. At 7:45 A. M. Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Berry and Captain John W. Frost, Regimental Operations Officer, were sent forward to open advance Regimental Headquarters at Duncan Post. At 8:45 A. M. Lieutenant Colonel Berry sent back word that he had established temporary headquarters in a dugout on the road in F.16.d. 7.5, due to conditions which obtained at the time at Duncan Post. Regimental Headquarters was then moved to the place temporarily selected. At 11:55 A. M. a message was received from the 3d Battalion that leading troops had taken and occupied The Knoll and were in touch with a company of Royal Fusiliers on the left. At noon Regimental Headquarters was moved to Duncan Post, which was at the time occupied by Captain Frank J. Maldiner, commanding the 3d Battalion of the 108th Infantry. At 1:50 P. M. Captain Frank R. Potter, commanding Company F of the 105th Infantry, reported to the Regimental Commander that British troops on his left had withdrawn and that he was still occupying Willow Trench. Troops of the 105th Infantry were moved up in support of the 107th Infantry to help stem enemy counter-attacks already described. The heavy fighting on the left has also been described. Soon the various companies of the 105th Infantry were utilized in helping to stop the enemy counter-attacks in that sector. Troops of the 105th Infantry in the heavy fighting which followed found themselves in Willow Trench, Cochrane Avenue, Fag Trench, Island Traverse, Causeway Lane and part of Knoll Switch and positions in support. During the night Australian troops moved up in close support ready to continue their advance the following morning. At 6:20 P. M. on September 30th the 105th Infantry was directed to withdraw to the vicinity of St. Emilie. Numbers

of men of the regiment with similar outlying detachments of the 107th, 106th and 108th had gone forward with leading units of the 3d Australian Division when the latter division moved forward in its attack to the northeast on September 30th, and hence could not be reached. Captain Clinton's 3d Battalion of the 105th Infantry, for example, which had gained and tenaciously held the left of The Knoll, did not begin its withdrawal from the line until the early morning of October 1st. The losses of the 105th Infantry in this battle as reported by the Regimental Commander were 4 officers killed and 10 wounded; 91 enlisted men killed and 504 wounded.

In the 1st Battalion, First Lieutenant John J. Callahan, commanding Company A, First Lieutenant Kevney O'Connor and Second Lieutenant John T. Clissett, Jr., of Company B; First Lieutenant Harry Merz and Second Lieutenant Clement A. G. Feldt were wounded. The Battalion Commander, Captain Henry Maslin, and his Adjutant, First Lieutenant Ogden J. Ross, were also wounded.

In the 2d Battalion, Captain James S. Slossen, commanding Company E, the two officers with Company G, First Lieutenants Earl W. Maxson and Edward Warschauer were killed and Second Lieutenant Edward Van Holland was wounded.

In the 3d Battalion, Second Lieutenant Harold J. Hobbs of Company I was killed and the Battalion Commander, Captain Stanley Bulkley, wounded.

The signal work of the regiment was efficiently carried on when the extraordinary conditions are considered, but it was embarrassed by the disability of the officer in charge, Second Lieutenant Paul A. Florian, who was wounded early in the battle.

Many of the officers and enlisted men of the regiment distinguished themselves. The three Battalion Commanders, Captains McArthur, Maslin and Bulkley, led their battalions with skill and determination, the latter two being wounded as stated above. Captain Bulkley, who commanded on the left, was succeeded by Capain Jacob S. Clinton.

The Knoll never left the possession of the troops of the 105th and the 1st Battalion of the 107th after they took it on the morning of September 29th. The attached sketch shows the disposition of troops about The Knoll on the night of September 29th.

In this battle Private Anthony Sclafani of Company A won the Distinguished Service Cross for shielding a Lewis gunner in an exposed position with his body, while the gunner poured fire into the enemy. This act was performed despite the fact that Private Sclafani had been wounded once in reaching the Lewis gunner and twice more while shielding him. He finally lost consciousness, but after his wounds were dressed insisted on leaving the field unaided.

The 105th Machine Gun Battalion, under command of Major Kenneth Gardner, participated in the firing of the machine gun barrage on the morning of September 29th. The companies from left to right were commanded as follows: Company A by Captain Lucius H. Biglow, Jr., Company B by Captain Nathaniel H. Egleston, Company D by Captain Stanton

107th Infantry—Assaulting Troops, Left of Division Sector

C	B	I	L
1st Lt Ralph P Buell (w)	1st Lt Samuel Crump, Jr (k) 1st Lt Ford M Terry (w) 2d Lt John M Andrews (w)	1st Lt Percy M Hall (k) 2d Lt Claude G Leland	Capt Fletcher Nicoll (k) 1st Lt Robert A Byrns (w)
D	**A**	**K**	**M**
2d Lt Thomas G Simpson	1st Lt Clarence L Hall	Capt George B Brecht 1st Lt Griswold B Darrell 2d Lt Ben M Rambo (k)	1st Lt Murray J Cramer (k) 1st Lt Corey L Walrath (k)

1st Battalion

Capt Cortes E Enik
1st Lt Richard M Raven, Adj
2d Lt Oscar H Hellquist, Int Off
1st Lt Charles F Graham Rogers, Gas Off
1st Lt Herbert L Shaver, Transport Off
Capt Charles P Gray, M C

3d Battalion

Capt Raphael A Egan (w)
1st Lt Charles A Flood, Adj (w)
2d Lt Harry W Robinson, Int Off (k)
2d Lt Alexander L Ostrander, Trans Off

ATTACHED
1 37mm
2 T M

SIGNAL PLATOON
1st Lt Albert M Benedict, M C
1st Lt Henry A Bancel, M C

Supporting 1st Battalion

M G
Capt Walter G Andrews (w)
1st Lt Harry Adsit (w)
1st Lt Edward Wilkes (k)
2d Lt Kenneth Cook, Trans Off
2d Lt Paul H Gadebusch (w)

2 37mm
Capt Kenneth C Wilson (w)

4 T M
1st Lt Richard H McIntyre (c

SIGNAL PLATOON
2d Lt John C Erschen

H	E
1st Lt Arthur J McKenna (w	Capt Harry W Hayward (k) 1st Lt Benj T Hammond (k 1st Lt Stephen M Schwab (k)
G	**F**
Capt Marston T Drake (w)	Capt Geo P Nichols (w 1st Lt Roe M Dennis (w)

2d Battalion

Capt Rowland Tompkins
1st Lt William S Hawkins, Adj
2d Lt Marsh H Lockyer, Int Off
1st Lt David C Bull, M C (w)
1st Lt Beverly L F Burnham, Gas Off

SIGNAL PLATOON
1st Lt John A Korschen, Trans Off
1st Lt Wm J Coogan M C

Colonel Charles I Bellevoise
1st Lt Edward H Kent Adj
Capt Thomas J Brady, Op Off
Capt Henry B Heylman, Pers Adj
1st Lt Edwin S Munson Gas Off
1st Lt Hiram W Taylor Sup Off

Major Nicholas Engel
1st Lt Eugene L Mullaney, Int Off
1st Lt William G Le Compte, Transp Off
Major Raymond A Turnbull, M C
Capt Dudley C Hughes, D C
Capt Francis P Riggs, D C

1st Lt David B Warren, D C
Chaplain Peter E Hoey
Chaplain Edwin F Keever
Chaplain Hugh W Stewart
1st Lt Edwin L Holloway, Liaison Off with 108th Inf

Det. Co. F, 102d Eng.

301st Tank Battalion

108th Infantry—Assaulting Troops, Right of Division Sector

L	I	F	E
Capt James Riffe (w) 1st Lt Jesse I Varney (w) 2d Lt Benjamin Fuller (k) 2d Lt John E Lathrop (k)	Capt Joseph W Smith (k 1st Lt Harold G McKay (k 1st Lt Harry H Crosby (k) 2d Lt Thomas F Kerr (k)	1st Lt Delancey King (w) 2d Lt Henry C Mendenhall 2d Lt Robert McKay	Capt Charles A Sandberg 2d Lt Samuel A Brown, Jr 2d Lt Harrison J Uhl
M	**K**	**H**	**G**
Capt William L Hodder (w) 1st Lt Harry B Bentley (k)	2d Lt Fredk K Pierce 2d Lt Louis G Weber	Capt Albert M Barager (w 1st Lt Frank L Sines (k)	1st Lt John F Welch (k) 1st Lt Edward H O'Rourke (w)

3d Battalion

Capt Frank J Maldaner
1st Lt Frederick G Sprawten, Adj
2d Lt Wm B Shelley, Scout Off
Capt Philip C Hacker, M C
Capt Joseph T Loughlin, M C

ATTACHED
4 M G
1st Lt Henry O Somers (k)
1 37mm
Sergt Lewis
4 T M
Signal Det

2d Battalion

Capt John S Thompson
2d Lt Fred C Davis Adj
2d Lt Raymond A Neill, Scout Off
Capt George I Miller, M C
1st Lt I R Mason, M C
John C. Ward, Chaplain

ATTACHED
4 M G
1st Lt Ralph W Laughlin (k)
1 37mm
1st Sgt F Donnelly
2 T M
Signal Det

D	C	A
1st Lt Charles J Donnocker 2d Lt. Frank H Brietbeck	Capt Harry H Farmer 1st Lt Edward M McCabe (w	Capt Arthur T Smith (w 1st Lt James A Kipp 2d Lt Erwin A Dennee

B

Capt Samuel H Merrill
1st Lt Edward F Winnek (k,
2d Lt Jay R Fiero

1st Battalion

Major Frederick S Cochman
2d Lt Allen H Williams Adj
2d Lt Walter N Hersburgh Scout Off
1st Lt Sidney D Palmer, M C

ATTACHED
4 M G
1 37mm
Signal Det

Colonel Edgar S Jennings
Capt George A Elliot, Adj
Capt Edwin G Ziegler, Op Off

Capt Clarence S Martin, M G Off
Capt Henry D Bagnall, Int Off
2d Lt Cecil H Page, Sig Off (w)

Major Charles W Lynn, M C
1st Lt Elmer P Brecht, T M Off
1st Lt Kennard Underwood Trans

Det. Co. F, 102d Eng.

Composite Battalion 106th Infantry.

Support 107th Infantry To Aid In Mopping Up Behind 2d and 3d Battalion 107th Infantry

Co. Z (3d Battalion	Co. Y (2d Battalion.	Co. X (1st Battalion)
Capt Wm L Blasdell (k) 1st Lt Edward J Ryan (w) 1st Lt Chester P Jones 2d Lt Harold C De Loselle (w	Capt Arthur V McDermott (w) 1st Lt Erdmann N Brandt (w 1st Lt Lucius H Doty (w 1st Lt Albert G Reinert	1st Lt George Archer 1st Lt Arthur B Ellman (w) 1st Lt Joseph L Gilman (w) 1st Lt Herbert G Rosboro

3 provisional companies, each formed of survivors of a battalion

Major Ransom H Gillet (w)
1st Lt Ames T Brown, Adj

105th Machine Gun Battalion. M G Barrage and Special Target Fire.

A (62C F 17a	B F 10 b	D (F 17 b)	C (F 10 c)
Capt Lucius H Biglow, Jr 1st Lt Joseph F Cook 2d Lt Harold L Downes 2d Lt Harry B Jennings	Capt Nathaniel H Egleston 2d Lt George Matthews, Jr 2d Lt Richard G Lyon 2d Lt Richard D McCaskey	Capt Stanton Whitney 1st Lt Alwyn Ball, 3d 2d Lt Bert R Anderson	Capt Robert R Molyneux 1st Lt Edward Flash, Jr 2d Lt Joseph G Galvin

Major Kenneth Gardner
1st Lt Theodore Crane, Adj

1st Lt Knowlton Durham, Int Off
1st Lt Raymond A McIver, Sup Off

2d Lt Fred Soare, Jr Trans Off
1st Lt Archer B Bass Chaplain

Capt Chas D. Kayser, M C
1st Lt Joseph Mulcahy, D C

106th Machine Gun Battalion. M G Barrage and Special Target Fire

D (Benjamin Trench)	C (Switch near Bellecourt Road	B (Switch near Artaxerxes Alley	A (Artaxerxes Post
Capt Charles N Morgan 1st Lt George C Donnelly 2d Lt Walter H Wells 2d Lt Reginald H Wood 2d Lt Everett W King	1st Lt Nicholas E Devereux, Jr Lt Walter L Glass Lt John Perkins Lt Edward Zimmer	Capt Harold Bousfield Lt Randolph M Fuller Lt Paul B Selby Lt Harry Von Der Leith	Lt Edgar T Beamish Lt Roger A Wellington Lt Myles McDonell Lt Earl Hawkins

Major Mortimer D Bryant

2nd Lt Lawrence Beattie (w

1st Lt Harry K Tebbut, D C

1st Lt Clarence H K Blauvelt

105th Infantry Support for Left Flank and Exploitation

2d Battalion Capt Charles A McArthur 1st Lt Rbt Williamson, Adj 2d Lt Llewellyn H Davis Int Off Capt Elmer H Ormsby, M C 1st Lt Maurice Exiner, M C 1st Lt George E Ramsey, Trans Off	F Capt Frank R Potter 1st Lt Lawrence P Clarke 2d Lt Edward Van Holland (w)	E Capt. James S. Slosson (k) 2d Lt Frank P Buck
	G 1st Lt Earl W Maxson (k) 1st Lt Edward Warschauer (k)	H Capt. Raymond F Hodgdon 1st Lt James T Bergen
1st Battalion Capt Henry Maslin (w) 1st Lt Ogden J Ross, Adj (w) 1st Lt Harold A Blakeley, Gas Off 2d Lt Charles J Doyle, Int Off 1st Lt James C Donovan, M C 1st Lt Donald D Campbell, M C	A 1st Lt John J Callahan (w) 2d Lt Stephen B Elkins	B 1st Lt Kevney O'Connor (w) 2d Lt John T Chesett, Jr (w)
	C 1st Lt Harry Merz (w) 2d Lt Clement A G Feldt (w)	D 1st Lt Leo F Giblyn 1st Lt Benjamin Buckley
3d Battalion Capt Stanley Bulkley (w) 1st Lt Carl G R Ross Adj 1st Lt Cary Walradt Int Off 2d Lt Frank B Howe Jr, Trans Off 1st Lt Leonard J Howard, Sig Off 1st Lt James R Haigler, M C 1st Lt James R Lusa M C	I 1st Lt Alexander Grannat 2d Lt Harold J Hobbs (k)	K 1st Lt John D Snedeker 2d Lt Ramon L Hall
	L 1st Lt Thomas G Carlin 2d Lt John C Cupperly	M Capt Jacob S Clinton 2d Lt Walter W Slayton.
Colonel James M Andrews Lt Col Charles W Berry Capt John W Frost, Op Off	Capt Lewis H Gibbs, Adj Capt Stephen H Fifield, Pers Adj	Capt Roscoe B. Trumble, Sup. Off 2d Lt Paul A Florian, Sig Off (w)

Det. Tanks

Order of Battle

HINDENBURG LINE

SEPTEMBER 29, 1918

K—Killed or died of wounds
W Wounded

106th Infantry (2 Battalions) Div. Res.

2 battalions ordered to Area 10 as Division Reserve
All available rifle strength in provisional battalion
These 2 battalions not available as combat troops

Colonel Wm A Taylor
Capt Murray Taylor, Act Adj
1st Lt William V Hunter Int Off

102d Engineers Div. Res.

F	E	D	C B A
Det 107-108 2 Plat Reserve Ronssoy	3 Plat Ronssoy 1 Plat Reserve	Construction work, Div Hdqtrs.	Road maintenance work Ste. Emilie

Lt Col William S Conrow — Ste Emilie

104th Machine Gun Battalion Div. Res.

A	B
1st Lt Joseph B Vanderbilt 2d Lt John M. Cummings	1st Lt Harley W Black 1st Lt Clarence E Hancock. 2d Lt. Donald Armstrong.

Major Chester H King — Ronssoy

Whitney and Company C by Captain Robert R. Molyneux. None of the officers of the battalion were wounded. Thirty-five guns were employed. Upon the completion of the barrage the guns were laid on the S. O. S. line and preparations made to move forward to St. Emilie, where the battalion arrived at 4:45 P. M. Late in the afternoon of September 29th, in order to stiffen the advance of the left flank, guns were placed in position at Thistle Trench, Lempire Post, St. Patrick's Lane, Yak Post, the trench at F.10.a.8.2 and at Duncan Post, with reserve guns in Kent Lane and Pomponius Avenue. The latter were planned to be placed in Doleful Post, Egg Post and Fag Support, but these places were found to be crowded with Australian and British machine gunners. At 9:50 P. M. Company B fired 4,000 rounds of harassing fire on targets in the vicinity of Tino Trench. The battalion remained in position throughout the day of September 30th, the withdrawal being completed at 12:50 P. M. on October 1st.

The Battalion Commander reports that throughout the battle every man in the battalion received proper and sufficient rations, and that the ammunition supply was adequate. Damaged machine guns were replaced by the Divisional Machine Gun Officer, Lieutenant Colonel McLeer, almost as soon as they were disabled. Due to the larger number of wounded in the infantry regiments calls were made upon some of the companies to aid in their evacuation.

In relation to the wounded men, Private Martin of Company C, 105th Machine Gun Battalion, was especially commended at the time for his constant and courageous aid to the wounded of infantry commands in the vicinity of Doleful Post.

The 106th Machine Gun Battalion, commanded by Major Mortimer D. Bryant, occupied an area behind the 108th Infantry, generally in F.22, 23 and 29. The companies were commanded as follows: Company A, First Lieutenant Edgar T. Beamish, Company B, Captain Harold W. Bousfield, Company C, First Lieutenant Nicholas E. Devereux, Jr., and Company D, Captain Charles N. Morgan. Second Lieutenant Lawrence Beattie, Battalion Adjutant, was wounded.

Each company used twelve guns. Needed supplies for all guns were reported by the Battalion Commander to have been furnished on time. The battalion fired the barrage as directed by the divisional Field Orders. Two hundred and fifteen thousand rounds of ammunition were expended in the firing of this barrage. After the completion of the barrage the companies were disposed in support of the 108th Infantry, but were not called upon to fire. They were relieved about noon on October 1st and marched to Villers Faucon.

The 104th Machine Bun Battalion under command of Major Chester H. King moved up from St. Emilie, occupying a position of readiness at F.16.d.4.3., but was not called upon to fire. Its two companies were commanded respectively by First Lieutenants Joseph B. Vanderbilt and Harley W. Black.

The German forces on the front of the 27th Division in the battle of the Hindenburg Line were the units of the IV Corps. These were,

on the north, the 8th Prussian Division, which had opposed the 27th Division in the battle of Vierstraat Ridge in Flanders, and which in this battle held Vendhuile and the outworks of the Hindenburg Line as far south as the Vendhuile-Lempire Road. South of the 8th Prussian Division was the 54th Division, which carried the line to a point midway between Guillemont Farm and Quennemont Farm. South of the 54th Division was the 121st Division, which carried the line to the area of the 30th American Division. In reserve at Le Catelet was the 2d Guard Division, commanded by Lieutenant General V. Friedburg, the infantry of which was composed of the Kaiser Alexander Garde Grenadier Regiment No. 1, the Kaiser Franz Garde Grenadier Regiment No. 2 and the Koenigin Augusta Garde Grenadier Regiment No. 4.

During the winter of 1920 Lieutenant Colonel Edward Olmsted, G-1 of the 27th Division, received a letter from the Chief of Staff of the 2d German Guard Division, Captain Karl von Unger, giving some information from the German point of view concerning the Hindenburg Line Battle. Some very interesting facts were given in this correspondence. Among other things this German officer states in reference to the attack of September 27th, made by the 53d Brigade, that "hand-to-hand fighting had occurred repeatedly, which was seldom the case with other adversaries."

This German officer had been asked by Colonel Olmsted to express an opinion concerning the reason why the German forces were unable to prevent the "break through" of the tunnel sector of the Hindenburg Line. He wrote, "If even in normally conducted warfare all failures cannot be traced back to tactical errors, it is impossible under the conditions described to state a tactical reason why our front was penetrated in the tunnel sector while it held at other points."

In another part of the letter Captain Von Unger referred to lack of sufficient numbers to deal by counter-attack with local penetration and then stated, "Had we possessed a number of troops only in some measure sufficient (in view of the weakness of the individual units you must not judge by the number of divisions) your attack would never have been crowned with such great success."

Prior to the battle the 102d Engineers were occupied with a great diversity of work, principally having to do with roads and approaches to the front, so that the artillery, tanks and other auxiliary units might readily advance. A detachment of the engineer regiment constructed shelters of loose stone and sheet iron for the officers and men at the division post of command.

In the narrative of the battle mention was made of the details furnished by the 102d Engineers to the British tunneling companies charged with the mission of investigating enemy dugouts and removing mines and traps where found. Other detachments, it will be remembered, were given the mission of removing land mines wherever they might be located in captured territory. In this connection Sergeant Solomon E. Schiff of the Sanitary Detachment, 102d Engineers, was later commended

for his gallantry and determined devotion to duty in removing fuses from land mines which had been placed in the enemy wire.

On the night of September 29th, when the progress of the battle on the left flank of the division had demonstrated the dangerous possibilities at that place if the troops about The Knoll should not hold, the Commanding Officer of the engineer regiment was instructed to place one battalion of his regiment in support of the troops at The Knoll. This was accomplished, but as has already been stated no occasion arose during the night of September 29th or the following day for their intervention.

The regiment was commanded by Colonel Pillsbury, who shortly thereafter went to the II American Corps as Corps Engineer. The second in command of the regiment was Lieutenant Colonel William S. Conrow, while the battalions were commanded by Majors William E. Lane and Harvey Garrison.

The 102d Field Signal Battalion, always a most efficient organization, played its part in the battle under the extraordinary difficulties which have already been described, difficulties which particularly affected any efforts in the field of communication. All forms and methods of signaling which depended upon visibility became ineffective because of the mist and smoke with which the field of operations was covered. The experience in this and other battles seemed to indicate that there is no field of effort or arm of service where greater need exists for the development of wholly new methods and appliances than in the Signal Corps. This statement is of course not intended as any reflection upon the corps or its methods and appliances as they existed during the war and in anticipation of war. For twenty years it had been the acclaimed boast of armies that no longer would smoke obscure the battle-field. Yet toward the end of the war, in an effort to neutralize the effectiveness of enemy machine gun fire, the use of smoke was developed to a degree which made the "smoke of battle" of the old days seem like a thin mist. Very much of the modern methods and appliances of communication on the battle-field had been developed upon the principle that nothing is quicker than the observed signal. Hence we had men highly trained in the use of the flag, semaphore, heliograph and signal lamp. Nevertheless almost as soon as a battle opened the scene was obscured by a thick opaque smoke which made such signals impossible of use. Reliance was therefore had upon the buzzer, the telephone, wireless and the runner. It may be said in a general way that the only method of communication which stood the test was the runner and to some extent the telephone. It all means that in a great modern battle the army, in the transmission of messages and orders in the forward areas, had to revert in the main to the methods employed by Hannibal and Cæsar, to go no further back in history.

The troops of the Signal Battalion met the extraordinary conditions confronting them with courage and resourcefulness. Their detachments and details of men seemed to be everywhere, and their losses were considerable. The companies of the battalion were commanded as follows: Company A by Captain Herbert L. Watson, Company B by Captain



View of Bony Cemetery, looking from Guillemont Farm

Gordon Ireland, and Company C by Captain Lawrence J. Gorman, while the battalion was commanded by Major Arthur L. Howe. The signal work during the battle was under the immediate charge of the Division Signal Officer, Lieutenant Colonel William L. Hallahan.



Monument erected by the 102d Engineers at Guillemont Farm to the memory of the men who lost their lives there

The sanitary troops are entitled to special mention for the manner in which they carried out their work of relieving the wounded. Reference to the report of the Division Surgeon, which is contained in a later chapter, will indicate the very large number of wounded passed through the dressing stations during the battle. The medical officers of regiments and other combat units, and as well those of the ambulance companies in charge of dressing stations, were constantly under fire, and with little rest and almost no sleep continued in the performance of their duties throughout the battle period. It would be difficult to select particular medical officers for special mention, there were so many of them who

did well, but nevertheless the names of the following should be mentioned as rendering service of particular worth.

First of all, there was Lieutenant Colonel Walter C. Montgomery, the Division Surgeon, who had succeeded Lieutenant Colonel Edward R. Maloney when the latter had become physically disabled in Flanders. Colonel Montgomery's preparations for the battle were most thorough and his great energy and determination enabled him to maintain an intimate and understanding grip on the medical situation throughout the period of operations.

In the 105th Infantry there was Captain George W. Papen, Jr., who had already won the regard of the officers and men of his regiment and who on this occasion more than measured up to the estimate they held of him.

In the 106th Infantry Captain Nils P. Larsen was in charge of the medical arrangements. He was acting in the absence of Major Lucius A. Salisbury, who had been wounded in Flanders. The conduct of Captain Larsen was on a par with the standards of courage and determination of the 106th Infantry. He was ably assisted by Lieutenants Hadley, Cleaver, Tilden, Rowan and Adams.

The work of the medical officers of the 107th Infantry under Major Raymond A. Turnbull has already been mentioned in the account of the part played by that regiment.

In the 108th Infantry the senior medical officer, Major Charles W. Lynn, and his assistants evacuated the wounded of that regiment with great care and diligence.

Major Moses A. Stivers, Director of Field Hospitals, and Major William J. Cranston, Director of Ambulance Companies, as well as Captain Martin De Forest Smith and others, were commended for their cool courage, resourcefulness and efficiency in the care and evacuation of the wounded in this battle.

The chaplains of the division won special distinction during this period. The respect and regard held for them by the personnel of the units to which they were attached were strengthened by the courage and devotion to duty they displayed in this battle.

Chaplain John C. Ward of the 106th Infantry was wounded and awarded the Distinguished Service Cross and the British Military Cross for his exceptional gallantry and devotion to duty in going forward under heavy fire and caring for the wounded and searching for the dead, continuing this hazardous work after being twice warned by officers of his regiment that it was sure death for him to continue.

Chaplain Francis A. Kelley of Division Headquarters was also awarded the Distinguished Service Cross and the British Military Cross for repeated acts of heroism under heavy fire during this battle.

Chaplains Peter E. Hoey and Edward F. Keever of the 107th Infantry, both exceptionally modest and courageous men, were cited for their gallantry during the battle.

Chaplains David T. Burgh and Royal K. Tucker of the 105th Infantry

were cited and awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for their remarkable devotion to duty under heavy shell and machine gun fire.

Chaplain Horace R. Fell of the 102d Engineers and Chaplain Michael T. Hoffman of the 108th Infantry were cited for their courage and devotion to duty.

In the 106th Infantry, Chaplains Frank I. Hanscom and George C. Eillers, who were held in high regard by officers and men of that regiment, won special distinction and were cited for their work on this occasion.

The saddest and most difficult work following a battle is the burial of the dead. This disagreeable duty comes at a time when officers and men are exhausted by nervous strain and lack of sleep. The fighting during the Hindenburg Line Battle was so fierce and continuous that little could be accomplished toward securing and interring the bodies of the dead until the division had been relieved. As more than 1,000 men of the division had been killed in this battle, and as most of their bodies, particularly on the left of the divisional sector, were lying in areas still under shell fire, the burial parties worked in geat danger as well as under extreme difficulties. The Divisional Burial Officer was 2d Lieutenant Summerfield S. Curtis. He was supplied with details of men from each regiment for the conduct of his work. The chaplains also were pressed into service, not only for the purpose of conducting appropriate religious ceremonies, but also to aid in the work of identification of bodies and making authentic record of their interment. Search of the fields, dugouts and trenches was systematically made by squads assigned to particular areas. The contents of the clothing were secured, placed in sacks, sealed and properly tagged for shipment to the Effects Bureau in the Service of Supply. The bodies were then carried on litters to the nearest road, where they were laid along the edge of the road awaiting removal by limbers and wagons to cemeteries which had been established at St. Emilie, Ronssoy, Bony and other points in the vicinity.

It is regrettable to have to report that when the burial parties arrived they found the pockets of many of the dead had been turned inside out and the contents removed. In most cases money and anything of value had been taken, while frequently letters, photographs and other papers were scattered about. After the Hindenburg Line Battle, whenever it was necessary, the battle-field was guarded for the purpose of preventing looting of the bodies of the dead. There can be no doubt about it—familiarity with the brutalities of war tends to dull appreciation of the refinements of civilized life.

The 301st Tank Battalion, commanded by Major Roger Harrison, was assigned to the division for the attack of September 29th. It consisted of three companies: Company A, with fifteen tanks, commanded by Captain Kit Varney, who was killed on September 29th; Company B, consisting of ten tanks, commanded by Captain Victor L. Ralli; and Company C, commanded by Captain Ralph Clark, consisting of fifteen tanks. The seven remaining tanks were held in reserve. The signal tank was in charge of Captain C. Reynell. Company A was assigned to the 108th Infantry on the right, Company B to the 105th Infantry in support, and



Bony Cemetery, looking from Bony village

Company C to the 107th Infantry on the left. The tanks were guided to their positions with the various companies of the attacking battalions by guides furnished by the infantry companies.

Each tank commander took into action with him necessary maps showing roads to be followed, obstacles to be encountered, barrage table



The "Ausies" come forward

with objective drawn upon it, and a number of oblique photographs of the relevant terrain. Opportunity had been afforded tank officers for several days prior to the attack to reconnoiter the approaches to their start positions and to study the maps and data available.

The tank equipment is shown in the following table:

	Mark V Star Male	Mark V Star Female	Mark V Star Composite	Mark V Male	Mark V Female	Mark V Composite	Total
Company A...	9	2	4	...	...	....	15
Company B...	7	2	....	3	1	3	16
Company C...	...	...	....	7	...	9	16

Note.—All Mark V tanks carried gribs.

In addition, one Renault tank was issued to Battalion Headquarters, but due to a broken track, damaged shortly before the battle, it was never used.

On September 25th all tank officers of the battalion attended the conference at Division Headquarters, at which all available information was given them. Upon the completion of the conference they conferred with the Brigade Commander, who approved the details of the plan of operations for the tanks. From September 25th until the 29th, company and section commanders conferred daily with the infantry commanders with whom their units were to be associated.

The report of the tank commander shows that on September 29th, Company A cooperated with the 108th Infantry, but Company C never gained contact with the 107th Infantry on the left. The tanks of Company B were knocked out before they could render any service. In cases where tanks were ditched in trenches and sunken roads, the cause as stated by the tank commander was that the smoke through which the tanks traveled was so thick that the obstacles could not be seen. He reports that tanks lost their way in the smoke immediately after leaving the tape and had nothing to depend upon except the compass. Some of the tank officers reported their compasses defective and that they were seriously handicapped in consequence. Some of the crews reported difficulties with the Hotchkiss guns and belts, but no difficulty with the six pounders. All tank crews reported that the tanks drew concentrated fire. Nearly all crews were handicapped by lack of pistols. Incidents were reported where tank crews were taken prisoner in consequence of lack of arms, after evacuating their tanks.

Two tanks ran on ground mines which were later reported to have been laid by the British when they occupied the area prior to the German offensive of March, 1918, and information concerning which had not been given to American troops. Most of the casualties to tanks were caused by direct hits from enemy artillery fire. A number of tanks continued in action after being hit a number of times by armor-piercing bullets.

The tank crews report much help derived from the use of the ampule ammonia which had been furnished by the Medical Corps.

The casualties in the tank battalion were 3 officers and 17 enlisted men killed, 7 officers and 55 enlisted men wounded and 7 enlisted men missing.

Two tanks under Lieutenants Webb and Hart of Company A were reported to have crossed the Hindenburg Line and returned safely. In Company B one tank under Lieutenant Ellingwood reached the Hindenburg Line, but was stopped on account of mechanical trouble. In Company C one tank commanded by Lieutenant Dunning went through, across the Hindenburg Line and the tunnel, but on its return was put out of action by a direct hit.

The writer on the morning of October 1st reached Bony in making an inspection of the field and saw the track of one of our tanks which crossed the Hindenburg Line several hundred yards south of Bony. The track was plainly visible. Where it crossed the main trench one of the treads ran upon and partially crushed the wooden cover of a pit sunk into the parados of the trench. The track could be seen leading to the spoil over the tunnel a short distance beyond. It could not be followed farther because of shell fire.

The motor transport of the division was in charge of Major Walter L. Bell and carried out its arduous duties with great devotion. After the battle, officers of the Australian Corps, with whom the division was intimately associated, specially commended the manner in which supplies were furnished to units of the division in the short space of time allowed for the purpose. They also specially commended the work of furnishing battle stores to the units in the line, which work was in charge of Captain Raymond T. Moniz.

The units of the division in the battle of September 29th captured and passed through the divisional prisoner of war cage 14 officers and 532 enlisted men, captured and passed through the Australian divisional cage 1 officer and 113 enlisted men and captured and passed through the 30th divisional cage 61 enlisted men. There were also captured and evacuated as wounded 2 officers and 57 enlisted men, making a total of captures of 17 officers and 763 enlisted men.

There are some features of the battle which the reader interested in the operations will find of special interest. In the first place the canal where it ran in the open cut constituted an obstacle for tanks that could not be overcome. Accordingly, the sector where the canal ran through the tunnel offered the only opportunity for tanks to go through the Hindenburg Line, and was prepared for defense by the enemy in the manner that has been described. In the effort to break through the line, it was important that the attack of the 4th British Army be made along its entire front so that the enemy might not know definitely in which particular sector the real thrust would be made. It will be remembered, however, that when the 4th Army had battled its way to the line fronting the canal, the III Corps had failed to take the outworks in the sector later assigned to the 27th Division, and that there followed the battle of September 27th for the purpose of gaining the outworks. The persistency of the effort which had been made in this sector fronting the northern

half of the tunnel must have indicated to the enemy that when the main attack would be launched along the entire front, the real effort would be made through the tunnel sector. The presence of American troops on the front of the tunnel sector, as indicated by the attack of September 27th when prisoners were taken, must have furnished corroborative evidence that these fresh and confident troops were on the front which was to be the scene of the real thrust.

If this is true, it is proper to assume that the forces defending this sector were augmented at the expense of forces holding other parts of the front. Something of the kind is indicated by the fact that the 46th British Division immediately south of the 30th Division succeeded in crossing the open cut of the canal south of Bellicourt with little trouble, although, in anticipation of great difficulties, they were provided with life belts and rafts for the purpose. As a matter of fact, a very deep penetration was made by the British troops south of the tunnel sector, which apparently was made possible by the concentration of enemy forces in defense of the tunnel sector, where the enemy probably and correctly believed the main effort was to be made.

The aftermath of every battle naturally gives rise to speculations concerning the features of its preparation and execution. Would it not have been better not to have made the preliminary attack of September 27th, but to have included that operation as part of the main operation? Would not such decision have avoided the bad start given the 54th Brigade on September 29th and thus permitted that brigade to have gone through with less loss than it actually sustained? Should not the 54th Brigade have been committed to the attack of September 27th to any extent necessary to secure the gains of the 53d Brigade? On September 29th should not the rolling barrage have been laid down on the immediate front of the 54th Brigade irrespective of the detachments of the 106th Infantry still on the front? Would it not have been better if less smoke had been used on the morning of September 29th? Should not the American divisions have had more time to prepare for this greatest of all battles? Should not the British division immediately to the north of the 27th Division have made some headway toward Vendhuile and have secured the left flank of the American Corps? These and many other questions might be asked and probably have been asked by those who participated in the attack.

One answer, however, to all such questions is that the 4th Army, chargeable with the breaking of the Hindenburg Line between Cambrai and St. Quentin on September 29th, accomplished its mission, and the mission was accomplished by the employment of the methods and the carrying out of the operations which have been described. The 4th Army had seen much fighting between August 8th and September 25th. They had sustained many losses during that period. Officers and men were tired. If the momentum of their advance was not to be unduly slowed down, but on the contrary was to have sufficient power to break through the Hindenburg Line, their strength must be augmented by fresh, confident troops, and it was good judgment that such troops should have

been placed in the van so as to take over the burden of the attack against so strong a position, and as well the losses which were sure to follow. What was needed for the time and the occasion were just such divisions as became available when the 27th and 30th American Divisions were assigned to the 4th Army. The officers and men of these divisions sought the opportunity to fight. They were full of confidence. They were almost light hearted concerning the obstacles confronting them. With the opening of the attack they had enough fighting to satisfy the most belligerent among them, but they fought and fought and fought, leading elements going on with the Australians when they continued the drive. General Monash in his book describes this in the following language:

> Very considerable numbers of American soldiers had become mixed up with the Australian battalions, and, in their eagerness, had gone forward with them, regardless of the particular rôles or objectives which had been originally assigned to them. It was found to be a matter of some difficulty to induce these men to withdraw from the fighting and to rejoin their own units, so keen were they to continue their advance.

It was good judgment also for the Army Commander to have directed the American advance to be followed and exploited by the Australians. While such speculations as have been referred to are perhaps interesting, they have no particular value. In the opinion of the writer, the decisions made by the 4th Army Commander and by the Commander of the Australian Corps in relation to the conduct of the battle were fully justified by the results of the battle.

This chapter on the Hindenburg Line Battle is an appropriate place to make some observations concerning the Australian soldiers, with whom we fought on that occasion.

The Australian soldier was a distinctive type. Much misinformation concerning him exists in the minds of our American public, who, while acclaiming his martial valor and individual skill, seem to assume that in the mass he was lacking in discipline. This view, if it exists, is not correct. The Australian army was solely a volunteer force. Not a man in it was present except by his voluntary action. This naturally affected his physical fitness and its morale. There were no troops in the war which equaled the physical standards of the Australians. The American army had thousands, perhaps some hundreds of thousands of men who measured up to the very best physical specimens to be found among the Australians, but we also had many thousands of men drafted into the army who were not fighting men, and who knew they were not. The Australians had none of this class. It is true that the Australian soldier was lacking in "smartness" of appearance and manner, and good humoredly took a seeming pride in the cold astonishment he created among others by his indifference to formality and his blunt attitude toward superior officers. But if by discipline we mean experienced and skilled team work in battle, then it must be said that the Australian troops were highly disciplined. Their platoons and companies possessed, as did ours, a highly developed gang spirit which prompted the members of "the gang" to work together in mutual support, but in addition to this, and by virtue

of their long experience in the war, they had come to realize the essential importance of military technique. They knew, from harsh lessons they had received in earlier battles from the harsh enemy instructor, that the shooting and bombing of the individual man at the front may be fruitless unless his group maintains contact with other groups on right and left, and at the same time sends a constant and reliable stream of information to the rear, so that the great auxiliary power of the division may be intelligently employed to aid them. The operations and the supply technique of the Australian divisions were of the very best, and so it was that the rough-and-ready fighting spirit of the Australians had become refined by an experienced battle technique supported by staff work of the highest order. Their record demonstrated, that for Australian troops at least, the refinements of peace-time precision in drill and military courtesy and formality were unnecessary in the attainment of battle efficiency. The Australians were probably the most effective troops employed in the war on either side.

Immediately after the relief of the division from the line after the Hindenburg Line Battle, official commendations of the work of the division began to arrive at Division Headquarters. Some of these follow:

HEADQUARTERS II CORPS
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES.

FRANCE, October 4, 1918.

From: Adjutant General.
To: Commanding General, 27th Division, American Expeditionary Forces.
Subject: Operation against Hindenburg Line of September 2, 1918.

1. Following is letter received from the Commanding General, Australian Corps:

AUSTRALIAN CORPS

CORPS HEADQUARTERS, October 2, 1918.

My Dear General:

As the II American Corps has been withdrawn from the line, and my official association with you and your troops has been, for the time, suspended, I desire to express to you the great pleasure it has been to me and to the troops of the Australian Army Corps to have been so closely allied to you in the recent very important battle operations which have resulted in the breaking through of the main Hindenburg Line on the front of the 4th British Army.

Now that fuller details of the work done by the 27th and the 30th American Divisions have become available, the splendid gallantry and devotion of the troops in these operations have won the admiration of their Australian comrades. The tasks set were formidable, but the American troops overcame all obstacles and contributed in a very high degree to the ultimate capture of the whole tunnel system.

I shall be glad if you will convey to your Division Commanders my appreciation and thanks for the work done and to accept my best wishes for every possible success in the future.

Yours very sincerely,
(signed) JOHN MONASH.

Major General G. W. Read, N. A.,
Commanding II American Corps.

2. In communicating to you this expression of the sentiments of the Commander of the Australian Corps, the Corps Commander desires to make known to you his appreciation of the splendid fighting qualities of your division, and of the results they

accomplished in their part in breaking this formidable portion of the Hindenburg Line. It is undoubtedly due to the troops of this corps that the line was broken and the operations now going on made possible.

The unflinching determination of those men, their gallantry in battle and the results accomplished, are an example for the future. They will have their place in history and must always be a source of pride to our people.

(Signed) STEPHEN C. CLARK,
Adjutant General.

LETTER FROM THE COMMANDING GENERAL, 3d Australian Division

France, October 14, 1918.

Major General J. F. O'Ryan, 27th Division.

General:

On behalf of all ranks of the 3d Australian Division, I desire to express our sincere appreciation of the fighting qualities displayed by the 27th Division U. S. on the 27th and 29th of September last. The gallant manner in which your troops faced an extremely difficult task, the determination of their attack on a strongly intrenched position, and the undaunted spirit with which they met their losses make us hope that we shall again have the honor of fighting alongside the division under your command. The confidence of the men in their officers appealed to us as a particularly happy omen for the future success of the 27th.

Very respectfully,
I. GELLIBRAND,
Major General.
Commanding 3d Australian Division.

OFFICIAL TELEGRAM FROM GENERAL PERSHING

(Dated October 10, 1918)

Commanding General, 27th Division:

The following repeated for your information quote number 160603. The Commander in Chief desires you to convey to the officers and soldiers of your corps his appreciation of the magnificent qualities which have enabled them, against powerful resistance, to advance more than ten miles and to take more than 6,000 prisoners since September 27th. McANDREW. Unquote added 27th and 30th divs. II American Corps.

OFFICIAL TELEGRAM FROM SIR DOUGLAS HAIG, K. T., G. C. B., G. C. V. O., K. C. I. E.,

Field Marshal, Commander in Chief, British Expeditionary Forces

(Dated October 20, 1918)

General Read, II American Corps: I wish to express to you personally and to all the officers and men serving under you my warm appreciation of the very valuable and gallant services rendered by you throughout the recent operations with the 4th British Army. Called upon to attack positions of great strength held by a determined enemy, all ranks of the 27th and 30th American Divisions, under your command, displayed an energy, courage and determination in attack which proved irresistible. It does not need me to tell you that in the heavy fighting of the past three weeks you have earned the lasting esteem and admiration of your British comrades in arms whose success you have so nobly shared.

D. HAIG.

ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CITATION

EXTRACT

SPECIAL ORDER
NO. 86

HEADQUARTERS 27TH DIVISION, U.S.A.
AMERICAN E. F. FRANCE
Camp Upton, N. Y.
March 27, 1919.

Private George J. Cuddy, deceased
1210851 Company F. 107th Infantry

2. For exceptional valor and inspiring example during the battle of the Hindenburg Line, France, September 29, 1918. This soldier was shot thru the throat and both cheeks by machine gun bullets when his company entered the enemy machine gun barrage during its advance. He was ordered to the rear. Unable to speak, he shook his head and immediately started forward, furnishing to his company an inspiring example of determination at a critical moment. Shortly thereafter he received a third and fatal wound.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL O'RYAN

THE FOREGOING IS AN EXTRACT FROM THE SPECIAL ORDER QUOTED

APPROVED

MAJOR GENERAL COMMANDING

Assistant
ADJUTANT GENERAL DIVISION ADJUTANT

CHAPTER XVIII

ENEMY RETIREMENT FROM HINDENBURG LINE, THE PURSUIT TO LE SELLE RIVER, AND LE SELLE RIVER OPERATIONS



IN the preceding chapter it was explained how the attack made by the 27th and 30th American Divisions was followed on September 30th by the continued advance of the 3d and 5th Australian Divisions.

On October 1st the 27th and 30th Divisions retired for rest and reorganization close behind the forward areas, but out of shell fire.

Supporting troops of the 4th Army pushed through the break in the Hindenburg Line and took advantage of the great disorganization which had been created among enemy troops as a result of the constant hard fighting that had taken place. On October 1st General Rawlinson directed a prepared attack to be made at 6:05 A. M. on the morning of October 3d for the purpose of taking the high ground known as Mannequin Hill and the villages of Montbrehain and Beaurevoir, as well as Prospect Hill northeast of Gouy. This attack was generally successful. The enemy attempted to retain Ramicourt, but was driven out. At Montbrehain British troops captured about 1,000 German prisoners and a battery of field artillery. The enemy continued to withdraw. The line of the Beaurevoir-Gouy Road was reached with practically no opposition. Macquincourt Farm, near the north end of the tunnel, was one of the last points of resistance to give way.

On October 3d an Alsatian prisoner was captured who stated that roads and points in the back areas, as well as buildings and bridges, were being mined and prepared for demolition to retard pursuit.

On October 5th, the 2d Australian Division attacked Montbrehain. The attack was successful. Numerous prisoners were taken and the enemy seemed to be disorganized. As a result of this deep penetration beyond the breach made in the Hindenburg Line the enemy was compelled to withdraw along the entire front between Lens and Armentieres. On this day a warning order was received that the II American Corps would prepare to relieve the Australian Corps in the line, the 30th Division to take over the front line with the 27th Division in reserve, the latter division probably to move about October 9th.

Beyond the Hindenburg Line, French villages were intact and the country had not been devastated by the war. In fact it had been under German domination since 1914. As one proceeds easterly over the rolling country beyond the Hindenburg Line, the most serious natural obstacle to be met is Le Selle River. It was evident that the enemy would not retire



Army direction signs, Busigny, France



German motor truck captured by the 27th Division during Le Selle River operations

beyond Le Selle River, but along the line of the stream would make another stand.

On October 6th the II American Corps, composed of the 27th and 30th Divisions, was again assigned for active operations with the Fourth Army. As planned, the 30th Division took the lead with the 27th Division in support. On this day the 53d Brigade marched to the Tincourt area and the next day advanced to the Hervilly area, the 54th Brigade moving to the area vacated by the 53d Brigade.

The village of Brancourt was taken by the 30th Division during the advance of October 8th. With little opposition the same division advanced the next day to Becquigny and Busigny.

On October 8th, the 27th Division troops marched to the Tincourt area, which had just been vacated by the 54th Brigade, that brigade moving to the Bellicourt area.

On October 9th Division Headquarters moved from Bois de Buerre to Joncourt, the divisional troops and 53d Brigade advanced to Bellicourt and vicinity, while the 54th Brigade advanced to the vicinity of Brancourt.

On October 10th the 30th Division gained the westerly outskirts of Vaux Andigny, La Haie Menneresse and St. Souplet. Strong resistance was met from the westerly bank of Le Selle River, which was supported by heavy machine gun fire from the high embankment on the easterly side of the river. The pursuit of the enemy by the 30th Division in this sector had been most gallant and determined.

On October 10th the 54th Brigade marched to bivouacs just south and east of Premont, the 53d Brigade at the same time moving into the Brancourt area and the divisional troops to the vicinity of Montbrehain.

It became clear that the enemy intended to hold the line of Le Selle River in force. Dispositions of the enemy were unknown along the front, and the cloudy, rainy weather had made air reconnaissance unsatisfactory. The pursuit had ended, and the Fourth Army was confronted with the task of reconnoitering the enemy's position and delivering another prepared attack.

The 27th Division was ordered to relieve the 30th Division on the night of October 11th. This was done, and the 27th Division took over the line shown on the accompanying map and extending from St. Benin (exclusive) to Vaux Andigny (inclusive). This line was 11,000 yards in length and included not only the sector held by the 30th Division, but a part of the line held by the 6th British Division. At daylight on the 11th the 54th Brigade had marched to woods east of Premont, the 53d Brigade in close support at Premont and divisional troops on the march to the latter place. Division Headquarters opened at Premont on the same day.

This relief of the 30th Division was accomplished pursuant to Field Orders Nos. 59 and 60 and Orders Nos. 106 and 107, copies of which may be found in the Appendix as Exhibit 40.

The 54th Brigade held the front of the divisional sector. General



Division Headquarters at Busigny



Removing wounded from Division Headquarters at Busigny after the shelling, October 18, 1918

Pierce's headquarters were established in Busigny. The 53d Brigade, less one battalion of the 105th Infantry, moved up in close support to bivouacs west and northwest of Busigny, Brigade Headquarters being established in the town of Busigny. The headquarters of the 108th Infantry were established at Escaufourt. That regiment held the line from St. Benin to the weaving mill immediately south of St. Souplet. The 107th Infantry carried the line from that point south to the westerly side of the village of St. Martin-Rivere, from which point the line bent back to the east side of La Haie Menneresse, whence it was carried to and around the easterly outskirts of Vaux Andigny, where it joined the British division on the south. Headquarters of the 107th Infantry were established at Escaufourt. Company D of the 106th Machine Gun Battalion was in support of the left of the 108th. Company C of the same battalion was on the high ground west of La Haie Menneresse. Companies A and B occupied ground immediately west of Vaux Andigny. The 106th Infantry was in support in the area west of Escaufourt, while the 105th Infantry was in support of the 107th Infantry. The occupation of the line was made quickly and in the manner most convenient to make prompt relief of the 30th Division, which had been carrying the burden of the pursuit. A reduction of the front of the line held would, of course, be essential before any prepared attack could be made.

At about 1:45 P. M. on Sunday, October 13th, the enemy put down a heavy crash of shell fire on the village of Busigny. Several of these shells struck in the courtyard of the chateau at Busigny, where Division Headquarters had just been located. Other shells fell in and about the Brigade Headquarters. At Division Headquarters a fragment of one shell struck Major Chester H. King, of the 104th Machine Gun Battalion, in the head, inflicting a serious wound which necessitated his prompt evacuation. At the same time several motorcycle dispatch riders attached to the divisional message center were badly wounded by shell fragments. The mobile electric light plant was damaged and several motorcycles destroyed.

Escaufourt and St. Souplet were receiving similar visitations of shell fire. At Escaufourt one shell burst outside the headquarters of the 106th Infantry, where Colonel Ward and a number of officers were located, a fragment striking Captain Euston F. Edmonds, attached to the 53d Brigade Headquarters, in the arm, causing a serious wound necessitating his evacuation.

On October 14th orders were received that the front held by the 27th Division was to be reduced the same night to the sector extending between W.14.d.5.0 on the south and Q.28.c.0.0 on the north, as shown on the accompanying map,the 6th British Division taking over the remainder of the line on the south and the 50th British Division taking over the remainder of the line on the north. This was accomplished pursuant to Field Orders No. 61. This reduced the 27th Division sector to about 4,200 yards. The strength of the infantry companies at this time averaged less than sixty rifles per company. The division was still without replace-

ments. This new front was later to be reduced for the purpose of the coming attack by dividing it equally between the 27th and 30th Divisions.

On the 14th of October the Division Commander determined upon a raid to be made by a detachment of the 54th Brigade into enemy territory for the purpose of securing prisoners, and thereby establishing the identity of opposing organizations, and as well to reconnoiter the character of the obstacles to further advance on the day of attack, interposed by Le Selle River. It had seemed to the Division Commander that in the past, raiding detachments had sustained losses out of proportion to the benefit gained and that such losses were usually to be attributed to the fact that the number of men making up such detachments were unnecessarily large. At any rate it was determined in this instance to give the impression to the enemy that the raid was one conducted by a substantial force, but actually to compose the raiding party of less than thirty men. Arrangements were made for the divisional artillery to place a barrage on a frontage of 1,500 yards on the enemy trenches fronting the 108th Infantry at St. Souplet, and to smoke both flanks and the enemy support areas, so as to deceive the enemy as to the character of attack to be made. The barrage was to rest for three minutes, after which the middle sector of the barrage, approximating 200 yards in width, would move forward, the remainder of the barrage fire continuing on enemy front line trenches, in order to hold the occupants in their shelters. The plan was that not more than a platoon should follow the moving part of the barrage and secure prisoners, while two other patrols, having gained the river, would move, one up the stream and the other down the stream, for the purpose of securing all necessary information concerning its depth, width and obstructions. The details of the conduct of the raid were left to Brigadier General Pierce, who delegated the 108th Infantry to make the raid. The officer selected to command the raiding party was First Lieutenant Charles R. Fritz, of Company I. Numbers of men volunteered and the party was promptly constituted of approximately twenty-one selected men. The party assembled at Q.33.d.3.9 at 3:45 P. M. on October 14th. The raid was made at 4 o'clock in the afternoon in broad daylight. It was a complete surprise. The intensity of the barrage and its considerable front led the enemy to believe that an attack was on. Under cover of the smoke Lieutenant Fritz's party waded the river, which was then about three feet deep. They came in contact with enemy groups in dugouts near Q.34.a.3.0, along the railway embankment, and at the railway station, and captured two non-commissioned officers and twenty-one enlisted men without loss to themselves, except two men slightly wounded. The prisoners were from the 414th Infantry Regiment of the 204th Division, recruited in Wurtemburg. The prisoners reported that they had been instructed to hold the line at all cost. They had shortly before come into the line from the Vosges Mountains. Le Selle River was found by the reconnaissance parties to be narrow and sluggish, but waist deep in places. One of these patrols was led by Second Lieutenant James W. Cross of Company L, who personally waded



Church at St. Souplet, France

the stream from the mill down to a point where the main bridge had been destroyed. This officer rendered a very complete report covering his observations. He reported that the banks averaged from five to six feet in height and were steeper on the east bank than on the west; that the stream itself averaged from ten to twenty feet in width and from three to four feet in depth; that its bed near the edge was soft but had a firm gravel bottom in the center, and that the ground from the river bank to the railway track had a gradual upward slope.



Main Street, St. Souplet, France

The raid was a complete success and its results fully justified the plans for its execution. The fact that we lost no men was particularly gratifying.

On the same day that this raid was made an order was received from the Corps Commander directing that a raid be made for the purpose of securing identifications. Arrangements having already been made for such an operation, which was in fact to be carried out on the day the order from the corps was received, it was possible to comply with this order with surprising promptness and with the results already described.

During the period of occupation of the front, from October 11th until the commencement of the attack of the 17th, there was constant patrolling and sniping, as well as shelling, to occupy the attention and to test the endurance and morale of the troops in their fatigued condition. At Imberfayt Farm, 800 yards north of La Haie Menneresse, occupied by the headquarters of the 2d Battalion of the 107th Infantry, the heavy shelling had caused a number of casualties. The line about La Haie Menneresse was subjected to constant enemy machine gun fire from the direction of the heights of Bellevue in W.27.a. St. Souplet was kept flooded with gas by enemy shelling.

On October 15th, pursuant to orders from the II American Corps, Field Orders No. 62 were issued in preparation for the attack to be made on the 17th. These orders directed that the front then held by the division be further reduced, by the 30th Division relieving that portion of the 54th Brigade holding the sector south of W.9.b.0.5. This reduction resulted in the divisional sector extending from Q.28.c.0.0 on the north to W.9.b.0.5 on the south. The 53d Brigade was directed to relieve the 54th Brigade in the right half of the new divisional sector, which gave each of the brigades a frontage of about 1,000 yards. The interbrigade boundary was fixed at Q.34.c.0.0. The enemy was holding a line on the east bank of Le Selle River as far south as St. Souplet, from which point the line continued on the west bank of the river facing our line and a short distance therefrom throughout the remainder of the divisional sector. The river had been dammed by the enemy so as to make considerable backwater in the river bed within the divisional sector. The permanent bridges at St. Souplet and Marsh Mill had been destroyed by the enemy. East of the river the ground rose gradually for a short distance. About 300 yards east of the stream a railway ran nearly parallel to the river and upon a railway embankment about thirty to forty feet high. The railroad was carried on a heavy stone bridge over the road running from St. Souplet easterly to Arbre Guernon and Mazingheim. To the east of this rose a low ridge which again sloped to a valley running to the northward, in which lay Bandival Farm. On the next rise ran the main Le Cateau-Arbre Guernon Road, the latter named village being at the extreme southern edge of the divisional boundary. Advantage Farm, an organized strong point, lay a short distance north of Arbre Guernon at the top of the rise. Farther eastward the terrain again rose to a ridge on which was located Jonc de Mer Farm and then sloped to a valley running to the



View of Bandival Farm, taken during summer of 1920

north, and rising again to another ridge on which was located La Jonquiere Farm. The two farms named were organized as enemy strong points. Beyond lay the valley of the St. Maurice River and then another ridge beyond which lay Catillon and the Canal de la Sambre.

The redistribution of troops in preparation for the attack was effected without incident as directed, on the night of October 14th-15th. The positions of the units in the line are indicated on the accompanying map.



Another view of Bandival Farm

On the 15th of October orders having been received from the II American Corps that the divisions of the corps would attack on the 17th in the sectors assigned them, and that at the same time the remainder of the 4th Army would also attack, the IX British Corps on the right and the XIII on the left, Field Orders No. 63 of the division were issued. These orders, which cover the operations which became known as the Battle of Le Selle River, will be found in the Appendix as Exhibit 41. As will be seen from the orders, the 54th Brigade with the 108th Infantry in the lead and the 107th in support was to attack in the left half of the divisional sector from St. Souplet, while the 53d Brigade with the 105th Infantry in the lead and the 106th Infantry in support was to attack on the south half of the divisional sector.

The artillery assigned to the division was that of the 4th Australian Division. Zero hour was fixed at 5:20 A. M. on October 17th. The barrage was to move forward at the rate of 100 yards in three minutes, first having rested for three minutes on the artillery start line. The infantry was to advance under this barrage to a line approximately along the Arbre Guernon-Le Cateau Road, a distance of about 3,000 yards from the jumping-off line, where the barrage was to halt for thirty minutes to give the infantry time to reorganize and mop up. At the end of this half hour the infantry was again to follow the barrage to the first objective, which was a line running north and south and located immediately east of Jonc de Mer Farm. Here the first line was to organize a line of resistance and the troops designated to take the second objective were to advance and prepare to continue the attack. The artillery was to fire a protective barrage for thirty minutes and then lift and search the ground eastward. After the line had halted on the first objective for three hours, the second line battalions were to pass through the front line and continue the advance, with the assistance of tanks, supported by batteries cooperating directly with them, but without the creeping barrage. The advance was to be made in open warfare formation to the second objective, which was a line on the crest of the hill just west of Catillon, where the infantry was to halt, organize a line of resistance and immediately exploit to the line of the Canal de la Sambre. The machine gun battalions were to support the attack with a machine gun barrage, the 105th Machine Gun Battalion on the south half of the divisional sector and the 106th on the north half. The 104th Machine Gun Battalion was in the divisional reserve immediately south of Busigny. The 102d Engineers were directed to prepare foot bridges in readiness for the opening of the attack, and as soon as the first infantry wave crossed Le Selle River behind the barrage, were to carry the foot bridges forward and place them at designated points indicated in special instructions given them. At the same time a large detachment of engineers was to undertake the repair of the bridge over the river at St. Souplet, which had been blown up, or the construction of a temporary bridge strong enough to enable the artillery to cross. Another detachment of engineers was directed to follow the infantry across the stream and to clear away the debris of the

stone railroad bridge which had been blown up and which was effectively blocking the road from St. Souplet to Arbre Guernon. Ten heavy tanks of the 301st Tank Battalion were assigned the division, but as it was believed that these tanks could not cross Le Selle River as far north as the 27th Division sector, it was planned that they would cross where the stream presented less of an obstacle further to the south, and then move north to assist the infantry as soon as practicable after crossing. One squadron of the 20th British Hussars was assigned the 27th Division by the IV Army. Each of the infantry brigades was furnished with a detachment of troopers from this squadron, while the remainder were held under orders of the Division Commander.

In preparation for this attack the Division Commander sent a personal communication to the Brigade Commanders dated October 15th. This was in the form of a memorandum of discussion covering features of the coming operations and the difficulties to be met. The memorandum emphasized the importance of applying particular methods to meet expected difficulties. The paper is included here, as it will give the reader an intimate insight into the character of the operations as planned.

The following is a memorandum of points which should have special attention in the coming operations. As the time is short and as these points should have careful attention of the Regimental and Battalion Commanders as well, six copies are furnished each Brigade Commander for prompt distribution to those concerned if such action is deemed desirable.

1. The location of the barrage starting line indicates the necessity for a withdrawal of units of the 53d Brigade which now hold positions in advance of that line. This situation should make easy the accurate taping of the start line of the 53d Brigade. Outposts beyond the barrage start line should not be entirely withdrawn until fifteen or twenty minutes before zero hour in order to prevent hostile patrols or enemy light machine gunners from advancing inside our barrage line.

2. In the 54th Brigade sector the buildings of St. Souplet should aid materially in locating the precise start line.

3. In both brigades the line should not be taped until after dusk of the evening preceding the attack, but the line for the tape should be pegged in advance by competent officers and this checked by the Battalion Commanders concerned. Much of the success of a barrage operation depends upon the start.

4. The first obstacle to be met is Le Selle River. The leading battalions in order to keep up with the barrage will have to cross this river by wading it. Simultaneously with this advance engineer detachments will endeavor to place foot bridges at the rate of four on each brigade front more or less evenly distributed for the convenient passage of following troops. It should be borne in mind, however, by all concerned, and particularly by the Battalion Commanders of the next battalions to cross, that the essential thing is to cross at the time prescribed by brigade or regimental orders. Therefore, if the foot bridges are not ready they must cross by wading. If possible, as an insurance against men falling into holes in the stream bottom, it would be well to provide hand ropes to be passed across the stream and either secured to some fixed object on the other side or held by three or four men so that men crossing may maintain a hold on the rope, using it as a hand rail. The engineers have undertaken to provide such assistance.

5. Some enemy machine gunners may be encountered on the line of the railroad and in the sunken road immediately east of it in the sector of the 54th Brigade. Men in the leading battalions should not be permitted to do more than disarm enemy soldiers who surrender and turn them over to supports immediately following, who in

turn should wave them to the rear. Such detailed instructions should be given to all the men of the battalions in relation to this matter that the strength of companies will not be frittered away by men going back with prisoners. There will be Military Police in St. Souplet and many troops following the leading battalions, so that there will be no occasion for concern that prisoners will get away or act badly.

6. If the enemy is to offer serious resistance in the beginning of the attack it is believed that this resistance will be offered on the line of new entrenchments prepared by him along the ridge 400 yards east of and parallel to the railroad. The leading elements should pass quickly over these entrenchments so as not to lose the barrage, leaving to mopping up details the duty of securing the occupants of these trenches. The same comments made in relation to the handling of prisoners that may be taken on the line of the railroad hold in relation to this trench line, for it is essential that the strength of the leading units be not impaired at this stage of the advance.

7. Upon reaching this line, the advance will have covered a distance of 900 yards on the left and about 1,500 yards on the right of the divisional sector. This line of entrenchments appears to constitute a desirable trace for a position facing east. About the time our line arrives on the general line of this trench there may be cause for concern in relation to our flanks. For that reason it might be well to consider placing at least one and perhaps two Lewis guns from the reserve battalion in those trenches at either end of our sector line. These parties should be provided with bombs for defensive purposes. At the north end of our sector from this point, it will be seen from the map that such a position affords excellent flank field of fire and should provide effective flank security until it is assured that the British division on our left has covered up to that line. A position in this trench at or near the top of this knoll would seem to be an excellent location for one or more Stokes mortars and a rest place for one or more of the one-pounders which are to accompany the advance of the 108th Infantry. From this position these weapons could deal effectively with possible resistance in the sunken road and farm in the hollow near Q.29.central. Similar comment applies in a measure to the use of these weapons by the 105th Infantry Regiment from the same trench system at the southern divisional boundary. From such position the one-pounders could deal with targets in the village at W.8.b. and the Stokes mortars with targets within the limits of their range. With the adjoining divisions in possession of this trench system on our flanks, it should be a matter of honor with these detachments to hurry on to engage in other and similar missions further forward.

8. Between the trench system referred to and the pause line it is not believed that much resistance will be encountered except possibly from Bandival Farm in the hollow near Q.29.central, the hedge shown by the red dotted line in parallelogram form extending northwest from the orchard in Q.36.a.9.7. and the sunken roads in the valley 600 yards north of Bandival Farm. To secure the left flank of the 108th Regiment during the thirty-minute pause it might be well to provide for a special flank protection on the nose of the ridge at Q.29.b.3.7. A Stokes mortar advancing from the first flank position to Bandival Farm after that place is mopped up should be in good position to deal with opposition from the sunken roads referred to. These also could effectively be dealt with by the one-pounder from the first flank position.

9. The thirty-minute pause will enable leading troops to organize these places. It will also enable them to dig in to some extent along the road extending northwest from Q.30, and south through the copse on the interbrigade boundary line. It will also enable supporting and reserve troops to readjust their units and to orient themselves.

10. In spite of time tables it is probable that troops will not know what time they arrive on the pause line. They will pause because the barrage will stop and then it is hoped they will recognize the road and copse referred to and dig in, providing for the security of their flanks. It is important, however, that they do remember that the sudden increase in the intensity of the protective barrage constitutes the warning signal that in two minutes the barrage will again move forward. Therefore they should be ready to move with the barrage.

11. From a study of the map it would not seem that there is much resistance to be expected in the 54th Brigade area until its arrival on the line of the first objective. Some resistance may be offered by machine gun fire from Le Quennelet in Q.24.a. Again it would seem to be desirable to provide special flank security in this location by provision for a special party to occupy the ridge at Q.24.central until the British division on our left secures Le Quennelet. Some resistance may also be encountered at La Roux in R.13.d., as well as from Jonc de Mer Farm and copse in R.25.b.

12. In the case of the 53d Brigade greater resistance is to be expected, for there is the village of Arbre Guernon to be taken and mopped up. It may be that the resistance here may not be strongest from the village itself, but rather from the edges of hedges about the road leading north and west from the village. The mopping up parties should be warned of such possibility. One or two Lewis guns quickly gotten into the upper floors of buildings on the southern outskirts of this village should provide excellent flank security for the 53d Brigade at this stage of the advance.

13. Upon reaching the first objective the leading elements should not endeavor with their low strength to consolidate a line of resistance. The line of resistance should be organized in groups and in depth, each group digging in, in several positions having the best possible fields of fire. In the 54th Brigade the remains of Roux Farm and the copse should constitute the means for organizing a local strong point, and it will be noted that its field of fire is good. The detachments to occupy and hold this place should be warned to observe sharply the valley running north toward Basuel, for it is up such valleys that the enemy usually trickles his forces to assemble for counter-attack purposes. During the three-hour halt on this line the heavy artillery will bombard this valley as well as the next valley to the east thereof. Similar comment applies to Jonc de Mer Farm and copse on the interbrigade boundary. It might be well to organize this as a local strong point in establishing the line of resistance. Further to the right in the 53d Brigade sector, excellent fields of fire are to be had on the hedges shown by the red dotted lines at R.31.b.9.8. Right here it should be emphasized that upon attaining this line, a red flare should be burned by each squad as a signal to observers that the line has been attained. Later, if called for by aeroplanes sounding "A" on the Klaxon horn and dropping a white light, the flare signal should be repeated on this line. Flares should not be burned for any reason during the thirty-minute pause prior to attaining the first objective, unless specially called for by the aeroplane. In any event, sufficient flares should be maintained for use on the line of the final objective.

14. In proceeding beyond the first objective, practically all the operation conditions change, for as stated at the conference, the division then goes into open warfare. From this point on there will be no barrage. The heavy artillery will shoot special targets well in advance and will engage hostile battery locations. The troops designated to engage in this open warfare advance will have been brought up during the three-hour halt as directed by the Brigade Commanders and at the termination of the three-hour halt will without further signal or warning take up open warfare formations and continue the advance to the final objective.

15. I know from observation that the tendency is toward insufficient elasticity of movement in such operations, particularly in a terrain of the character presented by the area to be covered. By that I mean that the patrols should in the first instance proceed well in advance of their elements, so that in the case of the 54th Brigade sector, they may gain the ridge 1,000 yards in front of the first objective. If these patrols signal the ridge clear, the distance between elements may be reduced until the ridge is gained and held with proper disposition in depth. Similar principles would apply to the 53d Brigade sector, with additional precautions in relation to the strong point at Le Jonquiere Farm and copse, which I suspect may turn out to be a serious obstacle in view of its approaches from the enemy side, its commanding position for purposes of observation and fire, and the cover afforded in the vicinity. One-pounders advanced to Jonc de Mer Farm and the supporting fire of the light batteries directly attached to the regiments, together with the possible assistance to be afforded by the tanks, should furnish means necessary to overcome resistance.

16. With possession of La Joncquiere Farm I believe the only remaining difficulties of a serious nature will be fire from LaRoux, Tonnoille Farm in N.28 central, from Catillon and the road leading northwest from the latter place with the copse about it.

At this point I should say that in relation to all of these obstacles I have arranged to-night for heavy destructive shoots against all of them by both light and heavy artillery throughout the day, to-morrow and to-morrow night as well.

17. With the attainment of the final objective, the line should be entrenched as speedily as possible and preparations made to stand off possible counter-attacks. The danger point, I think, will be from the north, and I believe, therefore, that not only should the commanding position at R.9. central be well organized, but there should be if possible machine gun supports to that position and machine guns also placed so as to cover the two draws on either side of that ridge leading to the north. Field artillery and Stokes mortars should so be placed as to effectively cover these two draws. Liaison with the units on the north will fix the limits of their line and the location and character of their points of resistance.

18. The area of exploitation beyond the final objective should be covered by patrols with the least practicable delay, with a view to contact with the enemy and ascertaining the extent of his retirement. Information from these patrols should be sent back with the least delay. The quickest means of communication will probably be by wireless.

The foregoing are suggestions and are not intended as specific directions, which might hamper those charged with carrying on the local operations. They are not needed by the Regimental and Brigade Commanders, but will doubtless prove of value as a guide at least in coordinating the work of the two brigades and in aiding the work of the Battalion Commanders.

JOHN F. O'RYAN, Major General.

October 16, 1918.

SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADE COMMANDERS PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS.

1. Zero hour will be communicated to you by a Division Staff Officer.
2. Synchronization of watches will be effected upon the arrival of a Division Staff Officer, as soon as proper time is received from the corps.
3. Compass bearing should be taken on boundaries and prominent points to serve as a means of accurate identification of position.
4. Mopping up parties should be assigned special tasks.
5. In addition to flank protection, liaison should be maintained from rear forward.
6. Means of communication:

Signal lamps. It has been found in recent operations that the most successful means of maintaining communication has been by use of signal lamps.

The terrain over which this operation will take place affords excellent opportunity for their successful use. Stations should be established in advance, and operators fully informed of their positions.

Telephone, buzzer and wireless; message rockets; runners. Routes for runners should be selected as far as practicable before the operation. Such routes, in order to reduce casualties, should avoid areas most likely to be shelled.

Mounted orderlies.

7. Supplies:
   - Battle stores.
   - Grenades.
   - Flares.
   - Discs.
   - Rockets.
   - Hot food—necessary arrangements for.
   - Rations.

8. Dressing stations. Information concerning them should reach all concerned.

9. Information:

Send back frequently, even if negative. Be accurate.

Quote time in body of message as well as time sent.

Determine exact locations.

Send staff officers to secure information as an additional means.

Observe the roads for men returning from the front and question them for purpose of ascertaining duties upon which they are engaged. Get their estimate of the situation if they have returned from the front line.

10. Correct false impressions. It has been found that in recent operations men returning from the front line frequently bear wild tales as to losses and conditions in the front line. The impressions are usually based on local conditions within a limited area.

11. Wounded should be accompanied only when absolutely necessary, and then by the least possible number.

12. Prisoners. Guards should be small and should return immediately to the line. Prisoners *should* be treated with the consideration imposed by regulations. (Reference G. O. 159.)

13. Stragglers. This subject is of especial importance now, in view of the present strength of organizations. Use all available means to prevent stragglers reaching the rear.

Watch your headquarters to see that there are no unauthorized men present.

14. Roll call. After the operation a roll call should be made immediately to determine the actual number of men present and so far as practicable to fix the number of casualties.

Even during the operation constant effort should be made to ascertain the strength of the unit under your command.

This applies particularly to company and platoon commanders, and commanders of small units.

15. Police of battle-field. Upon conclusion of the operation it is important to determine the number of machine guns and other arms captured, and to identify their locations, and if practicable to secure such captures. However, this does not contemplate that troops should be sent to the rear for the purpose.

Plans will issue for the evacuation of wounded and dead.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL O'RYAN.

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

Orders No. 111 accompanied Field Orders No. 63. These orders will be found in the Appendix as a part of Exhibit 41.

The division at this time was a very different division from that which had joined the Fourth British Army a month before. The division had joined that army with units in the full power of their strength, except that the 53d Brigade units had suffered some losses in Flanders. But at this time the very heavy casualties of the Hindenburg Line operations had greatly reduced the strength of all units, and extraordinary as it may seem, no replacements had been received to make up for these great losses. Accordingly the rifle strength of the regiments at this time was as follows:

105th Infantry.....732
106th Infantry.....405
107th Infantry.....648
108th Infantry.....592

or a total rifle strength for the division of but 2,377 men, instead of more than 12,000 which the division should have had. But what the division lacked in numbers, was made up in substantial measure at least, in the experience and skill it had acquired. The confidence exhibited in the Hindenburg Line Battle was still in evidence, but now it was accompanied by experienced understanding and deliberation of preparation and movement. During the operations of Le Selle River, the men of the division captured many more prisoners and with much less loss than was the case in the Hindenburg Line Battle. This, of course, was mainly due to the strength of the Hindenburg Line defenses and to the determined resistance offered there by the enemy, as compared with the conditions existing in the enemy ranks during the operations of Le Selle River. At the same time, however, it is believed that the results were materially affected by the greater experience and more certain skill possessed by the division in the latter operations.

Preceding the battle of October 17th, the usual divisional, brigade, regimental and battalion conferences were held. All troops reached their battle stations on time and in the manner prescribed by orders. On the morning of the attack there was a heavy mist which added to the density of the smoke barrage which had come to be a feature of attacks at this time. At zero hour, the barrage fell along the westerly side of the river where the enemy still held vantage points, particularly south of St. Souplet. There had been continuous house-to-house sniping and patrol fighting on the easterly edges of St. Souplet during the preceding week.

At 5:20 on the morning of October 17th, when the barrage fell, the troops moved forward. On the front of the 108th Infantry in the left half of the divisional sector, that regiment attacked in column of battalions, the 1st Battalion under command of Major Frederick S. Couchman, in the lead. The battalion attacked with two companies in the line and two in support. It was followed by the 3d Battalion, commanded by Captain Samuel H. Merrill. This battalion furnished the mopping up parties. The 2d Battalion followed as regimental reserve. The river was crossed with little difficulty by wading, except that some of the men got into water deep enough to wet their gas masks. The damaged respirators were replaced from battalion and regimental reserve. The first strong resistance met by the 108th Infantry in its advance, was from the westerly side of the railroad embankment. In overcoming these enemy parties and climbing the high railroad embankment, the leading elements of Couchman's battalion fell behind the barrage. These elements, however, quickly resumed their forward movement. Much opposition was expected to be met at Bandival Farm in Q.29.c. central. Our artillery had shelled this place heavily and the machine gun battalions had visited it with a hurricane of machine gun bullets for a considerable period of time and up to within a few minutes of the arrival of the leading waves of the 108th Infantry. The place was mopped up with little difficulty and a large number of prisoners taken. Bandival Farm (known locally as Baudival Farm) was visited by the writer and Colonel Wainwright in the

Map showing

Corps Lines taken over by the

27th DIVISION

Night, October 11, 1918

Sectors of Attack of the 27th and 30th Divisions Oct. 17-20, and the successive advances of the 27th Division, Oct. 17-20

Scale of Yards

0 500 1000

107th Inf. 108th Inf. 106th M.G. BN.

Sheet 57B S.E.

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108th Infantry Headquarters, St. Souplet

summer of 1920, and everywhere on the westerly side of the buildings were to be found the marks of machine gun bullets. The buildings generally were in a shattered condition from shell fire. The 108th Infantry established one of its aid posts in this farm, but that evening and the two following days, the place was subjected to severe artillery fire by the enemy batteries. The most effective enemy machine gun positions encountered were those in the open, away from farms and other prominent objects. Considerable loss was inflicted on the leading battalion of the



107th Infantry Headquarters, St. Souplet

108th Infantry in the sunken road immediately north of Bandival Farm. The British division adjoining the 108th Infantry on the north also suffered casualties in this locality.

By nine o'clock in the morning elements of the leading battalion had reached the road running northwest to southeast through Q.30, that is to say, the road from Arbre Guernon to Le Cateau. Here resistance was met in the form of heavy flank fire from the heights in the area of the British division at Q.23. central and from Jonc de Mer Farm at R.25.a. Under very heavy enemy machine gun and shell fire the leading battalion of the 108th Infantry, now reinforced to some extent by elements from the following battalions, held the line gained for three hours. At this time a heavy counter-attack developed against the right elements of the British division on the left and the latter were forced to fall back several hundred yards. This exposed the left flank of the 108th Infantry to envelopment, and their line on the left was thereupon strengthened and refused, that is to say, bent back so as to maintain connection with the British. Later, the line of the 108th Infantry, on account of the severity of the flank fire directed against it, withdrew to the ridge immediately southwest of the road from Arbre Guernon to Le Cateau and about 250 yards therefrom. There the battalion dug in and consolidated its line. The 108th Infantry in its advance had covered about 2,500 yards. They captured several hundred prisoners, numerous machine guns and anti-tank rifles, together with four field pieces.

What was particularly noticeable in inspecting the area covered by this advance was the very considerable number of German dead. Along the railroad embankment already mentioned a large number of dead were found. If the reader will look at the map, there will be seen in square Q.35.a. a dotted line showing a hedge. Other hedges which existed are not shown on the map. Enemy soldiers had constructed pits and short stretches of trenches at the base of these hedges where good fields of fire were offered. The writer personally saw groups of as many as twenty enemy dead in several of these places. It was difficult to determine from a casual examination of these bodies what percentage of them had been killed from shell fire and what percentage by direct action of the infantry soldier, but it is evident that the 108th Infantry did very effective work in its advance of October 17th.

At 9:00 P. M. on October 15th, two days before the attack, the Division Commander had directed the divisional field artillery to be prepared to fire, between 9 and 9:30 A. M. the following morning, a light barrage along the divisional front and at the same time to smoke the area. This barrage was to remain on the enemy front for three minutes and to move forward at the usual rate. No troops, however, were to follow the barrage. As the barrage cleared each line of suspected enemy trenches, all guns not employed for the firing of the barrage were to fire on the trenches with shrapnel, allowing two minutes after the barrage cleared for enemy soldiers to leave their shelters, assume their battle stations and commence firing through the smoke that obscured them. In other

words the sudden shrapnel fire brought to bear directly upon the trenches and following the barrage, was a substitute for attacking infantry. The heavy smoke was for the purpose of preventing the enemy knowing that infantry were not following the barrage. It was believed that the enemy soldiers would hardly have reached their positions and begun to fire when the shrapnel squalls would fall upon them. The dispositions of the guns which were to fire the shrapnel after the barrage fire had passed over the trenches were located at different distances from the targets, and hence it was essential that these guns would not fire at the same time, but that they would fire so that their shots would arrive at the enemy trenches simultaneously. This order to the artillery was carried out on the morning preceding the opening of the attack, and it is believed that the shrapnel fire accounted for many of the German dead so numerously distributed along the enemy trenches on the ridge east of Le Selle River.

On the same day and in similar manner Bandival Farm received the same treatment. Arbre Guernon also was included in this progressive artillery attack, as well as La Roux Farm and Jonc de Mer Farm.

Theretofore the custom in the British artillery assigned the 27th Division had been to harass particular enemy points of resistance by special shoots directed against such points. The target, in other words, would be shelled for a stated period of time. After the first few shots arrived, however, all the enemy had taken cover. It was the same with us, when the enemy visited points in our area with its artillery fire. It is surprising how quickly human beings can disappear from the face of the earth with the arrival of one or two shells. Accordingly in relation to the shoots prescribed by the Division Commander on this occasion, and which became known as "shell tornadoes," it was stated in his memorandum to the artillery commander:

"The paramount factor in this plan of harassing fire is the employment of a large number of guns for each crash, in lieu of rapid fire by a small number of guns. Loss is inflicted on enemy personnel by the aggregate of the first shots fired from all the guns employed and much depends upon their simultaneous arrival at the target."

It seems to be well established that this form of shell storm fire proved much more effective in inflicting casualties upon the enemy than the long-drawn-out form of harassing fire, and probably accounted for many of the large number of enemy dead found in the area covered by the first day of the division's advance.

The attention of the reader is directed to three photographs which appear in connection with the text. They are three oblique aerial views taken from different points and showing the country between St. Souplet and Arbre Guernon. They were taken on October 14th. These photographs are quite remarkable for their clearness.

The first shows the easterly outskirts of St. Souplet, the railroad embankment and right of way, and the debris of the destroyed railroad bridge blocking the roadway. In the photograph, to the right of the chalk bluff running across the front of the picture, is shown the trench line



Country between St. Souplet and Arbre Guernon, aerial photograph taken October 14, 1918

which shortly before had been constructed by the enemy. The communicating trench connecting it with the sunken road behind it also appears. The road between St. Souplet and Arbre Guernon is clearly indicated, as is the open character of the rolling country in this section of France. This form of terrain afforded excellent fields of fire for the defenders. An inspection of the photograph will also show the hedges surrounding some of the fields, and which offered such excellent cover for enemy machine gun parties. It was across this country that the 108th Infantry advanced on the morning of October 17th. In the upper left-hand corner of the first photograph will be seen four poplar trees. These mark the road leading from Arbre Guernon (on the right of the photograph) to Le Cateau toward the north (left of the photograph). In looking at these photographs the reader is looking towards the east.

The second photograph is another oblique view taken above the northeastern outskirts of St. Souplet. It shows the railroad embankment and right of way running across the photograph, midway between the top and bottom. The railroad station is shown in the right center of the photograph. Near the lower right-hand corner of the photograph will be noted the coordinates Q.34.d.3.0.9.5. These coordinates were marked there evidently in error by the photographic service of the Fourth British Army, as these coordinates on the map mark the railroad bridge, which



View of the railroad station and railroad yard east of St. Souplet, of Bandival Farm, and the highway extending from Arbre Guernon to Le Cateau

as a matter of fact is just off the right side of the photograph. The photograph affords an excellent view of Bandival Farm with the sunken road approaching it from the west. Beyond Bandival Farm may be seen the tall poplar trees which mark the highway running from Arbre Guernon to Le Cateau and which was taken by the 108th Infantry on October 17th after it had swept over the railroad and mopped up Bandival Farm.

The third photograph is another aerial view of Bandival Farm, taken from a point in the air about 1,500 yards north of St. Souplet. In this photograph also will be seen the poplar trees which mark the Arbre Guernon-Le Cateau highway. This photograph clearly shows the line of the railroad with its high embankment extending across the photograph from right to left and just beyond St. Crepin, the hamlet shown in the immediate foreground. The left of the 108th Infantry in its advance across the territory shown in this photograph came into the picture to the right of the destroyed railroad bridge shown in the photograph and moved diagonally across the photograph, so as to include Bandival Farm, to the point where the roadway with the poplar trees leaves the left of the photograph.

On the south half of the divisional sector the 105th Infantry attacked in column of battalions with the 1st Battalion, commanded by Captain George F. Bradshaw, in the lead, followed by the 2d Battalion, commanded



View of Bandival Farm with Arbre Guernon in the distance beyond. Taken from a point 1,500 yards north of St. Souplet

by Captain Charles A. MacArthur, and the 3d Battalion, commanded by First Lieutenant Charles R. Whipple, in the order named.

At 5:20, when our supporting barrage fell, the enemy's counter barrage almost immediately fell along the front held by the 105th Infantry. Lieutenant James T. Bergen, commanding Company E, and Lieutenant A. G. Cunningham of Company H were killed as a result of this fire, while Captain Raymond F. Hodgden, commanding Company H, and First Lieutenant Leo F. Giblyn, commanding Company D, were wounded. A number of enlisted men were killed and wounded. The Machine Gun Company, which was to move forward behind the leading battalion of the regiment, also suffered heavy casualties.

The attacking troops were almost immediately lost to view in the dense smoke and mist. Early reports showed the attack was progressing favorably. At 8:35 A M. Regimental Headquarters moved from Escaufourt to St. Souplet. At 9:15 A. M. Colonel Andrews received a message from Captain Frank R. Potter, commanding Company E, stating that his company had arrived at Arbre Guernon and was engaged in clearing the town. It was also reported that Companies G, H and I had also reached Arbre Guernon. Company G, commanded by First Lieutenant Benjamin Buckley, was farther north. With the message from Captain Potter there arrived under guard as prisoners, three enemy officers and 133 enemy



View of Imberfayt Farm, taken during the summer of 1920

enlisted men. Company C and other detachments of the 1st Battalion had at this time advanced through Arbre Guernon and were attempting to proceed northeast upon the first objective. At 12:27 P. M. the Commanding Officer of the 2d Battalion reported that his line was established on the eastern outskirts of Arbre Guernon and that he was held up by intense enemy machine gun fire.

It will be remembered that the leading battalion of the regiment was the 1st Battalion. When the enemy barrage fell on this battalion it caused so many casualties that there was some confusion, with the result that



View of La Roux Farm, taken during the summer of 1920

the 2d Battalion went through carrying with them many of the men of the 1st Battalion. When the 2d Battalion with Company C and other attached groups of the 1st Battalion arrived at Arbre Guernon, the 2d Battalion proceeded to mop up the village, while Company C, with other elements of the 1st Battalion which had gone forward, reorganized and endeavored to continue the advance beyond Arbre Guernon. Due to lack of numbers, the enemy resistance was sufficient to stop further advance and accordingly the leading elements of the 105th Infantry consolidated their line for the night on the easterly outskirts of Arbre Guernon, continuing their line around the village to the south and west. The left of the 30th Division on the right had not been able to get forward up to the time the line was established, and accordingly the right of the 105th Infantry was refused as a defensive flank until it joined with the 30th Division. During the afternoon and evening, the 30th Division established its front on a line with the 105th Infantry.

Captain MacArthur's battalion had two companies in line, with the remaining two companies in support when they followed the 1st Battalion. Direction was difficult to keep owing to the mist and smoke, and as well the heavy shelling, which seemed to affect the compasses. The left of the battalion line skirted the southern portion of St. Souplet as it crossed the river. At the railroad track and embankment some casualties were sustained, but a considerable number of machine guns and prisoners were taken. The line of the railroad was thoroughly mopped up and other machine gun nests overcome in the advance toward Arbre Guernon. Patrols approached both flanks of the village while groups pushed forward from the front. Bursts of machine gun fire were received during this advance, but the place was taken and mopped up with the result that a large number of prisoners and materiel were captured. Captain MacArthur moved his battalion headquarters to Arbre Guernon and having reorganized his forces, made an effort with the aid of a tank to advance the line. The tank, however, was put out of action.

The 3d Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Carl G. R. Ross, had much difficulty in getting to its battle stations. The battalion followed the 2d Battalion through Busigny at 3:20 A. M. and moved to its position south of St. Souplet. En route in the darkness, they were subjected to very heavy shelling and concentrations of gas. Masks were continuously worn. Shells striking in Company L broke the column so that part of Company L and all of Company M were for a time separated from the rest of the battalion, but arrived in their positions shortly before the barrage opened. Battalion Headquarters were established in a ditch near the cross road near W.2.b.5.3. When the barrage fell the 3d Battalion followed the 2d Battalion in artillery formation at a distance of about 300 yards, Companies I and L in the lead on the left and right respectively, being followed by Companies K and M. The battalion evacuated 200 prisoners taken by the leading battalions.

When the battalion reached the line of the railroad, it having been charged with the protection of the right flank of the regiment, its disposi-



Arbre Guernon, taken during summer of 1920

tions were reorganized and a wait of two hours resulted. The left of the 30th Division had been unable to get forward. Contact with that division, however, was made and when its left regiment went forward, the advance of the 3d Battalion of the 105th Infantry continued toward Arbre Guernon. The advance was made in line of skirmishers and without resistance, the leading battalions having apparently cleaned up the area covered by them. When near Arbre Guernon and within supporting distance of the troops there, the Battalion Commander received a message from Captain Potter of Company E, asking for reinforcements. This was



View of La Joncquiere Farm, taken during the summer of 1920

at 11:25 A. M. Lieutenant George with Company M was immediately sent forward to Arbre Guernon. On approaching the ridge leading north from Arbre Guernon, strong machine gun fire was met. Units of the 3d Battalion, however, pushed forward to strengthen the left of the regimental sector. Lieutenant Alexander Granat of Company I at this point made a personal reconnaissance of the left of the regimental front and established liaison with the right of the 108th Infantry, which shortly before had retired behind the Arbre Guernon-Le Cateau Road as already narrated. By this time men of the 105th Infantry had captured and mopped up Advantage Farm, 500 yards north of Arbre Guernon. In going forward this battalion lost Lieutenant Walrath, who was severely wounded near the trenches in W.2.d. The battalion at this time was very ably commanded by Lieutenant Carl G. R. Ross of Company M, Lieutenant Whipple having been wounded. Lieutenant Ross upon arrival in the vicinity of Arbre Guernon reported to Captain Mac Arthur, commanding the 2d Battalion, who had assumed command of the troops of the 105th Infantry on the extreme front.

The Machine Gun Company of the 105th Infantry, commanded by Captain Howard Bird, had eight guns with the leading battalion and the remainder of the guns with the 3d Battalion. The Captain accompanied the leading battalion. Lieutenant Higbee, commanding the third platoon of the Machine Gun Company, went with the 3d Battalion. The Machine Gun Company assumed its battle positions on time. Captain Bird's command was in position in the sunken road at W.3.c.9.5. one hour before zero. Captain Bird reports that two minutes before zero hour troops on the south of the divisional sector opened up a machine gun barrage with the result that the enemy artillery counter barrage promptly replied, its fire overlapping on the right of the 27th Division front. Three large shells struck along the road in the vicinity of the Machine Gun detachment and inflicted so many casualties that the detachment was for the time demoralized. These casualties amounted to ten dead and forty-five wounded, among the company personnel and the carriers. The machine gun platoon with the 3d Battalion went forward and assisted in the fighting in the vicinity of Q.36.b, north to Advantage Farm. From among the survivors of the remainder of the company, two squads were equipped and sent forward to the railroad bridge in support. Captain Bird went forward and conferred with Captain MacArthur at Arbre Guernon. The latter directed that in view of the paucity of numbers in and about Arbre Guernon and Advantage Farm, additional machine guns be brought up to repel possible enemy counter attacks. By the early evening twenty-one guns were disposed with good fields of fire for the defense of the line of the 53d Brigade against enemy counter-attacks. These guns were supplied by the Machine Gun Companies of the 105th and 106th Infantry Regiments and by detachments from the 105th Machine Gun Battalion.

The 105th Machine Gun Battalion, commanded by Major Kenneth Gardner, had in the mean time moved forward to a supporting position. Dispositions in depth were made to repel possible enemy counter-attack.

108th Infantry—Left of Division Sector

Assaulting Troops October 17th. Support October 18th to 19th. Front Line Night of October 19th.

K	I	B	A
2d Lt. Russell W Hallock (w). 2d Lt Fred J Pierce. 2d Lt Adam J Schaenzer	2d Lt. Crist R Fritz (w) 2d Lt Roy E. Adams	1st Lt James J Roos (k). 2d Lt Jay R. Fiero (w). 2d Lt Richard D. Wright (w)	2d Lt. Erwin A. Dennis. 2d Lt. Dick D. Smith (k).
M	**L**	**D**	**C**
2d Lt Timothy O'Connor (k). 2d Lt Edward O Mitchell (w)	2d Lt Harold B. Crowson. 2d Lt James Cross (w)	Capt Charles J. Donnecker 1st Lt. Rudolph C. Dittus. 2d Lt. Frank H. Brietbeck (k	Capt. Harry H. Farmer (w). 2d Lt. Wm. T. De Rade.

3d Battalion

Capt Samuel H. Merrill
1st Lt Frederick G Spawton, Adj (w)
1st Lt William D. Coulter, Gas Off
2d Lt William R. Shelley, Scout Off
1st Lt Archie L Blades, Supply Off
Capt Joseph T Loughlin, M. C.

Attached
2 M G.
1st Lt. Elmer P. Brecht (w.)
Sgt James Diffin.
2 Sec. 1 Lumber.

1st Battalion

Major Frederick S Couchman
1st Lt. Allen H. Williams, Adj
1st Lt. Charles Rudolph, Jr., Gas Off.
2d Lt. Walter N. Horsburgh Scout Off. (w).
1st Lt. Wheeler C Case, Sup. Off.
Capt. Sidney D. Palmer, M C

Attached
4 M. G.
2d Lt. Wm. G. Golden.
1st Sgt. Chas. Bates.
1 Sec. T. M.
2d Lt. Donald C. Stuart (w).

F	E	H	G
2d Lt Howard M Karr 2d Lt Niel C Prangden (w) 2d Lt Claude H Spicer (w)	Capt Charles A. Sandberg (w). 1st Lt Samuel A. Brown, Jr. 1st Lt Harrison J Uhl, Jr	1st Lt Jacob W Vogt (w) 2d Lt Harry Campbell (w	1st Lt. Fred C. Davis. 2d Lt. Theodore C. Veit (w).

2d Battalion

Capt John S. Thompson
1st Lt. Charles F. Mosher, Adj
Capt. George L. Miller, M C

Colonel Edgar S Jennings.
Capt George W Elliott, Adj
Major Charles W. Lynn, M C.

Capt. Henry D. Bagnal, Op. Off.
1st Lt. James F. Oakleaf, Int Off
Capt Clarence S. Martin (w).

2d Lt. Merton W. Brush, Sig. Off.
1st Lt Kennard Underwood, Trans Off.

Chaplain John C. Ward (w).
Chaplain Michael T. Hoffman.
Chaplain Arthur G. Bagby.

107th Infantry—Left of Division Sector

Support to 108th Infantry October 17th. Front Line October 17th to 19th inclusive.

E	F	G	H
1st Lt Richard M. Raven (k).	1st Lt. John A. Korschen 2d Lt. George L Baker. 2d Lt. Benjamin J. Potter (k).	1st Lt Royal C. Johnson.	2d Lt Carl J. Stock (k).

2d Battalion

Capt Rowland Tompkins — 1st Lt William S. Hawkins, Adj. (w) — 2d Lt. Marsh S. Lockyear, Int. Off. (k).

I	K	L	M
1st Lt. Claude G. Leland. 2d Lt. Joseph P. Murphy. 2d Lt. Luther M. McBee.	1st Lt. Griswold B. Daniell. 2d Lt William J. Boehm (w).	1st Lt. Allen F. Reagan.	1st Lt. George B. Bragdon. 2d Lt. Joseph F. Snyder.

3d Battalion

Capt. George B. Bradish (w). — 2d Lt. Harry L. Roaler, Adj. (k). — 2d Lt. John B. Jessup, Int. Off. — 2d Lt Alexander E. Ostrander, Transp. Off.

A	B	C	D
1st Lt. Frederick D. Conklin. 1st Lt. Clarence E. Hall (w).	1st Lt. Ford M. Terry (w).	Capt. Harry L. Stratton. 1st Lt. John F. Greaney (w).	1st Lt. Thomas G. Simpson. 2d Lt. Roland D. Davis. 2d Lt. David R. Nimocks.

1st Battalion

Capt. Clinton E. Fisk (k). — 1st Lt Arthur C. Lumley, Adj. (w). — 1st Lt. Charles T. Graham-Rogers, Gas Off. (w).
2d Lt. Oscar E. Hellquist, Int. Off. (k).

M. G.

1st Lt. Harry Adsit (w).
1st Lt. Kenneth Gow (k).
2d Lt. Horace C. Johnson.

Colonel Charles I. Debevoise.
Major Nicholas Engel.
Capt. Thomas J. Brady, Op. Off.
1st Lt. Eugene L. Mullaney, Int. Off.
1st Lt. Edward H. Kent, Adj.
1st Lt. Edwin S. Munson, Liaison Off with 105th.

1st Lt. Edwin L. Holloway.
1st Lt. Hiram W. Taylor, Sup. Off.
1st Lt. Edward C. Lecompte, Transp. Off.
Capt. Henry B. Heylman, Pers. Adj.
Major Raymond A. Turnbull, M. C.

Capt. Dudley C. Hughes, D. C.
Capt. Francis P. Riggs, D. C.
1st Lt. David B. Warren, D. C.
Chaplain Peter E. Hoey.
Chaplain Edwin F. Keever.
Chaplain Hugh W. Stewart.

H. Q. Co.

Capt. Kenneth C. Wilson
1st Lt. Arthur Talbot.
2d Lt. Harry F. Allen, T. M.
2d Lt. John H. Freeman, Signal Off.

105th Machine Gun Battalion

Support

B	A	C	D
Capt. Nathaniel H. Egleston. 1st Lt John Reynolds. 2d Lt. George Matthews, Jr. (w). 2d Lt. Robert D. McCaskey. 2d Lt. Richard G. Lyon.	Capt. Lucius H. Biglow, Jr. 1st Lt. Joseph F. Cook. 1st Lt. Wm. C. Barthman. 2d Lt. Harry B. Jennings. 2d Lt. Harold L. Downey.	1st Lt. Robert H. Leake. 1st Lt. Edward S. Flash, Jr. 2d Lt. Ward W. Farnham. 2d Lt. Joseph G. Galvin (w).	Capt. Stanton Whitney. 1st Lt. Alwyn Ball, 3d. 2d Lt. Bert R. Anderson. 2d Lt. Frank H. Grace.

Major Kenneth Gardner.
1st Lt. John J. Fleming, Adj.
1st Lt. Knowlton Durham, Int. Off.

1st Lt. Raymond A. McLeer, Supply Off.
Capt. Charles D. Kayser, M. C.

Capt. Joseph Mulcahy, D. C.
2d Lt. Frederick Snare, Jr., Trans Off.
Chaplain Archer D. Bass.

105th Infantry—Right of Division Sector

D	C	B	A
1st Lt. Leo F. Giblyn (w).	1st Lt Benjamin Buckley (k) 2d Lt. Charles J Doyle (w).	1st Lt Harold O Blakeley (w)	1st Lt Jacob L Van Schoonover

1st Battalion

Capt. George F. Bradshaw.
1st Lt Stephen B. Elkins, Adj.
1st Lt. Christopher B Deganaar, Int. Off.

E	H	F	G
1st Lt James T. Bergen (k).	Capt. Raymond F Hogdon (w). 2d Lt Arthur H. Norris (w).	Capt. Frank R. Potter. 1st Lt. Lawrence P Clarke (w) 2d Lt Walter W Quigel.	1st Lt Thomas F Brown (w). 1st Lt Arthur H. Cunningham (k)

2d Battalion

Capt Charles H. MacArthur.
1st Lt Robert D. Williamson, Adj.
2d Lt Harold W Graham, Int. Off
Chaplain David T. Burgh.

M	L	K	I
1st Lt. Carl G. R. Ross (w) 2d Lt. Walter W. Slayton. 2d Lt. Henry J. Camman (w)	1st Lt Thomas G Carlin (w 2d Lt John C Cipperly (w).	1st Lt. Marvin L Atkins	1st Lt Alexander Granat 2d Lt Robert J Geis. 2d Lt Willis J. Nolan.

3d Battalion

1st Lt Charles H Whipple
1st Lt. Ernest C. Dreher, Adj
1st Lt Cary J. Walradt, Int. Off
Capt Robert S. Hall, Liaison Off 30th Div
Chaplain Walter S. Cross.

Colonel James M Andrews.
Capt Lewis H. Gibbes, Adj.
Capt. John W. Frost, Op. and Int. Off
Capt. Stephen H. Fifield, Pers. Adj.
1st Lt. John D. Snedeker, Int. Off
Capt. Roscoe B. Trumble, Sup. Off.

1st Lt John F Mahoney, Sup Co.
1st Lt George E. Ramsey, Sup. Co
1st Lt. Michael J Connery, Sup. Co.
1st Lt Frank D. Howe, Sup Co
1st Lt Leonard J. Howard, Sup Co.
Capt. George W. Papen, Jr, M C.
1st Lt. James C. Donovan, M. C.
1st Lt James R Lisa, M. C
1st Lt Elmer H. Ormsby, M. C
1st Lt. Maurice Exiner, M. C.

M. G. Co.

Capt. Howard Bird
1st Lt. Lester C Higbee
2d Lt. Archie B Gwathmey
2d Lt. Glenn S Wasson.
2d Lt. George F Evans.

106th Infantry—Right of Division Sector

Support

E	F	G	H
1st Lt. Winslow B. Watson (w). 2d Lt. Norman E. Hudson (w). 2d Lt. Ivan L. Fenty (w).	1st Lt. Frank C. Vincent (w). 1st Lt. Martin H. Shuford. 2d Lt. Allen G. Carson.	1st Lt. David R. Adamson.	1st Lt George R. Dunspaugh (w). 2d Lt. Robert S. Moore (w). 2d Lt. Harold B. Longfellow (k).

2d Battalion

Capt. Rutherford Ireland (w).
1st Lt. Frederick K. Long (w).
2d Lt. John C. Clark (w).
1st Lt. Lee A. Hadley, M. C.

A	B	C	D
1st Lt. Arthur B. Guttzeit (w). 2d Lt. Grant H. Sibley.	1st Lt. Robert H. Trask 2d Lt. Harry F. Loessing.	1st Lt. Herbert H. Davis. 2d Lt. Thomas Spencer (w). 2d Lt. William E Ludtke.	1st Lt. Arthur J. Henrici (w). 1st Lt. James B Post. 2d Lt. Otto W. Marquard (w).

1st Battalion

1st Lt. Ames T. Brown (w).
2d Lt. Irving G. Davis (w).
2d Lt. James E. Polka (w).
1st Lt. Robert S. Cleaver, M. C.
1st Lt. Watson S. Rowan, M. C.

I	K	L	M
1st Lt. George W. Turner.	1st Lt. H. F. Marshall (w). 1st Lt. Orville E. Clifford.	1st Lt. Chester P. Jones 2d Lt. John C. Gilmore.	1st Lt. Walter D. Keller. 2d Lt. John H. Potts.

3d Battalion

Capt. Robert M. Dashiell.
Capt. Walter C. Tilden, M. C. (w).
1st Lt. William B. Clayton (w).
2d Lt. Mason Walker (w).
2d Lt. Charles J. O'Hara (w).
Capt. Joseph E. Adams, M. C

Colonel Franklin W. Ward.
Lt. Col. John M. True.
Capt. James P. Cooke, Adj.
Capt. Murray Taylor, Op. Off.

1st Lt. Thomas L D Cronan, Int. Off.
Capt. Nils P Larsen, M. C.
Capt. Frank F. Farwell, Sup. Off.

M. G.

Capt. Stewart D. Tiffany.
1st Lt. Leaman S. Broughton.
2d Lt. Charles A. Rice (w).
2d Lt. Charles B. Smith.

106th Machine Gun Battalion

Support

A	C	B	D
Capt. John S. Roberts. 1st Lt. Edgar T. Beamish. 1st Lt. Roger H Wellington. 2d Lt. Myles McDonell. 2d Lt Earl G Hawkins.	Capt. Abner H. Platt. 1st Lt. Walter L. Glass (w). 1st Lt. John B Perkins. 2d Lt. Horace Zimmer.	2d Lt. Randolph M. Fuller. 2d Lt. Paul B. Selby. 2d Lt. Harry Von Der Leith.	Capt. George H. Morgan. 1st Lt. Albert L. Sopp (w). 1st Lt. Everett W King. 2d Lt. Reginald H Wood (w). 1st Lt. Walter H Wells.

Major Mortimer D. Bryant (w).
1st Lt. Lawrence Beattie, Jr.
1st Lt. Nicholas E Devereux, Jr.

1st Lt. Clarence H. K. Blauvelt.
1st Lt. Harry K Tebbutt, Jr., M. C.
1st Lt. Isadore A White, D. C.

Order of Battle

LE SELLE RIVER OPERATIONS

OCTOBER 17 to 19, 1918

K—Killed or Died of Wounds W—Wounded

In relation to the supporting regiments, the 107th Infantry was still under command of Brigadier General Charles I. DeBevoise, who as a result of his exceptionally efficient service during the Hindenburg Line Battle had been recommended by the Division Commander for promotion to the grade of Brigadier General. Authority was received on October 15th to swear in Colonel DeBevoise in the new grade and this was done the same day. General DeBevoise, however, applied to be allowed to continue in command of his regiment until the termination of the coming operations for the crossing of Le Selle River. This request was granted and he continued as Regimental Commander until the termination of Le Selle River operations. Major Mortimer D. Bryant, of the 106th Machine Gun Battalion, who had demonstrated marked qualities of leadership, tactical skill and courage, was promoted and placed in command of the 107th Infantry. This was a case where an officer jumped a grade in his promotion. Major Bryant had no intimation of his promotion until it was announced to him. General DeBevoise succeeded Brigadier General Albert H. Blanding in command of the 53d Infantry Brigade. This latter officer had been temporarily attached, and left the division with an excellent record of accomplishment.

The 107th Infantry followed the 108th on the morning of the 17th of October, with the 2d Battalion, commanded by Captain Rowland Tompkins in the lead, followed by the 3d Battalion, commanded by Captain George B. Bradish, whose command was followed by the 1st Battalion, commanded by Captain Clinton E. Fisk. The 107th Infantry crossed the river in rear of the 108th and took up a support position along the road about 400 yards east of the railroad. In the afternoon, the 107th Infantry sent detachments forward in closer support of the 108th, taking up positions in Bandival Farm Hollow.

The 106th Infantry experienced considerable difficulty in getting through the gas and shell fire in the area between Busigny and Escaufourt. Their numbers were inconsiderable. However, such strength as the regiment possessed was placed in support of the 105th Infantry in its sector. The leading battalion was the 1st, under command of Captain Ames T. Brown, followed by the 2d Battalion, commanded by Captain Rutherford Ireland, and the 3d Battalion, commanded by Captain Dashiell.

En route to its battle station, the 106th Infantry had to cross the trench system on the westerly side of Le Selle River opposite Marsh Mill, which is 1,000 yards south of St. Souplet. This trench system had evidently been constructed by the Germans for training purposes at a time when this area was well back of their front line. The trench system appears on the map. It is more graphically shown in the accompanying aerial photograph. An inspection of this photograph will show a large number of shell craters, all of which appear within the perimeter of the trench system. Such accurate shooting is not possible, and evidently the craters were made for training purposes by blowing holes in the ground with powder charges. This trench system, as will be noted from the map, was rather extensive, and in the complete obscurity provided by the mist



106th Infantry Headquarters, St. Souplet

and smoke, the trenches were a serious obstacle to be overcome by the 106th Infantry, although they knew that they lay in the path of their advance.

It was while this regiment was mixed up with these trenches that such excellent work was done by Colonel Franklin W. Ward, Lieutenant Colonel John M. True and Captain Murray Taylor, the Regimental Operations Officer, in straightening out units and reorganizing the advance. Amid exceedingly heavy shell fire and much gas these officers moved about



View of Advantage Farm, Sopea, during the summer of 1920

with the greatest energy and by their personal supervision got the regiment across the river in its own sector between St. Martin Rivere on the south and the vicinity of the weaving mill on the north.

The 2d Battalion of the 106th Infantry in its advance had borne a little to the right of its correct line of march and had come under heavy machine gun fire from St. Martin Rivere, which was just outside the divisional boundary on the south. The fire from this place proved sufficiently attractive to this battalion of the 106th Infantry to cause it immediately to attack the place, which was done with such dash, that with the aid of four tanks, the position was quickly gained and mopped up. After this distraction, they continued on to the railroad enbankment. In the fighting at St. Martin Rivere they had gained touch with the left of the 30th Division, but in the advance to the railroad embankment this contact had been lost. Patrols were sent out from the battalion and contact with the 30th Division regained at 10:30 A. M.

The 1st and 3d Battalions of the 106th Infantry having cleared the practise system of trenches already described, gained Le Selle River and there awaited further orders. It was at this time that the 3d Battalion of the 105th Infantry, which was the reserve battalion of that regiment, pushed on toward Arbre Guernon.



Westerly side of the St. Martin Rivere, on Le Selle River, showing the practice trenches of the Germans. These trenches provided difficulties for the 105th and 106th Infantry in crossing them October 17



108th Infantry crossing temporary bridge constructed by the 102d Engineers across Le Selle River at St. Souplet

Shortly thereafter, the 2d Battalion of the 106th Infantry began its further advance, and arrived at Arbre Guernon at 12:15 P. M. The 2d Battalion was followed by the 1st and 3d Battalions of the same regiment, and these latter units moved up in support on the sunken road near Arbre Guernon, where they arrived at 1:30 P. M. In referring to these units as battalions, the reader must bear in mind their strength, which has already been referred to. The entire rifle strength of the 106th Infantry at this time was less than 400 men. The 1st Battalion had considerably less than 100 men on this occasion.

The tanks which had been assigned to the support of the 27th Division, it will be remembered, were to cross Le Selle River south of the divisional sector, and then having moved north in the territory east of the river were to come up to the support of the leading infantry elements in the attack. The tanks, however, having crossed the stream, lost their way in the mist and smoke and with the exception of one of their number played no part in the attack, at least in the area of the 27th Division. One tank did reach the vicinity of Arbre Guernon in time to receive orders from Captain MacArthur to take part in the effort shortly to be made to push the advance beyond Arbre Guernon, as already narrated. The tank, however, was destroyed by shell fire after an advance of not more than 1,000 yards.

The 102d Engineer Regiment was at this time commanded by Colonel A. H. Acker, who had succeeded Colonel Pillsbury. The battalions were commanded by Majors Lane and Crimmins. Severe losses were sustained by the regiment in placing the foot bridges across Le Selle River. This work was very gallantly carried out by them. Sergeants Clements, Fitzgerald, Williams and Pfeiffer won well-merited commendation for their valor and determination in advancing and placing the heavy foot bridges across the river. While engaged in this hazardous duty Sergeant Pfeiffer was severely wounded. The detachment under First Lieutenant Herbert E. Ross commenced and continued the construction of the bridge over the river at St. Souplet with the greatest courage and skill. The same comment applies to the detachment of engineers under First Lieutenant Maxwell P. Gray, engaged in clearing away the debris of the destroyed railroad bridge.

By noon the engineers had sufficiently finished the bridge over Le Selle River as to render it available for vehicular traffic.

In these operations the 102d Field Signal Battalion performed several extraordinary feats. Hardly had Captain MacArthur's command gained control of the situation at Arbre Guernon when Lieutenant Colonel William L. Hallahan, the Division Signal Officer, sensing the importance of connecting up with the place by wire, impressed into his service several litter bearers and a few signalmen, and under exceedingly heavy fire personally conducted them with the necessary wire to Arbre Guernon. Due to his personal courage and initiative, wire communication was established almost as soon as mopping up had been completed, and it was thereafter maintained with very few interruptions. In recognition of his splendid service on this occasion Colonel Hallahan was awarded the Distinguished Service Order by the British Government.

By the evening of October 17th the division had advanced the line on the divisional front to the ridge 200 yards west of the Abre Guernon-Le Cateau highway with outposts close to the highway. On the right half of the divisional sector the line was advanced to Advantage Farm and Arbre Guernon, both of which places were securely held with outposts in front. Behind this line, which was held by the depleted battalions of the 108th Infantry on the left and the 105th Infantry on the right, the 107th Infantry was in support in the Bandival Farm Hollow, with the 106th Machine Gun Battalion occupying positions to support the front line. Behind the 105th Infantry was established the supporting line of the depleted units of the 106th Infantry, which were generally located in and about the road west of Arbre Guernon. During the evening of October 17th all of these units were reorganized and in some cases redisposed where the tactical situation might be bettered. It will be seen therefore that a very material advance had been made and a large number of prisoners and materiel captured. The materiel included a locomotive and railroad train of fifteen cars, several motor trucks, one of which was brought back to the States as a souvenir and is now on exhibition in the Armory of the 107th Infantry in New York City. Scores of heavy



Bringing in wounded on wheel litters in the vicinity of Mazingheim. In the background, members of the 105th Machine Gun Battalion still firing their Vickers guns



Permanent bridge built across Le Selle River at St. Souplet after the Armistice. Picture taken during the summer of 1920

anti-tank rifles were also taken in this advance, together with the ever present machine guns, both light and heavy, and light minnenwerfers.

Most of the prisoners captured were from the 413th, 414th and 120th Infantry Regiments of the 204th German Division and the 1st and 3d Marine Regiments of the 3d German Naval Division. Following is a list of prisoners captured and recorded as having passed through the prisoners of war cage up to 3:30 P. M. on the 17th:

OFFICERS

Captains	1
Lieutenants	21
Sub-Lieutenants	1
	23

OTHER RANKS

	1st Battalion	2d Battalion	3d Battalion	Machine Gun Company	Total
3D NAVAL DIVISION					
1st Marine Regiment	12	21	40	..	73
3d Marine Regiment	5	2	5	6	18
					91
204TH DIVISION					
413th I. R.	..	2	97	..	99
414th I. R.	32	92	47	..	171
120th I. R.	6	17	4	..	27
27th F. A. R.	..	..	..	..	10
8th M. W. Co.	..	..	..	..	12
563d San. Co.	..	..	..	..	2
74th M. G. (Heavy)	..	..	..	..	3
					324
24TH DIVISION					
138th I. R.	..	..	2	..	2
133d I. R.	..	..	3	..	3
					5
243D DIVISION					
479th I. R.	45	19	1	..	65
122D I. R.	..	..	83	..	83
					158
OTHER UNITS					
476th M. W. Co.	..	..	..	..	1

From the above table it will be seen that in this day's fighting the division captured 23 officers and 574 other ranks.

The attack was to be resumed the following morning. The Division Commander was advised by the Commanding General of the II American Corps of the hour of this attack and the line upon which the barrage for the attack would fall. This line on the front of the 27th Division ran about 200 yards east of the Arbre Guernon-Le Cateau highway. As has already been pointed out, the highway mentioned, from a point a little north of Advantage Farm to the divisional boundary line on the north, was in the possession of the enemy. Accordingly, if the barrage was to fall as

planned, it would fall behind the first line of the enemy resistance. The Division Commander therefore objected to the barrage as planned and requested that the barrage line be carried back so as to fall on that part of the Arbre Guernon-Le Cateau highway which lay north of Advantage Farm. The Corps Commander referred the Division Commander to the General Commanding the British Royal Field Artillery attached to the corps, as it was understood that this officer had fixed the artillery start line. Wire communications existed between Division Headquarters and the Corps Artillery Headquarters, and accordingly Brigadier General Burgess, 4th Divisional Field Artillery, who at that time was the Chief of Artillery of the 27th Division, represented the Division Commander in explaining to the Corps Artillery Commander the views of the 27th Division in relation to the artillery barrage start line for the following morning. The Corps Artillery Commander objected to any change in the barrage start line, stating that all the batteries were then being notified of the details of the barrage and that the orders could not be changed. It was further explained that the artillery start line was really an army matter, as other divisions of the 4th British Army on the right and left of the II American Corps were to attack at the same time, and that the barrage would be general along the army front. The matter was therefore taken up directly by the Division Commander with the General Officer Commanding the 4th Army Artillery, who held with the Division Commander that while the time for the start of the barrage and the general line of the barrage were fixed by the army on occasions when the attack was an army attack, nevertheless within the front of a division, the divisional artillery start line, so long as it conformed to the general start line of the army, could and should be fixed by the Division Commander and its ends at the divisional boundaries joined up with the artillery start line of the adjoining divisions by appropriate allowances made in the firing data for guns firing on the extreme flanks. The desired change was therefore made, and due to the great zeal and energy of General Burgess, all batteries of the divisional artillery were notified in time.

Accordingly Field Orders No. 64 of the division, which appear in the Appendix as Exhibit 42, were issued. The attack was fixed for 5:30 on the morning of October 18th. The barrage start line was prescribed in a memorandum which followed the order and was not included in the order because at the time the order was issued the subject of the barrage was still under discussion. In the memorandum mentioned, the barrage start line was fixed as follows:

"Q.24.c.4.8 due south to and including the Le Cateau Road, thence southeast on the road to Q.36.b.7.1, thence in a straight line to X.1.a.7.9."

In the memorandum it was directed that shortly before zero hour patrols east of the infantry start line, which was fixed at 250 yards west of the artillery start line, should withdraw to the latter line.

The brigades were to continue the attack in the sub-sectors already assigned them. In the brigade orders it was prescribed that in the 54th Brigade the 107th Infantry, going through the 108th Infantry, would carry



The cut at St. Souplet, October 18, 1918



108th Infantry bringing in German prisoners near St. Souplet, France. October 17, 1918

forward the attack, supported by the 108th Infantry, while in the 53d Brigade the attack was to be continued by the 105th Infantry, still supported by what was left of the 106th Infantry. This was necessary in the case of the 53d Brigade because of the inadequate numbers of the 106th Infantry to cover the front of the attack.

The divisional reserve was to consist of the 104th Machine Gun Battalion, the 102d Engineers, less one battalion, and one squadron of the 20th British Hussars. The 105th and 106th Machine Gun Battalions, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Edward McLeer, Jr., Divisional Machine Gun Officer, were to fire supporting shoots on special targets that had been designated for attention during the progress of the artillery barrage. Upon completion of the barrage, command of these battalions automatically reverted to the infantry brigade commanders.

Orders Nos. 112 and 113 are also included in the Appendix as part of Exhibit 42.

When the attack opened, the barrage fell as planned, on the Arbre Guernon-Le Cateau Road from a point immediately north of Advantage Farm to a point near the northern divisional boundary. The 107th Infantry on the left, and on this front, swept forward closely behind the barrage and with little loss, overcame the enemy groups occupying the roadway, who if the barrage had fallen behind them would have inflicted considerable casualties on the attacking infantry. The 107th Infantry got forward in most satisfactory fashion until the line of Jonc de Mer Farm—La Roux Farm was met. These farms occupied the easterly side of the plateau shown on the map. This line was well held by enemy machine gun parties and supporting infantry groups. Their strength and the intensity of their fire were sufficient to stop the attack before this line. General DeBevoise, commanding the 107th Infantry, promptly determined upon a concentration of effort to capture La Roux Farm near the northern divisional boundary line. Dispositions were made accordingly, and La Roux Farm, with the machine gun positions in the hedges about it, was assaulted and captured. Within two hours after the attacking line had been stopped, the position was mopped up and prisoners evacuated. Shortly after this success, Jonc de Mer Farm, which was on the interbrigade boundary, was attacked from both flanks by detachments of the 107th Infantry on the left and the 105th Infantry on the right, with the result that it also fell into our hands.

By this time the 50th British Division, on the left of the 27th Division, had moved its line forward so that its right flank was in touch with the 107th Infantry at La Roux Farm. The left part of the line of the 50th British Division, however, was held up, and this seemed to slow down their progress.

In the area of the 53d Brigade, the 105th Infantry went forward at zero hour and almost immediately met with heavy enemy machine gun fire from the many hedges on their immediate front. Heavy enfilade fire was also received from the 30th Division area on the right. The advance of the 105th Infantry was therefore delayed by the fighting which re-

sulted and the barrage was lost. Progress, however, was slowly but steadily made by the determination and skilful action of combat patrols which enveloped enemy machine gun positions one after the other, killing or capturing the defenders. When their line had been advanced to the vicinity of Jonc de Mer Farm, it was held up as already explained until the farm was captured with the aid of detachments of the 107th Infantry on the left.

In the area of the 30th Division, it seems that their attack was embarrassed by the fact that the IX British Corps on their right had received an order not to begin its attack until 11 o'clock in the morning. In order that the right of the 30th Division might not lose contact with the left of the 6th British Division on its right, it was necessary for the right brigade of the 30th Division to refuse its right flank as the brigade advanced. This resulted in the 30th Division being delayed. Accordingly, when the line of the 105th Infantry had reached Jonc de Mer Ridge and had been unable to connect up with the left of the 30th Division, patrols were sent out to establish communication. These patrols came under heavy enemy fire from the direction of Mazingheim, in the area of the 30th Division. The right flank of the 105th Infantry was then refused toward the hedges immediately east of Arbre Guernon. This extension of the line of the 105th Infantry was promptly reported over the wire from Arbre Guernon and at 3:00 P. M. Company F of the 102d Engineers, in strength almost equal to one of the infantry battalions, was sent forward in support of the 105th and 106th Infantry Regiments, which by that time had become merged. Company F of the engineer regiment commanded by Captain Peter F. Burns, was sent to Advantage Farm, then about 2,000 yards behind the front line.

When the 105th Infantry went forward on the morning of October 18th, the 3d Battalion of the regiment was commanded by First Lieutenant Charles R. Whipple. The leading waves on the left half of the battalion sector constituted not more than forty men under command of Lieutenants Alexander Granat and Marvin L. Atkins. It was these detachments which with the right elements of the 107th Infantry cleaned up Jonc de Mer Farm. The greatest resistance was met from the line of the sunken road leading southeast from Jonc de Mer Farm to Mazingheim. After some stiff fighting on the front of the 3d Battalion of the 105th Infantry, about 150 of the enemy were driven off down the road toward Mazingheim. A very considerable number of their dead were left behind. Patrols occupied Jonc de Mer Ridge, which was found to be very well organized with dugouts and shelters. Two trench mortars, six light machine guns, five heavy machine guns and three anti-tank rifles and a large quantity of German hand grenades and small arms ammunition were captured along this road by this small detachment of the 3d Battalion of the 105th Infantry. A number of prisoners were taken from the deep dugouts. Lieutenant Whipple, the Battalion Commander, in his report of the activities at this time paid special tribute to the valor, determination and skill of the small group that constituted his battalion.

It appeared from all reports received, that the enemy defense had

been considerably demoralized. Their resistance was dependent upon machine gun groups, supported by infantry detachments, the whole in turn supported by enemy artillery fire from the heights of Catillon.

A defense of the character mentioned could have been quickly overcome by an aggressive advance by troops possessing requisite numbers and free from overfatigue. The troops of the 27th Division, however, at this time, had been in the line since the night of October 11th-12th—in other words for seven days and seven nights of practically continuous fighting. During this time they had been actively engaged against the enemy and their strength had been depleted until companies of the infantry regiments had a rifle strength of twenty or thirty men each. The enemy machine gunners were skilful and courageous. In most cases they fired their guns to the last. Their supporting infantry detachments, however, were lacking in morale and frequently sought an opportunity to surrender. Under these conditions the Division Commander directed that the 53d Brigade on the right and the 107th Infantry on the left would push forward the line by a night attack during the night of October 18th-19th.

Very early on the morning of the 19th, therefore, the leading elements of the division went forward in attack. The advance was successful. The line was advanced across Jonc de Mer Valley to the ridge lying between Jonc de Mer Valley and the St. Maurice Valley. This line included La Joncquiere Farm and North Chimney. Patrols were sent forward to the St. Maurice stream. By daylight the 27th Division line was in process of consolidation on the ridge mentioned, with the 108th Infantry in support of the 107th and Company F, of the 102d Engineers, in support of the merged regiments of the 53d Brigade on the right half of the divisional sector.

It was on the morning of the 19th that the Division Commander received information that the 118th Infantry on the left of the 30th Division had been held up in front of Mazingheim, after sustaining a considerable number of casualties. A glance at the map will show that Mazingheim at this time constituted a serious menace to the right flank of the 27th Division, but on the other hand the position of the leading troops of the 27th Division constituted a menace to the right flank of the German forces at Mazingheim. Arrangements were therefore made over the telephone between the headquarters of the 27th and 30th Divisions that reserve troops of the 27th Division would move into the area of the 30th Division and threaten Mazingheim from the north. While arrangements were being made to carry out this plan, troops of the 30th Division were reorganized for a renewal of their attack on Mazingheim. The reserve troops of the 27th Division organized for the flank attack were constituted of one troop of the 20th British Hussars, one platoon of Company B, 104th Machine Gun Battalion, commanded by First Lieutenant Clarence R. Hancock, and Company F, of the 102d Engineers. This detachment having gained the orchard in R.26.d deployed and began skirmishing toward the south. The demonstration was sufficient to cause the with-

drawal of the German troops from Mazingheim, and shortly thereafter troops of the 30th Division entered that place and extended their line to the left so that contact between the two divisions was reestablished.

On the evening of the 18th of October the Division Commander had discussed with General Burgess, the Divisional Artillery Commander, the practicability of supporting the advance of October 19th with an accompanying battery in each brigade sector, these batteries to move forward boldly and to aid with their fire action the reduction of opposing machine gun nests. The plan was not recommended by the Divisional Artillery Officer, who believed that unnecessary casualties would be sustained by the batteries without any increase in their ability to reduce enemy opposing positions by reason of occupying positions so far forward. After careful consideration of the entire matter the Artillery Commander was directed to send the batteries forward. This was done. Direct liaison was established between the batteries and the leading Battalion Commanders, and under the conditions as they existed on the 19th and 20th of October these batteries were enabled to render very prompt and effective support to the small infantry groups that constituted our attacking waves.

On the morning of October 19th the Division Commander visited the battery in the 53d Brigade sector. The command had succeeded in gaining a position on the reverse slope of the ridge west of Jonc de Mer Farm and apparently had not been discovered by the enemy. In any event the battery escaped heavy shelling throughout the day and rapidly and successfully fired upon enemy points of resistance.

In going forward through the battery position to the lines of the 108th Infantry on this occasion, the Division Commander's party, which included Captain Joseph D. Eddy and Private Leslie Hunt, orderly, passed through the heavy shelling along the line of Le Selle River and the roads beyond, in a very short space of time, because the three persons constituting the party were mounted. On previous visits of inspection in battle areas, movement had always been on foot. That had been the custom. Such movement necessitates slow progress and at times dodging into shell holes to avoid shell splinters. Mounted, however, the rider is enabled to get through a shelled area much more rapidly and may frequently avoid such area by moving quickly to one flank or the other. As a result of the battle conditions which had obtained up to the time of the operations of Le Selle River, mounted men were never seen in the forward area of divisions in attack. The experience on this occasion prompted the immediate dispatch of detachments of the 20th Hussars to serve as mounted messengers between battalion, regimental and brigade posts of command. During the succeeding days of Le Selle River operations, the troopers of the 20th Hussars rendered most prompt and efficient messenger service with very few casualties. For the first time in active operations, messages were carried with the least possible delay from advanced points to the nearest telephone station or direct to the regimental or brigade post of

command. There was in consequence of this innovation a marked increase in the efficiency of communication and intelligence.

On the night of October 19th the 108th Infantry relieved the 107th Infantry. This relief was completed by 2 o'clock in the morning of October 20th. The 108th Infantry pushed out patrols to the Catillon-Bazuel Road, overlooking the town of Catillon and the Canal de la Sambre. On the right half of the divisional sector the 105th Infantry, with the survivors of the 106th intermingled with them, pushed out their patrols to the right at R.22. central, also overlooking Catillon. The main line of resistance was established along the easterly bank of the St. Maurice River.

The success of the division during Le Selle River operations was not gained without the loss of some of our best officers and enlisted men. One of these was Captain Clinton E. Fisk, who commanded the 1st Battalion of the 107th Infantry, and who was killed by a shell on the 18th of October near the Arbre Guernon-Le Cateau Road. His loss was keenly felt throughout the division, not only because of his fine character and professional value as a soldier, but for sentimental reasons. Captain Fisk had served in the 107th Infantry for a great many years antedating the war and was the son of Colonel Willard C. Fisk, who commanded the regiment at Camp Wadsworth and brought it to France.

Special credit is due the 105th and 106th Infantry Regiments for the fortitude displayed bv officers and men in their continuous effort without relief from the beginning of the battle on October 17th. By this time the entire fighting personnel of the division was on the verge of complete exhaustion. Since October 11th they had been continuously under shell fire and gas bombardment, the leading elements always under machine gun fire. The troops, however, were required to hold their positions throughout the day of October 20th, the divisions on the right and left in the meantime getting forward in prolongation of the 27th Division line. The 50th British Division on the left captured Bazuel and secured the left flank of the 27th Division. Finally the 27th Division was relieved on the night of October 20th-21st by the 6th British Division. What was left of the infantry of the division assembled in the vicinity of St. Souplet and Busigny on October 21st. At St. Souplet the Red Cross detachment under Captain Stephen N. Bobo rendered particularly effective service in supplying the men with hot chocolate and cigarettes, as they were marching through that place.

During these operations the division captured a very large number of prisoners. They were so numerous at times that count was not made of some of the detachments going to the rear. Some detachments of prisoners were taken direct to the corps prisoner of war cage, while others were taken into the area of the 30th Division. However, the records of the divisional prisoners of war cage show that in these operations the division captured and recorded the capture of 48 officers and 1,463 other ranks.

The casualties in these operations were 12 officers killed, 33 wounded



Soldiers of 106th Infantry returning from the line after Le Selle River operations



Cemetery at St. Souplet. Picture taken during the summer of 1920

and 22 gassed; enlisted men, 156 killed, 36 died of wounds, 833 wounded and 401 gassed. No officers or men were captured by the enemy. The total casualties, therefore, were 194 killed and died of wounds, 866 wounded and 423 gassed.

A very great quantity of enemy armament, stores and materiel was captured during these operations. So few men were available, however, for any other purpose than fighting, that little effort was made to gather the captured property. The division found it difficult through lack of numbers efficiently to evacuate the wounded and bury the dead, without further depleting its strength to make up details for marking and recording captured materiel.

The conduct of officers and men of the division throughout the trying period of Le Selle River operations was magnificent. Always there was loyal response to the demands made upon them, and at times and toward the end of the operations it must have seemed to the men of the infantry regiments particularly, that they were being pushed beyond the limit of human endurance. It is difficult to imagine any sentiment of the human heart more worthy than the sentiment of enduring self-sacrifice for the common good. This sentiment was exemplified in superlative fashion by the officers and men who made up the depleted combat units of the 27th Division during the operations of Le Selle River from October 11 to 20, 1918.

On the morning of the relief, the Division Commander and one or two of the Staff saw the survivors of the 54th Brigade go through St. Souplet on their march to the rear. Some of the men were apparently asleep while they walked. They were covered with mud and many of them were bleeding from cuts and minor injuries. At first glance they seemed to be in a semi-stupor, but everywhere individual men upon seeing the inspecting party made a supreme effort, if only by a glance, to indicate that their spirit still survived. It is natural for every commander of troops that have behaved well in war, to feel pride in the conduct and record of men he has commanded under the extraordinary and trying conditions of active operations. Nevertheless, making due allowances for this natural feeling, it is the deliberate opinion of the writer that no general officer in war ever commanded more intelligent, determined, better disciplined and loyal military organizations than those which made up the 27th Division during the period of the World War.

After the close of Le Selle River operations, official commendations were given the Division for its part in the fighting and the results netted the Fourth Army. The following communications are some of those which commend the officers and men for what was done by them during this period.

HEADQUARTERS, 27th DIVISION, U. S. A.

AMERICAN E. F., FRANCE

October 21, 1918.

BULLETIN No. 103.

Since the 25th of September—a period of nearly a month—the Division has been engaged almost continuously in fighting and marching. Some of this fighting involved

a leading rôle in one of the fiercest battles of the war—the breaking of the great Hindenburg defense line. We have suffered the loss of some of our best officers and men, but unfortunately such losses are incidental to battles of such magnitude. Only divisions highly trained and disciplined, possessing the greatest confidence and morale and at the very top notch of their strength could have accomplished what the Division and our comrades of the 30th Division accomplished in that great battle. Only such divisions could have met the sacrifices demanded, and with morale unimpaired have renewed the advance in the manner characteristic of the operations of the past two weeks.

This is not the occasion to describe the Hindenburg defenses or the details of the battle for breaking them. That will doubtless be done after the war. The same comment applies to the details of the operations since that engagement. Nevertheless, the Division Commander cannot withhold this expression of his admiration and respect for the valor and discipline as well as the endurance and spirit manifested by officers and men throughout this long period of fighting. These sentiments are stimulated by the events of the past week. When reduced in numbers, the Division attacked the enemy, took the town of St. Souplet, forced the crossing of Le Selle River, and against strong opposition successfully assaulted the heights on the other side. Since that date the Division has attacked daily taking by force the town of Arbre Guernon and a number of strongly fortified farms and forcing a withdrawal of the enemy to the Canal de la Sambre.

In this latter advance the Division captured more than 1400 German officers and enlisted men, and a vast amount of military property including field guns, a great number of machine guns both light and heavy, anti-tank guns, trench mortars, dumps of ammunition and railroad rolling stock. In all this fighting the character of the enemy's resistance and the extent of his losses are indicated by the large number of enemy dead on the field.

The efforts of the past month constitute a record to be proud of, and their value is indicated in the commendatory letter from the Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Forces which has been published for the information of the Division. Officers and men have justified estimate made of the Division when, after its arrival in France, it was selected to hold the Mont Kemmel sector against the expected great effort of the enemy to drive through to the sea. They have justified the opinions of their fighting qualities formed when this crisis, with the evacuation of Mont Kemmel had passed, and the Division promptly attacked and took Vierstraat Ridge, being, with the 30th Division on our left, the first American troops to fight on Belgian territory.

JOHN F. O'RYAN, Major General.

OFFICIAL BRITISH REPORT

Saturday night, Oct. 20, 1918.

In the course of the last three weeks the 27th and 30th Divisions of the II American Corps, operating with the Fourth British army, have taken part with great gallantry and success in three major offensive operations, besides being engaged in a number of lesser attacks. In the course of this fighting they have displayed soldierly qualities of a high order and have materially assisted in the success of our attacks.

Having fought with the utmost dash and bravery in the great attack of September 29th in which the Hindenburg Line was broken and having on that occasion captured the villages of Bellicourt and Mauroy, with a large number of prisoners, on Oct. 8th the troops of the II American Corps again attacked in the neighborhood of Montbrehain. In three days of successful fighting they completed an advance of ten miles from Maton to St. Souplet, overcoming determined resistance and capturing several strongly defended villages and woods.

Throughout the past three days the II American Corps has again attacked daily and on each occasion with complete success, though the enemy's resistance has been

most obstinate. Fighting their way forward from St. Souplet to the high ground west of the Sambre Canal, they have broken the enemy's resistance at all points, beating off many counter-attacks and realizing a further advance of nearly five miles.

Over five thousand prisoners and many guns have been taken by the II American Corps.

OFFICIAL TELEGRAM FROM GENERAL H. S. RAWLINSON
COMMANDER OF THE FOURTH BRITISH ARMY

II American Corps.

Now that the American Corps has come out of the line for a well-earned period of rest and training, I desire to place on record my appreciation of the great gallantry and the fine soldierly spirit they have displayed throughout the recent hard fighting.

The breaking of the great Hindenburg system of defense, coupled with the captures of Grandcourt, Busigny and St. Souplet, and finally the forcing of the passages of the La Selle constitute a series of victories of which each officer, N. C. O. and man have every reason to feel proud.

The Corps has been very well supported by the Artillery of the Australian Corps, to whom I desire to offer my best thanks for their skill and endurance during the long months they have now been in action.

The efficiency with which the staff work of the Corps has been carried out on this their first experience as a fighting Corps in the line of battle has filled me with admiration, and I attribute it largely to the zeal and unity of purpose which has throughout animated the whole Corps.

The outstanding feature of their recent victories has been the surprising gallantry and self-sacrifice of the regimental officers and men. I congratulate them on their prowess and offer them one and all my warmest thanks for the leading part they have taken in the recent operations.

It is possible now to give the Corps a period of rest, during which special attention should be paid to the training of the smaller units in minor tactics such as the attack of strong points and machine gun nests. The experience they have had of actual combat will assist them to improve their fighting efficiency in this respect.

In thanking the Corps as a whole for the great services they have rendered to the Allied cause, I desire to wish all ranks the best of good fortune in the future.

H. S. Rawlinson,
General, Commanding Fourth Army.

Adv. Hqrs. Fourth Army.

On the days following the relief, the division continued its march to the Tincourt area. The movement of relief and march to the Tincourt area were covered by Field Orders No. 65 and Orders No. 114, which are included in the Appendix as Exhibit 43.

When the Tincourt area was reached, the division entrained at Roisel for a rest area. The area selected was known as the Corbie area and included the destroyed towns of Villers Bretonneux, Corbie, Hamel and other places which had marked the high water mark of the German offensive of the preceding spring. The area was not an inviting one for troops that sorely needed rest and recuperation. Most of the places included within the rest area were little more than ruins, particularly Villers Bretonneux. However, similar comment might be made of other areas assigned to other combat troops for purposes of rest. In comparison with what they had been through, however, the half-demolished buildings of the rest area seemed like havens of comfort.

Official records show that the 27th Division, during its operations, captured a total of 2,357 prisoners. These are divided as follows:

	Officers	Other Ranks
Vierstraat Ridge	..	47
Hindenburg Line	17	782
Le Selle River	48	1,463
Total	65	2,292

The story of the activities of the division from the time of its arrival at Corbie until it left that area will be continued in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XIX

THE REST AREA AT CORBIE

IN the Corbie area the 54th Infantry Brigade Headquarters and the 107th Infantry were directed to be billeted at Villers Bretonneux. The Division Commander recalled in a general way the condition of Villers Bretonneux when the division had gone forward for Le Selle River operations, and accordingly hastened to that place by motor for a personal inspection. The place was wholly unfit for occupation by troops. The roofless and demolished buildings not only offered little or no shelter or protection against the weather, but the place was foul with decaying matter of all kinds. Accordingly the regimental billeting officer who had arrived at the place was notified that other arrangements would be made to shelter the units mentioned, which at that time were en route for Villers Bretonneux by rail. By arrangement with the corps, the contemplated change was made and the 54th Brigade Headquarters went to Tronville Chateau and the 107th Infantry to Glisy.

The accompanying map of the Corbie area shows its relation to the city of Amiens, which appears in part on the left boundary of the map. A reference to the towns and villages shown on the map will serve to recall to the readers who were with the division at the time, the incidents connected with the life in this area. The mere mention of such names as Aubigny, Vecquemont, Daours, Bussy, Pont Noyelles, Vaux-sur-Somme, Blangy-Tronville, Hamelet and Glisy, will serve to remind the survivors of Le Selle River operations of the days spent in the damp valley of the Somme.

Division Headquarters was established at Corbie in what had been a very fine residence, surrounded by an attractive garden with large hot houses. The place had been badly damaged by shell fire. During the first few days following the arrival of the divisional units in their several billeting areas, the time of the officers and men was largely consumed with patching up and making as livable as possible the particular buildings which had been assigned them. When the troops arrived there were no civilian inhabitants in most of the villages. However, shortly afterward people began to come in, and it was most affecting to witness the grief of women and children as they looked at the ruins of their former homes.


Soon pathetic-looking little stocks of fruit and odds and ends could be seen as they were arrayed for sale to the soldiers, either upon improvised stands on the streets or behind broken windows. Needless to say the soldiers, in spite of their fatigue, were most sympathetic and generous toward these courageous inhabitants who had returned to their native village to begin anew their lives there.



Former inhabitant of Corbie sitting on a pile of rocks that was her home



One of the 27th Division bands entertaining in the Corbie area



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Following so serious a strain as the operations just concluded, it was essential that only the minimum of rest should be allowed the officers in order that they might with the greatest energy devote themselves to the welfare and recuperation of the men. Improvised baths were installed. Every effort was made to improve kitchen facilities and to better the mess menus. Clothing and equipment had to be renewed. Not the least important job was to provide recreation and entertainment for the men, for unless the mind is in healthy and optimistic condition the body does not properly respond. The divisional theatrical troupe was therefore reorganized and new bills of entertainment prepared and produced. An appropriate hall was found in Corbie for use of the theatrical troupe. The roof was patched, the stage repaired, and electric lights, which derived their power from the divisional mobile lighting plant, were installed. A preferred list of detachments was made up so that the men, to the limit of the capacity of the house, might each night visit Corbie and see the show. Preference, of course, was given to the infantry and machine gun units. In order that the soldiers coming to Corbie from other billeting places might readily find the "theater," the various streets leading to it were indicated by directing signs painted on the sides of buildings. As late as the summer of 1920 the writer saw one of these signs while passing through Corbie. This sign is shown on the accompanying photograph.

The theatrical troupe were known as the "Broadway Boys."

Those who were stationed in Corbie will never forget the clatter of the hobnailed shoes of the throngs of men who each evening walked slowly through the darkened streets of Corbie in the direction of the divisional theater. It was most satisfactory to note the effect of the entertainment upon them. Going to the theater there was little conversation heard on the streets—nothing but the heavy and tired tramp of the hobnailed shoes on the stone paving blocks, accompanied by the blinking glow of innumerable cigarettes. Leaving the show, however, there was much conversation, interested comment, and even some laughter and merriment. Never did the theatrical troupe do better work in rejuvenating the spirit of tired and sad men than during the days of the Corbie rest period. Many of the men were not in humor to attend the divisional theater. Their hearts had been saddened by the loss of intimate friends who had fallen by their side. Indeed in many cases it was necessary to order individual men to accompany the theater detachments. In other cases men went to the theater solely out of a spirit of loyalty to the performers and because they knew that during the period of the battle operations the performers had served as hospital orderlies in the advanced and main dressing stations. But once there they soon fell under the spell of Fallon and Brown, Van Zant, Roche and the soubrettes. The divisional theatrical troupe certainly justified the effort put into its organization and maintenance.

It was during the period of the Corbie days that there was held in each regiment a conference attended by all the available officers. The purpose of these regimental conferences was to bring together the officers from the



Sign of the "Broadway Boys" at Corbie. Picture taken during the summer of 1920

outlying billets in order that they might exchange views, suggestions and comments concerning the recent operations. In this manner, in each regiment, all the officers were made acquainted with the activities of the infantry units composing the regiment, including machine guns, Stokes



Division Commander's Headquarters at Corbie

mortars and one pounders. Such subjects as artillery support, liaison, and communication were, of course, included. The conferences were presided over either by the Division Commander or the Division Chief of Staff, and were attended by the Brigade Commanders and all other officers interested. Very valuable information was gained on these occasions and very much was done to increase the spirit of team play among the officers. What was particularly noticeable during these meetings was the modesty of all the officers in relation to their own activities and accomplishments.

The Division Commander was most desirous of taking advantage of this period of rest to grant leaves of absence and furloughs to as many officers and men as possible in order that the morale of the division might be stimulated through the opportunity of at least a percentage of the personnel to get into some new environment for a few days. The necessary authority was denied, however, and the men who visited Amiens, a short distance away, were required to leave the town at 4 P. M. This apparently small matter is mentioned here as indicating the survival of the old notion that a soldier is not a soldier unless he is continuously harassed by prohibitions, limitations and penalties. An intensive supervisory attitude is necessary in the early development of soldiers. The men of the 27th Division had received the benefit of such policy during their early training at Camp Wadsworth. Now, however, the conditions were entirely changed. They were not only thoroughly disciplined and dependable in every way, but they had been subjected to "hell's fires" for so long a time that what they needed most was confidence, encouragement, rest and recreation. Our military system, however, never seemed to be sufficiently elastic to meet promptly the swift-moving changes of war. Too frequently it was necessary for the commander of troops by protest, urging, or special plea to secure the needed elasticity. With the good will and cooperation of the Commanding General of the II American Corps changes were secured in relation to the prohibitions and limitations mentioned, and soon authority was given for the Division Commander to grant leaves of absence to officers, and furloughs to enlisted men, which included the right to visit Great Britain.

Some replacements were received during the latter days of October. Most of these went to the 106th Infantry. Preparations went on apace for the return of the division to the line. This was scheduled to take place after another two or three weeks' rest. It was essential, therefore, that during the intervening period additional replacements be obtained, that their training be undertaken in most efficient manner and that all the other work of supplying the division with needed clothing and equipment be pushed.

About this time the Spanish influenza, which had been kept out of the division with singular success, began to make its presence felt. This was, perhaps, due to the run-down condition of so many officers and men. The writer with many others suffered from the "flu," as it was called, during this period.



Men of the 107th Infantry show their trophies



Prisoners at work in the Corbie area

As was always the case in France, a unit as large as a division was necessarily scattered when occupying a billeting area. Due to the greatly reduced strength of the companies, it was thought to be desirable to assemble the division for some appropriate ceremony, so that the picture afforded by their total numbers, and the precision and discipline of their movements, might help in stimulating a return to the former high morale of the men. The Division Commander, therefore, directed that on Sunday, November 10th, there would be held on the plains near Corbie a divisional review in honor of the dead of the division. The orders for this review will be found in the Appendix as Exhibit 44. As is well known by the soldiers of the American Expeditionary Forces at least, the climate in this part of France during the fall months is usually bleak and rainy. The days preceding November 10th gave little promise of good weather for the occasion of the review. However, the weather gods, true to form, gave the division for the occasion of its memorial parade, a day of sunshine and reasonable warmth. The units of the division assembled at Corbie from all over the billeting area. Major General Read, the Corps Commander, who had been invited to take the review, motored to Corbie with his staff and there were provided with horses. The occasion was a most impressive one. The entire division was drawn up in line of masses with the infantry on the right, in accordance with the tradition of the New York Division, which gives the right of line to the infantry and not to the engineers. There stood these fine officers and men of the division who had been through so much fighting, thousands of them wearing one and scores of them wearing two wound chevrons. All were thinking of those whose memory the ceremony would honor.

A description of the occasion would not be complete without some reference to the part played by the numerous company mascots. When the division returned from the battle area it was surprising how quickly homeless dogs attached themselves to individual men and to particular units. It was difficult to imagine whence came all the dogs. However, with the enthusiasm and loyalty so characteristic of dogs, these animals soon acted as if they had always belonged to the units they served. Let even the Division Commander approach a company kitchen and he would be barked at and threatened and regarded as an object of suspicion by the company mascot running out upon his approach.

On the occasion of the concentration of the division at Corbie, the company dogs, as a matter of course, accompanied the units to which they had attached themselves. The playing of the bands and the bustle and stir of so many marching men seemed to stimulate them. They evidenced this by running from the head to the rear of the company columns, driving off other dogs and justifying in numerous ways the pride each dog apparently felt in belonging to the best company in the division. After the division had been formed in line of masses as already mentioned, the ceremony arranged for prescribed that the massed bands of the division would march at the front and play two stanzas of "Nearer, My God, To Thee," during which the division was to stand rigidly at attention and



Major General Read at the Corbie Review



Division Staff, Corbie Review

reflect upon the sacrifices made by the officers and men who had been lost. This was the first occasion since the days of Spartanburg when the massed bands of the division functioned as a unit under Lieutenant Francis J. Sutherland of the 104th Field Artillery. The massed bands marched silently from the right of the division to a position in front and opposite the center of the line. The silence seemed to impress the dogs, for at this time there were at least twenty dogs standing attentively in front of their companies. One little dog opposite the reviewing officer squatted on his haunches for a second or two and then looking at the other dogs to the right and left, and seeming to sense his unsoldierly action, promptly resumed a standing and attentive attitude. It almost seemed as if the dogs had been trained for the occasion. The participation and attitude of the dogs caused no mirth on the part of anyone. On the contrary, their conduct seemed to accentuate the emotions. The comradeship and affection of the dogs served to remind those present of the comradeship and affection of those who were absent.

Major General Read and the Division Commander rode around the division in inspection. The command presented a very martial appearance. Particularly were the visiting officers impressed with the handsome manner in which the horse transport was turned out. The animals were well groomed, and the harness, chains, leather, and the many vehicles, were in faultless condition. Finally, when the inspection was completed and the reviewing party had taken their assigned positions, the division passed in review, the infantry with bayonets fixed, the varnished steel helmets flashing in the sunlight. All who participated seemed stimulated by the satisfaction of having accorded this simple but impressive manifestation of their recollection and regard for the dead, and as well by the impressions conveyed by discipline, cohesiveness and power of the marching troops.

The following afternoon, while the Division Commander was preparing to mount his horse in front of the headquarters at Corbie, two Australian soldiers, quite the worse for wear, were observed passing down the street. Each carried a French flag and called out to the "Yanks" whom they passed, "Why the h—l don't you celebrate? Don't you know the armistice is signed?" We did not know that the armistice had been signed, although we knew that in all probability it would be signed on that day. However, it might be remarked here that the signing of the armistice caused not a ripple of excitement among the American soldiers in Corbie. There were no cheers and there was no excitement of any sort. Everything went on as usual. Some time after the armistice, groups of soldiers were posed by official photographers in attitudes indicating great joy and enthusiasm, and were then photographed. These purported to represent armistice day celebrations. So far as could be learned from conversations with commanding officers of the division, the majority of the men were glad the war was over, but it must be said that there was a substantial number who would have preferred to continue the operations until by combat the army had actually invaded German territory. As stated, however, there was not much discussion one way or the other. One place where real interest and

excitement were manifested was in the city of Amiens. In all probability the underlying cause for the numerous parties that were organized for diversion in that city was not the armistice or any other historical event, but the desire for recreation of that character, after the weeks of fatigue and danger and the hardship of battle.

At the time of the armistice more than five thousand men of the division were in hospitals as a result of wounds received in battle. Their exact locations were, of course, not known, once they passed out of the jurisdiction of the division. The loyalty of these absent ones for their division was well understood. Some of the officers who had visited London on leave had gone to the hospitals and had found numbers of our wounded there. The Division Commander felt that these wounded men should have whatever inspiration the division could give them and took up with the proper authorities the matter of being ordered to London, to visit them. This could not be arranged and accordingly a leave of absence for one week was taken. On Wednesday, November 13th, therefore, the Division Commander accompanied by Colonel Montgomery, Division Surgeon, and Captain Eddy, Aide de Camp, left Corbie for Boulogne, and the following morning crossed the channel to Folkstone, thence proceeding by rail to London.

When the Division Commander's party arrived on the dock at Boulogne to take the steamer to Folkestone, they met a very much disturbed detachment of furlough men of the 27th and 30th Divisions, aggregating perhaps 200 men. They had come to the dock prepared to board the steamer for England to enjoy the short period of time allotted them for furlough, only to be told that due to some change in the plan, priority had been given to some British soldiers also on furlough, and they would have to remain over in Boulogne until the following day. The extent of their dejection cannot be appreciated without understanding that the furlough period began to run from the time of the arrival of the train at Boulogne. The thought, therefore, of losing not only twenty-four hours of their precious leave period in this uninviting place, but also of expending from their limited funds the amount needed for this unexpected stop-over, caused them to feel that they had been greatly imposed upon. The eager and welcome glances of the men toward the Division Commander's party were noted but not understood until the situation was explained. When forceful representations were made to the British officer in charge and he had shown his orders prescribing the change which was the occasion of the trouble, he good-naturedly and generously cooperated in securing a revision of the original order. Accordingly, within half an hour the men were told that the former order was rescinded and that they would be allowed to proceed to England without stop-over at Boulogne. Great was the joy of the Yanks in consequence.

The next day, having called on Major General John Biddle, in command of the American troops in England, a program was arranged for visiting the hospitals where our men were located. The party went first to Tottenham Hospital, where several hundred wounded men of the 27th



Site of II Corps Meet near Corbie



102d Field Signal Battalion marching through Corbie

Division were found. Many of them were walking cases, while scores were confined to bed with most serious and distressing wounds. One who has not actually had such an experience as that afforded by the visits to these hospitals, under circumstances which can be imagined—the background of battle hardship and sacrifice—can understand the emotions of the visitor. Some of these emotions were joyous, some were sad, some were inspiring, others depressing. But through them all there was ever present the realization that these men loved their organization in a degree bordering on fanaticism. In the big hall of the hospital where the Division Commander addressed the walking wounded assembled there in great numbers, not only from the 27th Division, but also from the 30th Division, there was a most inspiring manifestation of the ardor of these veterans to rejoin their units and the companionship of their military family. In the wards men weak from recent surgical operations wept with gratitude for some favorable comment concerning their regiments. Everywhere men given an opportunity to talk, asked with an intensity that was almost pitiful whether there was any doubt concerning their return to their own division when they had recovered from the effects of their wounds. The experience was the same at Base Hospital No. 22, near Hyde Park, London. On succeeding days other hospitals were visited, including the great institution at Dartford, twenty miles from London.

During the week the party was in London, many wounded officers and men called at the Carleton Hotel, seeking reassurance from Captain Eddy that the wounded men released from hospital would go back to the division.

One afternoon toward the end of our stay in London a particularly downcast group informed Captain Eddy that they had received information that all the wounded were to be returned to the States direct. It is interesting, as illustrating the mysterious manner in which soldiers gain authoritative information, to know that such an order had been received by Major General Biddle from General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, a few hours before. This was learned when General Biddle called the Division Commander on the telephone and told him regretfully of the order that had been received. The Division Commander thereupon sent a strong telegraphic personal plea to Major General James W. McAndrew, Chief of Staff of the American Expeditionary Forces, stating that the wounded soldiers of the 27th Division to the number of 4,000 would regard such an order as in the nature of a deportation order. The telegram was a little unusual, first because it was in criticism of an official order, and secondly because it fully and completely indicated the outraged feelings of the wounded and the fact that the Division Commander shared these feelings. The telegram, however, was addressed to an unusual officer, one who possessed the necessary imagination to visualize the situation and the broad-mindedness and fearlessness to rescind the order, should such action be justified. In all probability the order had been prepared in a routine manner by some officer lacking in psychological sense, and who probably believed that he was doing the wounded soldiers in England a



Major General Read presenting prize for mule race to Sergeant Hart, orderly to the Division Commander



Band of the 107th Infantry at lunch at the II Corps Meet

specially good turn by marking them for early return to the States. General McAndrew telegraphed General Biddle the same day that the order was rescinded and that the wounded of the 27th and 30th Divisions who were fit for military duty within a reasonable time would be returned to their own divisions.

On November 21st the 27th Division party returned to the division and in the ensuing days there was a steady stream of convalescent soldiers returning to the division from England. A considerable number of them, taking no chances, had persuaded the hospital authorities with tears in their eyes to certify to their physical fitness for military duty before they really should have been discharged from the hospitals. It was necessary for these men to be given light duty for a time and for supervision to be exercised in relation to their subsistence and care. This, however, was done by the medical officers and by their companies with the greatest willingness, and within a very few weeks more than 2,000 of the wounded had rejoined the division.

On November 4th and 5th an interdivisional athletic meet was held in the neighborhood of Corbie. These games were suggested and planned by Major General Read, the Corps Commander. The games included all the usual field and track events. Motor trucks were made available to transport the men of the 27th and 30th Divisions where they were located at points distant from the field. A great multitude of soldiers of both divisions attended. The weather was satisfactory and the events were contested with sportsmanlike zeal by all the contestants. The games were particularly satisfactory to the 27th Division, as they won nearly all the events.

While we were at Corbie Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig sent to the Corps Commander a letter of commendation referring to the battle service of the 27th and 30th Divisions. The letter was published in a corps order, of which the following is a copy:

HEADQUARTERS II CORPS
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES FRANCE

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 44

November 18, 1918.

1. The following letter from the Commander in Chief of the British armies to the Commanding General, II Corps, is published for the information of the officers and men of this command:

"Now that the American II Corps is leaving the British zone, I wish once more to thank you and all officers, non-commissioned officers and men under your command, on behalf of both myself and all ranks of the British armies in France and Flanders, for the very gallant and efficient service you have rendered during the period of your operations with the 4th British Army.

"On the 29th of September you took part with great distinction in the great and critical attack which shattered the enemy's resistance in the Hindenburg Line and opened the road to final victory. The deeds of the 27th and 30th American Divisions who on that day took Bellicourt and Nauroy and so gallantly sustained the desperate struggle for Bony will rank with the highest achievements of the war. They will always be remembered by the British regiments that fought beside you.



27th Division National Guard mobile electric light plant, Corbie, France



Chinese coolies in the Corbie area

"Since that date, through three weeks of almost continuous fighting, you advanced from one success to another, overcoming all resistance, beating off numerous counter-attacks, and capturing several thousand prisoners and many guns. The names of Brancourt, Premont, Busigny, Vaux-Andigny, St. Souplet and Mazinghien testify to the dash and energy of your attacks.

"I rejoice at the success which has attended your efforts and I am proud to have had you under my command.

(Signed) "D. HAIG,
"Field Marshal."

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL READ:

OFFICIAL:

STEPHEN C. CLARK,
Adjutant General

GEO. S. SIMOND,
Chief of Staff.

Finally, the division received orders to move from the Corbie area to an area in and about the city of Le Mans, southeast of Paris, and which had been designated and was being organized preparatory to embarkation of troops to the United States by way of Brest and St. Nazaire.


It was directed by higher authority that the British machine guns be turned into the British Ordnance Service. Much other property deemed unnecessary to be taken to the new area was also directed to be returned to the British authorities. All of these details are set forth in Orders No. 121, dated November 19th, which will be found in the Appendix as Exhibit 45.

The rail movement of the division to the new area and the entraining table were prescribed in Orders Nos. 122, 123 and 124, also included in the Appendix as Exhibit 46.

This ended the stay of the division in the drear atmosphere and amid the shattered villages of the historic valley of the Somme. Officers and men were glad to get away from the Corbie area, with its depressing features and the sad spectacles afforded by the constant streams of civilians returning to the ruins of their former homes. The troops now felt that they were on their way not only to a brighter and more comfortable environment, but that in fact the trip to the new area would be the first step towards home. The stay in the new area was for so long a period, namely, from November 24, 1918, to February 22, 1919, that the narrative of the life there will be taken up in the next chapter.



United States government officials visit the 27th Division battle-field at the Hindenburg Line. Left to right: Paul D. Cravath, United States Treasurer for the American Expeditionary Forces; Captain Harold G. Pearson, 53d Brigade Headquarters; Joseph B. Cotton, Representative of United States Food Administration; Lieutenant J. H. Ernst, 53d Brigade Headquarters; and Captain James S. Wadsworth, Division Headquarters



Members of the Headquarters Troop drawing water from an old mill near Headquarters at Corbie


CHAPTER XX

LE MANS AREA

TUESDAY, November 26th, found the major portion of the division entraining or en route for the Le Mans area. Le Mans is a large and interesting city, southwest of Paris. The city is rather noted for the manufacture of high-grade motors. It was to this city that the Wright Brothers went when they sought a light motor to furnish power for the airplane developed by them, when the results of their first attempts to fly in America demonstrated the possibilities of aviation. The country about Le Mans had of course experienced none of the immediate suffering incident to military operations in the war. The terrain was rolling, healthy and attractive.

The task of returning to America an army as large as that of the American Expeditionary Forces required that the troops, before their arrival at the ports of embarkation, should be concentrated in some convenient area where they might be prepared for the homeward voyage. This preparation consisted of accounting for and turning in property not desirable to take back to America, the delousing of the men, where that process was necessary, and furnishing them with new clothing where needed. The Le Mans area was peculiarly well adapted for the purposes indicated. It was sufficiently distant from Paris to remove that attractive city from the immediate environment of the troops. Its location in a general way was on the line between the area of the American army and the ports of Brest and St. Nazaire, and it afforded adequate billeting facilities in the numerous towns and villages that made up the district.


Shortly before the division began its movement from the Corbie area, the Division Commander received a telegram from United States Senator James W. Wadsworth, Jr., who at one time had been an officer in the New York Division, that he had arrived in Paris and desired to visit the division. Senator Wadsworth at the time of the call for the Mexican border service was a first lieutenant in the 1st New York Cavalry, as well as United States Senator from the state of New York. When the call for the border service was made, Senator Wadsworth planned to resign from the Senate and resume his military duties as a subaltern officer. This attitude of loyalty to the military service and to the division was greatly appreciated at the time by the officers and men who knew of it, but when it was found that the Senator, contrary to the advice of his immediate military associates, proposed literally to carry out his purpose, the appreciation of the officers turned into concern, for all knew the importance to the army of the continued service in the Senate of Lieutenant Wadsworth. Accordingly the Division Commander and other officers made known their views to Senator Wadsworth and he was dis-



Division Headquarters at Montfort



Critique in the courtyard of the chateau of Count de Nicolay at Montfort following divisional exercises



WYNKOOP HALLENBECK CRAWFORD CO., NEW YORK, PRINTERS AND BINDERS



suaded from permitting his military ardor to interfere with his paramount duty to the people. The division went to the border, and while there had the pleasure of a visit from Senator Wadsworth on Thanksgiving Day at McAllen, Texas. The following Thanksgiving Day, when the division was at Camp Wadsworth, Senator Wadsworth again spent the holiday with his old comrades of the division, and then said that no matter where the division might be in 1918, he would, if it were at all possible, spend Thanksgiving Day with the officers and men. True to his promise, he had arrived in France for the purpose mentioned. At least he had so arranged his official business in France as to be able to spend Thanksgiving Day with the 27th Division.

The Division Commander met Senator Wadsworth in Paris on Wednesday, November 27th, and with him continued on to the Le Mans area the following day. Senator Wadsworth spent several days with the division, visiting most of the units before leaving the area for home.

Midway between Paris and Le Mans lies the ancient city of Chartres, with its interesting cathedral and numerous points of interest. Many of the officers and soldiers of the division whose duties occasionally took them to Paris after the division arrived in the Le Mans area will remember Chartres.

The Division Headquarters was established in the village of Montfort. A number of the officers of Division Headquarters were billeted and provided with every convenience and facility at the chateau of the Count de Nicolay, who left nothing undone to make the stay of the officers agreeable.

The new area is shown on the accompanying map.

With the arrival of troops in the Le Mans area, it was natural for the mass of the men to believe that this was but a short and intervening step preliminary to boarding the transports. About this time the American troops began impatiently to look forward to the commencement of the homeward voyage. The war was over. As a result of the participation of American troops, victory to the Allied cause had resulted. The mission had been accomplished. Why, therefore, remain in France? This impatience of the soldiers promised to result in a serious problem for the Division Commanders of the army. In the case of the 27th Division, however, the feeling of impatience was not marked. The division in a sense constituted a homeland. These remarks have no application to the replacements that had been received during the period of the division's service in the Corbie area. The replacements were new men. However, public opinion, if it may be termed such, was dominated by the veterans, most of whom had been in the division for several years. Most of them remembered the impatience of the troops to return from the Mexican border after it became clear that there was to be no fighting, and they, more than the others, realized that it was a physical impossibility to transport the entire A. E. F. back to America in a short period of time. It was inevitable that even if the troops were sent back in an uninterrupted stream and at the rate of 200,000 men per month, it would take ten months

before the last detachment could embark. A more pertinent question among the men of our division was, "What will be the order of the departure of divisions?" Would the division embark within a month or would their turn not come before ten or more months had elapsed?

It is common knowledge that a large body of men are peculiarly susceptible to unhappiness if they are kept in comparative idleness, and that, on the other hand, active work and physical effort make for the maintenance of interest and happiness. Division Commanders were reminded of this principle by General Pershing. The division had hardly completed its movement to the Le Mans area when plans were developed for interregimental competitions in all fields of activity. These included not only athletic events, but tests in marching, precision at ceremonies, combat exercises, condition of transport and animals, etc.

For a time the newer men seemed mystified concerning the great industry displayed on all sides in relation to development of company, battalion and regimental efficiency. Some of them believed that this activity foreshadowed a movement to the Rhine. After a time, however, they understood the importance of keeping hard at work during the waiting period. As a result of the previous hard field service, when men were required to sleep in dugouts, shelters and cellars infested with vermin, they had become infested with lice and other parasites. These pests were evicted with the greatest difficulty. This sanitary work required constant supervision and inspection. It was essential also that the billets of the new area should be kept in proper sanitary condition to prevent reinfection. Portable delousing machines were obtained and moved about as required. Other machines were improvised. Everywhere in the billeting areas men were to be seen at improvised baths, engaged in washing their bodies and underclothes. The washing of the latter garments was usually ineffective unless the washing process was followed by pressing with a hot iron. Simultaneously with this work a great effort was made to increase the smart appearance of orderly rooms, billets, stables, corrals, picket lines, motor transports, shops, storehouses and vehicles. The rivalry among companies, battalions and regiments was keen. Great attention was given by the best drillmasters to the instruction and training of the replacements.

More replacements arrived. The division began once again to resemble in numbers a war strength division. Toward the end of December great progress had been made in the training of replacements. This progress was augmented by the fact that the mass of the replacements were exceptionally fine material from the military point of view. Before coming to the division their experience had in most cases been unhappy. Some of them belonged to divisions that had been broken up. Their pride and morale had been badly damaged in consequence. They still talked to their new comrades of the injustice done them. None of them viewed with anything but apprehension the prospect of being assigned to a division that had seen a great deal of hard service and whose men would be able to tell of battle participation which had been denied them. This



Officers of the 27th Division. Picture taken at the chateau of Count de Nicolay at Montfort on New Year's Day, 1919

situation, however, had been anticipated, and the veteran officers and men of the division had been advised of the importance of welcoming the new men with enthusiasm and good will. With their usual loyalty they followed this advice. In the infantry regiments the band was paraded to greet incoming detachments of replacements. Without delay the replacements were assigned by detachments to the various company units, where they were received in appropriate and hospitable fashion and made to feel that their arrival was an event. A substantial percentage of the replacements had been moved from pillar to post from the time of their arrival in France until their assignment to the 27th Division, and in the case of such men the new life was, comparatively at least, most enjoyable.

Months before this period the division had adopted a divisional emblem, but no authority had existed to permit the officers and men to wear it. Later, however, the American General Headquarters had authorized the adoption of divisional insignia, subject to the approval of the Commander in Chief. The insignia selected by the 27th Division was approved shortly after the arrival in the Le Mans area, and a telegram had been sent to a firm in America to ship to the division in France some

thousands of these insignia. These arrived after a large number of replacements had joined the division and the question immediately arose among the men as to whether the new men who had not taken part in battle should be permitted to wear this proud emblem of their accomplishment. It is a commentary upon the generosity and good will of the veterans that they acclaimed the divisional order which made no distinction between veterans and replacements in relation to the wearing of the divisional insignia. The only distinction made was that no soldier was permitted to wear the insignia unless he had passed an examination by a commissioned officer of his company certifying to his character as a soldier and his reasonable efficiency in the performance of the duties of his grade. Names so certified were published on company orders. It was a military offense for a soldier to wear the insignia unless authorized by official order of his command. The psychology of this was so profoundly correct that hundreds of the newer men worked overtime under drill sergeants to qualify themselves to pass the prescribed examination.

It may be stated here that the military courtesy of the division during the period of the stay in the Le Mans area reached a state of precision and smartness that left nothing to be desired.

After the division had been in the Le Mans area for some time, the Division Commander began to receive a large number of cablegrams, messages and official communications commending the valor and battle accomplishment of the officers and men of the division. The official commendations were published in bulletins for the information of the personnel of the division.

One of the first letters received by the Division Commander was one written by Major General Gellibrand, commanding the 3d Australian Division, which command, it will be remembered, was in support of the 27th Division during the Hindenburg Line attack. The letter follows:

FRANCE, October 14, 1918.

GENERAL:

On behalf of all ranks of the 3d Australian Division, I desire to express our sincere appreciation of the fighting qualities displayed by the 27th Division U. S. on the 27th and 29th September last. The gallant manner in which your troops faced an extremely difficult task, the determination of their attacks on a strongly entrenched position, and the undaunted spirit with which they met their losses make us hope that we shall again have the honor of fighting alongside the division under your command. The confidence of the men in their officers appealed to us as a particularly happy omen for the future successes of the 27th.

Very respectfully,

(Signed) I. GELLIBRAND,
Major General,
Commanding 3d Australian Division.

On October 19th the following message received by General Read, commanding the II American Corps, was repeated by him to the 27th Division.

COMMANDING GENERAL, 27TH DIVISION:

The following repeated for your information: The Commander in Chief desires you to convey to the officers and soldiers of your corps his appreciation of the magnificent qualities which have enabled them, against powerful resistance, to advance more than ten miles and to take more than six thousand prisoners since September 27th.—McANDREW.

On November 22d the Division Commander received the following letter from Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander in Chief of the British Expeditionary Forces, transmitted through Major General Read, commanding the II American Corps:

Now that the American II Corps is leaving the British zone, I wish once more to thank you and all officers, non-commissioned officers and men under your commend, on behalf both of myself and all ranks of the British armies in France and Flanders, for the very gallant and efficient service you have rendered during the period of your operations with the 4th British Army.

On the 29th of September you took part with distinction in the great and critical attack which shattered the enemy's resistance in the Hindenburg Line and opened the road to final victory. The deeds of the 27th and 30th American Divisions, who on that day took Bellicourt and Nauroy and so gallantly sustained the desperate struggle for Bony, will rank with the highest achievements of this war. They will always be remembered by the British regiments that fought beside you.

Since that date, through three weeks of almost continuous fighting, you advanced from one success to another, overcoming all resistance, beating off numerous counter-attacks, and capturing several thousand prisoners and many guns. The names of Brancourt, Premont, Busigny, Vaux-Andigny, St. Souplet and Mazinghien testify to the dash and energy of your attacks.

I rejoice at the success which has attended your efforts and I am proud to have had you under my command.

(Signed) D. HAIG,
Field Marshal.

A day or two later Major General Read sent the following communication to the Division Commander:

Referring to the telegram from the Commander in Chief, of appreciation of the sacrifice and service of the troops of the American Expeditionary Forces, I feel that it should be impressed upon the men of our command that they, and the organizations to which they belong, have played an exceptional part in bringing about the magnificent results which the Commander in Chief has so warmly eulogized, and that every advantage should be taken of this expression of what has been done in the past and confidence as to the future by those in command to inspire their men with pride in the service they have had as soldiers in the army of the United States, and to keep alive this "proud consciousness of a new Americanism born of sacrifice."

I would request that you convey to your command my appreciation of the part they have taken in our great victory, and my thanks for their heroic devotion to duty; and that I share with them their sorrow for fallen comrades, and their pride in the high achievements of the men of this corps.

(Signed) G. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding.

Another commendation received on December 6th was from Sir Henry Rawlinson, commanding the 4th British Army, commending the work of the 102d and 105th Regiments of Engineers. The letter follows:

1. I wish to express to you my thanks for and my appreciation of the excellent work done by the 102d and 105th Regiments of Engineers, whose services you were good enough to place at my disposal.

2. The work done by these two regiments on the light railways was of the greatest value in getting through the system of light railway communication which, owing to the continuous destruction of the broad gauge lines by delay action mines, was the means by which it was possible to maintain the troops and continue the fighting which led to such great results.

3. I will be glad if you will be so good as to convey to Colonel A. H. Acker and Colonel J. H. Pratte, commanding respectively the 102d and 105th Regiments of Engineers, and to the officers, non-commissioned officers and men of these regiments this expression of the keen appreciation with which their valuable and cordial cooperation has been regarded by all ranks of the 4th Army.

H. R. RAWLINSON,
Commanding 4th Army.

The following cablegram was received during the first week in January from Honorable Charles S. Whitman, Governor of the State of New York:

MAJOR GENERAL JOHN F. O'RYAN,
27TH DIVISION,
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES:

New York State extends to the gallant officers and enlisted men of the 27th Division heartfelt greetings for the new year, with grateful and loving pride in their glorious achievements on the historic battle-fields of France in the cause of liberty and humanity. A year of accomplishment and heroic sacrifice has passed with victory won. A new year is breaking upon us. May it give to the civilized world the joys of peace and good will.

CHARLES S. WHITMAN,
Governor of New York.

On December 3d a new leave area was established for the 27th Division. This was at St. Malo on the northern coast of Brittany, an old and most interesting seaside resort. Orders provided that leaves of absence for seven days' duration, exclusive of time necessary for travel to and from destination, were authorized for officers and enlisted men in accordance with the provisions of General Orders No. 6, of General Headquarters, 1918. The leaves were so arranged that men were daily departing and daily returning after the first leave period had expired. This plan was carried out on the basis of two per day from Division Headquarters, three from the Trains and Military Police, two from the Sanitary Train, four from the Engineers, one from the Engineer Train, two from the Signal Battalion, one from each Brigade Headquarters, two from each machine gun battalion, eight from each infantry regiment and one every two days from smaller units. It was later noted that the men profited greatly as a result of the rest and change of environment resulting from these leaves.

During December and January there were periodical field exercises employing the entire forces of the division. These were usually supervised by the II American Corps. The critiques following these exercises were most instructive, particularly to the officers of field grade. Always, however, the newer men seemed puzzled concerning these military activities.



Officers of the 107th Infantry. Left to right: Lieutenant J. S. Snyder, Company M; Lieutenant W. R. Smith, Supply Company; Lieutenant Harry F. Allen, Headquarters Company; Lieutenant O. A. Albright, Company H; Lieutenant Charles P. Gray, Sanitary Detachment; Lieutenant A. L. Bibbins, Company G; Lieutenant Hiram W. Taylor, Supply Company; Lieutenant Jesse M. Hughes, Company D; Captain Henry B. Heylman, Personnel Adjutant; Lieutenant Luther M. McBee, Jr., Company B; Captain Douglas C. Despard, 53d Brigade Adjutant; Lieutenant Joseph P. Murphy, Company I; Captain Edward H. Kent; Lieutenant Edwin L. Holloway, Company H; Brigadier General Charles I. De Bevoise, commanding 53d Brigade; Lieutenant Alexander E. Ostrander, Company K; Lieutenant Colonel Mortimer D. Bryant, commanding the regiment; Lieutenant William G. LeCompte, Company F; Major Thomas J. Brady; Lieutenant Eugene L. Mullaney, Headquarters Company; Major Raymond A. Turnbull, Sanitary Detachment; Chaplain Peter E. Hoey; Captain Rowland Tompkins, Company H; Lieutenant William J. Coogan, Sanitary Detachment; Captain K. C. Wilson, Headquarters Company; Lieutenant Albert N. Benedict, Sanitary Detachment; Captain F. P. Riggs, Sanitary Detachment; Lieutenant R. C. Johnson, Company G; Lieutenant Edwin S. Munson, Company C; Captain Henry A. Bancel, Sanitary Detachment; Lieutenant G. B. Daniell, Company K; Lieutenant Claude G. Leland, Company I; Lieutenant Georges D. Bragdon, Company E; Lieutenant Herbert F. Shaver, Company A; Captain David C. Bull, Sanitary Detachment; Captain John A. Korschen, Company F; Chaplain H. M. Stewart; Lieutenant F. D. Conklin, Company A; Lieutenant Arthur Talbot, Headquarters Company; and Lieutenant John A. Nelson, Headquarters Company. Taken in Corbie, France, on November 10, 1918.

They seemed to suspect that the intense activity indicated preparation for other military operations.

About December 15th the 52d Field Artillery Brigade rejoined the division, General Wingate establishing Brigade Headquarters at Laval near Le Mans.

On Friday, December 18th, the entire day was utilized in the conduct of a terrain exercise. This and other similar exercises were carried out as actual operations, a large staff of officers from the corps and from the 30th Division acting as umpires. On occasions when the 30th Division was occupied in similar exercises the 27th Division was called upon to

furnish umpires. Friday, December 20th, was devoted to a divisional exercise in liaison.

During this period and until after the Christmas holidays many visits were made by the officers and men to their comrades of other units of the division stationed near by. On particular occasions these visits were for the purpose of attending company, battalion or regimental dinners. In some units where the billet afforded the requisite facilities, the dinner was held at the station of the unit, while in other cases hospitality was provided for at a hotel or restaurant. For units stationed near Le Mans the hotels and restaurants of that city provided excellent and attractive facilities. The Division Commander entertained the Brigade Commanders and the general officers of the II American Corps and 30th Division, and in turn visited these officers on occasions of formal and informal dinners.

On Saturday, December 21st, Major General Read entertained the senior officers of the 27th and 30th Divisions at dinner at the magnificent chateau at Bonnetable, where he was billeted. The 27th Division theatrical troupe provided the entertainment for the evening.

Great preparations were made in all commands for the Christmas holidays. Christmas is not celebrated in France as it is in America and



Lieutenant Colonel William L. Hallahan, Division Signal Officer, and officers of the 102d Field Signal Battalion

it was with much wonderment that the children in all the villages watched the preparations for the celebration. Wherever possible, a large Christmas tree was secured and erected in the "Grande Place" of the village or town. On Christmas Eve these trees were decorated and fitted with candles. Officers and men had contributed generously to the Christmas funds and this made it possible for the various committees to purchase at Le Mans large quantities of inexpensive toys to be given the children. During the entertainments soldiers wonderfully camouflaged as Santa Claus appeared and distributed the gifts to the enthusiastic and grateful children. Undoubtedly every American soldier thought of some American youngster near and dear to him as he handed out or witnessed the presentation of these presents to the youngsters of France.

At the Division Headquarters Christmas Eve celebration, Colonel Montgomery, the Division Surgeon, appropriately dressed as Santa Claus, distributed presents to the officers. These presents were of such a character as to indicate some foible of the donee. The ceremony was carried out with the mirth usually attending such occasions.


During the month of December, and in anticipation more particularly of the Christmas holidays, a large soldier choir was organized. In this choir was gathered the best singing talent of the division. After several weeks of training they were qualified to play their rôle in any form of religious service. They could sing one or two of the masses of the Catholic church; they knew the best Methodist hymns, and they could sing appropriately at a Jewish service. Chaplain Kelley, then assigned to Division Headquarters, arranged for a midnight mass at the Catholic church adjoining the chateau of the Count de Nicolay at Montfort and invited the choir to sing the service. The invitation was accepted and the people of the village were invited to attend. The church is large and normally swallows up the congregation of the village. On the occasion of Christmas Eve, however, all the soldiers that could be accommodated apparently attended and left little room for the native population. The latter must have believed the Americans to be very devout. Although there were undoubtedly a great number of Catholic soldiers present, their numbers were heavily reinforced by their comrades of other denominations. The choir sang most impressively. Privates Judson House, of Division Headquarters, and M. White, of the 102d Engineers, were the soloists.

Christmas day, of course, was marked by a Christmas dinner in every company unit of the division. There were no turkeys, but there were excellent substitutes, and what the soldiers most appreciated were the "seconds," and in many cases "thirds" and "fourths," that were allowed. To the uninitiated it is necessary to explain that the soldier is always hungry, and that "seconds" signifies a second helping.

It was expected that the week intervening between Christmas and New Year's would be a week of jollification. However, very much of the time was occupied in strenuous field exercises.

Prior to the Christmas holidays it had been announced by the Corps Commander that shortly after January 1st an inspection would be made

by a board of officers from the corps for the purpose of determining the best infantry regiment and best machine gun battalion in the corps, merit to be determined by precision of drill, soldierly bearing and smartness, condition of equipment and of the animals, harness and vehicles of the transport. In preparation for this test divisional inspections were held during the Christmas holidays for the purpose of determining the best infantry regiment and machine gun battalion within the division. When such units were selected, they were to represent the division in the corps tests. Great interest was manifested in these competitions. All canvas equipment was thoroughly scrubbed and refitted. Packs were made up with most meticulous care, steel helmets were repainted and varnished and all animals groomed to a standard approaching perfection. Particularly did the men of the machine gun battalions and the infantry transport lavish attention upon the animals, harness and vehicles. A great amount of time was expended in the preparation of the animals to meet the test. The chains of the harness were polished with sand until they glistened. All harness was placed in excellent condition, while the vehicles were scrubbed and repainted and the brass hub caps highly polished. As a result of the zeal shown in preparation for the competition, it was most difficult to determine what organization should be selected to represent the division. A board of divisional officers rated all units in accordance with a formula laid down for the purpose. The result of



Left to right: Brigadier General L. L. Durfee, commanding 54th Infantry Brigade; Major General John F. O'Ryan, commanding 27th Division; Brigadier General George Albert Wingate, commanding 52d Field Artillery Brigade



Brigadier General Charles I. De Bevoise, commanding 53d Infantry Brigade, formerly commanding 107th Infantry, conversing with Captain Thomas J. Brady, Operations Officer of the 107th Infantry

the competition was that the 107th Infantry was selected as the infantry unit and the 105th Machine Gun Battalion as the machine gun unit to represent the division. The 106th Infantry was a very close second to the 107th in this competition. During the time these competitions were under way it would be difficult for the most exacting officer to imagine troops presenting a more soldierly appearance than those composing the competing organizations. The two units selected were prepared to meet the corps test and looked forward to the competition with the greatest confidence. However, a few days before the corps competition was to take place, orders were received from the Corps Commander that the competition would not be held.

Christmas holidays were marked by the publication of a new number of *The Gas Attack*, the division's magazine. This number was published by a printing firm in France. It was produced with much difficulty and the exercise of considerable initiative on the part of the soldiers responsible for its production. The foreword, written by the Division Commander, gives the atmosphere of the time, and for that reason it is reprinted here. The illustrations contained in the number, as well as the reading matter, are most interesting, but space does not permit their republication in the history. The foreword follows:

We are all glad to have a Christmas number of *The Gas Attack*. With the enterprise and thoroughness so characteristic of our men, those charged with the

work of producing this number accomplished their mission in the manner shown by its pages. They are indeed to be congratulated.

Our last Christmas number was published in Spartanburg, S. C. Very much has transpired since then. We have come overseas. We have served and fought in Belgium and in France. It fell to our lot to take part in what doubtless will be regarded as one of the greatest battles of this greatest of all wars. The valor of our officers and men, their determined skill in action and their tremendous pride in their organizations, have been the subject of such continued praise, and from such eminent sources, that no further reference to them need be made here.

I have said that much has transpired since the appearance of our last Christmas number. Much indeed, for the soldiers of the division today are not the same men who came with the division to France. They may answer to the same names and there may be a resemblance so far as outward appearances are concerned. In those mental qualities, however, which individualize men and distinguish them from others—in those qualities our men are new men. They are not the men we brought to France. They are not the men we brought to France because they are products of a new and extraordinary life, an existence that may be likened to the process employed for the production of steel. For our men have been through the crucible. They are the survivors of every character and intensity of fire. They have seen and faced death in all its violent forms. In physical effort and in mental strain they have endured what none but the hardiest could endure and survive.


When our men return to their homes they will look on the world through eyes that will depict the sheltered life, its joys, its problems, and its sadness, in forms and in hues very different from the pictures seen by the ordinary man. Home and happiness, friends and pleasures, will no longer be accepted as matters of course, but by contrast with other days and this other life will be appraised and truly valued. How contemptibly trivial to men who have lived and half died in shell holes at night, in mud and water to their waists and with machine gun bullets skimming the tops of their tin hats, seem those circumstances of the sheltered life which constitute for some such apparently vexatious and depressing problems.

Merry Chrstmas and many Happy New Years to our soldiers who will constitute with their discriminating minds the America of tomorrow.

JOHN F. O'RYAN,
Major General.

On January 16th word was received that General Pershing would arrive in the Le Mans area the following day and would make a personal inspection of all the divisions in the area. General Pershing and the members of his staff arrived at Connerre in a special train. The 27th Division was directed to furnish one battalion as an escort of honor when the General left the train on the morning of the 17th. Connerre was in the area of the 107th Infantry and that regiment was directed to furnish the necessary escort. This regiment, having won the divisional competition shortly before this date, was well prepared to turn out a battalion worthy of the division. The men were for the most part very tall, and in their immaculate clothing and equipment, topped by the polished steel helmets, they presented a really remarkable appearance. When General Pershing left the train, he was immediately impressed by the appearance of this escort and then and there made a personal inspection of the officers and men, at the conclusion of which he commended the battalion commander.

The same day it was arranged that a few days later the Commander in Chief would inspect the entire division, including the transport, at



Regimental Staff of the 105th Infantry. Left to right: Captain Stephan H. Fifield, Personnel Adjutant; Captain George W. Papen, Regimental Surgeon; Colonel James M. Andrews, commanding; Captain Lewis H. Gibbes, Regimental Adjutant; Captain John W. Frost, Operations Officer, Daours, Somme, France, November, 21, 1918



Regimental Staff, 106th Infantry. Left to right: Chaplain Frank I. Hanscom; Captain Murray Taylor, Operations Officer; Lieutenant Colonel John M. True; Colonel Franklin W. Ward, commanding; Captain James P. Cook, Adjutant; Major Nils P. Larsen, Surgeon; Chaplain Warren T. Powell

Belgian Camp. Orders were accordingly issued for the movement of all units to that place, the marches being so timed that all commands would arrive at the camp not later than 11 o'clock on the morning of the review. The review was scheduled to be held in the afternoon. These arrangements were made for the purpose of enabling the commands to make a final clean-up of clothing, arms and equipment before the afternoon ceremony.

In the interim, General Pershing was entertained at dinner at the 27th Division Headquarters in the chateau at Montfort. The dinner was followed by an entertainment given by the division theatrical troupe. So well made up and so "girlish" were the soubrettes that for a time General Pershing seemed suspicious that the cast actually included some girls. After the entertainment was over, he asked opportunity to say a word to the actors and "actresses," and then saw the soubrettes with their wigs removed. Much to their satisfaction, he told them that they were the best entertainers he had seen in France. On another evening during his stay, the Corps Commander and the Division Commanders in the area were entertained by General Pershing aboard his special train.

On the day of the review, which became known throughout the division as the "Pershing Review," all the organizations reported at Belgian Camp on time and up to their best standards of preparation for participation in such a ceremony. Numerous questions arose in the minds of the staff as to whether the division should follow what the regulations prescribed in relation to reviews, or whether such requirements should be ignored and the customs established within the division followed. For example, as has been stated in the account of the memorial review held on November 10th, it has been the practice in the New York Division since the Mexican border days to give the infantry the right of line, as the infantry is the arm which fights the battles. Regulations, on the other hand, give the right of line to the engineers. Regulations furthermore provide that at such ceremonies troops shall be marched in review in column of companies or in column of platoons. It was the practice in the division to march the troops on such occasions in battalions closed in mass. Regulations provided that the rifles be carried without the bayonets fixed. The custom in the division was to carry the rifles with bayonets fixed. There were many other similar details in vogue in the division, which were the result of experience in military ceremonies involving the employment of considerable numbers of troops, and which differed from what was prescribed by regulations. The Division Commander determined to follow customs of the division, subject to the approval of General Pershing. When General Pershing arrived at Belgian Camp, the two best horses in the division were in readiness so that he might make a choice. Having selected one of the animals, the situation in relation to the proposed departure from regulations was explained to him, and he was asked whether he had objections to what was proposed. He replied that he would have to see the ceremony before he could judge it, remarking that officers who assumed to depart from regulations did so at their peril. Such confidence,

however, was felt in the superiority of the customs in vogue in the division over those prescribed by regulations that the risk of official displeasure was assumed, and the inspection thereupon commenced. So thorough was the preparation for this event and so careful had been the attention to details in relation to uniformity that not only were all the packs of the infantry uniform in size and appearance, but the wrap leggings were all rolled the same way. Even the shoe laces were laced in uniform manner. Although the roads approaching the camp were somewhat muddy, there had been time for mud spots to be removed from the shoes and leggings of the men and from the hoofs and legs of the animals and the wheels of the wagons. All units had come provided with the necessary oil, brushes and rags for the purpose. About the time the inspection commenced, the sun appeared. The division was in line of masses. All companies had been equalized so that the left guides as well as the right guides were covered in file. The alignment had been made upon a line "snapped" on the grass for the purpose. The observing eye of the Commander in Chief immediately noted the effects of the picture thus presented, and more and more, as he proceeded in the progress of his very thorough inspection, did he become enthusiastic over the men and their organizations. He inspected every individual soldier in the division and every animal as well. He questioned many men concerning their wounds and their decorations. He commented upon the great number of wound chevrons. In several squads seven out of the eight men wore wound chevrons. Frequently he met men who wore two wound chevrons. Several were encountered who had been wounded three times. It must be said that his greatest satisfaction was expressed when he saw the transport. Having looked over a portion of it, he stopped in the presence of the transport men and said that he had never seen anything like it and made numerous inquiries concerning the methods employed to attain such standards. Many methods had been employed, but the determining factor was the high standard of intelligence, zeal and efficiency of the transport personnel. That was the real secret. It had been almost a custom in the army to throw into the transport, to be there employed as "mule skinners," all the "roughnecks" and trouble-makers of the line companies. As far back as the Mexican border service this custom had been discontinued in the division, and from that period men had been selected for service in the transport with increasing care. The results which followed justified the practice. Although General Pershing gave no assurances to the officers and men, they nevertheless sensed, with that extraordinary accuracy which is a faculty of soldiers, that the division had made a "hit" with the Commander in Chief. Accordingly it was with the greatest pride and confidence that they prepared for the passage in review. When General Pershing again mounted his horse and took his reviewing post, the division, headed by the massed band, marched by in column of battalions closed in mass with bayonets fixed. The machine gun battalions marched as a machine gun corps. All the transport and trains of the division marched as a divisional unit. It would be hard

to imagine a more martial picture than that presented by the 27th Division on this occasion. Officers and men felt that they had left a lasting impression of their precision and efficiency upon the great crowd that had gathered to witness this final divisional ceremony in France.

The day following the review General Pershing left the division area in order to inspect other divisions in the vicinity. Before leaving, he remarked his preference for the customs which he had seen exemplified on the occasion of the 27th Division review. He approved the marching with bayonets fixed, the close formations and the massed bands. Later he directed these customs to be employed in other divisions.

Shortly after the departure of General Pershing, rumors again became abundant that the division would shortly move to the ports of embarkation. These rumors were quickly followed by others that the division would not leave the Le Mans area for five or six months' time. It was most desirable for the contentment of the men and for the efficient conduct of training that no mystery should be made of the approximate time of departure. If the men were not to leave France for another five or six months, there would appear to be no reason why such information should not be given them. On the contrary, with that knowledge they would then devote themselves with greater contentment to the training schedules prescribed for the intervening period. The matter, however, seemed to be steeped in mystery. The Division Commander certainly did not know when the division was scheduled to leave, nor did the Corps Commander. Inquiry at the headquarters of the American Embarkation Center developed the fact that the Commanding General there did not know. It was explained that orders for departure would come from Tours, but that the officers there did not know because their orders were dependent upon information received from Commanding Generals at the ports of embarkation, and in turn their calls for troops were dependent upon the amount of shipping available. It seemed clear that the entire matter could be determined, at least approximately, but that those in immediate authority believed it to be unimportant for the men to know whether they were to leave in a month or six months. That point of view, if it existed, answers itself so far as its merits are concerned. The Division Commander determined to learn, if possible, the approximate time when the division would leave France, and with this object in view took the necessary leave and motored to Brest. There it was learned that in all probability the 27th and 30th Divisions would move to that port within thirty days' time. Shortly after the return to the divisional area this prophecy was expressed in warning orders from the Commanding General of the American Embarkation Center.

A very elaborate system had been planned by officers in charge of the American Embarkation Center which required that a division, before leaving the area for Brest, should go through a delousing plant, which had been established at Belgian Camp. As has already been stated, the matter of delousing the personnel of the 27th Division had been taken up promptly after arrival in the Le Mans area, so that before the time for de-



Colonel Mortimer D. Bryant, commanding 107th Infantry, formerly commanding Officer 106th Machine Gun Battalion



Regimental Staff, 108th Infantry. Left to right: Captain Damase J. Cadotte, Personnel Adjutant; Major Charles W. Lynn, Surgeon; Captain H. S. Robertson; Colonel Edgar S. Jennings, commanding; First Lieutenant R. W. Robertson; Captain George D. Elliot, Adjutant; Captain Henry D. Bagnal; Captain Clarence S. Martin; Captain Edwin G. Ziegler, Operations Officer

parture of the division had arrived, they were entirely free from vermin. When, however, it was proposed to the Commanding General of the Embarkation Center that the 27th Division should move directly from its billets to the port of Brest without first moving to Belgian Camp and putting the men through the delousing plant, the officers who had planned and constructed the delousing plant protested. They seemed to feel that the system that had been provided should be tested by the first divisional unit directed to move to Brest. On behalf of the division it was urged that experience showed that with every movement of a large body of troops from one area to another, involving changes in billeting conditions, a percentage of the men take cold, and that of these a percentage become infected with the particular variety of bugs which are in the ascendancy in the new billets. It was known, furthermore, that of the men who became infected and who contracted colds and sore throats a percentage would develop pneumonia, particularly during the winter season which then prevailed, and of this percentage some would die. The whole proceeding seemed so obviously unnecessary and so short-sighted when the health of 25,000 men was concerned that the Division Commander made very strong representations to the Corps Commander and to the Commanding General of the American Embarkation Center concerning the matter. The officers who had built up the scheme to pass divisions through their plant were given a hearing. They protested that they could not be responsible for the sanitary condition of troops arriving in America unless they passed through their delousing plant. Finally it was agreed that a most rigid inspection would be made by medical officers from the American Embarkation Center for the purpose of determining whether or not the troops of the 27th Division were free from vermin as claimed. Such inspections were immediately commenced. They were most exhaustive and of a most minute personal nature, both in relation to the bodies of the men and their clothing. The efforts of the doctors to find grounds for criticism were in vain. Soon their doubts changed to enthusiasm concerning the personal hygiene of the personnel, and the division was given a clean bill of health without assuming the unnecessary risks involved in passage through the Belgian Camp.

Before the division left the Le Mans area word was received that the British Government would present medals to officers and men of the division who had been awarded them for gallantry in action. This presentation was made at the Belgian Camp on February 18, 1919, by Major General Read. The troops ordered out for the ceremony were constituted of the 3d Battalion of the 108th Infantry. The officers and soldiers decorated are listed in General Orders No. 9 of February 16, 1919, copy of which appears in the Appendix as Exhibit 47.

During the last week of February units of the division began to entrain for Brest. Arriving at Brest, some units went immediately aboard transports, while others stopped overnight or for several days at Pontanezon Barracks.

Word had been received from General Headquarters that the people

MAP SHOWING MOVEMENTS OF THE 27TH DIVISION A.E.F. IN BELGIUM AND FRANCE 1918

SCALE 1:250,000

Indicates location of Division Headquarters

Railroads — Routes taken by Div Hq ----- Area Boundaries

BELGIUM

FRANCE

CALAIS
Gravelines
Dunkerque
Furnes
Dixmude
Bergues
Bourbourg
Audruicq
Guines
Marquise
Wormhoudt
Haringhe
Oudezeele
Arrived July 19 Left Aug 1st Sept 3rd
TRAINING AREA
Camp Douglas
Arrived Aug 1st Left Sept 3
Poperinghe
Ypres
SECTOR HELD BY 27th DIVISION Aug 31st to Sept 3rd
Wormhoudt
Cassel
Hazebrouck
Bailleul
Wimille
BOULOGNE
Lumbres
Desvres
Samer
Wieurlet
Arrived July 3rd Left July 19
TRAINING AREA
St Omer
Aire
Merville
Lillers
Bethune
La Bassee
Lens
Etaples
Montreuil
Fruges
Hucqueliers
Campagne
Heuchin
St Pol
Comines
Menin
Halluin
COURTRAI
Audenarde
Renaix
TOURCOING
ROUBAIX
Armentieres
LILLE
TOURNAI
Seclin
Carvin
Orchies
Amiand
DOUAI
VALENCIENNES
Denain
ARRAS
Scarpe R.
Rue
Hesdin
Marey
Aubin
TRAINING AREA
Novelles
Arrived June 3rd Left June 5th
St Valery
Cayeux
Domvast
TRAINING AREA
St Riquier
Arrived June 5th Left June 8th
Ault
TRAINING AREA
ESCARBOTIN
Arrived June 18th Left June 22nd
ABBEVILLE
Somme R.
le Treport
Eu
Gamaches
Blangy
Envermeu
Oisemont
Picquigny
Doullens
TRAINING AREA
BEAUVAL
Arrived June 22nd Left July 25th
REST & TRAINING AREA
BEAUQUESNE
Arrived Sept 17th Left Sept 24th
Bapaume
Albert
Le Cateau
REST & TRAINING AREA
CORBIE
Arrived Oct 21st Left Nov 26
AMIENS
Villers Bretonneux
Meaulens-Vidame
Hornoy
Broodus
Nestle
Peronne
ST EMILIE QUARRY
Arrived Sept 28th Left Oct 5th
Sector held by 27th Div Sept 29th to Oct 5th
BOIS DE BUIRE
Arrived Oct 5th Left Oct 9th
JONCOURT
Arrived Oct 9th Left Oct 21st
PREMONT
Arrived Oct 17th Left Oct 19th
Bohain
BUSIGNY
Arrived Oct 19th Left Oct 21st
ST QUENTIN
Ribemont
Guise
Oise R.
Escaut R.
Sambre R.
Ancre R.
Selle R.
Canche R.
Authie R.

BREST & St NAZAIRE 27th Div Arrived from May 23rd to May 31st
Div Hq Arrived May 31st Left June 5th

MONTFORT Armed Nov 27th Left

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of New York City desired an opportunity to see the 27th Division after its arrival in New York. The matter had evidently been taken up with the Secretary of War, for a cablegram had been received from the War Department directing that, so far as practicable, the units of the 27th Division should leave the port of embarkation so as to arrive in New York as close together, in point of time, as possible. Among the ships in the harbor of Brest when the 27th Division began to detrain at that port was the great *Leviathan*, which immediately took aboard about 13,000 troops, or practically one-half of the division. These included Division Headquarters Troop and Detachment, the 105th and 106th Infantry Regiments and the 105th Machine Gun Battalion. The *Leviathan*, with several other ships, sailed February 26th. These ships weighed anchor as soon as the troops were aboard, and without delay left the harbor of Brest and set out on the homeward voyage.

As the homeward voyage was without particular incident, no detailed account will be given of it. The next chapter will relate the story of the arrival of the troops in New York, the reception given the division, and the final parade and muster.

CHAPTER XXI

HOME-COMING, PARADE AND FINAL MUSTER

THE arrival of the 27th Division in the harbor of New York was an experience that those who participated in it will probably never forget. The Mayor of the City of New York had appointed a large reception committee to tender an official welcome to the returning troops. In addition to this official committee, there were committees representing the leading cities and towns of the state where units of the division were maintained in time of peace. There were also committees representing veterans of all the organizations of the division.


The *Leviathan,* on account of her size and of the number of troops she carried—about 13,000 officers and men—naturally attracted the most attention. As the *Leviathan* approached the lower bay, Captain Phelps of the navy, who commanded the ship, finally decided to risk permitting the men to remain on the upper decks. It had been found on other voyages that in the excitement of home-coming the men, when permitted to remain on the upper decks, would not remain in the individual places assigned them, but would run from one side of the ship to the other as something of special interest attracted them, which resulted in giving the ship a decided and sometimes dangerous list. Captain Phelps, having observed the rigid discipline of the troops during this trip, accepted the assurance of the Division Commander that the men would remain in their assigned places, and permitted them to take positions on the upper decks where they could see the many boats coming out to greet them. The men made good the representations of the Division Commander, for no men left their places throughout the trip through the bay to the docks. As the ship approached the Narrows, she was met by a large number of steamers, ferry boats and launches, apparently chartered for the occasion. These were crowded with friends of the troops and various committees. Most of the boats bore signs of welcome. Surrounded by a veritable cluster of these vessels, the great *Leviathan* made her way past Governors Island and the Statue of Liberty and up the Hudson to the Hoboken piers amid the waving of flags, the blowing of whistles, the playing of bands and the cheering of men. Among the boats gathered about the *Leviathan* was an official boat of the City of New York, bearing the Mayor of the city and other leading officials, as well as members of the families of some of the senior officers of the division. Upon arrival at the pier, the troops, already prepared for the movement, were quickly debarked and sent, some to Camp Dix in New Jersey, and the remainder to Camp Upton on Long Island.

In similar fashion, during the next few days, other ships bearing other organizations of the division were welcomed as they proceeded to their



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The giant transport "Leviathan," carrying 10,000 men of the 27th Division, passing up the North River. The vessel is surrounded with welcoming craft, all crowded with cheering relatives and friends of the men. The enthusiasm of the men as familiar home sights were glimpsed was unbounded. The "Leviathan" reached New York on March 5, 1919



©International Film Service

Mayor John F. Hylan extending New York's greeting to Commanding General of the 27th Division, when the latter called at the City Hall

docks. The troops aboard them were sent, some to one camp and some to the other, where they remained until all had arrived.

Meanwhile the Division Commander learned some of the details of the proposed parade. Division Headquarters was established temporarily at the Biltmore Hotel in the city of New York. As many men as could be spared were authorized to go on furlough. Short leaves were granted many of the officers.

The day following the arrival of the division in the city of New York the Division Commander was advised that arrangements had been made for a formal reception of the Division Commander and his staff by the Mayor of the city at the City Hall. This reception took place the following day, the Mayor graciously receiving the officers mentioned and through them welcoming the division. In a speech of welcome the Mayor informed the Division Commander that the key of the city was his, and that its use might be extended to the entire division, adding cautiously that it might not be well to have them accept the gift too literally.



©Western Newspaper Union

Brigadier General Cornelius Vanderbilt (left) greeting Lieutenant Colonel William S. Conrow, commanding 102d Engineers, upon arrival of regiment on board the "Rochambeau," February 28, 1919

Soon it was realized that the proposed parade was to be an extraordinary affair in the sense of the numbers of people who were planning to view it and in the thoroughness of the arrangements being made by the city. A great arch had been erected at Madison Square and another at Fifth Avenue and 60th Street. At night powerful searchlights illuminated these structures. The arch at 60th Street was covered with crystal glass, which reflected the beams of the searchlights in such manner as to present an extraordinary appearance.

At the Public Library, on Fifth Avenue near 42d Street, an altar of Liberty had been erected. In front of the altar were grouped long battle pikes of ancient model and shields bearing the divisional insignia. These were said to represent the warlike armament of the returning soldiers, which had been laid upon the altar of Liberty.

A committee representing the city was designated to confer with the Division Commander concerning the details of the parade. The result of the conferences held with this committee was the adoption of a plan which

was carried out effectively in all respects except in relation to the throngs of spectators, as will be told later. The crowds exceeded all the calculations that had been made by the police, with the result that they encroached upon Fifth Avenue and broke up the formation of the troops.


As the farewell parade held in the summer of 1917 had been down Fifth Avenue to Washington Square, it was determined to be most appropriate for the route of the home-coming parade to be uptown from Washington Square. It was therefore arranged that the division would assemble in the vicinity of Washington Square and march up Fifth Avenue to 110th Street, and there be dismissed, the various units proceeding to the places prescribed in the parade order.

When the division arrived in New York it was learned that several thousand wounded soldiers of the division who had been evacuated while in France were then in hospitals in and about the city of New York. The city committee undertook to provide automobile transportation for these wounded men, and the various hospital authorities agreed to cooperate so that the men might take part in the parade. This proposal was most acceptable to the Division Commander, and it was arranged that the wounded should precede the division in the line of march. The city committee had arranged for an immense service flag to be borne at the head of the column by an appropriate number of soldiers. This flag contained more than 1900 gold stars, representing the number of men who had been killed in battle or had died of wounds received in



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Officers of 102d Engineers taken upon their arrival in New York on the "Rochambeau," February 28, 1919



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View of the Altar to the Heroic Dead in front of the New York Public Library. The names of all battles in which the division participated are listed on the Altar



Caisson bearing the memorial wreaths for the dead of the division passing the reviewing-stand. Note cadets from West Point at present arms

battle. A memorial feature of the parade was a caisson drawn by eight black horses, the body of the vehicle being loaded with flowers and wreaths appropriate to such an occasion.

The city had also planned an official banquet, or rather a number of official banquets, in honor of the home-coming troops. The manner in which these banquets were given was characteristic of the hospitality of New York City and of the magnitude of its undertakings. To feed 25,000 men three times a day under army conditions had become a matter of routine, but it seemed to the officers and men of the division a gigantic undertaking for the city to attempt to banquet that number of men without the extensive organization provided for subsisting troops in the army. Yet the city's committee accomplished this feat without a hitch. Not only was this done in the manner mentioned, but at every hotel where troops were banqueted the men were entertained by the leading actors and actresses of the city.

At the Waldorf Hotel all the officers of the division and the members of their families who were available were banqueted. The Mayor of the city presided at this banquet, which was attended by the Governor of the state and other prominent civil officers. Appropriate speeches were made and the Division Commander was presented with the national colors in silk, the staff of the flag being appropriately inscribed. At many other hotels throughout the city similar banquets were given, attended by groups of men ranging in number from several hundred to two thousand, who were dined and entertained at the same time.

About this time a very appreciative cablegram was received from Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Forces. A copy of this cablegram, with the reply thereto, follows:

London, March 9, 1919.

MAJOR GENERAL O'RYAN,
Care Bureau of Information, 511 Fifth Avenue, New York.

OS122 9. In the name of your comrades in the British Army I send to you and all ranks of the 27th American Division our heartiest greetings on your safe return. You can tell all those who today welcome you in your own homes that countless homes in Europe are the happier for what you have done and that the Old World will never forget her debt of gratitude to America.


FIELD MARSHAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG, France.

New York, March 10, 1919.

FIELD MARSHAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG,
Commander-in-Chief,
British Expeditionary Forces,
France.

Many thanks for your kind cablegram of congratulation and greeting to the 27th Division. The disciplined courage in battle of the British soldiers, their fortitude and determination during the dark days of the war and their modesty and generosity in their relations with us won our respect and high regard. We shall always remember with pride our service with the British armies under your command in the great war for world freedom.

JOHN F. O'RYAN,
Major General.



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Unusual view of the parade passing through the Victory Arch, which gives an idea of the tremendous mass of humanity which turned out to cheer the 27th Division in their "welcome home" parade. Three million people was the conservative estimate of those who saw the parade

This cablegram was supplementary to a letter containing similar cordial sentiments, which had been received by the Division Commander on the eve of the departure of the division from France. This letter and the acknowledgment thereof follow:

No. O.A. 122.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
BRITISH ARMIES IN THE FIELD.

12th February, 1919.

To the General Officer Commanding and the officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted men of the 27th Division:

You are returning in victory from the first campaign in which American troops have fought on European soil. Secure in the strength and limitless resources of your own great country on the other side of the Atlantic, the call of outraged humanity which from the outset of the war sounded so loudly and so closely in British ears was heard from afar by the manhood of our sister nation. A people less far-sighted, less imbued with the lofty ideals of liberty, might never have heeded that call. You heard it, you gave it heed, and when the time was ripe and every city, township, village, hamlet and farm in your mighty land knew the full meaning of the desperate conflict raging beyond the seas, you flung yourselves into the fray, ardent and impetuous on the side of Right.

Right triumphed. You who now return to the homes that send you forth in faith and hope, to make if need be the supreme sacrifice for the belief that is in you, can say to those who greet you that in that triumph you have had your share. You can point to a proud record of achievement, to the months of patient, earnest training, to the incessant strain and watchfulness of the trenches, to the fury of great battles. You can point also to your sacrifices, made with a courage and devotion unsurpassed in all the dread story of this war—abundant in heroism—sacrifices which were the price of world liberty and peace which you have helped so powerfully to build up anew.

Returning, you and all ranks of the American Expeditionary Force carry back with you the pride, affection and esteem of all who fought beside you, and not least of those with whom you share a common language and a common outlook upon life. The memory of our great attack upon the HINDENBURG Line on the 29th September, 1918, in which the 27th American Division, along with troops from all parts of the British Empire, took so gallant and glorious a part, will never die and the service then rendered by American troops will be recalled with gratitude and admiration throughout the British Empire. I rejoice to think, that in the greater knowledge and understanding borne of perils and hardships shared together, we have learned at last to look beyond old jealousies and past quarrels to the essential qualities which unite the great English-speaking nations.

In bidding Godspeed to you whom for a time I was privileged to have under my command, I feel confident that the new era opened out before us by the appearance of American troops on the battle-fields of the Old World will see the sympathy and friendship now established between our two nations constantly deepened and strengthened, to the lasting advantage of both peoples.

D. HAIG,
Field Marshal, Commander-in-Chief,
British Armies in France.

HEADQUARTERS, 27TH DIVISION, U. S. A.

American E. F., France,

A. P.O. 748.

February 18, 1919.

Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig,
Commander-in-Chief,
British Armies in France.

My Dear General Haig:

I acknowledge receipt of your very generous letter commending the battle record of the 27th Division. On behalf of the officers and men of the Division I express appreciation of your words and of the sentiments which inspired them. With you I rejoice in the knowledge that our relations born of peril and sacrifice shared together in campaign and in battle, constitute an enduring tie that will be proof against the petty distractions of ordinary times.

The personnel of our Division, being Americans, are the descendants of many races and peoples, some of them having no sentimental or other ties with Great Britain. It is natural to assume that they entered upon the service of their Division with the British Army, with widely varying notions respecting British soldiers and the soldiers of her colonies. I think I fairly state the sentiments of our officers and men when I say that upon the completion of our service, we carried with us respect and admiration for your soldiers, both officers and men. We found them to be brave and patient in adversity, courageous and magnanimous in victory, and under all conditions highly disciplined and modest in deportment. Toward us they acted like brothers—not as formal allies in a joint endeavor. And so we leave France with a complete reciprocation of the sentiments you have been kind enough to express and with gratitude for many kindnesses, both professional and personal, shown us by you yourself and by the Commanding Generals of the II and IV Armies, and the officers associated with them.

With best wishes and expressions of high personal regard, I am

Very respectfuly yours,

JOHN F. O'RYAN,
Major General,
Commanding.

In anticipation of this series of banquets, which were held on the evening of March 24th, and of the parade which was to take place the following morning, the troops at Camp Upton, Long Island, had been moved by rail to the city of New York, where they were distributed for billeting purposes among the various armories in the city. During the evening of the banquets, which, as stated, preceded the day of the parade, the question was constantly asked by civilians how it was possible to expect these men, after so joyous an evening, following their many months of hardship, to turn out early the next morning for a parade. It was predicted by some that not more than fifty per cent. of the personnel of the division would be on hand. It was argued that it would not be unreasonable to expect any other result. These persons, however, did not know the dependability of the men and their pride in themselves and their division. Upon the completion of the banquets, the troops were formed by companies and were marched to their armory billets, where they

promptly turned in for sleep on the armory floors. The number of men who were late or absent without leave the following morning was negligible—no more than would account for the number of men normally ill among so large a body of troops.

In accordance with the traditions of the New York Division the morning of March 25th dawned clear and warm. The records of the Weather Bureau show that this particular March 25th was the clearest and warmest that was recorded during the preceding twenty years. As the troops left the armories for their assembly positions, it was noticed that even at that hour, dense throngs of people crowded Fifth Avenue and the adjoining streets. Literally thousands of these people, including women and children, had taken up their positions as early as 7 or 8 o'clock of the preceding evening and had held their places all night in order to insure their possession the following day.

The procession, as has been indicated, consisted of two detachments. The first of these was made up of mounted police, one of the city bands, the memorial caisson and a column of several thousand wounded soldiers of the division riding in open automobiles. These automobiles were driven for the most part by women of the various army auxiliary organizations. Hundreds of other wounded soldiers of the division, who were not sufficiently convalescent to take part in the parade, were taken in wheel chairs to appropriate vantage points where they might witness the parade. The second detachment was composed of the division, led by the Police Band of the city of New York. This highly trained and efficient band had played the division down Fifth Avenue on the occasion of the farewell parade in the summer of 1917.

The parade started on the minute of the time prescribed. The great number of wounded soldiers, many of them carrying crutches, others with arms and heads still bandaged, created a tremendous impression as they proceeded up Fifth Avenue. There was little cheering. The great crowd seemed spellbound. Their emotion was too deep for cheers. This emotion was produced not only by the sight of so many wounded soldiers, a column of them, more than a mile long, but also by the memorial caisson and the service flag with 1986 gold stars, which headed the parade. The automobiles bearing the wounded proceeded in column of twos. In the vicinity of Madison Square the crowd was so deep that the people in front were unable to hold their positions against the surging of the great mass of people behind them and were pushed out into Fifth Avenue, so that at this point the column of automobiles was compelled to break into column of single vehicles. Having passed through the neck of this human bottle, the automobiles, by virtue of their speed, quickly regained their original and prescribed formation.

After the last of the wounded soldiers had cleared Washington Square, the Division Commander and staff, followed by the units of the division in the order of their turn, followed. The delay, however, caused by the breaking up of the column of automobiles into single file and their subsequent increase of speed to regain their original formation, resulted in



Sergeant Reider Waaler, of the 105th Machine Gun Battalion, winner of the Medal of Honor, Distinguished Conduct Medal (British), Croix de Guerre with palm (French), Military Medal for Bravery (Montenegrin), breaking the silken cord to permit the passage of the parade through the Victory Arch



The memorial flag containing 1986 stars

opening up a great distance between the rear of the first detachment and the head of the division. As the troops appeared on Fifth Avenue, the vast crowd seemed to experience a reaction from the emotion which had held them while they viewed the caisson, the service flag and the wounded. With the appearance of the troops in their steel helmets, fixed bayonets and packs, swinging along with the stride of hardened outdoor men, their bronzed faces showing the lines which bespoke the determination that had marked their battle conduct, the multitude became frantic in their cheers. The roofs, cornices and windows of all the buildings were black with people. Boys and men clung perilously to niches and ledges of buildings where they had secured vantage points from which to view the spectacle. Not only were the sidewalks packed with people so that there could be no movement even along the house lines, but the side streets seemed crowded half way to the avenues on right and left. From roofs and windows people threw confetti and ticker tape until the air seemed filled with this form of hospitable grenade. The great number of horns and mechanical devices for making noise added to the din.

The troops had reached not far above 14th Street when it became apparent that the crowd, in spite of its remarkable sense of order and good will, could not, by reason of the pressure of the people in the rear, hold itself in check, and that they were being forced into the highway reserved for the marching troops. The police, under the conditions, were practically powerless. They urged the masses in front to push toward the rear with a view to holding the prescribed line, but as the head of the column approached they found it impossible, amid the tumult of noise, to make their pleas effective, and gradually the crowd in front was forced by those in the rear to encroach upon the street. This necessitated a reduction of the front of the marching platoons as they advanced. At Madison Square the crowd was completely out of hand and surged across the avenue. It was at this point that the great arch was located. The arch had been barred by a rope until the head of the procession arrived, when the rope was cut in ceremonial manner to allow the passage of the troops. The cutting of the rope was done by Sergeant Reider Waaler of the 105th Machine Gun Battalion, one of the men who had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for extraordinary heroism in battle. Perhaps it was because of the curiosity of the crowd in relation to this ceremony, or perhaps it was because at this point the crowd was so deep that it extended clear across Madison Square, but at any rate masses of people surged across the avenue and blocked further progress of the troops. The Division Commander's horse was surrounded by thousands of enthusiastic but orderly citizens. Obviously, as the troops could not force their way through the crowd, there was nothing to do but wait until the intelligence of the crowd prompted appropriate action on their part. The Division Commander and officers of the Division Staff suggested to policemen that if the parade was to proceed it must be with the help of the people. The latter were asked to form lines four and five deep and to push the excess people into the side streets. Within four or five minutes this was accom-

plished to such an extent that a lane was opened up sufficiently wide for the troops to get through in column of squads. It was not until the head of the column had reached the vicinity of 29th or 30th Street that the troops began to reform in column of platoons at double time. Thus it will be seen that the troops had to pass through the neck of a human bottle with consequent elongation of the column. Unlike the automobile column, the marching infantry lacked the power to make up the lost distance with the same facility. When the head of the column reached 40th Street, the Division Commander halted for five or six minutes to allow as many of the following troops as possible to pass through the lane at Madison Square and regain their original formation. This halt naturally increased the distance between the head of the column and the rear of the wounded detachment, but the delay was essential if the troops were to pass the Altar of Liberty in anything approaching parade formation.

When this wait was terminated, the column proceeded up Fifth Avenue and past the altar of Liberty, receiving the same extraordinary welcome and amid the same extraordinary scenes that had been received and encountered in lower Fifth Avenue. Thus it continued through the march. Fifth Avenue, from 59th Street to 110th Street, is bounded on the westerly side by Central Park. Between the park and the street curb the sidewalk is very wide, and throughout the entire distance from 59th Street to 110th Street this walk was covered by one vast stand which had been erected at the expense of contributing citizens. Many private stands had been erected on the fronts of buildings on upper Fifth Avenue. All the stands were filled with people. All the trees capable of bearing the necessary weight, and which gave a view of the parade, harbored men and boys. Along the front of the official reviewing stand, the Corps of Cadets from West Point was drawn up. They presented arms with their accustomed precision as the head of the parade approached.

When the head of the column reached 110th Street the Division Commander and staff turned aside and took up a position in the plaza, there to watch for the last time the war division pass in review. After the Division Headquarters Troop and Detachment had passed on, the 54th Infantry Brigade, headed by General Pierce, began to swing by. General Pierce joined the Division Commander to watch his brigade. It was a magnificent spectacle to see the 108th Infantry and the 107th Infantry of this brigade march past this last reviewing point of the parade. It was a sad occasion also, for this review marked the disintegration of this great war organization with its superlative men and the associations that had become a part of the daily routine of life. Similar emotions were inspired when the 53d Infantry Brigade, headed by General Debevoise, followed along in the track of the 54th Brigade. What memories were recalled by the martial bearing and the athletic vigor of the soldiers of the 105th and 106th Infantry Regiments! So it was throughout the rest of the parade—the spick and span machine gunners, the faithful engineers, the gunners and cannoneers of the Field Artillery Brigade, the resourceful signal men, the self-sacrificing sanitary units and the efficient trains and

military police. They disappeared into side streets, some continuing their march and others proceeding by special subway, elevated or surface trains to their camps and armories, all animated by the same matter-of-fact demeanor and orderly precision that had marked their conduct in battle. Always dependable, they conducted themselves on this occasion as if a parade under such extraordinary circumstances, viewed by the greatest number of people that had probably ever been assembled, were a part of their daily routine.

The following day all the units of the division were either at Camp Upton for final muster or were en route there. By the end of the first week of April the last unit had been finally mustered out and thus ended the war service of the New York or 27th Division.

CHAPTER XXII

OPERATIONS OF THE 52D FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE

IN an earlier chapter relating to the overseas movement of the division, it was narrated how the 52d Field Artillery Brigade, having reached the Port of Embarkation at Newport News, Virginia, spent considerable time there before commencing its overseas movement, but finally did follow the division to France.

Upon its arrival in France, however, the brigade did not join the division, but was sent to Camp de Souge, near Bordeaux. There it spent six weeks in training. This training completed, it was moved by rail to Longeville, near Bar-le-Duc, where it was attached to the 33d American Division as its divisional artillery. This was during the first week of September, 1918.

As all the artillery brigade's fighting took place within a radius of twenty miles of Verdun, first on the left bank of the Meuse and then on the



Sergeant Campbell, Headquarters Company, 106th Field Artillery, singing "The Star Spangled Banner," July 4, 1918, Bordeaux, Place Girondin

right, a few words in regard to the geographic conditions and general situation should precede any account of its activities in that sector.

The terrain around Verdun is as if it had been made for battle. It is hilly, thereby furnishing protection for men and artillery positions. At the same time, it is in no sense impassable and the roads through it are splendid. That it was early recognized as a battle country is borne out by the elaborate citadel in the city itself, and by the chain of forts that extend completely around the city. The biggest of these forts is Fort Douaumont. On the right side of the river are Vaux and Tavannes. On the left bank of the river there are forts De Marre and Choissel and several others. These forts are prepared fortifications of concrete, and oppose themselves to attack on Verdun from every point of the compass.



52d Field Artillery Headquarters Detachment en route Brest to Camp de Souge, France

Through this country the River Meuse runs generally north and south, but twists and turns on its journey. For example, through the city of Verdun itself there is a very abrupt turn to the left of Cote de Talou. To the right of the river and to the right of Verdun rise the heights of the Meuse. These heights form a high ridge cut by many ravines heavily wooded, bounded on the west by the river and on the east by the plains of the Woevre.

On the left bank of the river, there is also high ground, but there is no consistent ridge as is true of the right bank. The highest points of the sector are Douaumont, the Hill 360, northeast of Samogneux; the Hill 357, near Sivry la Perche and Montfaucon. When the lines became stable, after General Guillaumont's attack in August, 1917, Montfaucon became the important observation post of the Germans, and Douaumont the observation post of the French. To the north of Douaumont, the more important high points are Cote de Poivre, Hill 344, Hill 360 and Hill 378. On the other side of the river are the Mort Homme and the Hill 304. During the time that the line lay stabilized for a year, there were important posts of

German command at Dun-sur-Meuse and Stenay; and, for the French, at the Citadel of Verdun, Rampont, and Souilly.

The Verdun sector had been the scene of very severe fighting and the word "La Meuse" connoted to the French soldier the most desperate fighting, the most terrible suffering and the most hotly contested area of the war. On the 22d of February, 1916, the army of the Crown Prince launched a tremendous attack. It was supported by the greatest group of artillery that had ever been assembled. This battle continued as a sustained effort for nearly five months, at the end of which time the pressure was still great, but Verdun remained untaken.

The fighting around Douaumont and Vaux, and around Hill 304 and Le Mort Homme, was most severe.

By early fall, the danger of the loss of Verdun had passed. But the enemy line was too close on the right bank of the River Meuse. Therefore there was organized, under General Mangin, those attacks of the fall and early winter which drove the Germans from the heights to the right of Verdun, and returned Douaumont and Vaux to the hands of the French.

It was not until the following summer that the pressure was relieved on the left bank of the river. Until August, the Germans held the Hill 304 and Le Mort Homme. In August of 1917, a carefully organized attack drove the Germans from these two important hills and also drove them from the Talou Hill on the right side of the river. These operations were conducted under General Guillaumont, who commanded the French 2d Army.

This advance left the French line in a position satisfactory to the French High Command. So long as the Germans had observation posts on Le Mort Homme and Hill 304, the maintenance of the line on the left of the river had been difficult. The same thing was true when the Germans held Douaumont on the right bank.

It was this line that the Americans found when they went into position in this sector in September, 1918. The line ran roughly as follows: starting on the left, the French held Avoucourt; extending to the eastward, the line ran through Haucourt and entered the valley formed by Forges Brook. At Haucourt, the little town of Malancourt was almost to the north, and Hill 304 to the south. Following the brook, the line passed just south of Bethincourt and north of Le Mort Homme. It extended practically due east, the German lines on the north side of the ravine and the French lines on the south. Crossing the river to the east of the ruined town of Forges, the line ran between Samogneux and Brabant-sur-Meuse. From that point, the line turned to the southeast, leaving Ornes in the possession of the Germans, and Bezongaux and Vaux in the hands of the French. To the south and the southeast of Vaux, the French held the heights and the Germans were completely down on the plains of the Woevre. As a result of this fighting, the country was completely devastated, the villages were destroyed by shell fire and the inhabitants had fled. There was nothing but destruction and desolation.

Within twenty-four hours after the arrival of the first regiment of

the brigade (104th Field Artillery), it proceeded by night marches with the 33d Division to the vicinity of Nixeville, southwest of Verdun, the other regiments of the brigade following as rapidly as their detrainment was completed. While the brigade was still en route orders were received for the 104th Field Artillery to take over the positions of the artillery of the 157th and 120th French Divisions in the Le Mort Homme-Hill 304 sectors, which divisions had been suddenly ordered to withdraw and proceed to other parts of the front. To accomplish this relief it became necessary to bring forward in motor trucks the regimental, battalion and battery commanders of the 105th Field Artillery and their reconnaissance details, and one battalion commander and the battery commanders of three batteries of the 106th Field Artillery. The howitzers of the three batteries of the 106th Field Artillery and their gun crews were also rushed forward in tow of motor trucks. Notwithstanding the difficulties encountered the relief was accomplished on time. On the nights of September 8th-9th, the 104th Field Artillery and 1st Battalion of the 105th Field Artillery relieved the 53d Regiment A. C. (French), the 2d Battalion of the 105th Field Artillery relieving the 33d Regiment A. C. (French) and Batteries A, C and D of the 106th Field Artillery, under command of Major Guido F. Verbeck, relieving the French heavy artillery units. The Artillery Brigade Headquarters was established at Fromerville. The division was attached to the XVII French Corps under command of Major General Henri Claudel. While in these positions the brigade participated in the St. Mihiel Offensive on September 12th, firing continuously for seventeen hours from 1 A. M. on that day to 6 P. M., at about the maximum capacity of its guns. All the artillery of the XVII French Corps, of which the 33d American Division and the 52d Field Artillery Brigade were a part, participated in this attack, which was the attack in which the 1st American Army reduced the St. Mihiel salient. The firing by the 52d Field Artillery Brigade was for demonstration purposes, no attack being made on the front of the 33d American Division.

On the 14th of September the 33d American Division was transferred from the XVII French Army Corps to the III American Corps, Major General Robert L. Bullard commanding, and participated in the American offensive which became known as the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. The 52d Field Artillery Brigade during the first part of this offensive continued its assignment with the 33d American Division.

This division attacked on September 26th, northwest of Verdun from Passerelle du Don (exclusive), 800 meters east of Bethincourt, to the Meuse River, after closing to the right to make room on its left for the other divisions of the III American Corps and establishing headquarters for the division and the artillery brigade at La Hutte in the Bois Bourrus. The attack was carried out by the 66th Infantry Brigade with Company A, 1st Gas and Flame Regiment, attached. The brigade attacked with the 132d Infantry on the right and the 131st Infantry on the left, each regiment with two battalions in the line and one in support.



The market at Bordeaux

The 132d Infantry was to advance through the Bois de Forges and organize a line of defense along the west bank of the River Meuse from the Cote de l'Oie (inclusive) to the road fork at .0993, 400 meters north of the north corner of Bois de Forges (exclusive).

The 131st Infantry was to attack and reach quickly the open ground east and north of Drillancourt and Gercourt et Drillancourt and the Trench du Bois Jure, to assist the 132d Infantry in the reduction of the Bois de Forges, to capture Drillancourt, Gercourt et Drillancourt, Trench du Bois Jure, Trench du Bois Rond and to organize a line of defense along the west bank of the Meuse from road fork at .0993, 400 meters north of the



Cafe de Bordeaux at Bordeaux

north corner of Bois de Forges (inclusive), to the Laiterie de Belhaine (exclusive).

The 52d Field Artillery Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General George Albert Wingate, consisting of the 104th, 105th and 106th Field Artillery Regiments, reinforced by the 212th R. A. C. (French 75 mm.) and the 2d Battalion of the 308th R. L. C. (French 155 mm. howitzer), was to support the attack as follows:

Two battalions of the 212th R. A. C. were assigned to furnish the standing and rolling barrage on the front of the 131st Infantry. The 104th and 105th Field Artillery Regiments were assigned to the same missions for the 132d Infantry. The 3d Battalion of the 212th R. A. C. was to furnish a standing and rolling barrage of limited duration from the right flank of the 132d Infantry to the village of Forges, for the purpose of deceiving the enemy in relation to the front of the attack. After this barrage lifted, the trenches in this vicinity were to be taken in the flank and rear by mopping up parties from the 132d Infantry. The 106th Field Artillery and the 2d Battalion of the 308th R. L. C. were to place concentrations of fire on specified points in the divisional sector, lifting successively as the attack progressed.

The 102d Ammunition Train was employed in supplying ammunition and the replenishment thereof during the night before the action until midnight.

The 102d Trench Mortar Battery was in reserve due to the fact that the width of no man's land exceeded its maximum range.

The Brigade Commander's post of command was at La Hutte 14.93 1,000 meters southeast of La Claire, with the Commanding General of the 33d Division.

At 11:30 P. M., September 25th, the army artillery preparation commenced, the three corps artilleries joining at 2:30 A. M. of the 26th. At 5:30 A. M. the divisional artillery preparation commenced. It consisted of concentrations by the 155 mm. units on the enemy front line and specified points in the zone of advance, the concentrations lifting successively upon the approach of the infantry. The standing barrage by the 75 mm. units was placed along the Forges-Bethincourt Road for twenty-five minutes in order to cover the crossing of the Forges Brook and swamp by the infantry. It then rolled forward 300 meters, remaining there for twenty minutes to permit the infantry to form up along the road. The barrage in front of the 131st Infantry, which was 800 meters in width, was fired by six batteries of the 212th R. A. C., and lasted for five hours and fifteen minutes. It progressed for a distance of approximately six kilometers at a rate of 100 meters in four minutes for three hours and five minutes, and at a rate of 100 meters in five minutes for two hours and ten minutes. The barrage in front of the 132d Infantry, which was about 1,300 meters in width, was fired by the 104th and 105th Field Artillery Regiments, one half by each. It lasted for three hours and fifteen minutes, progressing at a rate of 100 meters in four minutes for one hour and twenty-five minutes, and 100 meters in five minutes for one


BARRAGE MAP
OPERATIONS OF 52ND FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE NORTH OF VERDUN, SEPTEMBER 26TH TO NOVEMBER 11TH 1918.
THIS MAP SHOWS BARRAGES AT COMMENCEMENT OF THE MEUSE ARGONNE OPERATION SEPT 26TH 1918 AND OF THE SECOND PHASE ON OCT 8TH 1918.
BARRAGE AFTER CAPTURE OF FINAL OBJECTIVE
104 F.A.
DIV. SECTOR OCT 30 NOV 2
Gas Line
Brabant Gas Line
ZONE 105 F.A. 104 F.A.
IBN 212 F.A.
9/26/18
Bois de Sivry
Bois de Sartelle
Bois de Chatillon
Bois d'Ecurey
Bois de Montauna
Bois de Wavrille
Bois Jure
Bois de Consenvoye
Bois de Forges
Bois de Haumont
Haraumont
Sivry-s-Meuse
Seymour Fme
Dannevaux
Vilosnes-Meuse
Dercourt et Bonlancourt
Consenvoye
Haumont près Samogneux
Etraye
Villeneuve Fme
Molleville Fme
Sollemont Fme
Bethincourt
Forges
Regneville
Samogneux
Côte de Côte 265
Côte 344
Côte 360
Côte 382
Côte 348
Côte 338
Côte 310
Côte 295
Côte 282
Côte 288
Côte 304
Côte 347
Nouville
Champneuville
Cumières
le Châtay Fme
Champ
Vacherauville
Chattancourt
le Mort Homme
Cumières Fme
Mormont Fme
Ahalmont Fme
Charny
Bras
Fort de Vacherauville
Fort de Belleville
Fort de Marre
Bois Bourrus
Bourrus
Bamont Fme
Wamsau Fme
Germonville
Ft de Choisel
Longeau
Meulin Fme
Feuillères
Thierville
la Tuilerie Fme
Ft du Chana
Fromereville
Ft des Sartelles
Ft de la Chaume
VERDUN
MEUSE RIV.
Canal de l'Est
Branche Nord
Montzéville
Ft de Belleville
105
104
106
52nd F.A. Brig.
413 F.R. NIVELLE
308
80
85
189
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hour and fifty minutes. On the right of the 132d Infantry the barrage of 1,500 meters in width was placed to deceive the enemy. It progressed at a rate of 100 meters in four minutes for one hour and seventeen minutes.

The infantry regiments reported that the standing barrage and concentrations mentioned so effectively covered the crossing of the Forges Brook and swamp that they suffered few losses during that period.

The rolling barrage, the rate of which was prescribed by Corps Headquarters, was reported by the infantry to be accurate and effective, and that they were able to follow it closely. The 131st Infantry, which went over open country for the greater part of its route, reported, however, that the barrage retarded their advance, while the 132d Infantry, advancing almost entirely through woods, reported that at times they had to run to keep up. Both barrages were carried through to the final objective without interruption.

The infantry, following the barrage closely, organized their front lines on the final objective, in front of which the light artillery had provided a defensive barrage. The heavy artillery had prepared to lay down concentrations on the river crossings and at other points.

The barrage opened at zero hour, which was 5:30 A. M.

The 104th Field Artillery fired from positions on the high ground, 1,700 meters south of Chattancourt, Batteries E and F of the 105th Field Artillery from positions immediately west of Marre, the remainder of the 105th Field Artillery from the high ground 1,200 meters southwest of Cumieres on the southern slopes of Le Mort Homme and the 106th Field Artillery from the high ground 900 meters southeast of Le Mort Homme. Owing to the dense concentration of artillery for this attack, all battery positions were designated by Corps Headquarters. The accuracy, destruction and depth of the fire were favorably acclaimed by the infantry which made the attack.

In this attack the 33d Division was the right division of the American army, and was the pivot of the American army's movement. It swung around in a half circle until its front reached the west bank of the Meuse River, when it consolidated its positions and held a line from Forges to the Laiterie de Belhaine.

Despite the fact that it was subjected to fire from both the front and the flank, the division carried all its objectives on schedule time. It captured 1,500 prisoners, 42 pieces of artillery and 161 machine guns. It continued to hold these positions until October 2d, when it was ordered to extend its lines to the west, taking over the sector of the 80th Division to western edge of the Bois de la Cote Lemont, giving it a front of over 14,000 yards.

The 52d Field Artillery Brigade, in order to effectively support the infantry on this front, which was substantially a right angle, was called upon to fire barrages and attack targets in two directions. From the time of its advance, on the 26th, the division was under continual observed enemy artillery fire from the much higher and heavily wooded terrain on the east bank of the Meuse River.

The following extracts from the operations diary of General Wingate will indicate the character of work of his brigade during the succeeding days and until October 4th.

SEPTEMBER 27TH

8:05 Ordered Commanding Officer, 106th Field Artillery, to put one battalion 308th R. L. C. in position in Ravin des Caurettes.

10:00 Ordered Commanding Officer, 104th Field Artillery, to occupy positions near M.88.67 with one battalion, consisting of Batteries C, D and E. Movement to commence at 10:30 o'clock.

11:00 Ordered Commanding Officer, 106th Field Artillery, to send details to operate captured German guns near Drillancourt.

15:50 Ordered 106th Field Artillery to fire on three enemy batteries located in Bois de Chaume and near Consenvoye.

17:40 Ordered 106th Field Artillery to fire on enemy battery near Consenvoye.

22:00 Ordered 106th Field Artillery to fire on enemy battery at H.43.11.

22:00 Ordered readjustment of normal barrage to cover withdrawal of battalion changing position.

SEPTEMBER 28TH

1:30 Movement of enemy troops into Brabant reported. Ordered 106th Field Artillery to fire on Brabant with one battery and on the Brabant-Malbrouck Road with one battery.

13:15 80th Division requested assistance against six batteries attacking it. Batteries out of our range. Transmitted request to Verdun Grouping, Corps Artillery.

13:45 Ordered Commanding Officer, 105th Field Artillery, to fire on Brabant with one battery.

14:30 Ordered 106th Field Artillery to fire on Brabant with one battery against reported enemy movement.

15:00 Ordered 1st Battalion, 105th Field Artillery, to occupy positions in vicinity of M.88.67.

17:00 80th Division requested fire against batteries in Bois de Chatillon. Notified Counter-battery Office at Corps Headquarters.

SEPTEMBER 29TH

15:10 Ordered 106th Field Artillery to fire on enemy battery H.22.14.

15:15 Requested Corps Artillery for counter-battery work on enemy batteries at H.19.19, H.39.19, H.48.20, H.41.13, H.47.17, firing heavily on 132d Infantry.

16:30 Notified Corps Artillery that men were proceeding from south to the Haraumont-Ecurey Road, H.47.68.

18:00 Ordered Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 104th Field Artillery (Batteries C, D and E), to support front of 65th Infantry Brigade.

SEPTEMBER 30TH

9:00 Requested Corps Artillery to fire on trench mortar battery at G.82.42, firing on 65th Infantry Brigade front.

14:30 Requested Corps Artillery to fire on batteries G.39.62, G.18.34.

16:30 Ordered Commanding Officer, 212th R. A. C., to fire on all observed batteries on front between left flank of his sector to Consenvoye and respond to all requests for fire from 131st Infantry.

19:00 Ordered 106th Field Artillery to fire on battery on H.28.97.

19:15 Requested Corps Artillery to fire on outpost at H.23.62 and railroad gun H.29.62.

19:25 Requested Corps Artillery to fire on trench mortar at G.82.42.

22:50 Ordered 106th Field Artillery to fire on batteries at H.17.11 and H.18.92.



Battery D, 106th Field Artillery (Captain John W. Pulleyn), in action along Samogeneux Road, Meuse-Argonne Offensive, November 1, 1918



German artillery put out of action between Gercourt and Meuse, October 12, 1918, by 52d Field Artillery Brigade

October 1st

8:00 Notified Commanding Officer, 212th R. A. C., of order relieving them from duty with brigade.
11:40 Ordered Commanding Officer, 106th Field Artillery, to move three batteries to positions near Moulin de Raffecourt.
15:30 Ordered 106th Field Artillery to fire with two batteries on Trench Anatolie and Trench de Balis at request of 18th French Division in support of attack to be made by them next morning at about 4:30 A. M.
17:00 212th R. A. C. Regiment commenced withdrawal.
19:35 Requested Corps Artillery to fire on battery at H.09.35.

October 2d

6:30 1st Battalion, 104th Field Artillery, fired on and silenced batteries at H.18.94 at request of Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade.
15:00 Ordered Commanding Officer, 105th Field Artillery, to send 1st Battalion, 105th Field Artillery, forward to vicinity of Bois Jure.
17:30 Ordered Commanding Officer, 106th Field Artillery, to fire on battery in Bois de Consenvoye.
19:35 Ordered Commanding Officer, 106th Field Artillery, to fire on battery at H.19.11.

October 3d

4:10 Ordered Commanding Officer, 106th Field Artillery, to fire on machine guns at H.16.94, H.18.92, H.19.90.
12:45 Requested Corps Artillery to fire on batteries at H.86.70 and H.83.70.
13:00 Ordered 102d Ammunition Train to proceed with all available trucks loaded with ammunition to 4th Division at Cuisy.
15:30 Requested Corps Artillery to fire on battery at G.89.71.
16:25 Ordered Commanding Officer, 105th Field Artillery, to move the 1st Battalion into concealed positions along the northwest edge of Bois de la Cote Lemont. This was ordered by Division Commander.
18:00 Issued Field Order No. 3 covering missions of the units of the brigade for protection of the right flank of the 4th Division—which was participating in the attack of the III Army Corps (F. O. 26—33d Division, October 3, 1918).
19:35 Ordered Commanding Officer, 106th Field Artillery, to fire on battery at H.09.30.

During the above period the casualties in the brigade were three officers wounded; two enlisted men killed and seventeen wounded.

On October 4th a new operation was undertaken. The III American Corps was to continue its attack on the hostile positions west of the Meuse. The 33d Division was the right division of the corps and was to hold its position and protect the east flank of the 4th Division, which was in the center. The 52d Field Artillery Brigade was to give artillery support in protection of this flank and to neutralize the enemy artillery in the Bois de Chatillon, Bois de Sartelle and the two ravines east of Liny-devant-Dun. Brieulles and the ravine north, as well as the trench northwest of Brieulles, were to be bombarded between H and H plus 2. Special attention was to be given to eventual counter-attacks from the latter region.

Batteries C, D and E of the 106th Field Artillery continued in their positions south of Le Mort Homme as did Batteries E and F of the 105th Field Artillery. The 106th Field Artillery less the batteries mentioned fired from positions about 3,000 meters west of Forges.

It was the mission of the 106th Field Artillery to neutralize the



Lieutenant Lilly and men, 106th Field Artillery, examining captured 37 c. m. gun



Near post command of 79th Division, Bois de Consenvoye, November 10, 1918

enemy artillery in the Bois de Chatillon, in the Bois de Sartelle and in the two ravines east of Liny-devant-Dun and east of the Meuse within its zone of fire.

The 105th Field Artillery was directed to move the 1st Battalion to the northwest edge of the Bois de la Cote Lemont to neutralize hostile fire and to break up possible enemy counter-attacks. The 2d Battalion of this regiment was directed to fire on enemy batteries within its zone of fire east of the Meuse.

The 104th Field Artillery was ordered to neutralize fire from points in the vicinity of Vilosnes with one battalion, and to attack enemy batteries east of the Meuse with the other battalion.

The zero hour was fixed at 5:25 A. M., on October 4th. The attack went off as scheduled. At 6:00 A. M. the 1st Battalion of the 105th Field Artillery was directed not to fire until a specific mission was given the batteries. At 9:45 A. M. the Commanding Officer of the 105th Field Artillery was directed to change the position of his 1st Battalion to the vicinity of Bois Jure in order to fire north of Vilosnes in aid of the 4th Division. At 1:40 P. M. the Regimental Commander was directed to have the 2d Battalion fire on Brabant and Consenvoye. Numerous other missions for batteries of the brigade were imposed on them throughout the day.

The following day, October 5th, the 106th Field Artillery was directed to fire on Haraumont and Liny-devant-Dun at 12:50 P. M. Parts of regiments of the brigade continued in action throughout the day.

On the following day, October 6th, fire action was continued by the brigade. Late in the afternoon the 2d Battalion of the 104th Field Artillery moved to the vicinity of Ravin de Raffecourt.

On October 6th the 33d Division, including the 52d Field Artillery Brigade, was transferred to the XVII French Army Corps, Major General Henri Claudel commanding, for the purpose of attacking enemy positions on the heights on the east bank of the Meuse. From these positions a constant enfilading artillery fire had been directed against the American army's front lines and approaches so effectively as to seriously menace its progress and cause heavy casualties. The divisions participating in this attack were, in their order from right to left, the 26th French, the 18th French, the 29th American and the 33d American, which latter was to operate on the east bank of the Meuse River, from the river bank to the 24th parallel.

The original plan, so far as it concerned the 33d Division, called for the participation of one battalion of the 132d Infantry, supported by the machine gun battalions and a groupement of artillery consisting of the 104th Field Artillery, the 2d Battalion of the 105th Field Artillery and the 2d Battalion of the 106th Field Artillery, under the command of Colonel Emery T. Smith of the 106th Field Artillery. The remainder of the artillery brigade was retained by the Artillery Brigade Commander for additional artillery support. The attack commenced at 5 A. M. on October 8th and, as it progressed, the amount of opposition which developed required the reinforcement of the attacking troops by the entire 66th

Infantry Brigade, supported by all the machine gun battalions, and the subsequent relief of that brigade by the 65th Infantry Brigade. The infantry on three successive days carried its attack to its objective opposite the Giselher Stellung, but was ordered each time to retire to make contact with the 29th Division on its right, which had been unable to overcome the strong enemy opposition in the Bois de Consenvoye, Bois de la Grande Montagne and Bois d'Ormont. During this battle over 5,000 prisoners were captured by the XVII French Army Corps.

From October 11th to 13th the 52d Field Artillery Brigade was occupied continually in responding to calls from the infantry for supporting fire and counter battery work.

On October 14th the 52d Field Artillery Brigade supported by its fire an attack by the 29th Division on the heights of the Grande Montagne.

On October 18th the Artillery Brigade Commander moved his P. C. forward to .9579, on the northwest edge of the Bois de Forges, and on October 19th the groupement under Colonel Smith was terminated and all units regrouped as a brigade.

From this time the brigade continued to assist the 33d Division in holding the position attained by them and held under heavy observed enemy artillery fire which continued day and night.

On October 21st the brigade was relieved by the artillery of the 15th Colonial Division (French) and directed to march to rest billets in the vicinity of Dieue, south of Verdun.

On October 25th, while the units of the brigade were en route to their rest billets, orders were received detaching the 52d Field Artillery Brigade from the 33d Division and attaching it to the 79th Division for immediate return to the line. During the night of October 29th-30 the 79th Division relieved the 29th Division, becoming part of the 17th French Corps, and in support of the 79th Division the brigade relieved the 158th Field Artillery Brigade in the Grande Montagne sector. Brigade Headquarters were established at Vacherauville with the headquarters of the 79th Division. On the 30th orders were issued for the brigade to take over part of the sector held by the 51st Field Artillery Brigade, namely from Belleau Wood to Bois d'Ormont, inclusive. This extension was effected by the 105th Field Artillery taking over the added sector, the 104th Field Artillery assuming the missions of the 105th Field Artillery, and the 106th Field Artillery assuming those of the howitzer regiment of the 51st Field Artillery Brigade.

On November 1st, 2d and 3d, in addition to responding to calls for artillery support from the 79th Division, the brigade participated with its fire in the attack by the III American Corps to advance its line along the Cunel-Brieulle road and farther to the west of the Meuse, and from Brieulle to Dun-sur-Meuse to the north, which resulted in forcing the enemy from the heights on the west bank of the Meuse.

On November 4th the 158th Infantry Brigade, supported by the 105th Field Artillery, started a reconnaissance in force in the direction of the Borne de Cornouiller, and the 157th Brigade, supported by the 104th Field

Artillery, commenced two reconnaissances in force in the direction of the Bois de le Grande Montagne toward Reveille and Etrayes. In conjunction with this attack the 15th Colonial French Division attacked on the left. An engagement developed in the direction of the Borne de Cornouiller, involving the entire 158th Infantry Brigade and a large part of the 157th Infantry Brigade and requiring the supporting fire of the 106th Field Artillery. After repeated attacks on successive days the enemy, on November 7th, was forced to retire and the 79th Division, pivoting on its right, advanced its left to Solferino Ferme, connecting up with the 15th Colonial French Division, which had crossed the Meuse at Vilosnes, taken Haraumont Ridge, and reached the Ferme. The 79th Division, in this advance, broke through the strong Giselher Stellung and the formidable Kriemheld Stellung positions of the enemy line.

On November 8th the 79th Division pressed its advantage, advanced through the Bois de la Grande Montagne, Bois d'Etrayes, Bois de Wavrille, Belleu Bois, Bois des Chenes and Bois d'Ormont, and captured the towns of Reveille, Etraye, Wavrille and Crepion, the artillery advancing in close support. As a result of this action the enemy was driven from the heights of the Meuse across the Tinte Brook to the abrupt Hills 328, 319, Cote de Morimont, Cote du Chateau and Cote d'Orne.

On November 10th the division attacked again, the 157th Infantry Brigade advancing against Hills 328 and 319 under the supporting fire of the 104th Field Artillery, and the 158th Infantry Brigade attacking the Cote de Morimont supported by the 105th Field Artillery, the 106th Field Artillery supporting both attacks. The artillery brigade's P. C. was moved forward on this date with that of the division to Molleville Ferme.

The 157th Infantry Brigade captured Hills 328 and 319, but the 158th Infantry Brigade, because of the dominating position of the Cote d'Orne on its flank, was unable to reach its objective. The following day an attack, ordered the night before, was launched against the Cote d'Orne. After the attack had started, and while it was in progress, orders were received at 8:25 A. M. to cease hostilities at 11 o'clock. Orders were immediately sent to all units of the brigade and reached them in time to discontinue all firing at the designated hour, up to which time all the guns of the brigade were in action.


For the rest of the day the gun crews stood by their guns ready to respond to any calls for fire in case of any enemy reaction. Later the crews were reduced one-half and then relieved altogether.

All during the afternoon of November 11th, and for days thereafter, great numbers of French, Russian, Belgian and some American prisoners, released from the German lines, came into the division's sector and were sent to the rear. Over 5,000 were evacuated.

The 104th Field Artillery was commanded by Colonel Merritt H. Smith until he became ill, October 18th, after which it was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John T. Delaney, who was succeeded on November 6th by Colonel Charles C. Pulis. The following notes on operations of the regiment give an accurate and interesting account of its activities:



Colonel Merritt H. Smith, 104th Field Artillery



Colonel John T. Delaney, 104th Field Artillery

PHASE I

On September 25, 1918, the batteries of the 104th Field Artillery were collected on the Le Claire-Esnes Road, about 500 meters west of Le Claire. The general direction of fire was north towards Bethincourt and Forges. Colonel M. H. Smith commanded the regiment with his post of command in the Bois Bourrus, about 300 meters southeast of Le Claire.

The lines at this time ran generally east and west along Forges Brook through Bethincourt and thence west. The lines crossed the Meuse River between Samogneux and Brabant. At this part of the front the lines were widely separated, from 500 to 1,000 meters—the Allied lines were well up on the southern slope of the Forges Ravine and the German lines were up on the northern slope towards Forges Wood. The Germans had outposts in Forges and Bethincourt and some bombing posts close to the brook.

The general character of the sector had been quiet. The lines had remained undisturbed for about fourteen months. The line was thinly held. The French, who occupied this sector before the Americans, had held their artillery fire down to a minimum, and the only Allied artillery fire of any magnitude that had taken place in this sector for months had been the demonstration conducted in connection with the Allied attack at St. Mihiel.

The 104th Field Artillery was supporting—as a part of the 52d Field Artillery Brigade—the 129th, 130th, 131st and 132d Infantry Regiments of the 33d American Division.

The demonstration in connection with the St. Mihiel attack had increased the enemy artillery activity of the section, but the sector was still quiet.

The batteries of the regiment at their position near Le Claire were firing at long range in order to reach the enemy's front line and required "D" shell in order to go much beyond it.

The country in this sector was rolling and hilly. There is a certain amount of woodland such as the Bois Bourrus. Woodland nearer the line, such as the Bois des Corbeaux, had been practically destroyed by shell fire. Forges Wood was still thick. The towns which had played a part in the great battle of Verdun—along the actual line—were destroyed completely. These were Chattancourt, Cumieres, Forges and Bethincourt. The roads were good, except where for months they had been a part of no man's land. This included that part of the Cumieres-Forges Road that lay in the Forges Ravine and that part of the Cumieres-Bethincourt Road where it ran over the Mort Homme into Bethincourt.

Observation of the enemy's line was easily obtainable from observation posts on the Mort Homme or in the vicinity of the Bois des Corbeaux. The enemy also had good observation from Forges Wood, from Montfaucon and from the right bank of the River Meuse.

So far as reported patrols of the Allies had not crossed Forges Brook on reconnaissance. Forges Wood was reported to be extensively organized for defense. The right bank of the Meuse River was reported to be held by Austro-Hungarian troops. The centers of resistance—Forges and Bethincourt—were reported to be held by the enemy, with second rate troops.

The major operation of September 26th was conducted with the right regiment of the 33d American Division as a pivot. The 104th Field Artillery was instructed to support the right battalion of the 132d Infantry. The 132d Infantry was to be the right element of this turning movement. The attack was to move straight forward and then turn to the right, coming to a stop along the River Meuse at the railroad track.

A very heavy artillery preparation was laid down by Army and Corps Artillery, late on the night of September 25th and through the early hours of September 26th. At 5:30 A. M. on September 26th, the 104th Field Artillery started a rolling barrage to precede the advance of its infantry battalion. The local plan of attack of the 132d Infantry was to avoid a frontal attack on Forges Wood and to take it by going around it.

Therefore, the narrow lane of barrage of the 104th Field Artillery first moved straight forward to the north and then turned to the right. Prisoners taken in this action said that they could not withstand the artillery preparation and barrage. The result was that the infantry advance in this sector was completely successful. The infantry crossed some of the marshy ground in the Forges Brook bottom by foot bridges constructed by the engineers. The rolling barrage rested for an appreciable time just north of the Forges-Bethincourt Road and the infantry after crossing the brook was re-formed for attack along that road.

Approaching the Forges Wood from the flank, the 132d Infantry took the wood with comparatively slight loss, and moved forward to a line along the railroad track, extending from the Forges Brook northwest to the cross roads at 22.6—79.5. After the attack the 104th Field Artillery laid on a protective barrage in front of its infantry and just on the other side of the River Meuse.

For this protective barrage the guns of the 104th Field Artillery were laid at extreme range and some of them could execute the mission only with "D" shell. The attack generally of the 33d American Division had been successful. General King's infantry brigade on the left had moved up to the ground overlooking the Meuse at Vilosnes. The gun positions at Le Claire had originally been planned by the French as defensive positions, and they were not well adapted for attack, especially when the attack had been successful. Therefore, it became necessary to move three batteries of the regiment forward.

Batteries "C," "D" and "E" were moved to the ravine immediately north of the Moulin de Raffecourt and the post of command of this battalion was placed in the Trench de Misery at the southwest corner of Forges Wood. During the hours involved in the move of this battalion, Major Austin's guns were extended to include the entire regimental protective barrage.

At this time, because of some difficulty encountered by elements on the left, the 105th Field Artillery—the other light regiment of the 52d Artillery Brigade—were turned to the left and the guns of this forward battalion of the 104th were required to be pointed north against the enemy in the Bois de Chatillon and the general vicinity of Vilosnes. For a time the 104th Field Artillery was spread over a very wide front, stretching from the vicinity of Brabant on the southeast to the Bois de Chatillon on the northwest. There had been no advance up to this time on the right bank of the Meuse. It is true that French patrols had made night reconnaissance into Brabant, but it had been found expedient to withdraw the advanced posts established there.

One of the biggest difficulties in connection with the position of the forward Battalion near Forges Wood was the difficulty of transport.

The engineers at once started to construct the road northwest out of Cumieres over a shoulder of the Mort Homme, to meet the Forges-Bethincourt Road near Bethincourt. The Cumieres-Forges Road was also repaired. There was a good deal of shell fire of the enemy against both these roads and the jam of traffic due to the advance of troops made the problem of transport a difficult one. The positions of the guns of the forward battalion were, of course, in the open with simple camouflage against overhead observation.

The infantry of General Wolf's brigade—that is, the right brigade—had dug in along the railroad track and were extended north of a point opposite Sivry sur Meuse. General King's brigade was facing north. General King's brigade was subjected to considerable artillery fire from the direction of Vilosnes. General King called for considerable special fire from the forward battalion, and it was reported that such fire was effective.

At this time, the enemy had complete terrestrial observation of the terrain north of Forges Wood. The observation was obtained from the high ground across the Meuse in the vicinity of Haraumont. The enemy also had direct observation of a good part of the Cumieres-Forges Road and the valley of Forges Brook. Hostile artillery fire was heavy on many of the roads, such as the road west out of Gercourt and west out of Danneveaux. The town of Danneveaux was heavily shelled with gas.



2d Battalion, 106th Field Artillery, cleaning howitzers after a "shoot." Brabant Road



Camouflaged roads under enemy observation, near Forges

The right elements—infantry elements—of the 33d American Division were subjected to some front line artillery fire of the enemy, but not as much as were the left elements, that is, General King's brigade. The battery positions of the 104th Artillery near Forges Wood were subjected to considerable artillery fire of the enemy, none of which did much damage.

PHASE II

From Samogneux on the southeast to Brieulles on the northwest, the ground on the right side of the Meuse rises very rapidly from the bottom land of the Meuse to the high points of what is called the heights of the Meuse. The heights of the Meuse lying on the right bank of the river are heavily wooded at the crest and have all the aspects of splendid defensive military positions. With the enemy still in possession of these heights, the American army was extended forward and echeloned from south to north with its right flank exposed to the observation and the fire of the enemy on the high ground on the heights of the Meuse.

It was reported that the Austro-Hungarian units on the right side of the river had been supplanted by first rate German troops.

On the 6th of October Batteries "A," "B" and "F" of the 104th Field Artillery were moved north into the immediate vicinity of the other batteries so that they might be within effective striking distance of the enemy's lines.

On the 8th of October an attack was set in motion that had for its object the taking of the high ground of the Meuse Heights. The burden of this attack was on the French troops on the right side of the river and the part of the 33d Division began only after the first attack had been successful. It was planned that the 132d Regiment of Infantry should move across the river by bridges at Samogneux and Brabant and at five hours after the H hour proceed along the open country near the river and north of the Consenvoye-Etraye Road to the ridge on which is the Bois de Chaume. The 104th Field Artillery laid down a rolling barrage to make this advance possible, and the advance was entirely successful. The rolling barrage moved along in a line parallel to the direction of the river north of Consenvoye, and the barrage was finished near the river, becoming more concentrated as the ground became more difficult as it ascended to the wooded heights. There was at first a report of the light artillery having fired short, but this was fortunately found to be untrue and it was found that an element of the infantry had mistaken the cross road on which it was to form.

The 33d Division was successful in its part of this operation, but considerable difficulty had been experienced by the Allied infantry to the right, which had run into the very difficult country of the woods on the high ground.

On the 10th of October Batteries "C," "D" and "E" crossed the river by the bridge at Consenvoye and took position just south of the village in the vicinity of the German trench system that runs east and west at this point.

The infantry position in the vicinity of the Bois de Chaume was a difficult one. It had been found necessary to withdraw the infantry outposts from the most distant points that they had attained, because of the very severe artillery fire of the enemy to which they were subjected. Their first position, directly observable from the high ground in the vicinity of Haraumont, was one that could not be sustained.

Colonel Davis, of the 132d Regiment of Infantry, which had made the original advance on the right side of the river, had been relieved by General King's brigade. The regimental and brigade command posts of infantry were very close to Major Austin's posts near Consenvoye and the result was splendid liaison between the artillery and the infantry. The fire called for by the infantry commander was delivered by Batteries "C," "D," and "E," of Major Austin's command, within a very few minutes after the time it was asked for, and the infantry was able to see quickly the effects of artillery fire.

The command post of the regiment was moved into the northwest corner of Forges Wood and contact between elements of the regiment was much more easily maintained. It was still found that Batteries "A," "B" and "F" were too far from the

enemy's lines to be of maximum value and they were therefore moved to the southwest edge of the Bois Jure. This was an exposed position, especially from observation on the right, and it was fortunate that these batteries in this position were not called upon to fire.

During this period there had not been much advance on the part of troops to the right into the high wooded ground of the Meuse Heights, and the general regimental sector was subjected to harassing fire both from the north and from the east. The rationing and supply of Major Austin's command near Consenvoye were made difficult by the almost constant bombardment of the Consenvoye bridge and the roads both north and south of Forges Wood were subjected to harassing fire. There were occasional bursts of fire at high speed, delivered by the enemy, but most of the hostile fire seemed to be with one or two guns and at more or less regulated intervals. Gas was used by the enemy against Forges Wood and against the infantry and artillery positions at the right side of the river.

While the regiment was in this position, Colonel Smith was taken seriously ill and was sent to the rear by order of the regimental surgeon. Lieutenant Colonel John T. Delaney took command of the regiment. In this position the division was relieved by French Colonial troops.

PHASE III

From the vicinity of Brabant and Samogneux the country rises steadily to the high ground of the Meuse Heights, and the general locality of Haumont Woods, Brabant Woods, Molleville Woods and Etraye Woods is reached from southwest by two roads, one the Brabant-Etraye Road and one the Samogneux-Crepion Road. The first mounts almost immediately and stays on the high ground until it drops down into Etraye. The second stays on the low ground of a deep ravine until it reaches the foot of Hill 360, when it rises quickly over that hill and ascends more gently into Crepion.

On the 29th of October the regiment moved to take position in the general locality of Malbrouck Hill and to relieve the 322d Regiment of Artillery, of the 158th Field Artillery Brigade. The 322d Artillery was laid with a defensive barage on the right sub-sector of the sector Grande-Montagne. It supported the centers of resistance Wavrille and Etraye.

The Volker-Stellung of the German defensive system runs east out of a point just south of Consenvoye over the high ground across the Brabant Wood, skirts the Ormont Wood and goes east at the south edge of Moirey Wood. At the point where this line crosses the Brabant-Etraye Road, Major Seymour's battalion went into position and farther up the road on the left side Major Austin's battalion went into position.

The infantry position for both Allies and Germans was a difficult one. Most of the country was wooded. Observation was very difficult. The first twenty-four hours that Major Austin's battalion was in position a protective barrage was called for, upon a nervous call through the liaison officer of infantry.

After it had been in position relatively but a few hours, the brigade sector was moved to the right and the 104th Artillery took over a sector bounded generally by the right edge of Ormont Wood and the left edge of Houpey Wood.

At this time Colonel Charles C. Pulis took command of the 104th Field Artillery.

The 104th Field Artillery supported the 313th and 314th Field Artillery. The 313th Infantry held a short line running through the center of the Ormont Wood with one battalion, with one battalion in support in Brabant Wood and one battalion in reserve south of Haumont. The lines of this regiment were short because this ground was difficult to hold. Three times the Americans had taken the entire Ormont Wood and three times they had been driven out of the eastern half by a very destructive enemy fire. The Ormont Wood is comparatively thick, is traversed by a good many paths and has in it several strong dugouts. At the time the 104th Field Artillery took over this sector the infantry was convinced that the eastern half of the wood was infested with machine guns, pill boxes, at close intervals.

The guns in both positions were without protection except for overhead camouflage. There were several strong dugouts for command posts and the like. It developed that the enemy had direct observation from the high ground of either side of Ormont Wood. The result was that during the first days of the regiment's occupation of this position, the entire sector from Haumont to the southern point of Consenvoye Wood was subjected to a very severe artillery fire. This fire was particularly severe along points of the Brabant-Etraye Road and in the Haumont Ravine and the ravines that meet the Haumont Ravine from the northeast. The enemy was accustomed to deliver bursts of fire consisting of anywhere from 60 to 120 shots, delivered without warning and with great rapidity against a single locality. These bursts of fire during the first five days of occupation of this position were very frequent, but were in descending scale towards the last. This enemy fire was delivered with great accuracy and did great damage along such points as the bottom of the Haumont Ravine, where ration trains were compelled to proceed. Enemy fire was severe against support positions such as the Brabant Wood and against ravines such as the Ravine de Coassinvaux, the Ravine de Bourvaux and the Fond de Valonsevaux.

During the stay of the regiment in this position no attack was made in its immediate front. But the infantry on the left was active in attack and the guns of this regiment were frequently called upon to assist in such activity. The assumption is the general locality of the Ormont Wood and the Belleu Wood had been found so difficult for attack that it had been decided to make a turning movement to the east and go around this difficult high wooded position formed by the Ormont Wood and the Belleu Wood.

All this time the artillery positions, the infantry support positions and even the infantry front line positions were subjected to a very severe harassing fire, and to relieve this pressure the 104th Field Artillery was called upon to deliver a good deal of concentration fire, retaliation fire and harassing fire. Some of this fire was delivered with great rapidity.

Fortunately the liaison between infantry and artillery at this time was very close. Excellent telephone communication was maintained. Liaison officers of artillery had been sent to brigade, regimental and battalion headquarters of infantry. The result was almost immediate response to the demands of the infantry, thus fulfilling the instructions of the commanding officer of the regiment that one of the primary functions of the light artillery was to fulfil quickly the demands of the infantry. At this time the regimental expenditure of ammunition in a day often amounted to 4,000 projectiles.

The infantry commanders were especially interested in retaliation fire that would relieve the pressure on certain portions of their area. It was found that concentrations of fire rapidly delivered against Crepion lessened the enemy's artillery fire in the upper end of the Haumont Ravine.

About the 5th of November the artillery fire in the general regimental sector seemed to decrease. There was still considerable fire by gun and by platoon, but the rapid concentrations delivered with bursts of fire seemed to lessen.

About this time gas was thrown over by one or two guns on certain areas, with concentrations of two or three hundred projectiles, but little harm was done unless it was in the very low ground.

The infantry attack had been successfully carried forward on the left and the plan was to squeeze out the enemy on the high ground in the vicinity of Hill 360.

On November 8th the commanding officer ordered Batteries "A," "B" and "C" forward, along the Brabant-Etraye Road, to a point almost in the woods, so that they could fire at the enemy's front line, at a range of about 2,500 meters.

About 3 o'clock on the afternoon of November 8th the enemy apparently became fearful of attack along the Ormont Wood, or was desirous of covering his retreat. At any rate a really tremendous artillery fire was delivered by him about the base of Hill 360 and extending slightly to the right and left. This fire continued with great severity until about 6 o'clock, when it decreased and spent itself in a gas attack on the Haumont-Batiue bottom and the Ravine Rechimpre.



37 cm. howitzer captured by 33d Division men of 1st Battalion Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery "investigating"



Near Gercourt. German guns abandoned, September 26, 1918. Objective of 52d Field Artillery Brigade

PHASE IV

After this demonstration on November 8th it was learned that the enemy had retired out of the Ormont Wood and there was from that time comparatively little artillery activity of the enemy in the area. On November 9th not a shot was fired up to 11 o'clock. Then there was one flanking gun that fired on the high ground towards Haumont Wood. On November 9th Batteries "A" and "E" went into position near Ormont Farm. The enemy had retired rapidly in front and first made a stand on Hill 328 and the high hills of the Cote d'Orne and the Cote de Chateau. When the two leading batteries moved forward it was impossible for them to go any farther because the road from the Ormont Farm into Crepion was not passable. Very severe artillery fire had been delivered against this road at the summit of Hill 360 and there were two hits directly on the road of projectiles larger in caliber than 300 millimeters.

While at this time the enemy was not firing heavily on this area he still had a direct observation from the high hills to the east on any point eastward of the 360 Hill.

The commanding officer of the regiment made every effort to see if guns could not be got in position in this vicinity of the Peine Wood by going around Molleville Farm. But the roads through rain and shell fire made such a thing impossible.

On November 9th the fire of this regiment played a very big part in making possible the successful attack of the infantry against the entrenched hill just north of the town of Chaumont and on the next day the same thing was true of the attack on Hill 319.

On November 10th Battery "D" moved to a position near Crepion, which was as near the line as even the infantry commander thought the light artillery should go.

On November 11th, at 10:15, this regiment fired its last shot with one battery in position in Crepion, three at Ormont Farm and two near Malbrouck Hill.

The experiences of the 105th Field Artillery were similar to those of the 104th, and are contained in some detail in the following notes on the operations of the regiment which were prepared by Colonel DeWitt C. Weld, the regimental commander.

PHASE I

OPERATIONS OF THE 105TH FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT FROM SEPTEMBER 26TH TO OCTOBER 3D

1. On September 23d Regimental Field Order No. 1 was issued, placing the batteries of the two battalions in position. This was based on warning orders issued by the 33d Division and 52d Field Artillery Brigade. On the afternoon of September 26th the Commanding General, 33d Division, called all artillery commanders to his P. C., announced "D" day and "H" hour, based on Field Order No. 23, 33d Division, A. E. F., and Field Order No. 4, 52d Field Artillery Brigade, and Regimental Field Order No. 2 was issued.

2. At the hour indicated (5:30, September 27th) all batteries of the regiment opened fire and continued without cessation to the end of the schedule. Observation of fire was impossible, due to the heavy fog and smoke. Liaison was established by detail of one lieutenant and six enlisted men with the attacking battalion of the 132d Infantry, which we were supporting, and one officer and four runners with the Regimental Headquarters, 132 Infantry, and one officer and two runners with the Commanding General, 66th Infantry Brigade. This never failed, and I was kept constantly in touch with the progress of the action.

3. Nothing to report.

4. (a) No advance made by the artillery.
   (b) No prisoners taken.
   (c) No materiel captured by the artillery.

(d) Casualties September 26th to October 3d, inclusive, were as follows:

Killed—One.
Wounded—Thirteen.

(e) Nothing to report.

(f) Nothing to report.

(g) Prisoners' statements indicate the accuracy and intensity of the artillery fire, and subsequent inspection of the terrain bore out these statements.

(h) Terrain hilly and heavily wooded in parts, necessitating a constant raising of angle of site during barrage.

(i) Conclusions. The attack was well planned and well executed, and the artillery support adequate and accurate. The difficulties of the terrain with a single road caused an unavoidable delay in the movement forward of the artillery.

5. 1/20,000 map showing sector limits, positions and advances each day is attached.

SEPTEMBER 28TH

The roads having been reported as prepared for the advance of artillery, the 1st Battalion was ordered forward to positions reconnoitered in the vicinity of the Mill de Raffecourt, based on Field Order No. 24, 33d Division, which was complied with, but upon arrival of the head of the column at the designated place at the hour set, the entire battalion was turned back to their positions by a colonel of the Military Police, who refused to allow them to proceed. The movement was repeated the following day and the positions were successfully occupied.

OCTOBER 2D

Regimental Field Order No. 4 was issued, directing the 1st Battalion to move forward from its positions near the Mill de Raffecourt to positions reconnoitered in the vicinity of the Bois de Sachet, by direction of the Commanding General, 52d Field Artillery Brigade.

OCTOBER 3D

Addenda to Field Order No. 4 was issued, based on Field Order No. 26, 33d Division and Field Order No. 5, 52d Field Artillery Brigade, directing the 1st Battalion Commander to move his battalion into concealed positions along the northwest edge of the Bois de la Cote Lemont to neutralize hostile fire and break up counter-attacks between the Bois de Brieulles, Bois de Foret and Brieulles-sur-Meuse, two batteries in line and one in reserve, movement to be completed before 5:00 A. M., October 4th.

PHASE II

FROM OCTOBER 4TH TO OCTOBER 24TH, INCLUSIVE

OCTOBER 4TH

1. In compliance with Field Order No. 26, 33d Division, and Field Order No. 5, 52d Field Artillery Brigade, Batteries "A" and "C," 1st Battalion, succeeded in getting up into the Bois de la Cote Lemont on the edge of the thick underbrush at a high point, being heavily shelled and gassed during the operation. They were also subjected to heavy machine gun and rifle fire, being close to the infantry front lines. Battery "B" was in reserve.

2. The 1st Battalion remained in position during the entire day but were not called upon to fire, as there were no counter-attacks, and the infantry did not need or wish for neutralizing fire of any kind. The battalion was ordered back to its positions near the Bois de Sachet at dusk. Beginning at the "H" hour (5:25) in accordance with Field Order No. 5, 52d Field Artillery Brigade, the 2d Battalion, Bat-



8-inch naval gun (French) used to supplement the fire of 52d Field Artillery Brigade



Men of 1st Battalion Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery. Sivry, Meuse. Meuse-Argonne, October 20, 1918

teries "D," "E" and "F," executed several missions of harassing neutralization and interdiction fire on the east bank of the Meuse.

3. Nothing to report.

4. Summary:

(a) No advance made by the artillery.

(b) No prisoners taken.

(c) No materiel captured by the artillery.

(d) Casualties from October 4th to 24th, inclusive, were as follows:

Killed—None.
Wounded—Ten.

(e) Nothing to report.

(f) Nothing to report.

(g) Artillery support as indicated above.

(h) Terrain heavily wooded in parts and under enemy's observation from higher ground, especially from east bank of the Meuse.

(i) The attack was not successful, and the employment of the 1st Battalion as indicated caused it to remain inactive for twenty-four hours.

5. 1/20,000 map showing sector limits, positions and advances each day is attached.

October 6th-7th

1st Battalion ordered by Field Message 7, 52d Field Artillery Brigade, to take over mission of 1st Battalion, 104th Field Artillery, and execute harassing and neutralization fire as directed.

October 8th

1. Regimental Field Order No. 5, issued on the 7th, based on Field Order No. 6, 52d Field Artillery Brigade, attached the 2d Battalion of this regiment to a groupement under Colonel E. T. Smith in support of the infantry detachment of this division temporarily attached to the 17th French Corps operating on the east bank of the Meuse, in order to perform which mission the battalion was moved, beginning at dusk on October 7th, to new positions on the slopes of the Cote de l'Oie.

2. Action opened as directed at "H" hour (5:30 A. M.) and continued in accordance with schedule. Liaison officers reported objective gained at 11:55 A. M.

3. Nothing to report.

4. Summary. Terrain open and rising ground over which the entire barrage could be observed. Infantry reported shots from friendly artillery. It was afterwards proved to their satisfaction that there were no shots from our artillery, but that it was German fire from the southeast, where the line dipped sharply to the south.

October 9th

Action resumed on east bank of the Meuse, second objective gained. Counter-attack by the enemy drove back the line of the 29th Division Infantry and caused the left held by the 33d Division to retire.

October 10th

Attack resumed at 6:00 A. M. with slight gains, the 2d Battalion again supporting.

October 12th

In accordance with Field Message 10, 52d Field Artillery Brigade, the 2d Battalion was ordered to move at dusk and to complete the movement before daylight to new positions reconnoitered on the southern edge of the Bois de Jure in the vicinity of Gercourt. At the same time the Regimental Commander reconnoitered new position for his P. C. east of the two battalions, slightly north of Consenvoye on the west bank of the Meuse.

October 13th

Regimental Field Order No. 6 issued, based on Field Order No. 8, 52d Field Artillery Brigade. Mission to assist by artillery preparation in the attack of the 29th Division in the sector east of the 34th meridian. Operation to commence at 5:30 A. M., October 14th. At 6:10 P. M. Field Message No. 11, 52d Field Artillery Brigade, ordered the postponement of the attack twenty-four hours and changed the mission of the 2d Battalion to the execution of fire on Sivry-sur-Meuse to cover the construction of emplacements of the 102d Trench Mortar Battery on the west bank of the Meuse opposite.

October 14th

The 2d Battalion ordered to execute neutralization fire on Villaneuve Farm from "H" minus thirty to "H" during the postponed attack, Battery "A," 1st Battalion, taking over the mission of covering the construction of trench mortar emplacements. Regimental Field Order No. 7, issued at 5:30 P. M., based on Field Order No. 9, 52d Field Artillery Brigade, to support the 29th Division in the continuation of the attack on the 15th.

October 15th

Action ordered on the 14th begun at 7:30 A. M.

October 17th-20th

Harassing and neutralization fire executed in accordance with Operation Orders, 52d Field Artillery Brigade.

October 21st

Regimental Field Order No. 8, based on Field Order No. 30, 33d Division, and Field Order No. 12, 52d Field Artillery Brigade, was issued, giving details of the withdrawal of the regiment from the sector upon relief by French units of the 15th Colonial Division, taking over the sector.

October 22d

Regimental Field Order No. 9, issued in compliance with Field Order No. 30, 33d Division, for the second stage of the relief.

PHASE III

FROM OCTOBER 25th TO NOVEMBER 8th, INCLUSIVE

October 25th

52d Field Artillery Brigade transferred to 79th Division.

October 27th

Regimental Field Order No. 10, based on Field Order No. 28, 79th Division, was issued, giving details of the relief of the 29th Division; the 1st Battalion to reconnoiter positions to the north of those then held by the 2d Battalion, 323d Field Artillery, 158th Field Artillery Brigade, northeast of Brabant, and to occupy them on the night of the 28th-29th; the 2d Battalion to reconnoiter positions to the west of those occupied by the 1st Battalion of the same regiment and occupy them on the night of 29th-30th. Mission to take over this sector in support of the 158th Infantry Brigade, 79th Division, in defense.

October 28th-November 1st

Taking over sector of 323d Field Artillery and performing sixty-five missions of concentration, area harassing and protective barrages.

November 2d

Regimental Field Order No. 11, based on Operation Order No. 5, 52d Field Artillery Brigade, calling for the support of a strong reconnaissance with the idea of

penetrating a limited distance into the enemy's territory and to hold, if possible, whatever ground gained within the limits of the advance.

NOVEMBER 3D

1. Attack was started at 5:30 A. M., the 316th Infantry moving forward against Hill 378, the 105th Field Artillery putting down a standing and rolling barrage lasting two hours.

2. Summary. The infantry reached and held ground up to the foot of Hill 378 and reported the artillery support adequate and accurate.

3. At 8:00 P. M. in accordance with Operation Order No. 8, 52d Field Artillery Brigade, the 105th Field Artillery was put at the disposal of the 158th Infantry Brigade, and in compliance with Field Order No. 12, Headquarters 158th Infantry Brigade, Regimental Field Order No. 12 for a further attack upon the sector in front of the positions held was issued, calling for harassing fire and barrage lasting three hours, to be begun on the morning of the 4th at 7:30 A. M. In order to obtain closer liaison, one officer and two runners were furnished to each of the two battalions of the 316th Infantry on the left in the forward lines, one officer and two runners to Regimental Headquarters, 316th Infantry, one officer and two runners to the battalion of the 315th Infantry in line, one officer and two runners to the Regimental Headquarters, 315th Infantry, and one officer and two runners to Headquarters, 158th Infantry Brigade. In addition, telephone and radio liaison was kept up.

NOVEMBER 4TH

1. The action began at the appointed hour, and at the request of the Infantry Brigade Commander during the attack one gun of Battery "D" was sent forward to take up a direct fire position to neutralize machine gun and trench mortar activity on the right flank, but due to the rainy weather, which had made the roads almost impassable with mud, and the very heavy grades over the hills, it was more than even eight horses could do in time to be of assistance, and it was ordered back to position.

2. Summary. The attack was partially successful and the infantry succeeded in taking and holding Hill 378, but was unable to advance beyond it to the second objective. Artillery support was pronounced effective and adequate.

NOVEMBER 5TH

1. At 1 A. M. Regimental Field Order No. 13, based on Field Order No. 13, Headquarters, 158th Infantry Brigade, was issued, covering a continuance of the attack and calling for intermittent harassing fire intermittently until "H" hour, followed by a standing and rolling barrage lasting three hours and fifteen minutes. The fire was opened at 5:00 A. M. as directed, and continued throughout the period. During the firing two guns of the 2d Battalion, each with two filled caissons, were ordered forward to take up advanced position to still further assist the infantry, but the engineers having reported that the German fire felled so many trees and cut up the roads so much that it would take eighteen hours to clear them, the Commanding Officer, 158th Infantry Brigade, ordered the guns back into their position.

2. Summary. The infantry, after advancing well forward, was subjected to a heavy counter-attack, which prevented them advancing but little beyond their original position.

NOVEMBER 6TH

1. At 1 A. M. Field Order No. 14, 158th Infantry Brigade, was received and Regimental Field Order No. 14 was issued calling for a continuance of the attack at 6 A. M. Intermittent harassing fire and barrage covering period from 6 A. M. to 11:40 A. M.

2. At noon the attack was ordered repeated, commencing at 2:15 P. M. Fire was opened as directed at 2:15 P. M., and carried through the same length period as the morning attack.

3. At 6 P. M., in accordance with Field Order No. 15, 158th Infantry Brigade, Regimental Field Order No. 16 for an attack on the morning of November 7th at 8:10 A. M. was issued.

November 7th

Fire was opened without preliminary preparation with a standing barrage at 7:55 A. M. and lasted 15 minutes, followed by a rolling barrage and ending with a standing barrage lasting from 9:50 to 10:20. The change in method was successful and the attack proceeded to the final objective without check, the infantry reaching and organizing the strong positions in the Kriemheld Stellung.

November 8th

In accordance with orders from the 158th Infantry Brigade Commander, Regimental Field Order No. 17 was issued, calilng for the support of a further development of the attack toward the northeast in the direction of Etraye-Reville. The 2d Battalion was ordered to assist by concentrations and harassing fire and the 1st Battalion was ordered to immediately reconnoiter positions as far advanced as possible in the vicinity of Hill 378 or further forward if the attack progressed sufficiently. As a result of the reconnaissance, the battalion was moved forward the following night to positions east of the Villeneuve Farm and close up to the infantry lines.

Summary

The terrain over which the attacks during this period were launched was of the most difficult character, deep valleys, high hills in most places, thickly wooded with dense undergrowth through which the infantry had to fight its way. Hill 378 and the Haraumount Ridge, which were the keys to the enemy's position, were difficult, as the infantry had to issue from the woods at the foot of these hills and advance up a bald slope without cover against strongly fortified positions flanked on the right by woods full of machine-gun nests. It was all the more, therefore, an achievement on their part to continue to return to the attack so many times until successful. The artillery support was strong and accurate and contributed materially to their success, according to the statements of prisoners and observers in the French lines, which were advanced somewhat on the left flank.

Casualties from October 25th to November 8th, inclusive, were as follows:

Killed—Four.

Wounded—Twenty-three.

1/20,000 map showing sector limits, positions and advances each day is attached.

PHASE IV


FROM NOVEMBER 9TH TO NOVEMBER 11TH, INCLUSIVE

November 9th

On the morning of the 9th the 1st Battalion was ordered to reconnoiter positions still further forward, the infantry having advanced about three kilometers, and to make, if possible, positions as near the front lines as practicable, with direct observation from the hills from which the enemy had been driven, and to occupy these positions during the night, prepared to execute the missions covered by Regimental Field Order No. 18 based on Field Order issued by the 158th Infantry Brigade, which provided for an attack on the Cote de Chateau and Cote d'Orne, two hills rising from the plains beyond the town of Damvillers.

November 10th

Attack began at 5:00 A. M. with heavy harassing fire on an indicated area, followed by a standing barrage commencing at 6 and lasting until a rolling barrage



The above is a photographic copy of photogravure made by the Germans of the sector held by the 27th by the 33d Division and immediately turn

commenced at 6:30, the artillery support ending in a standing barrage lasting from 8:10 to 8:30 A. M. The attack was not pushed forward, however, on account of meeting unexpected opposition from machine-gun fire from the flanks on the slopes of the hill.


In the evening at 20 Hr., in compliance with orders from the Commanding General, 158th Infantry Brigade, Regimental Field Order No. 19 was issued, calling for a renewed attack on the morning of the 11th, the artillery fire commencing at 8 A. M. and lasting until 11:12 A. M. The 2d Battalion was ordered forward to positions reconnoitered by direction of the Regimental Commander and occupied near Etraye, with instructions to have the batteries in position before dawn of the 11th. All three batteries were in position before midnight. The 1st Battalion was in position at Reville, all within a range of less than 200 yards from the objective, one battery of each battalion being well forward, practically in open warfare positions in direct fire.

November 11th

At 1 A. M. orders were received by telephone from the Commanding General, 158th Infantry Brigade, countermanding the previous orders, and directing me to place the regiment at the disposal of the Commanding Officer, 315th Infantry, who would make an attack supported by the 316th, which had previously been designated. After consultation with the Commanding Officer, 315th Infantry, Regimental Field Order No. 20 was issued, covering the attack to commence at 8 A. M., and I personally went forward to the P. C. of the Commanding Officer, 315th Infantry, and remained there during the attack.

A heavy fog rendered observation impossible, but fire was opened at 8 A. M.

At 9:12 A. M. Colonel Knowles, commanding the 315th Infantry, received the order transmitted by the Division Commander that hostilities would cease at 11 Hr., to continue the operations previously ordered with vigor until that time, and the necessary orders were issued to the batteries to secure compliance. The fire ceased promptly at 11 Hr. with the infantry in position but not attacking.



erican Division near le Mort Homme, September, 1918. The original was captured September) General Wingate for the use of his brigade

SUMMARY

The terrain was a broad open plain without cover, leading up to the foot of the two hills attacked, which rose from the plain to a considerable height quite precipitously. It was a difficult objective to gain, but a Prussian officer, questioned, stated that the artillery preparation had practically blown them from the hill and that the attack would surely have been successful if made. This position, once taken, would have left the enemy without a good defensive position upon which to make a stand until he had reached the other edge of the plain and the hills on the northeastern edge.

Casualties from November 9th to 11th, inclusive, were as follows:

Killed—None.
Wounded—Two.

1/20,000 map showing sector limits, positions and advances each day is attached.

CONCLUSIONS

I attribute the remarkably small number of casualties to the careful selection of positions, careful camouflage, severe concealment discipline and untiring efforts of all Commanding Officers to quickly improve positions after occupation.

The 106th Field Artillery was commanded by Colonel John D. Howland until August 6, 1918, when Lieutenant Colonel John T. Delaney was assigned to its command at Camp de Souge. Colonel Delaney commanded the regiment until September 1st, when command was taken over by Colonel Emery T. Smith. The following notes on operations of this regiment give in detail many interesting facts connected with its service:

PHASE I

SEPTEMBER 26 TO OCTOBER 3, 1918 (INCLUSIVE)

1. Situation at Beginning of Operations.—Attached to 33d Division and occupying positions as follows:

Regimental P. C.	20.1—72.6
1st Battalion P. C.	19.5—72.2
1st Battalion O. P.	18.9—73.2
Battery "A" No. 1 Gun	19.7—72.2
Battery "B" No. 1 Gun	19.6—72.2
2d Battalion P. C.	20.0—71.9
Battery "C" No. 1 Gun	19.9—72.1
Battery "D" No. 1 Gun	19.9—72.0
3d Battalion P. C.	19.4—72.1
Battery "E" No. 1 Gun	19.5—72.2
Battery "F" No. 1 Gun	19.4—72.1

Echelons at Bois la Ville, 23.5—61.5.
Sector of Fire—Divisional Sector.

2. The Attack.—September 26, 1918—H.5:30—2,550 rounds fired between H. and H.3:45 on objectives I-XIX, designated by Table I, Field Order No. 4, Headquarters, 52d Field Artillery Brigade. (See map attached.)

September 27th—326 rounds harassing fire delivered during day on roads north and east of Consenvoye, and on enemy batteries in Bois de Chaume.

September 28th—Sixty rounds harassing fire on Brabant—130 rounds fired harassing roads on east of Meuse.



Battery D, 105th Field Artillery, near Etraye, a few minutes after the armistice, November 11, 1918

September 29th—180 rounds harassing fire on batteries, Boise de Chaune and roads to northeast of Brabant and Consenvoye.

September 30th—Sixty rounds H. E., twenty rounds No. 5 gas harassing fire on sensitive points as prescribed in Operations Order No. 7, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery.

Third Battalion O. P. established at 21.5—74.3.

Second Battalion O. P. established at 20.0—71.9.

October 1st—Eighty rounds H. E. and fifteen rounds No. 5 gas harassing fire on sensitive points easts of Meuse in accordance with Operations Order No. 8, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery.

October 2d—Batteries "A," "B" and "F" and Headquarters 1st Battalion moved at 20H.15 to new positions east of Bethincourt. Road blocked by disabled trucks at Cumieres. Carriages camouflaged alongside of road and horses returned to echelon.



Headquarters 52d Field Artillery Brigade, September 9-24, 1918, at Fromereville, France

October 3d—Headquarters, 1st Battalion, Batteries "A," "B" and "F" moved from Cumieres at 10H.30, reaching positions at 24H.00. Positions occupied in accordance with Field Order No. 5, Headquarters, 52d Field Artillery Brigade.

Headquarters 1st Battalion P. C.....18.5—74.9
Battery "A" No. 1 Gun.....19.9—76.0
Battery "B" No. 1 Gun.....18.6—75.9
Battery "F" No. 1 Gun.....19.6—75.7

3. Nothing to report.
4. Summary:
   (a) Nothing to report.
   (b) None.
   (c) 150 mm. enemy battery organized with gun squad.
   (d) One private slightly wounded.
   (e) Nothing to report.
   (f) Nothing to report.
   (g) Fire executed as ordered in support of infantry.
   (h) Favorable for artillery fighting.
   (i) Nothing to report.

PHASE II

OCTOBER 4TH TO 24TH, 1918 (INCLUSIVE)

1. SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF OPERATIONS.—Attached to 33d Division and occupying positions as follows:

Regimental P. C.....20.1—72.6
1st Battalion P. C.....18.5—74.9

Battery "A" No. 1 Gun.....19.9—76.0
Battery "B" No. 1 Gun.....18.6—75.9
2d Battalion P. C.....20.0—71.9
Battery "C" No. 1 Gun.....19.9—72.1
Battery "D" No. 1 Gun.....19.9—72.0
3d Battalion P. C.....19.4—72.1
Battery "E" No. 1 Gun.....19.5—72.2
Battery "F" No. 1 Gun.....19.6—75.7

Echelons at Bois la Ville, 23.5—61.5. Forward echelons established at La Claire, 20.8—69.7.

Sector of Fire—Divisional Sector.

2. The Attack.—October 4th—5H.25—1,200 rounds covering fire delivered on enemy batteries for neutralization in Bois de Chatillon, Bois de Sartelle and ravines east of Liny-Devent-Dun in connection with the attack of the 4th Division on our left per Field Order No. 5, Headquarters, 52d Field Artillery Brigade.

October 5th—1H.00—neutralization fire on enemy batteries in Bois de Sartelles 7H.30—10H.00, harassing fire on Brieulles-Haraumont, and destructive fire on Trench du Teton 14.4—84.0. Total, 415 rounds.

October 6th—256 rounds destructive fire on Trench du Teton 13.9—82.8, twenty-four rounds registration fire, twenty rounds neutralization on enemy battery at 25.6—80.1.

October 7th—115 rounds for registration, forty-seven rounds harassing fire on 16.5—85.3, 21.9—81.5.

October 8th—Artillery groupment consisting of 104th Field Artillery, 1st Battalion 105th Field Artillery and 106th Field Artillery, commanded by Colonel E. T. Smith, 106th Field Artillery, placed at disposal of Colonel Davis, 132d Infantry. From 8H.25 to 15H., 1,573 rounds harassing fire for preparation east of Meuse at 22.7—81.8, 21.8—81.1. From 15H.50 to 17H.25 accompanying fire in conjunction with attack of Colonel Davis' detachment. 1,674 rounds on areas designated by Operations Order No. 11, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery.



Chateau le Haut Meral, Montsurs, France. Headquarters 52d Field Artillery Brigade, December, 1918, to February, 1919

October 9th—Accompanying fire along the line 21.1—81.8 to 21.8—81.7 and 21.0—78.2 to 21.8—782. Total, 365 rounds.

October 10th—Attack resumed east of Meuse at 6H.05. 168 rounds accompanying fire on objectives in accordance with Operations Order No. 13, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery.

October 11th — 106 rounds interdiction fire on Haraumont, seventy-five rounds harassing fire on 24.7—84.0 and 25.—84.0, 180 rounds harassing on area 20.8 —83.1.

October 12th—Seventy-six rounds harassing fire on area 20.8—83.1, forty rounds on line from 24.7—82.4 to 25.0 —84.0 to 24.7—84.0.

October 13th — 408 rounds harassing fire on 20.8 — 83.1, 350 rounds on Sivry. Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 3d Battalion and Batteries "C," "D" and "E" moved to following positions at 23H.00, arriving at 6H.00 October 14th.



105th Field Artillery post of command near Verdun, France, November 20-December 14, 1918

2d Battalion P. C.	18.1—79.4
3d Battalion P. C.	18.1—79.0
Battery "C" No. 1 Gun	18.0—79.5
Battery "D" No. 1 Gun	18.0—79.5
Battery "E" No. 1 Gun	17.7—79.3

October 14th—Eighty rounds adjustment fire 9H.30 to 14H.00, 1,090 rounds accompanying fire from 7H.20 to 8H.00 on 24.2—82.8, 24.6—82.9, 24.2—83.3, 24.4—83.8. Operations Order No. 15, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery.

October 15th—Headquarters 1st Battalion, Batteries "A," "B" and "F" moved at 19H.00 to new positions west of Gercourt, arriving at 23H.00. Positions occupied as follows:

1st Battalion P. C.	17.2—78.3
1st Battalion O. P.	18.5—74.9
Battery "A" No. 1 Gun	17.0—78.7
Battery "B" No. 1 Gun	16.6—79.1
Battery "F" No. 1 Gun	17.2—78.7

October 16th—No activity.

October 17th—Regimental P. C. closed at 20.1—72.6 at 13H.00, opened at same hour at 17.2—78.3. Total, fifty-one rounds fired during day for registration.

October 18th—196 rounds harassing and registration fire on following points: 22.9—83.3, 21.7—83.0, 22.7—83.0.

October 19th—554 rounds harassing fire on 17.7—85.4, 23.4—83.5, to 24.0—83.8, 23.9—86.8, 19.3—84.7, 24.9—85.4, 24.2—85.3. Battery at 17.9—86.5.

October 20th—No firing. Relieved at 22H.30 by French Colonial Troops. Regiment left position at 23H.00 for Bois la Ville.

October 21st—Arrived at Bois la Ville 20H.30.

October 22d—Regimental Headquarters, 1st Battalion Headquarters, Batteries "A" and "B," Headquarters Company, Supply Company, left Bois la Ville at 19H.00 for billets at Camp Chene Gossin, 3 km. southeast of Dugny; arrived at 24H.00.

October 23d and 24th—In billets at Bois la Ville and Chene Gossin cleaning materiel, harness and conditioning animals.

3. Nothing to report.

4. Summary:

(a) Nothing to report.
(b) None.
(c) None. Captured battery fired on Sivry.
(d) Wounded—Two.
(e) Nothing to report.
(f) Nothing to report.
(g) Fire executed as ordered in support of infantry.
(h) Terrain favorable for artillery fire.
(i) Nothing to report.

PHASE III

OCTOBER 25 TO NOVEMBER 8, 1918 (INCLUSIVE)

1. Situation at Beginning of Operations.—Attached to 79th Division and billeted as follows:

Regimental Headquarters	Camp Chene Gossin, southeast of Dugny
1st Battalion Headquarters	Camp Chene Gossin, southeast of Dugny
Battery "A"	Camp Chene Gossin, southeast of Dugny
Battery "B"	Camp Chene Gossin, southeast of Dugny
Supply Company	Camp Chene Gossin, southeast of Dugny
Headquarters Company	Camp Maujouy
2d Battalion Headquarters	Bois la Ville at 23.5—61.5
Battery "C"	Bois la Ville at 23.5—61.5
Battery "D"	Bois la Ville at 23.5—61.5
3d Battalion Headquarters	Bois la Ville at 23.5—61.5
Battery "E"	Bois la Ville at 23.5—61.5
Battery "F"	Bois la Ville at 23.5—61.5

2. October 25th to Otcober 27th, at billets, cleaning men, materiel, harness and conditioning horses.

October 28th—Headquarters, 2d and 3d Battalions. Batteries "C," "D," "E" and "F" left Bois de la Ville at 15H.30, arriving at positions south of Brabant, and relieved 2d and 3d Battalions, 324th Field Artillery, at 24H.30, in the following positions:

2d Battalion P. C	24.7—76.7
Battery "C" No. 1 Gun	24.7—76.7
Battery "D" No. 1 Gun	24.5—76.7
3d Battalion P. C	24.8—76.8
Battery "E" No. 1 Gun	24.9—76.4
Battery "F" No. 1 Gun	24.9—76.4

Regimental Headquarters, Headquarters 1st Battalion, Batteries "A" and "B," Headquarters Company, Supply Company, left Chene Gossin at 16H.00 for Bois de la Ville, arriving at 21H.30.



General view of Vacherauville, Headquarters 52d Field Artillery Brigade, October 30, 1918

October 29th—Regiment P. C. opened at 24.7—76.17 at 9H.30. Headquarters, 1st Battalion, Batteries "A" and "B" left Bois de la Ville 15H.00, arriving at positions south of Brabant at 24H.30, relieved 1st Battalion, 324th Field Artillery, in positions as follows:

1st Battalion P. C.....24.1—76.9
Battery "A" No. 1 Gun.....24.1—77.0
Battery "B" No. 1 Gun.....23.9—77.0

Echelon—Supply Company at Cote Talou, 26.—72.3.

October 30th—670 rounds harassing and concentration fire on sensitive points in accordance with Operations Orders Nos. 19 and 20, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery.

October 31st—708 rounds harassing fire in accordance with Operations Order No. 23, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery.

November 1st—1,900 rounds H. E., seventy-five rounds gas demonstration fire on sensitive points and active battery in accordance with Operations Order No. 24, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery, from 3H.30 to 5H.30.

November 2d—722 rounds harassing and demonstration fire in accordance with Operations Order No. 25, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery.

November 3d—1,023 rounds fired for destruction of machine-gun nests, harassing and counter-battery and demonstration fire in accordance with Operations Order No. 27, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery.

November 4th—182 rounds No. 5 gas fired on 25.4—85.2, 992 rounds on Villeneuve Farm, Sillon-Fontaine Farm and 24.8—85.2, 23.1—85.8, 26.8—83.1, 23.4—84.3, 25.4—85.2 in accordance with Operations Order No. 8, Headquarters, 52d Field Artillery Brigade. 1st Battalion O. P. established at 20.0—77.9.

November 5th—1,365 rounds accompanying fire in accordance with Operations Order No. 33, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery, from 8H.30 to 11H.15. Enemy battery observed in action at 24.22—86.64 at 9H.30, silenced by our fire at 10H.25.

November 6th—1,038 rounds H. E. and 160 rounds No. 5 gas preparation fire as per Operations Order No. 35, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery. Battery "C" moved right platoon to 25.8—78.2 at 2H.30.

November 7th—680 rounds accompanying fire from 7H.45 to 9H.05 as per Operations Order No. 36, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery. Left platoon Battery "C" moved to position at 25.8—78.2 at 4H.45.

November 8th—173 rounds H. E. fired on Buisson Chaumont, Cote de Romagne and Cote de Morimont trenches at 6H.00 and 11H.00 as per Operations Order No. 38, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery. Battery "D" moved to position at 25.8—80.4.

3. Nothing to report.
4. Summary:
   (a) Nothing to report.
   (b) Nothing to report.
   (c) Nothing to report.
   (d) Killed—Two. Wounded—Sixteen.
   (e) Nothing to report.
   (f) Nothing to report.
   (g) As ordered.
   (h) Observation poor before November 8th.
   (i) Nothing to report.



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Artillery Brigade Commander and Staff. Left to right: Brigadier General George Albert Wingate, Lieutenant Colonel Isaac J. Lovell and Major Walter L. Schoellkopf

PHASE IV

NOVEMBER 9TH TO NOVEMBER 11TH (INCLUSIVE)

1. SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF OPERATIONS:

Regimental P. C.	24.7—76.7
1st Battalion P. C.	24.1—76.9
1st Battalion O. P.	20.0—77.9
Battery "A" No. 1 Gun	24.1—77.0
Battery "B" No. 1 Gun	23.9—77.0
2d Battalion P. C.	26.0—78.1
Battery "C" No. 1 Gun	25.8—78.2
Battery "D" No. 1 Gun	25.8—78.2
3d Battalion P. C.	24.8—76.8
Battery "E" No. 1 Gun	24.9—76.5
Battery "F" No. 1 Gun	24.9—76.4

Echelon—Cote Talou 26.1—72.3.

2. November 9th—100 rounds fired on Cote Morimont, Cote Romagne and Buisson Chaumont 5H.30 to 6H.15 per Operations Order No. 39, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery.

November 10th—1,590 rounds H. E. fired from 2H.00 to 7H.00 on Cote du Chateau trenches south edge of Hill 319, Cote d'Orne, Buisson Chaumont, per Operations Order No. 40, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery. Headquarters, 1st Battalion, Batteries "A" and "B" moved to new positions, arriving at 2H.30.

1st Battalion P. C.	26.55—80.1
1st Battalion O. P.	28.6 —80.4
Battery "A" No. 1 Gun	26.7 —79.6
Battery "B" No. 1 Gun	26.6 —79.7

380 rounds harassing fire on 31.6—84.0, 34.8—82.94, 24.9—82.2. Battery "F" moved to 26.9—79.2.

November 11th—9H.00 180 rounds fired on west trenches on Cote Morimont.

Armistice in effect at 11H.00—all firing ceased—no activity.

3. Nothing to report.

4. Summary:

(a) Nothing to report.
(b) None.
(c) None.
(d) One gassed.
(e) Nothing to report.
(f) Nothing to report.
(g) As ordered.
(h) Favorable for artillery—good observation.
(i) Nothing to report.

The 102d Trench Mortar Battery, commanded by Captain Charles Pearson, Jr., operated with the 52d Field Artillery Brigade. Lieutenant Bell, of the battery, commanded two platoons in the Bois de Forges in the latter part of September. On the night of the 19th-20th of October, seventy-five rounds were fired by the battery into Vilosnes. This was the only time the battery got into action. The battery, however, rendered



Headquarters 102d Ammunition Train at Faubourg Pave, Verdun

fine service in supplying ammunition to the battery positions through practically the entire front line service of the brigade.

The 102d Ammunition Train, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Walter L. Bell, rendered most effective service throughout the period of operations. Colonel Bell had served most efficiently as Motor Transport Officer of the 27th Division in the British area until early in November, when he took command of his train in the area in which the 52d Field Artillery Brigade was operating, in time to take part in its later operations. The activities of the Ammunition Train are covered in the following report made by Colonel Bell:

PHASE I

SEPTEMBER 26 TO OCTOBER 3, 1918

1. Situation at the Beginning of the Operation:

The 102d Ammunition Train, consisting of Headquarters Train, Headquarters Motor Battalion, Headquarters Horsed Battalion, Companies A, B, C, D, E, F and G, Ordnance and Sanitary detachments, were situated on September 26, 1918, as follows:

Horsed Battalion, consisting of Headquarters, Companies E, F and G, and a detachment of the Sanitary unit, after traveling via rail from Bordeaux, France, in two sections, were situated as follows:

Headquarters, Companies E and F in the woods at Bois de la Ville with thirty men of Company E on detached service at the Division Ammunition Dump at Germonville, and sixty-four men of Company E on detached service at the Brigade Dump at Bois de Sartelles.

Company G with detachment of Sanitary unit at Marre.

Headquarters Train, Headquarters Motor Battalion and Motor Battalion, consisting of Companies A, B, C and D, Ordnance detachment and Sanitary detachment, after traveling via motor trucks overland from Bordeaux, were situated on September 26, 1918, in the woods at Bois de la Ville.

Company F moved from Bois de la Ville to Chattancourt, September 29, 1918.

Company G at Marre from September 26 to October 3, 1918.

Balance of Company E, Headquarters Train, Headquarters Horsed Battalion, Headquarters Motor Battalion, Companies A, B, C and D, Ordnance and Medical detachments, from September 26 to October 3, 1918, at Bois de la Ville.

2. The Attack:

From September 26 to October 3, 1918, the Motor Battalion furnished motor trucks and details, and continually hauled ammunition from different ammunition dumps and railheads to the battery positions of the 52d Field Artillery Brigade, on orders of the Division Munitions Officer.

Company E with details at the Division Ammunition Dump and Brigade Dump; the balance of their men were used as details for loading and carrying ammunition.

Company F at Chattancourt were in charge of an ammunition dump.

Company G at Marre, with their combat wagons, were used in hauling small arms ammunition to and from ammunition dumps.

3. Statement of enemy units engaged, time and place. Shelling of roads, etc., by artillery.

4. Summary:

(a) Depth of advance—Battery positions of the 52d Artillery Brigade.

(b) Prisoners taken—Nothing to report.

(c) Materiel captured—Nothing to report.

(d) Casualties—Three wagons containing hand grenades accidentally exploded, causing seven casualties and the loss of three mules.

(e) Employment of infantry weapons (machine guns, 37 mm. guns, Stokes mortars, and rifle grenades—Nothing to report.

(f) Employment of auxiliary weapons (tanks, gas troops, etc.)—Nothing to report.

(g) Artillery support—Supported artillery in hauling ammunition from dumps and carrying it to their battery positions.

(h) Terrain—Country very hilly, roads mostly in very poor shape, and at some points almost impassable.

(i) The organization operated throughout the entire period with but one-third of its equipment in the Motor Battalion and in the Horsed Battalion, the two caisson companies having no equipment whatsoever, and the wagon company equipped with combat wagons used entirely for hauling small arms ammunition. This condition greatly interfered with the maximum efficiency of operations. The Motor Battalion in addition being handicapped with the lack of equipment for repairs, having no repair shop in the organization. It had been at all times very difficult to secure spare parts, which resulted in having from ten to fifteen trucks laid up every day. It therefore became necessary to run what trucks we had twenty-four hours of every day.

The two caisson companies, having had no equipment, were not able to perform their proper functions at any time. They were used to supervise the forward ammunition dumps as loading details for the trucks, and to salvage ammunition in positions left as the batteries of this brigade advanced.

PHASE II

OCTOBER 4 TO OCTOBER 24, 1918

1. Situation:

Company E—Left Bois de la Ville October 14, 1918, and arrived at La Claire. Left La Claire October 22, 1918, and arrived at Faubourg Pave.

Company F—Left Chattancourt October 18, 1918, and arrived at Pump Dump near Forges. Left Forges October 20, 1918, and arrived at La Claire. Left la Claire October 22, 1918, and arrived at Foubourg Pave.

Company G—Left Marre October 21, 1918, and arrived at Foubourg Pave. Balance of organization left Bois de la Ville October 11 and 12, 1918, and arrived at La Claire. Left La Claire October 22, 1918, and arrived at Foubourg Pave.

2. The Attack:

From October 4 to October 24, 1918, the Motor Battalion furnished motor trucks and details and continually hauled ammunition from different ammunition dumps and railheads to the battery positions of the 52d Field Artillery Brigade, on orders of the Division Munitions Officer.

The Horsed Battalion was used for details and hauling small arms ammunition.

Report on sub-headings 3 and 4 the same as under period from September 26 to October 3, 1918, with the exception of no casualties.

PHASE III

OCTOBER 25 TO NOVEMBER 9, 1918

1. Situation:

Company E—Left Foubourg Pave November 3, 1918, and arrived at Brabant. Left Brabant November 5, 1918, and returned to Foubourg Pave.

Company F—Left Foubourg Pave November 4, 1918, and arrived north of Brabant.

Company G—Left Foubourg Pave October 30, 1918, and arrived at camp across river at Marre.

Balance of organization at Foubourg Pave.

Report on sub-headings 2, 3 and 4 the same as under period from October 4, 1918, to October 24, 1918.

PHASE IV

NOVEMBER 9 TO NOVEMBER 11, 1918

1. Situation:

Entire organization with the exception of Companies F and G at Foubourg Pave.

Company F—North of Brabant.

Company G—Across river at Marre.

Report on sub-headings 2, 3 and 4 the same as under period from October 25, 1918, to November 9, 1918.

The following facts concerning the consumption of ammunition by the artillery brigade will prove interesting:

Organization	Number of Rounds Fired	Value of Ammunition Consumed	Weight of Rounds Fired, Pounds
104th Field Artillery	66,782	$1,335,640	1,001,730
105th Field Artillery	81,096	1,621,920	1,216,440
106th Field Artillery	33,036	1,982,160	3,072,348
Totals	180,914	$4,939,720	5,290,518

The Ammunition Train delivered 1,420 truck loads of ammunition at the battery positions.

Battery A, 105th Field Artillery, held the record for the greatest number of rounds fired: 15,166.

Battery F, 106th Field Artillery, led the heavies in firing with 7,429 rounds.

Gun No. 16,948 of Battery B, 105th Field Artillery, fired the greatest number of rounds in the light regiments: 4,049; while Gun No. 12,748 of Battery D, 104th Field Artillery, led in its regiment with 3,834 rounds.

Gun No. 3,010, 106th Field Artillery, led the heavy artillery by firing 2,100 rounds.

The service of the 52d Field Artillery Brigade was frequently commented upon in relation to the dependability of its fire, the discipline of its troops and the professional ability of its officers. Some of these commendations were in the form of formal communications sent to the Brigade Commander and from among them the following are culled and published:

HEADQUARTERS, 33D DIVISION

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, FRANCE

October 28, 1918.

From: Major General Geo. Bell, Jr., Commanding.

To: Brigadier General George Albert Wingate, 52d Field Artillery Brigade.

Subject: Service with 33d Division.

As the 52d Field Artillery Brigade is being relieved from duty with the 33d Division, I wish to take this occasion to express to you my appreciation for the invaluable service and assistance rendered by it.

Every request of ours you have met in a uniform, earnest and efficient manner, and your cooperation has contributed in a great measure to our success in the recent operations.

Please express to your officers and men my appreciation and sincere regret that the exigencies of the field service necessitate your separation from us at this time.

(Signed) GEO. BELL, JR.,
Major General, U. S. A.

HEADQUARTERS 158TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, FRANCE

November 14, 1918.

From: Commanding General, 158th Infantry Brigade.

To: Commanding General, 52d Field Artillery Brigade.

Subject: Conduct of Artillery.

I desire to express to you, and through you to the officers of the 105th Regiment of Field Artillery, my appreciation of the services rendered by this regiment since the beginning of the operations November 2d last. At all times they have worked in the closest cooperation with my brigade, and have performed the duties assigned them most efficiently and effectively, assisting very largely in such measure of success as I may have gained.

I may add not only this regiment, but where called upon the heavy artillery worked, I found, also very effectively, and I desire to record my appreciation of the assistance rendered.

(Signed) EVAN M. JOHNSON,
Brigadier General.

HEADQUARTERS 157TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, FRANCE

November 15, 1918.

From: Commanding General, 157th Infantry Brigade.

To: Commanding General, 52d Field Artillery Brigade.

Subject: Artillery Support.

1. It is my pleasure to take this opportunity of communicating to you the opinions of all members of this Command regarding the support and cooperation of the 104th Field Artillery and that portion of the 106th Field Artillery assigned for the support of this brigade during the recent operations prior to the cessation of hostilities.



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Colonel DeWitt C. Weld, commanding 105th Field Artillery

2. The service rendered by the above mentioned units from the start commanded the thorough confidence of all members of this Command and by the efficiency of their work and the effect of their fire supported all ranks and assisted materially in maintaining a high standard of morale.

3. From my own observation and from reports and statements made by officers of my Command, the units mentioned above proved themselves to be the best supporting artillery which has been associated with us. Their fire has been the most accurate, their action upon request the most prompt, their means of communication with us the most complete and continuous and their cooperation by moving forward with our infantry, the best that has been our fortune to encounter.

4. I trust that you will convey the thanks and appreciation of myself and of members of this Command to the officers and men of the 104th Field Artillery and the battalion of the 106th Field Artillery above indicated, for their splendid services.

(Signed) W. J. NICHOLSON,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

HEADQUARTERS 79TH DIVISION

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, FRANCE

November 18, 1918.

From: Commanding General.

To: Brigadier General George A. Wingate, 52d Field Artillery Brigade.

Subject: Commendation.

I desire to record my appreciation of the manner in which you and your brigade have functioned in support of the 79th Division. During the recent operations north

of Verdun October 30th to November 11th, inclusive, your brigade was called upon many times for artillery support, and frequently the aid desired made it necessary for you to employ the full resources and capacity of your brigade. You, your officers and men have always responded to the call of the infantry with the utmost cheerfulness and enthusiasm and our artillery support has been all that could be desired.

I beg that you will extend to your officers and men the sincere thanks of myself and of the division as a whole for their hearty and whole-hearted cooperation.

(Signed) JOSEPH E. KUHN,
Major General, U. S. A.

CHAPTER XXIII

EXPERIENCES OF MEN TAKEN PRISONER



HILE the 27th Division captured approximately 3,000 German officers and soldiers, it lost to the enemy but 200 prisoners throughout the period of its service. Most of the men of the 27th Division who fell into the hands of the Germans were wounded at the time of their capture and in most cases were taken during counter-attacks.

After the division had settled down in the Le Mans area, most of those who had been taken prisoner were repatriated and returned to the division. Others, too badly wounded to render military service, were returned direct to the United States. In order to have a record of the circumstances affecting their capture and subsequent experiences, the men, upon their return to the division, were required to make out and sign a statement giving the following information:

(a) Date, place and particular circumstances of capture.
(b) Approximate time of the day.
(c) Was the soldier captured wounded? If so, to what extent? If not, why did he surrender?
(d) Movements in detail for the remainder of the day. This should include where sent; if questioned, by whom, when, where and nature of questions.
(e) By what forces captured, giving regiment and division, if possible.
(f) Treatment in relation to intimidation, if any, and food provided. If wounded, character and extent of medical treatment.
(g) Brief statement of subsequent movements of the prisoner after the first day; where confined, whether required to work, character of work, how fed and whether or not escaped.
(h) Any comments or statements having military value in addition to the foregoing.

A résumé of the more interesting of these statements will be given in this chapter.

Private First Class Thomas Burton, of Company A, 106th Infantry, and Private Bartolomeo Cuneo, of Company C of the same regiment, were both wounded at Quennemont Farm on September 27th in the attack on the outworks of the Hindenburg Line. The former took refuge in a shell hole at the extreme front and shortly before dusk was evacuated by German stretcher bearers. The latter named soldier was wounded by shell fragments and lay all night near the enemy lines, where he was found and evacuated by German soldiers at 8 o'clock on the morning of the following day. These soldiers report that they were passed through an aid station, where their own first aid packets were removed and fresh paper bandages applied. The first named prisoner was captured by the 27th German Infantry Regiment. Both prisoners reported that their

treatment was satisfactory. They were sent to hospital at Le Cateau, from which place they were finally sent to Giesen, where they were confined until after the Armistice, when they were sent to Metz and taken in charge by French authorities. These men reported that a number of German enlisted men seemed to think the American soldiers were really Englishmen in American uniforms and that the U-boats were accounting for a great number of ships engaged in the transportation of American soldiers to France.

On September 27th, Corporal Alfred Knudsen, Corporal Theodore Schermuhly, Private Joseph Manzione and Private Philip Wendell, all of Company A, 106th Infantry, having reached Quennemont Farm and secured a lodgment in a German communication trench, became separated from the remainder of their platoon. Corporal Knudsen was wounded. Others of the party were dressing the wounds of Sergeant Sullivan of the same company, whose right leg had been blown off by a piece of shell, when they were surrounded by a large number of German troops and compelled to surrender.

Corporal Christian Faaland and Private Edwin Dwyer of the same company gained the enemy trench east of Quennemont Farm. Two of their companions, Privates Anaroma and O'Connor, had been badly wounded and left in a shell hole. When night came on the two men first named sought to connect up with others of their command and to secure relief for the two wounded men. In the effort to do this at night, they got into a trench which was filled with enemy soldiers and found themselves surrounded.

On the same day, Corporal Lester Harris, with Privates William O'Donnell and William Zorn of the same company, held a shell hole at the edge of Quennemont Farm throughout the day. At nightfall an enemy party crept up and captured them.

On the same day, at the same place, Private Clarence Owen of the same company lay badly wounded in a shell hole. After dusk he was evacuated by German troops.

All of the foregoing soldiers were interrogated at German Divisional Headquarters in relation to the strength of their regiment, how long they had been in France and the location of other units of the division. All stated that they refused to answer questions, except those affecting their names and organizations. All reported that the Germans accorded them as good treatment as could be expected. All except Corporal Knudsen were sent to Le Quesnoy, where they remained for six days, thence by stages to Dulman in Germany, where they were kept until after the Armistice. After this they were sent to Rotterdam, Holland, from whence they were returned to the division via Hull, London and Winchester, England. While prisoners these men were not compelled to work. At places where they were detained, work by prisoners seemed to be voluntary, some of it being in military cemeteries and the rest in railroad yards. All complained of the food to a German Sergeant Major, who informed them that the German authorities were doing the best they could and that the

Germans themselves were faring no better than the prisoners. Corporal Faaland and Corporal Schermuhly, both of whom spoke German, reported that their German guards informed them that if the war did not end soon there would be an uprising in Germany. These guards also informed them that most of the army realized that the U-boat warfare had been a failure and that America had larger numbers of men in France than the German authorities admitted.

It might be mentioned here in connection with all statements made by our men that they seemed greatly impressed by the fact that the German intelligence officers who questioned them were able to tell them the units composing the division, names of commanding officers, and the previous service of the division, all of which was given to them by the German officers during the progress of their examination and in order to impress them with the completeness of their intelligence system. The men did not seem to appreciate that similar information concerning German units was in the hands of our intelligence officers when questioning German prisoners.

Private Peter Pfeifer of Company G, 106th Infantry, having with the corporal of his squad reached the objective line east of Guillemont Farm, found himself out of touch with the survivors of the platoon, and deciding that his command had passed further to the east, moved on with a view to locating them. Passing into another trench beyond the objective, the two men found themselves engaged with a large number of enemy soldiers. This was at 9 o'clock on the morning of September 27th. The Corporal was killed and the above-named soldier was taken prisoner. He was compelled to carry wounded enemy soldiers to an aid station for some time, after which he was evacuated to the rear, finally reaching the town of Coudry. There he was interrogated by a German intelligence officer, who told him the usual information at hand concerning his division and its units. He was given military postal cards to send to his home to notify his people of his capture. After being a prisoner for about two weeks, he escaped from the prison cage accompanied by another American and a Canadian of the Tank Corps. They were at liberty for about four days, traveling by night and living on raw vegetables gathered from fields along their route. They reached the town of Le Cateau, where they went into a machine shop and fell asleep. There they were discovered by a party of German soldiers. They reported that these soldiers were kindly disposed and were pointing out the proper road to take when an officer approached and directed their arrest. One of the German soldiers, who was called by the others "Professor Schultz" and who spoke excellent English, asked them several questions. Learning that they had escaped, he informed them that he would tell the officer that they, the prisoners, had just been captured and were on their way back from the lines rather than toward the lines. This was in order that they might escape punishment for their absence. They remained for six days in custody of the company to which these German soldiers belonged and during this time learned that the members of the company were for the most part extremely bitter against the Kaiser, the Crown Prince and the German military authorities gen-

erally. At the end of six days they were sent to a prison camp near the town of Gossieles. There they found a considerable number of French prisoners. After being at the latter place for about a week, Private Pfeifer, accompanied by the same Canadian and a French prisoner who spoke English, forced a window of their hut and, making their way through the barbed wire fence, escaped. Although the guard detected them at the last moment and fired four shots at them, none took effect. After traveling about four kilometers, they were secreted by a French family and later, at the time of the Armistice, succeeded in reaching a camp of New Zealand troops near Cambrai. Private Pfeifer was returned to the division by way of Winchester, England. He had no complaint to make of the treatment accorded him while a prisoner in the hands of the Germans. While at a place near Jumet, Belgium, about the time of the Armistice, he saw a German soldier step up to an officer and remove the officer's insignia of rank, telling him that he would have no further use for it. All German troops, he observed, seemed glad the war was over and they cheered lustily as they passed through the towns.

Privates Karl G. Kampf, Irving Fuchs, Stephen Trzceak and Elmer W. Ross, of Company K, Private Andrew Marrone of Company I, Corporal Hugh Devine, Privates Kenneth Teator, Thomas Fusco, Frank C. Hlavac, and Archibald C. Schoomacker, all of Company M, 106th Infantry, most of them wounded, were taken prisoners at the Knoll on September 27th and 28th. They reported that their captors belonged to the 27th and 84th German Infantry Regiments. They had no complaint to make concerning the treatment accorded them.

Sergeant William O'Connell of Company L, 106th Infantry, was wounded on September 27th while at the Knoll. He remained, however, with his command, but later was compelled to seek refuge in a shell hole from enemy machine-gun fire. At 9 o'clock on the morning of the 28th he was evacuated by enemy soldiers. Although wounded by shrapnel and shell fragments, he, with Corporal Charles Schwartz of Company L, was compelled to aid in carrying wounded to the rear. His own wounds, however, had been painted with iodine and dressed.

Corporal Edward Dilmeier of Company K was hit by a string of machine-gun bullets in the hip, groin and foot while at the Knoll. He was evacuated by enemy soldiers and after his wounds were dressed was compelled to walk most of the night to Le Cateau. He considers his treatment as good as could be expected. At Le Cateau he received an anti-tetanus injection and was then removed by ambulance to Meschede, where he was placed in a hospital. After the Armistice he was repatriated through the German camp at Geisen, on November 24th.

Corporal William Grace of Company I was badly wounded at the Knoll on September 27th. He took refuge in a shell hole and at 7:30 P. M. was evacuated by enemy soldiers. His captors could not find their aid station, and it was 3 A. M. on September 28th before his wounds were dressed with paper bandages. He was then sent to Le Cateau. Several of these soldiers reported that while at Le Quesnoy a leaflet was circulated

among the French prisoners containing what purported to be a speech made in the Reichstag by a socialist member. The speech contained a prediction that Germany and France would soon be sister republics. The speech was supposed to have been delivered a week before the Armistice. Most of the prisoners above named reported that behind the German lines numbers of German soldiers had informed them that they realized that they had been deceived by their leaders. In contrast with this, they commented on the attitude of German officers who claimed that the German army was unbeatable. Many Germans made inquiries concerning the treatment accorded German prisoners by the Americans.

Sergeant Morton Brown of Company D, 106th Infantry, reported that on September 27th, while taking part in the attack on Quennemont Farm, he became entangled in enemy barbed wire, and that, having extricated himself, he ran and caught up with his platoon at the parapet of a German trench in time to take part in the mopping up. Having accomplished this, the party then advanced to a small copse a hundred or more yards beyond the trench, where he with two other members of his command became separated from the others. Stopping to give aid to a seriously wounded man of Company C who was lying in a shell hole, they were suddenly attacked by enemy soldiers with "potato masher" bombs and compelled to surrender. It appeared from the statement of this soldier that his rifle had been broken at the small of the stock and consequently he was not able, having expended his grenades, to repel this attack. He reports the food received while a prisoner to have been very poor.

Sergeant James F. Early of Company C, 106th Infantry, reported that on September 27 at Quennemont Farm he was one of a small party of men under Lieutenants Malloy and Ryan. The enemy counter-attacked. Sergeant Early's party was outnumbered about twenty to one. Two men, one of whom was Private James D. Winne of the same company, were designated to cover the retirement of the party. During this retirement Lieutenant Malloy was killed and Lieutenant Ryan wounded. At 9 P. M. the Sergeant, while in a shell hole, was taken prisoner. He later escaped with Private Pfeifer, whose experience has already been related.

Private John T. Ryan of Company H of the same regiment was captured beyond Guillemont Farm on September 30th. He was one of the provisional battalion of the 106th Infantry assigned to mop up behind the 107th Infantry in the attack of September 29th. While being marched to the rear he made his escape in the darkness. He had been relieved of his steel helmet and had been given a civilian cap. He walked the rest of the night and arrived at Nivelles, where he attached himself to some French refugees who were traveling toward Brussels. He had succeeded in disguising himself and reached Brussels safely. A Belgian photographer, who spoke English, took him to his home and gave him food. A brother of the photographer was a member of the police force of Brussels. Through him Private Ryan, with two English civilians, were given a room in a schoolhouse. He reported that twice the Germans searched the place without finding them. On the 10th of November German

troops stationed in Brussels appeared on the streets and tore the insignia of rank from the clothing of their officers. They waved red flags.

Private Fred C. Becker of Company M, 106th Infantry, was captured at the Knoll. This soldier reported that he spoke German fluently; that at the first station to which he was sent a German officer attempted to intimidate him, but that at other places the treatment accorded him was satisfactory. While a prisoner, Private Becker conversed with several German officers, one of whom told him that it was not the German army that had failed, but that the civilian population had lost its morale because of shortage of food. Another officer, the day following the Armistice, asked him when he thought the United States would begin to send food to Germany. He reported that soap was almost impossible to get and that the civilians frequently stole grease from the car axles in the railroad yards. The civilians generally looked undernourished and were dissatisfied with conditions. Private Becker, as well as other prisoners, commented favorably upon the excellent work done on behalf of prisoners by the American Red Cross.

Private Edward McGarry of Company C, 106th Infantry, reported that on September 27th, while at Guillemont Farm, he was struck in the hip with a machine-gun bullet and shortly afterward, while attempting to crawl after his comrades, was again struck in the nose and cheek by rifle bullets. He then became unconscious and the following day was picked up and evacuated by enemy soldiers. He reported that he was treated as well as could be expected under the circumstances. He was in the hospital during the entire period of his experience as a prisoner.

Corporal Edwin J. Kramer of Company E, 106th Infantry, was captured at 9:30 in the morning of September 27th at Guillemont Farm by a party of enemy soldiers while he was lying wounded in a shell hole. While being evacuated he was struck twice by fragments of shells, once in the arm and once in the leg. He was taken to a hospital at Marlincourt, where he was given black bread covered with unpalatable soup. He states he has no criticism to make of the treatment accorded him.

Private Leonard L. Lamphorn of Company A, 108th Infantry, was taken prisoner at 9:30 A. M., August 8th, in front of Mt. Kemmel, Belgium. With two other American soldiers and two British soldiers, he was at a listening post 150 yards in advance of our line. The duty of these men was to observe the front constantly between darkness and dawn. Shortly before dawn they retired to a shell hole behind the listening post and fell asleep. At 9:30 A. M. they were awakened by six German soldiers and taken prisoner. The treatment accorded them was satisfactory. They were sent to a prison camp at Cartrig, Belgium. Private Lamphorn was repatriated by way of Switzerland, rejoining the division December 28th.

Private First Class Arthur F. Hall, of Company M, 108th Infantry, was taken prisoner September 29th in an enemy counter-attack. He reports that while a prisoner he was twice beaten with the butt of a rifle and with sticks for accepting food from Belgian civilians while passing their towns en route to the rear.

Corporals J. E. Applin and F. D. Mosher of Company L, 108th Infantry, were captured on October 13th near St. Souplet. The company at the time was digging in. The two corporals had advanced about fifty yards beyond the company and were looking about when they were suddenly covered by the rifles of three German soldiers. They were marched to Marburg and placed in a prison camp, where they were confined for two weeks, after which they were transferred to Namur, Belgium, where they were confined for three weeks, during which time they worked loading barges with hospital supplies. They report the food given them poor, but their treatment satisfactory.

The division lost two officers captured by the enemy. These were Captain Harry F. Sullivan, commanding Company K, 106th Infantry, and First Lieutenant Richard H. McIntyre, in command of the Stokes Mortar Platoon of the 107th Infantry. The capture of Captain Sullivan has already been mentioned. Lieutenant McIntyre, having distributed the Stokes Mortar Platoon on the morning of September 29th, joined the detachment assigned to the First Battalion shortly before the zero hour. The objective of this battalion was the open canal from the north end of the tunnel to the divisional boundary near Vendhuile. Lieutenant McIntyre followed the platoon in its advance. When the first wire was reached he waited for a tank which was immediately behind him to go through and open up the way. This was done, and he and his runner, Private William J. Cairns, had passed through the wire when the smoke screen settled on the field, obscuring visibility. The Lieutenant and his runner continued to walk in an easterly direction through the smoke without either being able to see anything. Being unable to find his Stokes mortar detachment and seeing no troops of the battalion, he turned and saw directly in front of him two Germans. One ran and disappeared in the smoke, while the other surrendered. They took shelter in a shell hole at a point reported by the Lieutenant to be immediately north of a railway running northeast and southwest across A. 9 a. Three other German soldiers then appeared, but, when hailed, ran off. The runner killed one with his rifle and wounded the others. The wounded men at once surrendered and came into the shell hole with the rest of the party. At this moment several American soldiers appeared in the smoke to the south in charge of a German guard. Private Cairns shouted to them that he would get the guard with his rifle and for them to make a fight. They called out that there were too many Germans about. The smoke then lifted somewhat and disclosed several groups of German soldiers in trenches to the west of the Lieutenant's party. Almost immediately a German machine gunner opened fire on the party from the rise in the ground to the south of them. The Lieutenant then determined upon a retreat and abandoned the German prisoners. He and Cairns had made about three hundred yards from shell hole to shell hole under fire of the German machine gunner when Cairns fell into a trench. A few moments later, being driven by enemy machine-gun fire to the protection of a shell hole, the Lieutenant was surrounded by several groups of German soldiers who forced his sur-

render. Private Cairns then appeared and asked whether the Lieutenant had surrendered. As he, too, had been surrounded, he was directed by the Lieutenant to give up. They were taken to the north end of the tunnel and from that point to Le Catelet. At Bertry the Lieutenant was placed in the guardhouse with two British tank officers, a British machine gun officer, Scotch infantry officer and two British aviators. Later the party was sent to Busigny, where they were joined by four officers of the 119th Infantry of the 30th American Division. Lieutenant McIntyre was finally sent to the American officers' camp at Villingen.

Private Edward A. Guidice of Company K, 107th Infantry, was captured near Le Catelet on September 29th. He reports that he was in company with First Sergeant Dean, Corporals Volk and Waters and Privates Gullatto and Noonan of his own company, and an unknown sergeant from some other company of the 107th Infantry. They had advanced with a Lewis gun through the enemy's lines and finally took position in a deep shell hole, where the Lewis gun was placed in action against counter-attacking groups of enemy soldiers. These attacks were stopped for a time, but eventually the party was surrounded. Hand grenades were thrown at them, one of which wounded Corporal Volk and Private Guidice. They were then taken prisoner and conducted to trenches and told to lie down because of British airplane machine-gun fire. Half an hour later they were marched to a rear headquarters and questioned. On the way to the rear a German soldier picked up a rifle and threatened to strike several members of the party. He did strike Private Noonan across the back, knocking him into a trench. Private Guidice spent six weeks in a German hospital at Acchen, after which he was sent by train to a prison camp at Giesen. He reports the hospitals dirty and the food poor.

Sergeant Herman F. Eggers of Company F, 108th Infantry, reports that on September 29th he had arrived in front of Le Catelet when he was wounded by a machine-gun bullet in the right leg. Several German soldiers then took him prisoner, and he reports that, knowing that the Australians were to pass through the 107th Infantry, he made an effort to keep his captors with him in the shell hole where he was lying for as long a time as possible. He succeeded in holding them until 11:30 A. M. He reports that while lying in this shell hole he saw an American soldier advance alone, firing a Lewis gun. When his ammunition was expended he was abused for about fifteen minutes by German soldiers and then killed. The sergeant was evacuated to Bohain and thence to Le Cateau and thereafter to Meschede and finally to Giesen. He reports all prisoners had highest praise for the American Red Cross, and that from his observations the treatment accorded American prisoners of war by the Germans was all that could be expected under the circumstances. He makes exception in the case of prisoners sent out to work. These were sometimes badly treated.

Sergeant Henry Schurrman, Company C, 105th Infantry, was captured on October 17th at Auber de Guise, while making a reconnaissance in front of his company. He was cut off by enemy patrols and was captured by several German officers. He escaped from confinement October

22d by cutting the wire surrounding the prison camp with a file. He walked in a westerly direction a distance estimated by him to be about thirty miles, guided by the North Star and the sound of the guns. Sergeant Schurrman succeeded in slipping through the enemy lines into the lines of the 66th French Division, from which organization he was returned to the division.

Corporal Joseph M. Cahill, Company G, 105th Infantry, was wounded during the fighting for the possession of Arbre Guernon on October 17th. He was taken prisoner and carried back to North Chimney. This place was captured by troops of the 27th Division the next day and Corporal Cahill was found resting in a billet. He states that his wounds were dressed and food was given him by the enemy.

On the morning of September 27th several men of Company M, of the 105th Infantry, were captured in the vicinity of Crellin Avenue Trench. They had fought their way across several lines of enemy trenches, at the last of which Lieutenant Turner and two of the remaining men of the company were killed. Privates Manning, Reich, Story and Zirt, who constituted the survivors of the platoon, reached the last trench. They were surrounded and compelled to surrender. They report that some of their captors appeared to have been drinking heavily. They were threatening to shoot them when an officer arrived and had them sent to the rear. They were confined several days at Codrie, from whence they were taken to Le Quesnoy and later to Figenes and La Roco, and then through Dulman, Westphalia. They were repatriated through Holland.

Privates First Class John S. Crawford and Delmer D. Carpenter, 102d Field Signal Battalion, were taken prisoner September 27th. They were evacuated, but on October 14th succeeded in making their escape. In an effort to get back to the division through Jeumont, Belgium, they traveled by night for four nights, living on raw vegetables. They became so hungry that they determined to risk a raid on a German wagon train encampment in an apple orchard. They were investigating one of the wagons for food when the German sentry called upon them to surrender. In the fight that followed Carpenter was shot in the chest and killed. Subsequent shots fired at Crawford missed him. This soldier later sought shelter in an abandoned barn and fell asleep. About 4 o'clock in the afternoon he was awakened by being shaken by a group of German soldiers. They took him to a hospital at Norrell, where his feet were attended to by a German doctor who spoke English very well. He apprised him of Carpenter's death. After being four days in the hospital, he was sent back to the prison camp at Floures from which he had previously escaped. After the Armistice he escaped a second time and successfully reached Brussels, from where he was returned to the division.

Privates George Nash and James F. Sheehan of Company D, 102d Engineers, were captured while unarmed and acting as stretcher bearers on September 27th, the enemy employing them as stretcher bearers. They report the food very poor, but state they got a fair share. They record the treatment received as good as could be expected.

CHAPTER XXIV

USE OF THE BOMB AND BAYONET



HE reader will remember that between 1914 and our entry into the war, and even thereafter, the accounts of battles and engagements which appeared in the public press were replete with stories of the great numbers killed by the bayonet. No newspaper description of a battle was deemed interesting unless the headline announced: "TAKEN AT THE POINT OF THE BAYONET."

Shortly after the war broke out in 1914 the writer, in cooperation with Captain W. D. A. Anderson of the Regular Engineers, wrote a book, called "The Modern Army in Action." In the chapter on infantry the popular misconceptions concerning the extent to which the bayonet was used in battle were pointed out, and the bayonet was referred to as a psychological weapon. The authors were surprised, after the appearance of the book, to receive letters from several American officers taking issue with the statement concerning the small percentage of casualties in battle caused by the bayonet. These communications indicated the belief that a large percentage of casualties in the war were being caused by the bayonet. It would, therefore, seem to be a matter of interest to record in this connection the official report of our War Department concerning the character of casualties suffered by the American army in the World War:

"Of the 266,112 soldiers admitted to the hospitals of the A. E. F. from battle causes more were suffering from gas than any other cause, and more were wounded in the legs than in any other part of the body. Complete analysis follows:

Gunshot missiles	85,132	Falling objects	193
Shrapnel	40,448	Aerial bomb	150
Rifle ball	22,336	Cutting and piercing instrument	146
Shell	21,312	Airplane	88
Hand grenade	1,156	Crushing	85
Indirect result	1,133	Saber	14
Explosives	943	Other	3,901"
Pistol ball	257		
Bayonet	245		

Another list prepared shows the location of wounds and the number. All casualties from gas, except mustard gas, are classified under "thorax":

Legs	72,527	Abdomen or pelvis	10,286
Thorax (50,084) cases	67,584	Back	8,948
Arms	56,213	Neck	5,396
Head (24,251 facial injuries)	35,819	Unclassified	8,839

It will be noted that of the many thousands of casualties inflicted upon the American army but 245 were caused by the bayonet. These figures need no further comment.

After the Armistice it occurred to the writer to make inquiry among the officers and men of the 27th Division concerning their experiences with the bayonet and with the hand grenade as well. As many of the personnel of the division who had been wounded had not yet returned to the division, the inquiry was deferred until the middle of January, at which time the division was in the American Embarkation Center in the vicinity of Le Mans, France. Most of the slightly wounded had returned to the division, but unfortunately some thousands of the more seriously wounded were not available. Accordingly a bulletin was sent out to every company in the division requiring:

(a) A report from each officer or enlisted man who actually saw one or more of the enemy or one or more of our own men bayoneted in action during the present war, with the names of witnesses if they could be given.

(b) A report from each officer or enlisted man who had used grenades in action against the enemy or against whom enemy grenades had been used, or who personally witnessed such attacks, with statements of witnesses concerning the relative efficiency of our own and the enemy grenades.

A great mass of very interesting material was received in pursuance of this bulletin. The statements bore out the claim that relatively few men had been killed or wounded on either side with the bayonet. Although the division had been highly trained and were very expert in the use of the bayonet, it was their practise when coming to close quarters with the enemy to use magazine fire, while some of the attacking party threw a few hand grenades into the enemy group. In most cases, however, in these local combats at close quarters the enemy group surrendered before there was opportunity to use the bayonet in fair combat.

It is not the purpose of this chapter to indicate to the reader a belief that the bayonet is relatively valueless as a weapon, but only that its value is not to be measured by the number of actual casualties inflicted by it in battle. The statements of the officers and men of the division show that the bayonet is for the most part a psychological weapon. Men highly trained in the use of the bayonet and possessing confidence in its effectiveness will go forward under the lure of the bayonet in order to get in physical contact with the enemy. Without the bayonet the infantry would lack this lure and would be dependent solely upon fire action. But to fire the rifle with any kind of effectiveness the soldier must stop. It is well known that when men stop in battle it is very difficult to get them moving forward again. The value of the bayonet is not to be judged by the harvest of its casualties, but by the pull of its magnetic influence in getting the infantry forward to close grips with the enemy when fire action may be most effectively employed.

Some of the more interesting statements of officers and men of the division in answer to the questionnaire mentioned are given in brief:

Captain George F. Terry of Company C, 105th Infantry, reported that Sergeant Henry Schurman of his company in the assault on

Le Selle River, October 17, 1918, saw three men of the 106th Infantry with Mills bombs in their bomb carriers struck by shrapnel which caused one or more of the bombs to explode, killing the group instantly.

The Captain himself reported that on September 29th in the Battle of the Hindenburg Line he saw one of the men of another company of the 105th Infantry engage one of the enemy with the bayonet, and that after a few passes the 105th Infantry soldier drove his bayonet into the abdomen of the enemy soldier, which, however, did not cause instant death.

Private William Talbott of Company C, 105th Infantry, reported that on October 17th near St. Souplet, First Lieutenant Charles J. Doyle of his company took his rifle from him and engaged two of the enemy, who belonged to the 3d German Marines. The Lieutenant shot one and killed the other instantly with a bayonet drive through the chest.

Sergeant William Flynn of Company C reports seeing Lieutenant Harry Merz fire three rifle grenades against a sniper's post while the company was in the Dickebusch Sector in Flanders. Later investigation shows that one of the rifle grenades made a direct hit, killing the sniper. Captain Terry expressed the opinion that the Mills grenade was much better than the German potato masher in opening fighting, but that the potato masher was very effective in dugouts owing to its great concussion.

Sergeants George D. Rapport and John S. Fleming of Company G, 105th Infantry, reported numerous experiences in the Battle of the Hindenburg Line, illustrating the greater effectiveness of the Mills grenade in comparison with the German "potato masher." These Sergeants, on September 29th, with platoons of their company were in a trench thirty-five yards from the enemy. An effort was made by Lewis gun and rifle fire to run the enemy out of their trench. The latter resisted by hurling large numbers of "potato mashers," which failed to inflict many casualties. A reply was then made by throwing Mills grenades, which were so effective that the enemy was driven from the trench and the platoon enabled to advance. These men reported, "There is no doubt but that the Mills grenade has a terribly destructive effect when dropped into a section of trench or thrown into a group of men."

First Lieutenant Marvin L. Atkins of Company K, 105th Infantry, reported that on October 18, 1918, when a detachment of the 3d Battalion of his regiment, near the village of Arbre Guernon, stormed a number of machine-gun and rifle nests some hand-to-hand fighting resulted and that he saw two cases of bayoneting. Private Seward Dorvee of his company used a bayonet on a German rifleman (unit unknown), the thrust passing up the man's arm into his elbow, the result being that Dorvee was unable to remove his bayonet until the enemy soldier had been shot by another soldier of the company.

Lieutenant Atkins also reported that on the same day Private James M. Reed of his company used the "short jab" at close quarters against an enemy machine gunner, the point of the bayonet entering the throat of the enemy soldier. The point was easily withdrawn.

Captain Carl G. R. Ross of Company L, 105th Infantry, reported that

on September 27th, in the preliminary assault against the outworks of the Hindenburg Line, he personally threw about fifteen Mills grenades and that he later saw the results of their effectiveness. He also reported that nearly a dozen "potato masher" grenades were thrown at him, some five or six of which exploded within six feet of him without causing injury. He reported that his practise was to watch enemy grenades as they came through the air, so as to determine the probability of their falling in his trench. When they fell in the trench he flattened himself as much as possible against the trench wall and succeeded in avoiding injury. However, on this occasion two of his men were badly wounded in the head and on other occasions other men were slightly wounded. His conclusions concerning the relative merits of the two types of grenades are that the Mills grenade is very effective and that the enemy fears it; that the German "potato masher" is comparatively ineffective, but that it can be carried more easily and in greater numbers than the Mills.

Sergeant Arthur M. Donnelly of Company L, 105th Infantry, reported a successful hand grenade duel with an enemy soldier at close range on September 27th. He states that the German "potato masher" is not effective.

Private William G. Bennett of the same company saw a soldier of his command rush an enemy machine gunner and drive his bayonet into the man's breast, extracting it with no difficulty.

Corporal Edward O. Acker of the same company reported grenade contest at fifteen yards between his platoon and an enemy group on September 27th, resulting in the hurried retirement of the enemy.

Corporals Anthony R. Etes and George F. Lewis and Private Christy del Guidice, all of Company L, reported putting enemy machine-gun posts and patrols out of action with Mills grenades in the Dickebusch Sector. Corporal Lewis reported also that German "potato mashers" had no effect on his machine-gun post because they did not make direct hits.

Corporal George Kitsaros of the same company reported that in the open warfare operations east of the Le Selle River on October 18th he saw an enemy soldier waiting to attack him behind a tree. He engaged him and drove his bayonet into the body of the enemy soldier, but was unable to withdraw it, being compelled to disengage his rifle from the bayonet.

In the same company Sergeant Joseph J. Delaney, Corporal Patrick D. Burns and Private Peter J. Keenan reported incidents of grenade fighting, all with the general effect that the Mills grenades were most effective against the enemy and that our men did not have much respect for the enemy "potato mashers."

Captain Charles R. Whipple of Company M, 105th Infantry, reported that on September 27th Private First Class James J. Manning of his company, turning a corner of an enemy trench, came upon an enemy soldier who made a lunge at him with his bayonet. Manning, being in the "on guard" position, stopped the thrust and drove his own bayonet into the chest of the enemy soldier, the bayonet breaking off. The enemy soldier was killed almost instantly. Private Manning, on another occasion, witnessed the blowing off of roofs of shelters and dugouts and killing of

the occupants by Mills grenades. This soldier had a German "potato masher" land in the bay of the trench in which he was standing and explode, he being only slightly cut by a fragment.

Private Raymond Bennett, now deceased, of the same company, while leading a group up an enemy trench, in like manner came upon an enemy soldier in turning a corner, and overcame the latter with the bayonet.

Private Abraham Zirt of the same company on September 27th, seeing First Lieutenant William B. Turner engaged in combat with an enemy soldier and about to be attacked by another, drove his bayonet into the latter. He reported using Mills grenades in cleaning out dugouts and shelters, with the result that the destruction of the dugout was almost complete. He saw Lieutenant Turner wounded slightly on two occasions by German "potato mashers" falling near him.

Private John V. J. Storey of Company M saw Private Edward S. Connelly of his company, now deceased, suddenly come upon a German soldier in a shell hole. The latter raised his rifle to fire at Connelly, who rushed him with the bayonet and successfully overcame him.

Most of these and other incidents on the date mentioned were combats between men of the 105th and 106th Infantry and German troops of the 27th Prussian Guards regiment.

Corporal Leo F. White of Company M reported that his party threw Mills grenades into an enemy dugout containing about ten enemy soldiers, with the result that all but two were wounded.

Corporal Percil E. Corbin of the same company reported a shell hole grenade contest with two enemy soldiers, resulting in the killing of one and the escape of the other slightly wounded.

Captain Whipple in his report gave it as his opinion that the German "potato masher" can be thrown farther than the Mills grenade, although not as effectively.

Second Lieutenant Harold G. DeLoiselle of Headquarters Company, 106th Infantry, reported that on September 29th, in the attack on the Hindenburg Line, he witnessed an encounter between our infantry and German troops in the vicinity of Guillemont Farm. In one instance an American soldier (name unknown) charged a German soldier with the bayonet with such force that he practically threw himself into the enemy trench. The bayonet went through the enemy soldier, pinning his body to the side of the trench, while the butt of the rifle became wedged in the opposite side. The soldier, not being able to extricate the weapon, seized another and continued down the trench.

Lieutenant DeLoiselle reported that on the same day about 200 yards further on in the same trench, while leading a group of 106th Infantry men, he came upon two German soldiers guarding a turn in the trench. The first had his bayonet ready for use and lunged at the Lieutenant, letting go the left hand and extending the right so as to drive the bayonet far forward. The bayonet went between the left arm and the body of Lieutenant DeLoiselle, without causing more serious injury than a bruise on the arm. While the German soldier was pulling back his rifle for another

lunge, he was struck on the head with the butt of a rifle by an Australian soldier in the Lieutenant's party, and still showing fight, was bayoneted by an American soldier who came from behind the Lieutenant.

Lieutenant DeLoiselle also reported that on September 27th, during the attack of his regiment against the outworks of the Hindenburg Line, he was making a reconnaissance in the vicinity of Guillemont Farm, his party consisting of First Lieutenant Franklin J. Jackson and Private Christian Johnson of the 106th Infantry. When well within the enemy trench system they came to a fork, Lieutenant DeLoiselle going to the left and Lieutenant Jackson to the right. The former encountered none of the enemy; the latter, after going about 200 yards, met an enemy party and was killed. Private Johnson, who had been left in reserve at the fork, reported to Lieutenant DeLoiselle that they were being surrounded, whereupon the Lieutenant ordered Private Johnson to return and make report, while he himself hid behind a traverse to await developments with six grenades. In a few minutes an enemy party was seen coming cautiously down the trench. Lieutenant DeLoiselle pulled the pin from one grenade and threw it. It landed in the trench behind the leading member of the enemy party. A terrific explosion followed. The leading enemy soldier was blown about three feet forward and instantly killed. The effect on the remainder of the party could not be seen, but those uninjured fled. The Lieutenant then found that he had been outflanked by other enemy groups who threw "potato mashers" at him. Three exploded within five yards of where he was standing without inflicting injury. The Lieutenant succeeded in escaping through a drain to shell holes, where he lay for some time observing the Germans ineffectively throwing grenades at the place where he had been.

Private Edward J. Dougherty of Company L, 106th Infantry, reported that on September 27th, near Guillemont Farm, his platoon being held up by an enemy machine-gun nest, the party was ordered to bomb it out. With the third bomb fire ceased and the group advanced. After reaching their objective he was wounded and while being evacuated was attacked by a small enemy group in a shell hole, the group using "potato mashers." Their fire was returned by throwing Mills grenades, with the result that the enemy party were put of action.

Private James Lohman of Company L, 106th Infantry, reported that on August 31st, in the Dickebusch Sector in Flanders, Second Lieutenant Ira A. Hodes ordered Sergeant John F. Schnepf of his company with a patrol to silence an enemy machine gunner who was hindering the advance of the company. After advancing about 100 yards with two men on the right, two in the center and two on the left, the enemy machine gun was located in a heavy brush about 200 yards in front. An effort was made to silence the machine gun with rifle fire, but without effect. Sergeant Schnepf then determined to advance under cover of the rifle fire of the group. In this way about 175 yards were gained, when one of the party got within bombing distance. Six grenades were thrown, after which the

place was rushed and the enemy gunner found with one leg torn off. He died while the party was there.

Private Francis Esposito of Company L reported that on August 31st in the Dickebusch Sector, after ineffective efforts to drive an enemy party from a trench by Lewis gun and rifle fire, they attacked with grenades, killing six, wounding six and causing the remainder to retire.

Similar incidents were reported by Private Frederick Koelsch and others of the same company.

Private Joseph F. Farrell of the same company reported that in the attack on the outworks of the Hindenburg Line, September 27th, his company, having reached its objective on The Knoll, came under fire of three enemy soldiers in a shell hole not more than ten yards distant. Corporal Peter A. Anderson endeavored by rifle fire to drive out the enemy party, but without success. Private Farrell then threw one Mills grenade, which killed all three of the enemy group.

Private Leo V. Lanning of the same company reported that in the attack on The Knoll, September 27th, all machine-gun nests encountered by his platoon were mopped up; that when the objective trenches were taken the men loaded up with enemy "potato mashers" to replace bombs they had expended. The enemy counter-attacked, and forced his company to retire from the captured position. He with Private Harold Smalley, while retiring, saw two enemy machine-gun nests which had evidently been passed over in the advance, firing at their comrades in the trench just taken. They fell into a shell hole close by and threw grenades into both nests with such good effect that both machine-gun crews were killed or wounded. The grenades thrown were both Mills and "potato mashers" and the report does not indicate which caused the more damage in this instance.

Private Joseph E. Ferris, also of Company L, reported that on the afternoon of August 31st, during the commencement of the Battle of Vierstraat Ridge, Belgium, his company was stopped twenty-five or thirty yards from the objective trench by enemy fire. Lewis gun and rifle fire being ineffective against the enemy position, the command was ordered to bomb it out. Bombs were successfully thrown with effective results, many of the enemy rushing from the trench to fall victims of Lewis gun and rifle fire.

Private William J. Moran of the same company reported that in the attack on The Knoll an enemy soldier came out of a dugout with a dagger and attacked. The dagger thrust was parried with the bayonet and the enemy soldier then bayoneted through the arm. A moment later he was shot. Private Moran also reports that on the same day his platoon found it difficult to use rifle and Lewis gun effectively and resorted to bombs; that the bombs carried by his platoon were soon expended and that they resorted to the German "potato mashers," of which there was plentiful supply in the enemy trenches. He also reported that many of the "potato mashers" thrown at his platoon were picked up and thrown back at the

enemy before they went off. He also reported that many "potato mashers" thrown at his platoon failed to explode.

Private Lester Tarling of the same company reported that in the attack on The Knoll on September 27th he saw a party of about twelve men of Company I of his regiment attacked by twenty or twenty-five enemy soldiers. The attack lasted a few moments and resulted in the killing of six or seven of the enemy with the bayonet and the capture of the remainder. He also reported that on September 29th, near Bony, he threw bombs at several enemy machine-gun emplacements, putting two of them out of action.

Sergeants Chester A. Hendrickson and Carl Barth with Privates Gerald P. Donnelly and Wesley Witherington of Company L, 106th Infantry, in the attack on The Knoll on September 27th, reported that when they reached the sunken road about ten or fifteen of the enemy in a trench twenty yards in their front were firing heavily upon them; that the enemy had clear fire superiority and that thereupon Sergeant Hendrickson directed the use of bombs. The party then effectively bombed the enemy, causing a cessation of fire and the advance of the party to the enemy's position.

Sergeant William Moncrief of the same company reported that on September 2d in the Dickebusch Sector he approached to within fifteen or twenty yards of an enemy machine-gun nest by crawling and threw in Mills grenades which silenced the enemy machine guns. He states that it would have been impossible to reach these effectively by either rifle or machine-gun fire.

Private First Class William H. Anderson of Company L, 106th Infantry, reported that in the Dickebusch Sector in Flanders on August 26th an effort was made to locate and destroy an enemy sniper, who had bothered the platoon for some time. Corporal Peter A. Anderson and Private John J. Brady of the same company, having located the flash of the sniper's rifle forty-five or fifty yards distant, took a few bombs and successfully crawled to bombing distance, one of them succeeded with Mills grenades in destroying the sniper.

Private Edward A. Reilly of the same company reported that in the attack on The Knoll on September 27th he saw a Sergeant of Company F of his regiment (name unknown) attacked by an enemy soldier with a bayonet while the Sergeant was passing a dugout. Continuing the report, Private Reilly, referring to the enemy soldier, says: "His form was poor and it took but a moment for the Sergeant to run him through."

Private Walter C. Ferris of the same company, one of a mopping-up party following the assaulting troops in the attack against the Hindenburg Line, September 29th, reported the effective use of Mills grenades thrown into dugouts as enemy groups attempted to emerge after the assaulting waves had passed on.

Sergeant Edward F. Duffy of the same company reported seeing a soldier of his company in a bayonet fight with an enemy soldier in one

of the trenches of The Knoll. The fight resulted in the killing of the German soldier.

Private George Wetlick of the same company reported that on October 1st he was selected with a Sergeant and six other men to form a combat patrol to go into Joncquiere Farm. There was a patrol on the right and another on the left. They encountered an enemy machine gun in a shell hole which was causing some trouble. While his patrol engaged the enemy gun from the front the other two patrols executed a flanking movement, encircling the shell hole and bombing it out with Mills grenades, killing and wounding the crew.

Privates Frank Fairechie, Salvatore Striano and Matthew McNamara all reported the effective use of Mills grenades in the Dickebusch Sector on August 31st and September 1st under varying conditions.

Private John Jenkins of Company A, 106th Infantry, reported that on September 29th, while mopping up for the assaulting line, he in company with Corporal Tilford L. Larsen, now deceased, and Privates Frank O'Brien and Alexander M. Wulff of his company, attacked two enemy machine guns in a nest. They got to within bombing distance and threw in all eight Mills grenades. Hands appeared waving over one of the guns. The other continued to fire. Private Jenkins reports three of the enemy killed with the bayonet. The others, badly mangled by the bombs, expired in the position. Private Jenkins gives as his opinion that "German 'potato mashers' were a joke."

Private Abraham Brenner of the same company reported that, having been wounded in the ankle by a German "potato masher" in one of the enemy counter-attacks of September 27th, he was taken prisoner. At the time he had four Mills grenades on his person and his captors made him throw them over the parapet, as they apparently feared to handle them.

Private Arthur F. Messner, also of Company A, 106th Infantry, reported that in the attack of September 27th on the outworks of the Hindenburg Line he became separated from his company in the heavy smoke screen, and getting into a battered enemy trench was shortly joined by two other soldiers not of his own company. Almost immediately they were attacked by German "potato mashers," which they could see coming through the air. They replied by throwing their Mills grenades in the direction of the enemy position. With the explosion of one of them they heard a cry and saw a German helmet fly in the air. This stopped the enemy bombing attack. Corporal Messner further reports meeting men of his regiment who had been slightly wounded by splinters from the handle of the German "potato mashers." In concluding his report, the Corporal states: "The German bombers, it seemed to me, travel in teams of four, the 'mashers' being passed from the rear to the throwers in front."

Corporal Augustine Brophy of the same company reported that in the attack of September 27th against the outer defense of the Hindenburg Line and about halfway to the objective, he and Corporal Larsen, now deceased, saw an American soldier (name unknown) throw a Mills grenade at a

group of seven Germans in a prepared shell hole. Four of the enemy were killed by the grenade and the others taken prisoner. Corporal Brophy considered the German "potato masher" ineffective. He says: "The German bomb, the 'potato masher,' was almost worthless. Several were thrown at me, exploded, but did no harm. The noise they made was all that seemed to cause any discomfort to the person they were thrown at. * * * I observed that the Mills grenade played the chief part, both as a defensive and offensive weapon. * * * The bayonet played a minor part all the way through. I never saw it used at all."

Private James M. Cleary of the same company reported that in the attack of September 27th he was wounded in the head by shrapnel during the attack, and crawled to a German trench where, finding a dugout that had been used as an aid station, he entered it. There were two bunks to this dugout. He sat on one and dressed his head. The trench in which the dugout was located was very low, having been battered by our artillery. He remained in the dugout until the early morning of September 28th, when, weak from loss of blood, he tried to leave the shelter. A German machine gunner saw him and fired a string of bullets at the mouth of the shelter. He remained inside until the following day, when he left the trench and saw the German machine gunner shooting in the direction of the right flank of the old line of his regiment. As the gunner's attention was directed away from him, he succeeded in creeping to within fifteen yards and throwing two grenades. After waiting some time he crawled to the gunner's position and saw that his right shoulder had been ripped off and the machine gun damaged. He states: "I noticed he was strapped to his gun by a belt, which was attached to his waist and to the gun. He had been sitting on a box."

As to this latter statement, it will be remembered that reports had appeared in the allied newspapers that German machine gunners had been found chained or strapped to their positions. Of course, no such thing happened. What Private Cleary saw was a belt employed by many of the German machine gunners to aid in carrying the gun when going to or retiring from position.

Captain Ames T. Brown, commanding Company C of the 106th Infantry, reported that no member of his company would state that he had participated in or seen a man bayoneted or a hand grenade thrown.

Captain Matthew J. Wilson of Company D, 106th Infantry, reports that in the attack on Guillemont Farm on September 27th the men of his company in a number of instances used the bayonet, and that always they seemed superior to the Germans in its use. In relation to grenades, he reported that there were numbers of occasions in his company when his men quickly seized "potato mashers" thrown at them and succeeded before they exploded in throwing them back at the enemy. His view confirms that of others that the Mills grenade was infinitely superior to the German "potato masher" grenade.

Sergeant Francis J. Farrelly confirms his Captain's views and reports further that in the attack of September 27th he with Private Thomas F.

Hamilton engaged two enemy soldiers in the second line of their trenches. Sergeant Farrelly shot one with his automatic pistol and his magazine being empty, was attacked by the other with the bayonet, whereupon Private Hamilton jumped from behind him and engaged in a bayonet duel with the enemy soldier, the result of which was that the latter was disposed of by the use of the "long thrust."

Sergeant George J. Parker of the same company reported that on September 27th Private Joseph A. Clarke of his company fought a bayonet duel with an enemy soldier in the bay of a trench, Clarke quickly being the victor. The Sergeant states, "By use of the 'short thrust' while closing in after the German's inferior attack, Private Clarke several times demonstrated the superiority of our method of use of the bayonet." He also reports: "I have seen many times the Mills grenade used as against German 'potato mashers.' In every case I recall that the Mills grenade was very effective, the German grenades being of no value to the enemy unless a direct hit was obtained. The Mills grenade is of certain effect in clearing any dugouts or trenches suspected of containing the enemy."

Corporal Kling M. Nelson of Company E, 106th Infantry, reported that on August 5th, in the Dickebusch Sector, Belgium, a German "potato masher" exploded three feet in front of the parapet of his trench and that a fragment one-half inch square penetrated the steel helmet of a soldier of his company, inflicting a slight scalp wound, while another soldier sitting on the fire step was uninjured.

Sergeant Patrick Leddy of the same company reported that in the Dickebusch Sector an enemy raiding party approached within twenty-five yards of his trench, when they were driven back by one Mills hand grenade, which exploded in their front.

Sergeant James J. Kerrigan and Corporal Michael V. O'Rourke of the same company report that in the attack of September 27th German "potato mashers" thrown at thirty yards struck within a few feet of their group of five men without causing injury, and that shortly thereafter they threw Mills grenades at the same distance, killing one of an enemy party and resulting in the capture of the rest.

Private Matthew Kerr of the same company reported seeing a German "potato masher" thrown at thirty yards at three soldiers of his company in a shell hole. One of them was fatally wounded. He further reports that a Mills grenade thrown at the same distance resulted in several German helmets flying into the air and the apparent complete demoralization of the occupants of the trench.

Corporal Thomas P. Callow of the same company in the Battle of the Hindenburg Line on September 29th saw a German officer refuse to surrender to a soldier of his regiment, who thereupon killed him with the bayonet. The same corporal reports seeing the survivors of one of the platoons of his company maintain a grenade duel with an enemy detachment for a considerable period of time, after which the enemy position was assaulted and captured. Ten dead and dying German soldiers were found with two uninjured, who were taken prisoners.

Mechanic Sarkis T. Attarian of the same company on September 29th saw a group of six soldiers of his company stopped by enemy machine-gun fire from a shell hole. These soldiers crawled fifteen yards to a mound and from there threw one Mills grenade into the machine-gun nest, which was then captured, two dead enemy soldiers being found there. This soldier also saw an unknown soldier of Company F of his regiment throw a Mills grenade into an enemy shell hole, killing one and wounding three of the enemy. He also with others successfully used Mills grenades in mopping up dugouts.

Corporal Arthur Buehrer and Private Francis T. Cashman of the same company reported being part of an outpost of seven men in the Dickebusch Sector on August 7th, when an enemy raiding party approached throwing "potato mashers," some of which landed within four feet of the post, but without causing injury. The enemy detachment was driven back by rifle fire and Mills grenades.

Private William J. Fibisch of the same company reported that in the Battle of the Hindenburg Line, September 29th, he with one other soldier was directed to outflank an enemy machine-gun post by crawling to a bombing position. While doing this they met and surprised two German snipers, who had telescopic sights on their rifles. One of these, seeing the American soldiers, thrust at Fibisch with his bayonet. The latter parried and drove his own bayonet into the German's throat. The other German soldier was killed by a bullet fired by Fibisch's companion.

In the earlier attack of September 27th a German machine-gun post was engaged by a Lewis gun, while squad leader Conrad Lihle with four others turned the position. One grenade was thrown at fifteen yards, resulting in one German being killed, one wounded and one taken prisoner.

Corporal John J. Dougherty of the same company on September 27th maintained Lewis gun fire on an enemy machine-gun nest, while a party outflanked and successfully turned the position, killing two enemy soldiers and wounding one by means of Mills grenades. This was repeated the same day by the same group when one enemy soldier was wounded and two taken prisoners. This detachment reported the successful mopping up, mainly by using grenades, of twelve enemy dugouts on this occasion.

Private Walter Mayer of the same company, with one Mills grenade thrown at ten yards, successfully mopped up an enemy shell hole position on September 27th.

Corporal Joseph Theiner and Private Arthur M. Richards reported seeing, on September 27th, a "potato masher" explode between the legs of an unknown American soldier, wounding him slightly in both legs. The same men reported a "potato masher" exploding within ten feet of them without inflicting injury. These men also reported that they were members of a party of twelve soldiers under a Sergeant of Company H of their regiment, holding a captured trench when they were heavily counter attacked. They used their rifles until the enemy got within twenty-five yards, when all threw Mills grenades. This stopped the enemy assault. A little later the party was counter attacked on the left flank and "potato

mashers" were thrown by the enemy in such numbers that all but the two soldiers mentioned were killed or wounded.

Private Joseph Mathews, also of Company E, reported seeing eight American soldiers in a trench slightly in advance of the objective on September 27th, when they were attacked by a German detachment who threw about twenty-five "potato mashers," apparently killing and wounding all the American party. On the same day this soldier saw twelve American soldiers under the First Sergeant of Company H attack a German trench, throwing about a dozen Mills grenades, the result of which was the killing of several enemy soldiers and the retirement of the remainder.

Sergeant Fred W. Hemgen of Company E, 106th Infantry, in the Battle of the St. Maurice River, on October 19th, finding the advance of his platoon held up by enemy machine-gun posts in shell holes and hedges, took command of a patrol of five men and crept forward under hostile fire, throwing Mills grenades into places that might shelter enemy groups. Their advance was covered by rifle fire of the platoon. The result was that the Germans in that part of the line retired, protecting their retirement by machine-gun fire from the rear. On this occasion one enemy soldier was killed and several wounded. A similar patrol was employed by the platoon on the right.

Captain William B. Watson, commanding Company E, 106th Infantry, reported that Private Milton J. Hjordt, while stationed in the German trench system taken on September 27th, saw four German soldiers marching from a near-by shelter in single file. He shot three of them and bayoneted the fourth in the kidneys. He was wounded immediately thereafter.

Private Rosario S. Benovisto of Company F, 106th Infantry, on October 19th, in the attack east of Arbre Guernon, was one of five men sent out under a corporal to gain touch with the enemy. The party was held up by an enemy sniper. Private Benovisto, having seen one of his comrades killed by the sniper, undertook to locate the latter. By clever maneuvering he crept within bombing distance and threw one grenade into the sniper's post. The party then went forward and found the bomb had blown off the face of the enemy soldier.

The report of Captain James G. Conroy, commanding Company G of the 106th Infantry, was to the same general effect as those already mentioned.

Details of bombing and bayoneting action were not furnished by Company I of the 106th Infantry, commanded by Captain Jerome F. Langer, due to the small number of survivors of the company present with it at the time the report was called for.

Private Salvatore Notch of Company H, 106th Infantry, reported seeing a Sergeant of his company bayonet an enemy soldier on September 27th and afterward shoot him with his revolver.

Private John T. Ryan, also of Company H, reported that he was in a shell hole near Guillemont Farm on September 29th and saw a German "potato masher" drop into another shell hole occupied by three men of his

company. Two of the occupants were slightly wounded and the other uninjured. He reported seeing Mills grenades used effectively in dugouts and against machine-gun nests.

Private Henry L. Lamb of Company H reported using grenades on September 27th in the attack on the Hindenburg Line, against an enemy party occupying a trench, resulting in the killing of two and the surrender of one.

Sergeant James E. Merry of the same company reported that on the 18th of October near Arbre Guernon, being unable to neutralize a German sniper's post by rifle fire and Lewis gun fire, he finally succeeded in gaining a bombing position from which he threw one Mills grenade. This struck one of the enemy soldiers on the forehead and exploded. The other enemy soldier ran off, but was shot with a pistol by one of the company officers. Arriving at the enemy post, it was found that the dead enemy soldier had his head blown off.

Private Joseph Consiglio of the same company reported that on the 29th of September near Bony he was in a shell hole with several Australian soldiers, using a Lewis gun against Germans in a near-by shell hole. Keeping them down with the fire of the Lewis gun, two of the Australians flanked the position and getting within throwing distance, threw six grenades, three of the enemy party being wounded and the remainder calling, "Kamerad," surrendered. In a further advance this soldier is reported to have killed two enemy soldiers with the bayonet.

Private Frank J. Creighton of the same company reported that in the attack of September 29th in front of the main defenses of the Hindenburg Line he and an unknown soldier from Company C of the 105th Infantry came upon two German soldiers in a shell hole with a machine gun. In the fight that followed the two enemy soldiers were killed with the bayonet.

Private Harry J. Deitsch of the same company reported hand-grenade combat on the morning of September 29th at Guillemont Farm while mopping up a German machine-gun nest. The advance was made from the front and one flank. Three Germans were wounded and the remainder taken prisoners.

Sergeant James J. Finn of the same company reported that on the 27th of September near Guillemont Farm, when his company entered the first enemy trench, he bayoneted a German soldier. Later the same day his platoon successfully bombed out two enemy machine-gun posts. In the same locality one of his men bayoneted an enemy soldier.

Sergeant Irving Sucher of the same company reported that on September 29th near Guillemont Farm he overtook a party of soldiers of the 107th Infantry in a trench, who were not advancing because of the presence of a large enemy group on their left in the same trench. Shortly thereafter an Australian officer and four Australian soldiers came up. The situation was explained to this officer, whereupon a bombing attack was made upon the trench, with the result that the enemy party was cleared out.

Sergeant Herbert E. Walsh of the same company reported that on September 27th near Guillemont Farm he bombed a German machine gun,

killing three enemy soldiers and wounding one by grenades and killing one with the bayonet.

Sergeant James M. Doyle of the same company reported that on the 29th of September near Guillemont Farm their mopping-up party was held up by an enemy machine-gun post. Thereupon, with two men of another regiment, he maneuvered around the post and bombed it out with Mills grenades. Upon advancing, it was found that the machine-gun post had been held by three enemy soldiers, two of whom were dead and one badly wounded.

The foregoing reports concerning men of Company H were made by Captain Frederick K. Long.

Captain Harry F. Sullivan of Company K, 106th Infantry, reported that in the attack of September 27th he saw three German soldiers bayoneted by members of either I or K Company of his regiment. This took place when the company reached the second sunken road when about sixty prisoners were taken. While they were being formed to be marched to the rear, three or four of them made an effort to get away, which resulted in three of them being killed with the bayonet. He also reports that on August 31st in the vicinity of Vierstraat Switch, Belgium, an enemy counter-attack, employing a large number of "potato mashers," compelled withdrawal of part of his company. He also reported that when his regiment took the outworks of the Hindenburg Line his company found at least 300 "potato-masher" grenades in the enemy trenches, and that during the morning of September 27th he personally used about forty of them. He states: "It seemed to me that you could throw much farther with 'potato-masher' grenades and more accurately, although the damage caused through fragmentation is not as great as that caused by the Mills grenade." On this occasion Captain Sullivan had been hit in three places by fragments of German hand grenades, but none of the wounds were serious. He saw one soldier nearest to him killed by a German grenade. He also saw German soldiers who had been badly cut up by Mills grenades. Captain Sullivan also reported that on one occasion a private of Company K called to Germans in a dugout to come up and surrender and that upon their refusal to do so a German "potato masher" was thrown in at each entrance. After its explosion the German soldiers persisted in their refusal to come out, whereupon Mills grenades were thrown down each of the two entrances. Thereupon three German soldiers emerged, two of them wounded. No others were in the dugout at the time.

Private James M. Davenport of Company K, 106th Infantry, saw a man in M Company kill a German soldier with a bayonet in the vicinity of Dickebusch Lake, Belgium, at the commencement of the Battle of Vierstraat Ridge, August 31st.

Private Norman J. Mayer of the same company saw a soldier of the 105th Infantry kill a German soldier with the bayonet in the same place on the same day.

On the same day also Private Henry S. O'Hara of Company K saw a

soldier of Company I of his regiment bayonet a German in the same operation.

First Sergeant Edward R. Humann, Jr., and Sergeant Henry L. Hoffman of Company K made reports concerning the use of grenades which were of the same tenor as those heretofore mentioned.

Sergeant Percy O'Gorman of Headquarters Company, 107th Infantry, reported that on the morning of September 29th, east of Ronssoy, he had advanced with the left company of the 1st Battalion of his regiment as far as Willow Trench, where the advance was held up by machine-gun and rifle fire. After a short halt the Germans commenced bombing down the trench from the left. The counter-attack was broken up with Mills grenades, but was shortly thereafter renewed. Until Mills grenades were replenished the detachment employed German "potato mashers," of which there were boxes in the trench. The Sergeant reports that the Mills grenade seemed to be equal in explosion to the "potato masher," while its fragmentation was far superior and the danger zone much greater.

Sergeants Edward R. Cronk and Clarence E. Luckey and Private Frank S. Ross, all of the same company, make similar reports concerning grenades.

Captain Kenneth C. Wilson, commanding the company, in making these reports stated that the regiment at the time had opposing it units of the 2d Prussion Guard Division.

First Lieutenant Ford M. Terry of Company B, 107th Infantry, reported that on September 28th, while occupying a sector of trench preparatory to the Hindenburg Line assault, an enemy patrol of six men was seen shortly before dawn approaching the trench. The enemy group was driven off by rifle fire and Lewis gun fire, after which four men of Lieutenant Terry's company were sent forward through a trench near Egg Post, where they found one wounded German soldier. At 2:30 P. M. the same day an enemy party made a raid, using "potato mashers," six of which were thrown into and near the trench. Private W. C. Meyers was struck in the back by the belt hook and a shred of the casing attached, causing a flesh wound just above the buttocks, while Private Henry Williams was shot from the parapet by a sniper. The soldiers of the 107th Infantry used freely the German "potato-masher" grenades found in large quantities in the trench which had but recently been taken, reserving their Mills grenades for special use. The enemy patrol was driven off in about ten minutes. Grenade reports from this company are in line with others already enumerated.

Corporal Lonnie J. Moscow of Company C, 107th Infantry, reported that on September 29th, at 7:00 A. M., while in a German trench, he saw an American soldier with his leg blown off as a result of the explosion of a German "potato masher."

Private First Class Thomas J. Brown of the same company reported seeing two Germans take cover in a dugout. He closed in and threw one Mills grenade into the dugout, whereupon three wounded Germans emerged, but still showing fight, were killed by rifle fire.

Private John Kutchett of the same company, while advancing with Private Claude J. Oderkirk of his company in the attack on the main defenses of the Hindenburg Line on September 29th, came suddenly upon an enemy machine-gun nest about twenty yards ahead. Private Kutchett threw a five-second Mills grenade into the nest, killing the three enemy machine gunners who occupied it. Later this soldier saw Corporal Edmund Kells of his company killed by the explosion of a German "potato masher."

Corporal John P. Murphy of Company C reported that while holding a captured enemy trench on September 29th they were heavily counter-attacked by enemy forces using large numbers of "potato-masher" grenades. One of these exploding on the parapet propelled a fragment through the steel helmet of Corporal Francis Doane, causing a cut on the check. The detachment held the trench, repelling the counter-attack by the free use of Mills grenades.

Private First Class George K. Baxter of the same company reported that in the Battle of the Hindenburg Line on September 29th he was sent up a trench to block it against counter-attack. Hearing an enemy party approaching down the trench, he threw three bombs into the next bay, killing three enemy soldiers of the party and wounding several others, who were shot when they continued to fight.

Corporal Floyd S. Ellis, also of the same company, reported that on September 29th, while going up an enemy trench, he came to a dugout. Looking down the steps he saw a German soldier backing away. He promptly threw a five-second Mills grenade into the dugout, and going down into the dugout found it had killed three enemy soldiers.

Corporal Charles T. Stoll, also of Company C, reported that on October 18th, in the open warfare east of the Le Selle River, he was ordered with a patrol to reconnoiter a farm house. With Privates Frank W. Garvin and Wasyl Kolonzcyk of his company he advanced about 140 yards and aided in the capture of thirty-seven of the enemy. Two of these got away and ran into a barn. Corporal Stoll followed and with one Mills hand grenade "got them both."

Sergeant John Schwegler, also of Company C, reported that on September 29th, while lying flat on the ground behind the parados of an enemy trench held by twenty Americans, he witnessed the German counter-attack made from a trench about forty yards in front, a great number of "potato mashers" being thrown. Most of them landed on the foreground about four yards from the trench, with the result that only one man of the 107th Infantry in this group was wounded. Sergeant Schwegler states: "The danger zone of a German grenade is about fifteen yards and unless there is a direct hit little damage is done."

Private Fred W. Rushlow of the same company reported that early in the morning of September 29th, while going forward, he saw a German soldier in a trench in a crouched position throwing "potato mashers." He quickly threw a five-second Mills grenade, and when he advanced found that the bomb had killed the enemy soldier.

Private First Class Remington Scott of Company C states that on the

morning of September 29th he saw Sergeant Thomas W. O'Connor severely wounded in the arm and hand from the explosion of a German "potato-masher" grenade.

Sergeant Charles J. Haible of Company E, 107th Infantry, reported that on the morning of September 29th, after he had gotten through the enemy wire beyond Guillemont Farm, he with two other men was going down an enemy fire trench and had proceeded but a short distance when he heard a warning call. He promptly crouched and a German "potato masher" fell five or six feet behind him and immediately exploded. He was knocked down and stunned for a few seconds, but suffered no other injury. One of his men immediately threw two Mills grenades fairly into the bay. Investigation showed a number of dead enemy soldiers, but they were men who had apparently been killed earlier by artillery fire. The enemy soldier who had thrown the grenades had apparently fallen back promptly.

Reports on grenades of Corporals S. R. Drabble and Fermon R. Tompkins, both of Company E, indicate the effectiveness of the Mills grenade as compared with the German "potato masher."

Private Truman R. Coates of Company F, 107th Infantry, reported that on September 29th with one man of H Company of his regiment he came upon two Germans in a shell hole engaged in firing a machine gun at assaulting American troops a short distance from them. As they dropped to the ground for the purpose of opening fire on the Germans, the latter turned their machine gun upon them. The man from H Company suddenly raised up and threw one Mills grenade, which made a direct hit on the machine gun and killed both gunners.

On the same day Private Patrick J. Mullarky of the same company, with several other soldiers of his regiment and an Australian lieutenant, came upon an enemy machine-gun nest. They opened fire with a Lewis gun, keeping the enemy party down. At the same time others of the party turned the nest and bombed it with Mills grenades. Before this was accomplished the Germans threw a number of "potato mashers," some of which landed within a few feet of Mullarky and the Australian officer, the latter having his face blackened by their smoke, but suffering no other injury. The Mills grenade thrown killed several of the Germans and caused the surrender of the others.

Private First Class Thomas J. Higgins of the same company was one of a detachment of men held up on the same day by an enemy machine gun in a trench about forty-five yards from their position. The party divided and worked around each flank until one of the men got within twenty yards of the enemy position and threw in a number of Mills grenades. The little operation took nearly half an hour, and when the advance was resumed five dead German soldiers were found behind the gun.

Sergeant Otis R. Prior of the same company reported much experience with German "potato mashers," of the effectiveness of which he has a poor opinion.

Sergeant Charles W. Koch of the same company reported that on

September 29th, together with some men from Companies G and H, he ran against a machine gun, which they bombed for about three-quarters of an hour, at the end of which they advanced to find three dead German soldiers near the gun.

Private John O. Voorhis of the same company reported a grenade fight on the same day, the Germans using "potato mashers" and his party using Mills grenades. The result was the capture of four German soldiers, one of whom was wounded, and the death of two others.

Sergeant Floyd S. MacLean, also of Company F, with one other soldier, came upon a German machine-gun nest on September 29th. They each threw a Mills bomb into the enemy post, a distance of thirty-five yards. Advancing, they found the gun badly damaged and the two gunners dead.

Corporal John J. Foley and Private Ralph L. Starrett, both of the same company, were driven into a shell hole and held there by an enemy rifleman until Private Starrett succeeded in throwing a Mills grenade into the shell hole occupied by the enemy soldier, killing him instantly.

Corporal Lyndon W. Joyce of Company G, 107th Infantry, reported that on September 29th with another soldier from the 3d Battalion of his regiment he was forced to take shelter in a shell hole on account of machine-gun fire. About ten minutes later a "potato masher" exploded on the edge of the crater, but caused no injury. At that time the smoke screen was slowly lifting and at thirty yards distance two German soldiers were seen in a trench, or what had been a trench previous to the morning barrage. Joyce and his comrade saw the two enemy soldiers at the same time, for they both threw grenades together. A few moments later they advanced and found one of the enemy soldiers dead, he having received three grenade wounds. The machine gun, which had been on the parapet, was lying in the bottom of the trench.

Private Frank M. Van Horn of the same company reported that on September 29th in the attack on the Hindenburg Line he saw a Mills grenade thrown into a group of three enemy soldiers, which, upon exploding, killed all three instantly, their bodies being badly lacerated. The three bodies seemed to be hit all over by fragments of the bomb.

Private Joseph C. Stapleton of Company G of the same regiment reported that on the same day he and a soldier of the 108th Infantry threw two Mills grenades into a shell hole occupied by two enemy soldiers and upon approaching found the two men dead, both bodies having been badly mangled and torn.

Corporal Peter Bragaglia of the same company reported that on the same day with some other men of his company he was held up by machine-gun fire at short range and, dropping into a shell hole, threw two Mills grenades into the enemy position. The machine-gun fire was not renewed and upon approaching they found two enemy soldiers dead, their bodies badly lacerated.

Corporal George R. Brown of the same company reported a similar experience on the same day.

Sergeant Harold I. Moles of Company H, 107th Infantry, saw many

Mills grenades used during battle with telling effect. In the attack of September 29th, as his platoon reached the support trenches of the Hindenburg Line, they were attacked from their left by a number of German soldiers, throwing "potato mashers," Several of his men fell, while one of the enemy grenades dropped about five feet in front of him without exploding. He thereupon threw his Mills grenade, knocking out three enemy soldiers. While pursuing some Germans down a trench another sergeant directly in front of him threw a Mills grenade, which struck a German soldier squarely on the back and immediately exploded, the body of the enemy soldier being torn to pieces. About the same time four men of his platoon mopped up a machine-gun nest with Mills grenades.

An interesting statement was furnished by Private First Class Raymond R. Williams, also of Company H, 107th Infantry, who stated that in the attack on the Hindenburg Line, September 29th, after the outposts had been taken and they were attacking the main line of resistance, held in their front by regiments of the Prussian Guards, he saw the leading wave of his company come suddenly to a halt and immediately commence fighting with hand grenades and firing at German soldiers who stood up to throw their "potato mashers." The enemy group, numbering about 100, were holding stubbornly to a battered trench in the immediate front. A number of men of the leading wave engaged in this work were struck by fragments of these "potato mashers," the Germans also losing heavily from the Mills grenades. Groups from H Company immediately began to close in on the flanks, but the Germans acted quickly. They sent over a shower of grenades and then leaped up on the parapet with fixed bayonets. "A couple of men from our regiment were very close to the trench and ran forward to meet two Germans who were ahead of the others. At the sight of steel, one of the Germans turned back, but the other, a large square-headed fellow, crouched down and made a 'throw point,' which the American lad turned off with a right parry almost as coolly as he would have done in a bayonet class, and before the German could recover his piece the lad took a quick step forward and sent the bayonet home with a well-directed 'long thrust.' The German gave a yell as he dropped that could be heard above the noise of battle. Everyone on the scene of the fight stood still and looked on with bated breath. The contest had taken all the fight out of the other Germans, and they immediately dropped their arms and shouted, 'Kamerad.' I do not know the lad's name, but he belonged to some unit of the 107th Regiment."

Private First Class John J. O'Donnell of the same company reported another instance of use of the bayonet in the Hindenburg Line Battle, September 29th. He states: "During the advance as Germans were met they were shot down with rifles, while in some instances bombs were thrown ahead where Germans were seen. A machine gun was encountered and about five yards to my left a German jumped up, half decided as to whether to fight or throw up his hands. But he had no time to make a decision, for as he presented himself a man to my left delivered a 'long thrust' with lightning quickness, withdrawing his bayonet before the crumpled form of

'Jerry' had reached the ground. Immediately other Germans in the machine-gun nest began to run to the rear, but were shot down before they had gone many steps. A few men were soon in the trench moving towards the remaining Germans with bayonets pointed, but before the bayonet could be used the Germans dropped their arms and threw up their hands, evidently induced to do so by their fear of the bayonet."

Sergeant George Rowe of Company I, 107th Infantry, reported seeing two men dead as a result of bayonet fighting in Guillemont Farm on the morning of September 29th. One was a German and the other an American. Their bodies were lying close together and it was evident that they had been killed by bayonet thrusts.

The views of First Sergeant Philip Garey of the same company concerning the use of Mills grenades and "potato mashers" coincide with those already expressed.

Sergeant Washington I. Clayton of the same company reported the rough land about Guillemont Farm particularly suitable for bombing operations, it being difficult to use rifle fire effectively. In his platoon men bombed their way in this section from one shell hole and battered trench to another during the attack of September 29th.

Sergeant Frederick H. Brown, Jr., also of Company I, was seen by Corporal Willard S. Moore of the same company to put two German machine gunners out of action with Mills grenades while advancing through Guillemont Farm. This Sergeant was later in the morning of September 29th killed in front of the heavy wire at Bony.

Captain Claude G. Leland, commanding Company I, reported that the unanimous opinion of the men of his company was that the German "potato mashers" were effective only in the immediate vicinity of the point of burst. Several men of the company had at various times been stunned by the concussion of the "potato mashers," but promptly recovered.

In connection with these reports it is obvious that a considerable wealth of experience has not yet been drawn upon. This is true because at the time the reports were made, namely, in January, 1919, some thousands of wounded of the division were still in hospitals in France and England or had been evacuated to the United States. In a very large percentage of cases these wounded men had taken part in the fierce local combats which furnished occasions for the use of the bomb and bayonet. The foregoing is well illustrated by the report turned in by Captain Griswold B. Daniell, commanding Company K of the 107th Infantry. His company had been specially depleted as a result of their gallant service in the Battle of the Hindenburg Line, followed by the operations east of the Le Selle River. Naturally there were very few men in the company when it was finally relieved from the line. It was later filled up by replacements who constituted the company at the time the report was made. Accordingly, the Captain reported that no men of his company present with it in January, 1919, had seen anyone, enemy or Allied, bayoneted during the war and that no officer or enlisted man had actually seen the result of hand grenades thrown in action. Similar conditions existed in companies of the 105th,

106th, 108th Infantry, and largely account for no reports having been received from some of the companies of those regiments.

Private First Class Charles Johanson of Company L, 107th Infantry, in the attack of September 29th was compelled to use the bayonet against an enemy soldier. While going cautiously down an enemy trench in the position of "on guard" he suddenly came face to face with a German soldier about to throw a "potato masher." The meeting was so sudden that Johanson's bayonet had pierced the German's breast before he could throw the grenade, killing him instantly.

Corporal John J. Flynn, also of Company L of the same regiment, reported the mopping up of a German machine-gun nest on September 29th with the aid of men of other units of his regiment. Four of the occupants of the nest were killed, the remaining one having his hand blown off.

Corporal James J. McGough, Jr., of the same company, reported that while advancing over the Hindenburg Line on the 29th of September he saw an unknown soldier of his regiment in the act of throwing a German "potato masher," when the grenade exploded while the soldier still had his hand on the stick. The soldier, however, did not appear to be injured.

Captain John A. Korschen, commanding this company, reported that all the survivors of this battle stated that the Mills grenade was most effective and always killed or wounded severely, while the French and German grenades merely stunned for a minute or two.

Captain George R. Dunspaugh, commanding Company M of the 107th Infantry, reported an incident which occurred on September 29th when Private Joseph J. Ahearn of that company threw a Mills grenade, which resulted in the surrender of thirteen or fourteen enemy soldiers, who appeared to be demoralized. Under the same circumstances, he reported, rifle or machine-gun fire would not have given the same results.

In a similar manner another enemy group were compelled to surrender by Corporal Ralph S. Van Inwegin, who threw a Mills grenade into the group, killing three, resulting in the surrender of the remainder.

Still another case of the same character was recorded when Corporal John R. Forsythe on September 29th successfully threw a Mills grenade into a group of enemy soldiers, wounding several.

In the Machine Gun Company of the 108th Infantry Corporal Patrick Maguire reported that on September 29th, in the vicinity of Bony, he threw hand grenades against an enemy party and also saw a group of Australians bombing a similar enemy detachment. In the Corporal's opinion, hand grenades are more effective at short ranges in trenches and organized shell holes than machine guns and automatic rifles.

Private Harold D. Gardner of Headquarters Company, 108th Infantry, on October 17th, at St. Souplet, threw a Mills grenade at a German light machine gunner. The explosion upset the gun and killed the gunner, blowing off one arm and one leg below the knee, besides ripping open his abdomen.

Private Robert J. Mullen of Company G, 108th Infantry, reported that at 4:00 P. M. on August 4th, while occupying an advanced rifle post in

front of Mont Kemmel, Belgium, his squad was rushed by a party of six Germans, who carried no rifles, helmets or pistols, but who relied solely upon "potato-masher" bombs. They threw in all about six "potato mashers," three of which did not explode, due to the fact that they dropped in the mud and water, which was deep in the trench. Private Mullen further states: "There is a small iron ring at the bottom of the cylindrical part of the bomb at the handle which hit me in the leg. In my estimation, it is the only effective part of the bomb. One of the bombs hit Private Raphael Rispoli of my company and fell to the ground before it exploded. He received nine wounds from it and is now in the United States for further treatment. While going to the rear he was wounded in the leg by a machine-gun bullet, which was the real cause of the necessity for further treatment. It is my opinion that, aside from the concussion and the small iron band referred to, the bomb is almost useless for offensive operations, and in all it is about twenty per cent. as effective as the bomb used by our forces." First Lieutenant George F. Wallace, commanding this company, states that Private Mullen was wounded later in the attack, and that his statement is authentic.

Private Benjamin Le Barron of Company I, 108th Infantry, reported the effective use of hand grenades against six German soldiers in a communication trench which could not be reached by rifle fire on September 29th.

Corporal William I. Allen of Company I reported incidents showing the effective use of Mills grenades in the bombing of dugouts in the vicinity of St. Souplet on October 17th.

In the same engagement on October 17th Sergeant William F. Pritz, Corporal Edward L. Smith, Corporal Leo L. Kozlow and Private George H. Jenkins, all of Company I of the 108th Infantry, were witnesses to the blowing up of an enemy dugout by Mills grenades thrown by Private Arthur H. Boyle of the same company. The dugout was occupied by an enemy group, but as the whole thing was blown in, the extent of the loss was not known.

Corporal Frank J. Brennan of Company K, 108th Infantry, reported seeing the explosion of a "potato masher," which wounded Corporal Frederick L. Phillips of his company and several others, while the party were engaged in mopping up during the Hindenburg Line operations on September 29th. The Corporal states that, in his estimation, "the 'potato masher' is not half so efficient as the Mills grenade. It makes plenty of noise and throws a large cloud of smoke." This soldier prefers the Mills grenade to any other weapon when mopping up.

Corporal Harold Dunning and Private Salvatore Giametti of the same company reported instances in relation to the use of bombs in line with those already mentioned.

Captain James Riffe, commanding Company L of the 108th Infantry, reported that the views of the soldiers of his company in relation to grenades conform to the general views expressed.

Private Irvin L. Whitman of Company L was on October 14th in a

group near Le Selle River which was attacked by an enemy raiding party who threw "potato mashers." One of the group was killed and another wounded. The soldier killed appeared to have died as a result of concussion, while the one wounded was struck by a piece of tin from the container of the bomb.

Privates Daniel T. Radice and Alfred H. Pierce of the same company reported that enemy "potato mashers" thrown at the men of their company during the Hindenburg Line operations fell short and were not effective.

Sergeant Decatur W. Chilson of the same company had a similar experience. On September 29th his platoon was counter-attacked by German troops using "potato mashers," which had no effect on him or the men about him. He also reported that on October 14th, near Le Selle River, he forced the surrender of ten enemy soldiers hiding in a sunken road by using Mills grenades.

The survivors of the 104th, 105th and 106th Machine Gun Battalions contributed nothing of direct value in relation to the use of the bomb and bayonet.

From these reports, which, of course, do not include statements from wounded who were evacuated to hospitals and who did not return to the division, it would appear that only one soldier of the 27th Division was bayoneted by an enemy soldier. Making due allowance for the absence of so many wounded who were participants in numerous local combats and considering the impressions of company officers, it is probable that no more than twenty men of the division were killed or wounded by bayonets in the hands of the enemy out of more than 9,000 total casualties sustained by the division. In similar manner, it is the opinion of the writer that not more than 100 of the enemy were killed or wounded by bayonets in the hands of men of the division. In all the close fighting all companies, although possessing the spirit of the bayonet in marked degree, when they actually came in contact with enemy groups at close range employed magazine fire, while individual soldiers repeatedly threw Mills grenades.

CHAPTER XXV

SUPPLY, INTELLIGENCE, MEDICAL, GAS, ANIMAL CASUALTIES

FOR the readers who would learn in more detailed manner than can be given in the text, of the war activities of a division, there will be given in this chapter reports covering such matters as supply, intelligence, medical activities, gas defense and animal care and casualties. These reports were prepared by the officers in charge of these several fields of effort.

The following report, covering the administrative side of the division's operations, prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Edward Olmsted, Assistant Chief of Staff (G-1), will give the reader an outline of the numerous and varied activities which affect administration and supply during war, and, as well, will serve to preserve for the convenience of the veterans and for future reference, a record of the methods employed in controlling such activities.

ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT ON OPERATIONS

FRANCE, December 20, 1918.

PERIOD JULY 9 TO AUGUST 20, 1918.—27th Division was included in and administered by XIX Corps in 2d Army of British Expeditionary Forces in Flanders. Corps Headquarters at Winnezeele and Division Headquarters at Oudezeele. Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, was in a billet in the village. Personnel of the office comprised:

Officers	Major Edward Olmsted, G-1.
	Major James T. Loree, Quartermaster Corps, understudy.
	Captain Robert W. Hanna, Staff Captain, British Expeditionary Forces, attached.
	First Lieutenant Edward B. King, Quartermaster Corps, assistant to G-1.
	First Lieutenant H. A. Morriss, Infantry, assistant to G-1.
Enlisted	Battalion Sergeant Major Jack W. Boyd, Chief Clerk, Division Headquarters, Detachment, General Staff Section.
	Private Wm. C. Curtis, Office Orderly, Headquarters Troop.
	Private James Lynch, Office Orderly, Headquarters Troop.

The services of the division whose activities were coordinated by the Office of G-1 were the following:

Adjutant	Headquarters Troop	Red Cross
Baths	Inspector	R. R. and C. S.
Billets	Judge Advocate	Salvage
Burials	Motor Transport	Signals
Chaplains	Ordnance	Surgeon
Engineer	Police	Trains
French Mission	Postal	Veterinarian
Gas	Quartermaster	Y. M. C. A.

During this period the division was completing Phase "C" of training, which involved the attachment, for eight-day terms, of four battalions of infantry, two companies of machine gun

units, three platoons of engineers and signal detachments to the 6th and 41st British Divisions, which held the sectors of the corps front. Alternating with this duty, organizations were withdrawn for rifle practise in a back area while others occupied and held the East Poperinghe Line in anticipation of enemy attack. Moves between the forward area were made by road march, light railway and meter gauge railway, and with other administrative details became a matter of routine, covered by instructions as issued in orders. During this period occurred minor actions incident to occupation of the East Poperinghe Line. Plan of communication, supply and evacuation for such occupation is attached as a part of this report.

PERIOD AUGUST 21 TO AUGUST 30, 1918.—27th Division relieved the 6th British Division, taking over the Dickebusch sector of XIX Corps (British) front and under the same conditions as regards administrative details as had been developed during its long previous occupation by the 6th Division. Because of facility for enemy observation from the commanding height of Mont Kemmel in our front, the matter of ration supply was one of great difficulty and casualties to ration-carrying parties were more frequently nightly occurrences than exceptional incidents.

The name of the sector has been given to the series of minor operations—raids, patrolling and counter-attacks—incident to its occupation. Division Headquarters was located at Douglas Camp, two kilometers north of Abeele, in Belgium. G-1 Office was installed in a Nissen hut in this camp. Personnel of the office remained unchanged. To the "services" of the division at this time was added the personnel of the Belgian Mission (liaison officers and interpreters). Administrative summary (Orders No. 76) covering details of the routine during this period is attached as a part of this report.

The division, being without its own artillery and trains, the supply of small arms ammunition was carried on by small arms ammunition section of 6th Divisional Ammunition Column, under the direction of Captain Raymond T. Moniz, as Acting Munitions Officer.

PERIOD AUGUST 31 TO SEPTEMBER 2, 1918.—Operations during this period covered the engagement at Vierstraat Ridge, incident to the general advance of 2d British Army. While the advance was in progress and as personnel of G-1 Office were engaged in making a reconnaissance of the forward area for the location of more advanced dumps for rations and ammunition supply, word was received that the division was to be relieved and withdrawn to another sector.

On September 3, 1918, relief of 27th Division, American Expeditionary Forces, was completed by 41st Division, British Expeditionary Forces. This was a matter of some difficulty for the following reasons: The advance having progressed to considerable distance, the communication of instructions to more forward elements was only accomplished under extraordinary conditions. By reason of the same extension, there was considerable distance to be covered by returning formations before the light railway system was reached. Fortunately the system of light railways in the XIX Corps was highly organized and it was possible to avail of the facilities thus afforded, for the return of the personnel to back areas. On reaching the back areas, however, owing to the presence of personnel of the 41st Division moving forward in the area at the same time that units of the 27th Division were moving back and billeting accommodations being limited, there was considerable congestion and lack of billeting facilities. On this and other occasions the fact that organizations of this division were equipped with shelter-halfs proved a great advantage. The necessity of entraining almost immediately upon the completion of the relief also made it difficult to furnish complete new equipment and arrange for baths for all personnel who came out of the line. Provisions had been made for the thorough accomplishment of this, but the lack of time, and other circumstances as set forth above, prevented its being done to the fullest extent.

On September 4th and 5th organizations of the 27th Division entrained at Proven, Waayenburg and Heidebeek by twenty-nine strategical trains, for detrainment respectively at Doullens, Mondicourt and Candas, in the back area of the IV Corps, British Expeditionary Forces, and administered by II Corps, American Expeditionary Forces, in 3d British Army, as General Headquarters, Reserve. This period was given over to refitting, rest and further training, which included several tactical exercises involving the issuance of Administrative Instructions and actual participation by all the "services" of the division under the conditions of battle.

During this time 3d Army Headquarters was located at Villers L'Hopital, II Corps Head-

quarters at Beauval, and Division Headquarters at Beauquesne, G-1 Office being situated in a schoolhouse in the village. The following personnel of G-1 Office were detached for other duty:

Major James T. Loree, Quartermaster Corps.
First Lieutenant H. A. Morriss, Infantry.
Private James Lynch, Headquarters Troop.

Lieutenant Colonel David McCoach, Jr., General Staff, under orders from General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, was attached for observation and instruction for a period of ten days, from September 19th.

Commencing September 22d, the 27th Division entrained (nine tactical trains) at Doullens, Authieule and Roisel for detrainment at Tincourt, in 4th Army area.

On September 24th the 27th Division Headquarters "doubled up" with Headquarters of 74th Division of III Corps, British Expeditionary Forces, in Nissen Hut Camp, located in Bois de Buire, and on the following day the relief of that division by 27th Division in a sector of the line before Ronssoy was completed. There was also a change of corps at this time, Australian Corps of 4th British Army taking over the front. On September 24th conference of administrative officers from all divisions in the Australian Corps was held at Corps Headquarters, between Barleux and Assevillers, to go over all details preparatory to the coming operations. Administrative arrangements were discussed and all details settled for the contemplated operations, which involved the general advance of the 4th Army and the attack on the Hindenburg Line.

During these operations the following liaison officers of the Australian Corps were attached to G-1 Office:

Major Robert Kerr, D. S. O., D. A. and Q. M. G., 1st Division.
Captain Bartlett, Staff Captain, 1st Division.

The division still being without its own artillery and trains, the supply of small arms ammunition was effected by small arms ammunition section of the 4th Australian Divisional Ammunition Column, which was attached during the operations and rendered most efficient service under the direction of Captain Raymond T. Moniz, acting as munitions officer.

Administrative instructions of 27th Division for the operations were covered by Orders Nos. 93 and 95 (Plan of Communication, Supply and Evacuation), which have been included in connection with Administrative Report.

On September 27th there was a second conference of administrative officers at Australian Corps Headquarters, for final verification of all administrative arrangements.

The engagement about the Knoll, Guillemont Farm and Quennemont Farm on September 27th, and the battle of the Hindenburg Line on September 29th and 30th, occurred during these operations.

During operations the Divisional P. C. was located in a quarry north of St. Emilie. G-1 Office continued at Division Headquarters, Bois de Buire, but frequent daily visits were made to Divisional P. C. by G-1 and other personnel of the office in connection with inspections of the ammunition dumps, dressing stations, water tanks and supply arrangements generally.

When the 3d Australian Division "leap-frogged" the 27th Division, the latter withdrew to the rear for a period of rest in Tincourt and Peronne areas, returning at this time to administration by II Corps, American Expeditionary Forces.

PERIOD OCTOBER 9 TO OCTOBER 20.—In the early stages II Corps, American Expeditionary Forces, was moving to attack as part of a general continuance of the advance of 4th Army, British Expeditionary Forces; 30th Division was in the lead with 27th Division following closely as reserve. At this time II Corps Headquarters had moved to Bois de Buire. Headquarters of 27th Division moved successively as follows: October 9th, to quarry at Templeux le Guerard, Advance P. C. to Joncourt. October 12th, the Advance P. C. moved to Premont and the Rear Echelon to Joncourt. October 13th, the Advance P. C. moved to Busigny Chateau. In these moves G-1 Office was with the Advance P. C. Headquarters of II Corps moved to Wiencourt. Wire communications between Division P. C. and Rear Echelon or Corps Headquarters being practically impossible, frequent trips for consultation and instructions to the "services" by G-1 were required, in addition to necessary visits of inspection, etc., to dressing stations, ammunition or supply dumps, police posts, etc. Under the conditions which

existed, all movement in the immediate area of operations was on two main roads, so there was frequent delay due to congestion of traffic. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the enemy, on retirement, had fired many mines under bridges, cross roads at village entrances or exits and the like. Adequate forces of engineers and labor units made prompt repairs in such cases, however.

On October 12th the 30th Division "side slipped" to the south and the 27th Division came up abreast on its left (north) taking over certain of the 30th Division ammunition dumps. Captain Douglas C. Despard returned for duty with the 27th Division and was temporarily attached as an assistant to G-1.

During this series of operations occurred the battles of Le Selle River (on October 17th), and Jonc de Mer Ridge (on October 18th), and the engagements at the St. Maurice River, October 19th–20th.

Administrative instructions for the operations were covered by Orders No. 111 (Plan of Communication, Supply and Evacuation), included in connection with Administrative Report.

On October 21st the relief of 27th Division, American Expeditionary Forces, by 6th Division, British Expeditionary Forces, was completed and the 27th Division moved by road march in three stages for entrainment (eight tactical trains) at Roisel and Tincourt, for detrainment, respectively, at Corbie and Villers-Bretonneux for a period of rest and further training in the Corbie training area (4th Army).

The Armistice was signed while the 27th Division was in this area.

Reports of certain of the directors of the "services" of the division, covering the activities of their several departments, are included in connection with Administrative Report.

EDWARD OLMSTED,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.

SECRET

PLANS FOR DEFENSE OF THE EAST POPERINGHE LINE

27TH DIVISION

PLAN OF COMMUNICATIONS, SUPPLY AND EVACUATION

REFERENCE MAPS: Army Railways 1-40,000
2d Army M. T. Circuits 1-100,000
XIX Corps Administrative Map A 1-40,000
XIX Corps Administrative Map B 1-40,000
Secret Map B 1-20,000
Sheets 27 and 28 1-40,000

PART I—COMMUNICATIONS

1. RAILROADS AND LIGHT RAILWAYS:

(a) STANDARD GAUGE RAILROADS:
Existing system—Army control—Through "Traffic"—St. Omer.
Supply Railhead for Division—Arneke.
Personnel Railhead—Esquelbecq.

(b) ONE METER RAILWAY:
Existing system—Army control—Through "Traffic"—St. Omer.
Stations in XIX Corps area at Winnezeele and Steenvoorde.

(c) LIGHT RAILWAYS:

1. The system of light railway which serves XIX Corps is called the "L" system. It extends from Esquelbecq to neighborhood of Ouderdom.
2. The priority of the allotment of trucks is:

(a) Heavy ammunition.
(b) Field ammunition.
(c) Engineer material.
(d) Stone.
(e) Supplies.
(f) Personnel.

This priority can only be changed by Corps "Q" (by arrangement through G-1).

3. All demands for railway trucks, except as per paragraphs 5 and 8 below, must reach G-1 before 4 P. M. on the day previous to that on which trucks are required. When any trucks are required for reloading of salvage or for any other purposes, it must be stated in the demand. Trucks are not to be taken for reloading salvage, empty cases or other purposes without authority as above. All demands must state the loading station, the time at which trucks are required to be placed, the destination, the nature of the load and also the name or designation of the officer ordering. All trucks must be properly marked with a paper label to insure that they are correctly dealt with by Light Railway Operating Companies. When trucks have reached their destination all old labels must be defaced.
4. Six ambulance trucks (light railway) are available for the use of the corps.
5. Engineer stores will be delivered at the various engineer depots and also at sidings where required. All demands for trucks for engineer stores must be passed through Chief Engineer, XIX Corps. The Commanding Officer, 102d Engineers, will arrange for unloading parties to travel with trains when necessary, and to instruct all concerned that the material is to be unloaded and carried at least six yards from the light railway track.
6. All trucks are to be unloaded as rapidly as possible upon arrival at destination, and the nearest control informed when the trucks are ready for removal. As a general rule the time a truck is held at its destination, before becoming available for removal, should not exceed two hours.
7. Riding, walking or crossing light railways at any point except proper crossing places is forbidden. The A. P. M. is charged with the police of light railway lines within traffic control area of the division to prevent misuse.
8. Arrangements for movement of guns by light railways will be made by Headquarters, Heavy Artillery, or Headquarters, Divisional Artillery, with the Corps Light Railway Officer at Headquarters, XIX Corps, giving point from and to which guns are to be moved and the time at each place the trucks are required. Guns are only to be loaded and unloaded from spurs. They must not be loaded or unloaded from any main line without special permission from the Light Railway Control.
9. Any traffic which can possibly be sent by light railway is not to be sent by road.
10. No ammunition is to be left or stacked within six yards of the main line.
11. Railheads, dumps, etc., with light railway connection are shown in Appendix A.

APPENDIX A

ARMY AMMUNITION RAILHEAD—None.

ARMY DEPOT—Watou.

CORPS RESERVE HEAVY AMMUNITION DUMP—Winnezeele, J.17.d.

A. R. P.—Right Division.....Beauvoorde.....K.27.a.5.3.
Left Division.....Ungava.....L.27.d.7.7.
Support Division.....(As may be designated by Corps)

ENGINEER DUMPS—(a) Corps Park.....La Cloche .....C.13.c.
(b) Right Divisional Dump.....Steen Akker.....R.2.c.
(c) Left Divisional Dump.....Hopoutre.....L.18.c.
(d) C. R. E. Corps Troops.....Winnezeele.....J.17.d.
(e) Support Divisional Dump.....(As may be designated by Corps)

AMBULANCE SIDINGS—Remy.....L.23
Winnezeele.....J.17.d.
Esquelbecq.....B.12.c.

SALVAGE DUMPS—Corps Main Railhead Salvage Dump...Esquelbecq...B.12.c.
Corps Salvage Dump.....Winnezeele...J.17.d.
Support Divisional Dump.....Arneke

CAMOUFLAGE DUMP—Remy North Siding.....L.23.a.central

2. ROADS:

(a) "Transportation" line in the corps area runs along the eastern boundary of the road H.19.b.4.6. to Zevecoten and along the southern boundary Zevecoten-Reninghelst. G.32.d.8.0., L.33.c.2.4., R.1.d.0.0.

(b) The roads to be maintained in the area are those shown in red and blue on the Army M. T. Circuits Map.

(c) "Transportation" maintains roads west and north of the transportation line per paragraph (a) above. Commanding Officer, 102d Engineers, is charged with the maintenance of roads in support divisional area east and south of the same line.

(d) Demands for repair of the roads east and south of the transportation line will be made to the Commanding Officer, 102d Engineers. Demands of the roads west and north of the transportation line will be made to D. A. D. Roads, XIX Corps.

(e) Stone dumps are located as follows:

G.35.b.1.5.
Abeele Station.....L.33.a.0.3. (Broad Gauge)
Steenvoorde.....K.31.c.5.3. (Meter Gauge)
Winnezeele.....J.17.c.4.7. (Meter Gauge)

3. TRAFFIC:

(a) Under corps control throughout area.

(b) Organization of traffic control.

1. The A. P. M. will supervise the service within the support divisional area as may be directed by instructions from XIX Corps.

2. STRAGGLERS:

(a) Battle straggler posts will be established in support divisional area on the Poperinghe-Steenvoorde road as follows:

L.17.b.4.0.—L.22.a.7.2.—L.21.b.3.0.—L.21.c.1.3.—L.26.b.7.3.

ABEELE

L.31.b.5.3.—K.31.d.1.6.—L.31.c.7.6.

(b) Corps straggler posts will run through:

K.24.d.9.9.—K.30.a.3.9.—K.35.d.central.

Corps Advance Collecting Station—At K.29.c.5.8.

(c) Personnel for those posts are to be permanently warned and ready to take up their stations immediately order is given from Corps or Division Headquarters.

(d) Each divisional straggler post will consist of one non-commissioned officer and four privates. The A. P. M. will detail an officer to supervise the straggler posts in support divisional area. Mounted patrols of military police will visit these posts at frequent intervals.

(e) Stragglers not requiring medical attention will be collected at collecting stations and marched back in parties to their regimental headquarters.

(f) Stragglers requiring medical attention will be taken to nearest dressing station. Stragglers found unfit will be brought back to the straggler collecting station and returned to their regimental or separate unit headquarters.

(g) The A. P. M. will detail two non-commissioned officers and twelve privates for duty at the straggler collecting station at K.29.c.5.3. for the purpose of sorting out and disposing of stragglers.

(h) The A. P. M. will issue detailed instructions in accordance with the provisions of Provost Regulations, Section 4, for the guidance of details employed on this duty, copy of such instructions to be submitted to G-1.

3. Mounted military police will be detailed for duty at collecting stations for slightly wounded.

(a) To take over as stragglers men coming in wounded or gassed, who in the opinion of the medical officers are not justified in acting so.

(b) To report to their units slightly wounded men coming in without their arms or equipment.

4. A receipt will be given to escorts bringing in prisoners of war to cages. At

divisional cages all prisoners are to be searched for arms; documents will be taken from officer prisoners. When an intelligence officer is present, he will be informed before a party of prisoners is despatched to the corps cage. Rations will be dumped, and arrangements made for water for guard and prisoners at divisional cages. The A. P. M. is responsible for supplying adequate guard at prisoners' cage. The responsibility for conducting prisoners of war to the advanced corps cage devolves on officer commanding escort detailed for the purpose.

5. For prisoners of war the division cage will be at K.29.c.5.3. The XIX Corps cage is at Winnezeele. The 2d Army transit cage is at Cassel.

6. Attention is directed to G. R. O. 3823, as amended by G. R. O. 3987—"Prisoners of War—Thefts from."

G. R. O. 3823.—Complaints have been received alleging cases of theft of personal property from freshly captured German prisoners of war. Such incidents are not only discreditable in themselves, but they provoke retaliatory measures on the part of the enemy against British officers and men who have been captured by them. All ranks are forbidden to remove from German prisoners any personal belongings, including watches and other jewelry, iron crosses, money, identity disks, pay-books and articles of personal clothing. Private papers, letters, documents and maps will only be removed under the authorized supervision of a General Staff or Intelligence Corps Officer or an officer of the Provost Branch of the Staff. This order will be promulgated at frequent intervals so that reinforcements may be made aware of it.

4. WORKS:

(a) The construction, maintenance and extension of roads and trails will be in charge of Commanding Officer, 102d Engineers (and as may be directed by Chief Engineer, XIX Corps).

(b) The Commanding Officer, 102d Engineers, is charged with the construction of such roads, trails, trench crossings and trench bridges as the Commanding General, Divisional Artillery, may require to push forward his batteries.

(c) The Commanding Officer, 102d Engineers, will arrange for the establishment of advance engineer dumps, at such locations and for material in such quantities as may be prescribed by Chief Engineer, XIX Corps.

(d) All troops using roads or tracks are responsible for the removal of any obstacles they encounter, provided this does not interfere with their mission.

(e) DEMOLITIONS AND DESTRUCTIONS.—Arrangements will be made for effecting such demolitions and destructions as may be directed by Chief Engineer, XIX Corps.

(f) Directing sign boards will be prepared and placed in trenches of each regimental sub-sector. The plan of nomenclature will be that adopted at Camp Wadsworth.

PART II—SUPPLY

1. RATIONS:

Distribution of rations on hand as follows:

(a) One day's iron rations on each man.
(b) Iron rations at dump per Table A.
(c) One day's field rations in company kitchens.
(d) One day's field rations in ration wagons.
(e) One day's field rations in refilling points.
(f) One day's field rations arriving at railhead.

2. DAILY SUPPLY:

(a) Railhead—Arneke.

(b) Upon occupation of East Poperinghe Defense System, ration refilling points for units, as may be designated in daily supply order at locations as follows:

27/J.18.b.9.1.
27/J.18.b.9.5. (Farm 113)
27/K.19.c.4.5.
27/J.24.b.8.8.
27/K.25.a.7.0.

(c) PLAN OF SUPPLY:

1. By mechanical transport to refilling points.
2. By 2d Line transport to battalion dumps.
3. By 1st Line transport, pack animals or carrying parties to company kitchens.

The supply officers of regiments or separate units are responsible for the establishment of battalion or company ration dumps, and for the supply by pack animals or carrying parties for troops in the line.

TABLE A

Iron rations will be dumped as below:

(a) 1,000 at each of the following battalion headquarters dumps:
Condiment Cross Sub-sector, French Lodge.....28/G.31.b.6.0.
Hooggraaf Sub-sector, Ebden House.....28/G.25.d.45.50.
Anjou Farm Sub-sector, Orwell Farm.....28/G.19.d.2.8.

(b) 120 at each of the following machine gun support section localities:
Bala Cottages.....28/G.31.d.6.3.
Bida Farm.....28/G.32.a.4.4.
Gower Building.....28/G.26.a.1.8.

PART III

APPENDIX A

WATER SUPPLY—WATER CART FILLING POINTS AND DIXIE FILLING POINTS

Army No.	Location	Map Reference	Remarks
1	Abeele	Sheet 27—L.32.b.8.6.	Mont des Cats Line
2	Remy	Sheet 27—L.22.d.9.2.	Mont des Cats Line
3	Hopoutre	Sheet 27—L.17.d.5.3.	Mont des Cats Line
51	Steen Akker	Sheet 27—R.2.0.6.7.	Mont des Cats Line
52	Sodewaersvelde	Sheet 27—Q.18.a.6.7.	Old Godewaersvelde Line
54a	Busseboom	Sheet 28—G.21.a.6.3.	Mont des Cats Line
55	Heksken	Sheet 28—G.32.c.1.1.	Mont des Cats Line
56	Hooccraat Cabt	Sheet 28—G.31.b.2.8.	Mont des Cats Line
342	Steenvoorde (Latorie)	Sheet 27—K.31.c.1.9.	Self-contained Pumping Installation
343	Steenvoorde (Brasserie)	Sheet 27—Q.1.b.8.6.	Self-contained Pumping Installation
170	Steenvoorde (Concrete Tank)	Sheet 27—P.6.b.5.6.	Town Pumping Station
	Looge Joek	Sheet 27—J.1.b.2.3.	Sterilizer Lorry Supply
341	Arneke	Sheet 27—H.24.a.8.4.	Self-contained Pumping Installation
	Custom House	Sheet 27—K.16.d.7.1.	Sterilizer Lorry Supply

NOTE.—The Custom House water cart filling point will only supply when the stream is running. When this water cart filling point is not in action, water carts can fill at Watou. (Sheet 27/E.23.c.5.3.)

APPENDIX B

HORSE WATER POINTS

Location	Map Reference	No. of Horses Watering at One Time
Hoof Farm	Sheet 27—L.20.a.2.1.	40
Remy	Sheet 27—L.23.c.4.9.	8
Steenvoorde	Sheet 27—K.32.b.5.8.	30
Remy	Sheet 27—K.23.c.4.9.	16

APPENDIX C

CAMP SUPPLY

Location	Map Reference	Remarks
Remy	Sheet 27—L.23.a.3.7	C. C. S.
Wippenhoek	Sheet 27—L.28.d.6.6	
Steen Akker	Sheet 27—R.2.b.4.6	

2. TWO-GALLON TINS WILL BE KEPT FILLED WITH DRINKING WATER, AS FOLLOWS:

(a) Seventy-two tins to each battalion headquarters dump as below:

Condiment Cross Sub-sector, French Lodge....28/G.31.b.6.0.
Hoograaf Sub-sector, Ebden House....28/G.25.d.45.50.
Anjou Farm Sub-sector, Orwell Farm....28/G.19.d.2.8.

(b) Thirty-three tins to each dump at machine gun support section localities as below:

Bala Cottages....28/G.31.d.6.3.
Bida Farms....28/G.32.a.4.4.
Gower Building....28/G.26.a.1.8.

(c) Two tins to each machine gun position (six machine gun positions about each machine gun support section locality—exact locations to be determined).

PART IV

1. AMMUNITION SUPPLY:

(a) XIX Corps dumps for S. A. A. and grenades—At Haut Midi....J.14.b.
At Shuzy....J.17.d.

(b) Support division ammunition refilling point, to supply 66th Division Artillery—K.22.a.2.0.

(c) Division S. A. A. and grenade dump—At K.30.c.7.2.

(d) Regimental S. A. A. and grenade dumps as follows:

Right Sub-sector....At L.34.b.2.4.
Center Sub-sector....At L.28.b.0.7.
Left Sub-sector....At L.22.b.5.7.

(e) In the vicinity of battalion headquarters, dumps have been established as below:

(Right) Condiment Cross Sub-sector, French Lodge...28/G.31.b.6.0.
(Center) Hoograaf Sub-sector, Ebden House....28/G.25.d.45.50.
(Left) Anjou Farm Sub-sector, Orwell Farm....28/G.19.d.2.8.

At each of the foregoing dumps the following ammunition and grenades will be stored:

S. A. A.	200,000 rds.
Grenades, Hand	22,000
Grenades, Rifle	2,000
Very Lights	100
Rockets	40

(d) In the vicinity of machine gun support section localities, dumps have been established as below:

(Right) Bala Cottages....28/G.31.d.6.3.
(Center) Bida Farms....28/G.32.a.4.4.
(Left) Gower Building....28/G.26.a.1.8.

At each of the foregoing dumps the following ammunition and grenades will be stored:

S. A. A. (for machine gun)....80,000 rds.

(e) Dumps will be established at each of six machine gun positions in the vicinity of machine gun support section localities as above.

At each machine gun position there will be stored:

S. A. A. (for machine gun) ..... 5,000 rds.

(f) No large dumps of cartridges, etc., are to be made in any position. They are to be divided into a number of small dumps at intervals, and where possible traversed. No ammunition is to be dumped within six yards of a road, railway or canal.

(g) The mobile reserve of S. A. A. and grenades will not be used except for the purpose of effecting a turnover or in emergency. Whenever an issue is made from mobile reserve, a demand will immediately be made on Ordnance Officer for replacement.

(h) All units will move with their limbers (mobile reserve equipment of S. A. A. and grenades) whether on transfer or going into rest areas.

(i) Empty boxes or cartridge cases are not to be accumulated at ammunition refilling points or battery positions. There should always be a sufficiency of boxes to clear all used cartridge cases. Where this is not possible, cases are to be tied up in bags. A list of railheads to where empties can be returned is given below:

XG	Swiss Cottage	20/S.28.c.
XGA	Straffhem	27/F.2.c.
XGD	Heidebeek	19/X.19.b.&d.
XGF	Watou	27/E.18.c.8.9.
XCB	Peselhoek	28/A.14.c.
XCA	Westonhoek	28/G.4.a.
XC	Pacific	28/G.10.a.
OKB	Abeele	27/L.27.b.
ODA	Ebblinghen	27/U.21.cent.

In all cases empties must be handed over to ordnance representative. They must not be dumped without authority from above representative.

ARMY AND CORPS RAILHEADS

XK	Esquelbecq	27/C.7.b.8.9.
XGD	Heidebeek	19/X.19.b.&d.
XGA	Straffehem	27/F.2.c.
XGF	Watou	27/E.18.c.8.9.
XD	Blendecques	
XDA	Campagne	
*XG	Swiss Cottage, II Corps	20/S.28.a.
*XCB	Pese'hoek, II Corps	28/A.14.c.
*XCA	Westonhoek	28/G.4.a.
*XC	Pacific	28/G.10.a.
ODA	Ebblinghen, No. 1 Dump	27/U.21.cent.
*ODB	Hondeghem, No. 2 Dump	27/T.6.b.
*OKB	Abeele Siding	27/L.27.b.
XKA	Bavinchove, Heavy	27/O.21.a.8.5.
	Light	27/I.23.b.4.4.

*Advanced corps railheads. No army stocks.

XIX CORPS RESERVE DUMPS

Le Nouveau—For Field Ammunition, S. A. A., Grenades, etc. } Not yet in
Monde—For Heavy and Siege Ammunition ..... } operation.

(j) Defective ammunition, grenades, etc., are not to be returned with empties. They must be properly picked, fuses set at safety, grenades detonated, packages labeled (labels showing contents, destination and where from).

A certificate to the effect that they are safe for transit must be furnished by the officer loading them for return.

PART V—EVACUATIONS

1. The evacuation from the divisional front will be carried out by the 2/2 East Lancashire Field Ambulance reinforced by Bearer Division of 2/1 East Lancashire Field Ambulance.

2. ADVANCED DRESSING STATIONS:

Right Sector.....27/L.25.b.2.9.
Left Sector.....27/L.21.a.4.5. (Hillehoek)

3. WALKING WOUNDED COLLECTING STATION:

M. D. S.—Trappists Farm.

4. MAIN DRESSING STATION AND GAS CENTER:

Trappists Farm—K.17.b.2.5.

5. PLAN OF EVACUATION:

(a) Stretcher and gassed cases will be carried to R. A. P.'s by regimental stretcher bearers, thence by field ambulance bearers by wheeled stretchers or hand carriage to collecting posts or A. D. S. O. C., 2/2 East Lancashire Field Ambulance will arrange for relay post and collecting posts.

(b) Wounded will be conveyed by divisional cars to main dressing station, Trappists Farm, thence by M. A. C. cars to C. C. S., Esquelbecq, or by narrow gauge train from Beauvoorde Junction, 27/K.27.a.8.8. Walking wounded cases will also be evacuated by this train or by train from Watou (Farm, 27/K.5.a.6.4.).

(c) The M. D. S. at Trappists Farm will be capable of dealing with all cases, including gassed.

6. In the event of it being impracticable for ambulance cars to use cross roads at Abeele and the main Abeele-Poperinghe road, all evacuations southeast of the Abeele-Poperinghe roads will be by wheeled stretchers or hand carriages. The O. C., 2/2 East Lancashire Field Ambulance will establish relay posts.

RIGHT SECTOR:

Collecting and Car Posts.....Hillhoek.....27/L.21.a.4.5.
A. D. S.....Trappists Farm.....K.17.b.2.5.

LEFT SECTOR:

Collecting and Car Posts.....L.17.c.2.7.
A. D. S.....Trappists Farm

Location of M. D. S., if change is necessary, will be designated later.

7. EVACUATION OF SICK AND INJURED ANIMALS:

Cases will be evacuated to:

No. 10—Veterinary Evacuating Station at.....27/N.12.b.9.9.
No. 52—Mobile Veterinary Station (41st Division) at.....27/K.22.a.2.2.
No. 6—Mobile Veterinary Station (6th Division) at.....27/L.13.d.2.5.

Cases unable to walk will be immediately reported to the Division Veterinarian.

The following Administrative Summary covers the period of occupation of the Dickebusch Sector in Belgium, taken over from the 6th British Division and includes the Battle of Vierstraat Ridge:

27TH DIVISION

August 31, 1918.

SECRET

ORDERS
No. 76

REFERENCE MAPS: Hazebrouck 5A 1-100,000. Sheets 27 and 28, 1-40,000.

1. ACCOMMODATIONS:

The divisional area is subdivided into four sub-areas, all of which have Area Commandants

who are responsible for the administration of their areas as far as accommodation and care of billets, area stores, etc., are concerned.

Area	Area Commandants	Location
Ratterot	Second Lieutenant H. S. Ransom	27/K.16.d.8.9.
Hillhoek	Second Lieutenant G. P. Cooper	L.19.b.3.5.
Busseboom	Captain J. J. Everatt	L.24.c.2.9.
Dickebusch	Lieutenant L. S. L. Hallam	28/L.15.d.2.2.

2. AMMUNITION:

(a) Divisional reserve dump at location—L.15.b.9.2.

There will be maintained at this dump the following reserve:

S. A. A.	300,000 rounds
Grenades, hand	15,000
Grenades, rifle	15,000
Pistol, Colt	12,960
Stokes, T. M. C., complete with rings and fuses	9,000
V. P. A., 1″ white	25 boxes*
S. O. S. sets	200*
Flares, white	512*
Flares, red	512*
Flares, green	512
S. A. A. "K" (M. G. only)	300,000 rounds
S. A. A. tracer	11,232*
S. A. A., A. P	6,240*
Blanks for rifle grenades	7,020
37 mm. A. P	60
37 mm. C. I	1,140

(b) Regimental dumps will be established as follows:

Dumps in vicinity of Left Regimental Headquarters (H.27.b.6.7.) and Right Regimental Headquarters (H.31.a.3.6.) will *each* contain the following:

S. A. A.	150,000 rounds
Grenades, hand	7,500
Grenades, rifle	4,500
Pistol	3,240
Stokes, T. M. C., complete with rings and fuses	1,350
V. P. A., 1″ white	2,100*
S. O. S. sets	50*
Flares, white	512*
Flares, red	512*
Flares, green	512*
S. A. A. "K" (M. G. only)	75,000
S. A. A. tracer	2,486*
S. A. A., A. P	1,248*
Blanks for rifle grenades	2,808
37 mm. C. I	570
37 mm. A. P	30

(c) Six small dumps in the Dickebusch system between regimental headquarters at H.27.b.7.7. and Gretna Cross at H.32.b.4.9. will each contain approximately:

S. A. A.	15,000 rounds
Grenades, rifle No. 23 or 20	1,170

SALVED DUMP AT H.25.b.15.55 CONTAINS:

S. A. A.	112,500 rounds
Grenades, rifle No. 23	1,170
Stokes, T. M. C	600

RIGHT INFANTRY REGIMENT:

(a) The following ammunition, etc., is to be held between H.33.c.5.7. and N.2.c.8.2.

6 boxes of S. A. A. dumped at each platoon post, *i. e.*,

8 posts, 6 boxes = 48 boxes.

If necessary, ammunition and grenades needed to augment this supply will be drawn from the regimental dumps located at H.27.b.6.7.

(b) The following ammunition, etc., will be dumped in reserve regimental area, in the Ouderdom system:

1. S. A. A.....	15,000 rounds	This amount will be held at each of the following points: G.36.a.8.4. G.24.c.6.6. G.35.b.1.5. G.30.b.3.0. G.24.a.2.6.
Grenades, rifle No. 23.	180*	
V. P. A., 1″ white....	150	
2. S. A. A.....	30,000	To be established at each of the following locations: G.29.d.2.9. G.23.d.9.1.
Grenades, rifle.....	180	
V. P. A., 1″ white....	150	

(c) Stokes T. M. C. ammunition will be held at each of the following gun positions:

150 at G.36.c.87.99.
150 at G.36.b.30.30.
150 at G.30.d.80.10.
150 at G.30.d.75.20.
300 at G.30.b.90.75. (two positions)
300 at H.19.a.15.10. (two positions)

Ammunition and grenades needed to augment this supply will be drawn from division grenade dump.

Advance posts which would not be held in case of serious attacks will not maintain a reserve.

IN THE LINES

(a) 200 rounds S. A. A. per man. This will include 120 rounds carried on the man.

(b) In each occupied post and strong point, 100* rounds S. A. A. per man of the garrison in addition to that carried on the man, and 10* boxes rifle grenades.

(c) At each company headquarters, 10* boxes, S. A. A., 10 boxes rifle grenades, 10* boxes hand grenades.

(d) At each battalion headquarters, 75 boxes S. A. A., 25 boxes rifle grenades, 25* boxes hand grenades.

(e) At each machine gun position, 15,000 rounds S. A. A. per gun.

(f) At each Lewis gun position, 4,500 rounds S. A. A.

3. SUPPLY:

Railhead.....Esquelbecq.....Broad Gauge
Winnezeele.....Meter Gauge

Supplies arriving by daily train at Esquelbecq will be transferred by personnel of Railhead Supply Detachment to meter gauge for shipment to Winnezeele, where they will be handled by the same personnel.

Trains of 2d Line Transport (G. S. wagons) will move supplies from Winnezeele to refilling points.

These trains will consist of necessary G. S. wagons and personnel detailed from units attached.

Rations will be drawn one day for consumption the following day.

Organizations will draw from refilling points as indicated below, at 8:30 A. M.:

Dump "E" at K.17 central....For Division Troops and Brigade Machine Gun Battalions.
Dump "E" at K.18.a.8.8.....For 53d Infantry Brigade
Dump "H" at K.18.a.3.2.....For 54th Infantry Brigade

L. G. S. wagons of units will move supplies from refilling points to rolling kitchens.

LOCATION OF FIRST LINE TRANSPORT:

Unit	Location
Headquarters, 105th Infantry	27/K.23.c.1.7. (Details Camp)
1st, 2d and 3d Battalions	L.13.c.8.1.
Headquarters, 106th Infantry	27/K.18.a.8.8.
1st Battalion	K.24.a.9.9.
2d Battalion	K.24.a.1.1.
3d Battalion	K.24.a.1.7.
Headquarters, 107th Infantry	27/L.31.a.1.1.
1st Battalion	K.29.c.3.4.
2d Battalion	K.34.d.3.9.
3d Battalion	K.17.b.1.1.
Headquarters, 108th Infantry	27/L.25.a.9.8.
1st Battalion	
2d Battalion	K.30.c.7.1.
3d Battalion	K.34.b.1.1.
Headquarters, 106th Machine Gun Battalion	27/K.27.d.5.5.

The exact subdivision of rations according to distribution of units in the line, proper packing of same in bags and the plain labeling thereof with the designation of the unit for which intended are matters of vital importance.

All concerned will be held to strict accountability for the return by carrying parties of all empty water tins and food containers which are needed for bringing up supplies for the following night.

OFFICERS' RATIONS.—Will be packed separately and may include such components as they arrange to have purchased. Under no circumstances will the division of rations for a small number of officers be made so that they receive a disproportionate quantity to the detriment of the enlisted men.

SOLIDIFIED ALCOHOL.—The weekly allowance of solidified alcohol for the division is 20,000 ounces, and is drawn on Thursday by units, through Division Quartermaster.

This will be issued only to troops actually stationed east of the Dickebusch Line.

There are no reserve rations held by the division at reserve or supporting points, as it is considered that rations can be sent when required.

4. MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS:

1. The evacuation from the division front will be carried out by the 106th and 107th Ambulance Companies, reinforced by the 105th and 106th Field Hospitals.

The Director of Ambulance Companies will be the officer in charge of advance area evacuation with headquarters at Remy Siding, 27/L.23.a.4.7.

(a) ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS.—Long Barn, 28/G.30.d.6.7.

(b) DIVISION MAIN DRESSING STATION.—Remy Siding, L.23.a.4.7.

(c) DIVISION COLLECTING STATION.—Trappiste Farm, K.17.b.2.5.

(d) ADVANCED DRESSING STATIONS.—St. Dunstan, H.22.b.8.3.—Long Barn, G.30.d.6.7.

Railway Posts	Mic Mac	H.31.d.4.9.
	Railway No. 1	H.31.a.9.6.
	Gunner	H.26.c.6.1.
	Red House	H.32.b.4.3.
	Bethune	N.1.a.9.9.

(e) Regimental Aid Posts:

Right—Tiger Farm, N.2.a.1.1. Mic Mac, N.34.d.4.9.
Left—Vijverhoek, H.29.c.2.6.

Reserve Regiment (left Brigade), H.26.d.3.3.

(f) Walking Wounded Collecting Posts.—Busseboom, G.16.c.2.8.

(g) Dental.—Dental Surgeons with necessary equipment are located as follows:

Headquarters, 53d Infantry Brigade	G.23.c.9.3.
Headquarters, 54th Infantry Brigade	L.20.c.2.6.
Headquarters, 105th Infantry	H.27.b.7.7.
Headquarters, 106th Infantry	H.31.a.6.9.
Headquarters, 107th Infantry	L.31.a.9.1.
Headquarters, 108th Infantry	G.14.c.3.3.
Headquarters, 102d Engineers	G.15.d.4.2.
Headquarters, 104th Machine Gun Battalion	K.30.d.3.6.
Headquarters, 105th Machine Gun Battalion	G.23.d.0.0.
Headquarters, 106th Machine Gun Battalion	Beauvoorde Wood

2. Water Supplies, Water Points and Baths.

(a) The Commanding Officer, 102d Engineers, is responsible that all pumps and water appliances in the divisional area are in working order, and any failure in the water supply will be reported at once to the office of G-1. (L.14.a.2.0.)

(b) Horses are not to be watered directly from reservoir tanks; sufficient water troughs will be erected in the vicinity of horse lines, into which water is to be pumped.

(c) An officer, or, in exceptional cases when no officer is available, a senior non-commissioned officer will be in charge of every watering party. Men are to dismount when watering, and remove bits.

(d) Water troughs are to be so arranged that horses are not taken along or across main roads to water. Horses are not to be taken along tram lines, railway lines, or through fields where railway lines are in process of construction. Horses are not to be allowed to drink until water troughs are full.

(e) In the event of a move into a new area, all sources of drinking water must be tested before using by the testing cases in possession of medical officers of units. These testing cases will be always available for use by the medical officers. Sentries and warning notices will be posted on suspected water supplies, and samples sent in at once to the Division Surgeon for confirmation.

5. WATER.

The drinking water supply carries through a pipe line from Mont des Cats. Horse water supply is pumped from Yieterbeer.

HORSE WATER POINTS

Location	Map Reference	No. of Horses Watering at One Time
Hoop Farm	27/L.20.a.2.1.	80
Hoop Farm	L.14.c.1.1.	8
Remy	L.26.c.4.9.	8

DRINKING WATER

Map Reference:

27/L.17.d.7.3	Water carts and dixies
L.23.c.7.8	Water carts and dixies
L.22.d.9.5	Water carts and dixies
28/G.21.8.6.3	Dixies only
G.31.b.2.8	Water carts and dixies
G.32.c.2.2	Water carts and dixies

BATHS

The Division Sanitary Inspector is officer in charge of baths.
Divisional baths are located as follows:

27/L.17.d.5.8.
L.14.c.3.2.
K.21.a.3.5.

Each bath is in charge of one non-commissioned officer and four privates. Units will make time bookings with the non-commissioned officer in charge of bath, for use of same.

MILITARY POLICE ARRANGEMENTS

(a) The following battle straggler posts will be maintained when required:
STRAGGLER POSTS:

28/G.16.c.8.3.—Adjoining post of 30th Division, A. E. F., G.17.c.6.9.
28/G.21.a.5.0.—Adjoining post of 34th Division, B. E. F., G.26.c.5.3.
27/L.17.d.6.4.—Advance straggler collecting post.
27/L.19.a.3.4.—Main straggler collecting station.

Straggler posts will be manned by one non-commissioned officer and four privates of the Military Police.

Regiments, when ordered to do so, will send a representative to advance collecting station during operations. Such representatives must know the positions of the transport lines of each unit of their regiment and will hand over stragglers at such transport lines.

Arrangements will be made to obtain and hold the following supplies at collecting posts in case of necessity:

400 Complete iron rations.
50 Box respirators.
50 Field dressings.
50 Blankets.
20 Petrol tins for drinking water.
Empty boxes for small arms ammunition and bombs.

The rations will be held by the Division Quartermaster. The Assistant Provost Marshal will draw and be responsible for the remainder.

(b) PRISONERS OF WAR CAGES:

The advance and main prisoners of war cages are being erected at:

27/L.17.d.6.4.
27/L.19.a.3.4.

Before the two prisoners of war cages are built and in case of emergency the existing cage at L.22.a.1.9. will be used.

TRAFFIC CONTROL POSTS:

K.17.b.6.9.
K.24.d.9.9.
L.19.b.4.9.
L.14.c.3.2.
L.21.c.9.8.
L.17.d.6.4.
L.17.b.2.1. (Under Assistant Provost Marshal, 30th Division, A. E. F.)

TRAFFIC.—Mounted Military Police posts will be established in the divisional area along the Poperinghe-Renighelst road as indicated below:

The Poperinghe-Renighelst road and the cross roads leading from the Poperinghe-Renighelst road to the Abeele-Renighelst road.

Cross roads at G.20.a.4.5.—Hoograaf Cabaret—Cross Roads at G.32.d.8.1. through M.2.a.—M.1.d. to boundary, will be closed between 5 A. M. and 8 P. M. within the corps area, east of road G.14.d.7.7. to

(a) All Motor Trucks.
(b) All Columns of Horse Transport.

Roads in the corps area east of the above line and not under observation by the enemy ground observers, will be open to:

(a) Cars conveying Staff Officers.
(b) Horse transport, single vehicles.
(c) Motorcyclists.
(d) Single ambulances.

No vehicle, however, is to exceed a speed limit of eight miles per hour, or any speed which raises dust above the height of the vehicles.

GAS RESPIRATORS

Box respirators will be carried east of the road running from Droglandt through Winnezeele to Weld.

Box respirators will be worn in the alert position east of the line Busseboom-Boeschepe.

STEEL HELMETS

Steel helmets will be worn east of a line Busseboom-Boeschepe.

LIGHTS

No head lights or side lights are permitted east of the Poperinghe-Abeele road. All lights must be extinguished or completely shaded one hour after sunset.

6. RAILWAY EQUIPMENT STORES:

(a) Engineer parks and dumps are situated as follows:

Army Park, No. 3 Park	Bameque
XIX Corps Park, La Cloche	C.13.c.
Divisional Dump, Hopoutre	L.18.c.1.5.

Stores are drawn from (a) by light railway and motor trucks; from (b) by light railway; from (c) by light railway and horse transport.

(b) Light railways can now deliver stores as far as:

Yale Siding	H.15.d.1.4.
Zevecoten	G.36.c. central
Christ Church	H.25.a.9.7. (Not to be used except under specific direction of Division Engineers.)

(c) As soon as dumps are opened for traffic it is proposed to form advance dumps as follows:

Left Sector	Albemarle	H.27.c.35.95.
Right Sector	Cambridge Siding	N.1.b.10.20.

(d) Advance divisional dump will be at Mt. Elgin, G.16.d.85.75.
Light railway will deliver stores to Mt. Elgin.
Tramways will deliver to the advanced dumps.

(e) An old engineer corps park exists at Zevecoten, G.8.c.central. The stores can be drawn from there on receipt of authority from C. E. XIX Corps, through Divisional Engineer.
This dump will shortly be cleared by salvage companies.

7. SALVAGE:

(a) The division is responsible for salvage and evacuation to the divisional dumps forward of the line:

Road running from 28/G.14.c.2.7.—G.26.c.3.3.

(b) Salvage Dumps are Located as Follows:

Main Divisional Dumps and Office	L.23.a.4.7.
Esquelbecq Station	C.18.b.0.1.
Ration Dump "E"	K.17.central
Ration Dump "F"	K.18.a.8.8.
Ration Dump "G"	K.18.a.8.8.
Ration Dump "H"	K.18.a.3.2.
Ration Dump "J"	K.18.a.3.2.
Also at	L.14.d.5.6.

(c) All units should exercise particular care to send in to salvage the following:

Water and petrol tins.
Surplus fat not absolutely needed in cooking.
Bully beef tins.
Sand bags.

1st Line Transport of battalions, etc., when returning empty from forward area, are to bring back salvage.

Waste paper will be placed in old sacks and turned in to divisional salvage dumps in the same manner as other salvage. All paper marked "Secret," "Confidential," or "Not to be Taken into the Front Line Trenches," is to be burned.

8. CROPS:

It does not appear to be generally recognized that unnecessary damage to crops in the forward evacuated areas is as reprehensible as in areas where inhabitants are still living.

Crops in the evacuated area will be harvested under arrangement made by the military authorities. Such crops form a valuable addition to the available food resources of the country.

Commanding officers will be held responsible unless such damage is rendered unavoidable by urgent military necessities.

9. ORDNANCE:

Ordnance stores and dumps are at K.18.c.7.9. Ordnance stores are drawn from railhead at Grubhem and delivered at ordnance stores. Old stores received at ordnance stores. Ordnance salvage will be shipped twice weekly from railhead.

10. VETERINARY ARRANGEMENTS:

No. 6 Mobile Veterinary Section and 105th Mobile Veterinary Section are located at 27/L.13.d.2.5.

Animals are evacuated from there to No. 22, V. E. S., at E.12.d.5.9. and thence by rail to Calais.

Regimental and lesser units supply officers will notify the Divisional Veterinarian immediately upon the death or evacuation of animals in their organizations, giving the following: Date, unit, class of animal and the cause of death or evacuation.

11. BURIALS AND CEMETERIES:

The following are the cemeteries available for use by this division:

Nine Elms	27/L.10.b.4.4.
Lijssenthork (military)	L.22.d.6.3.
Ouderdom (military)	28/G.30.d.9.4.
Dickebusch Huts (military)	H.27.c.3.4.
Abeele Airdrome	27/L.31.a.8.2.*

* Not to be used except in case of urgent necessity.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL O'RYAN:
STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

SECRET

SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

APPENDIX A

(ORDERS 76)

ENGINEER WORK

The following works are now under construction by the engineer troops of this Division aided by infantry details of various strength as necessity requires:

TRENCH CONSTRUCTION

Outposts—Dickebusch Line	—H.27.c.5.7	Rivetting and placing "A" frames.
Westoutre—Goed Moet Line	—Right battalion area	
Westoutre—Goed Moet Line	—Left battalion area	
Gold Moet Line	—Right battalion area	
Gold Moet Line	—Left battalion area	
Dickebusch 1st, 2d and 3d Lines and 1st Line support		
Dickebusch Bund, C.T.		
Melon Farm, C.T.	—H.20.d.30.35.	
Scottish Wood, C.T. to	—H.36.c.5.2.	
Post No. 3, Melon Farm	—H.20.d.30.35.	
Post No. 2, and No. 4, near	—H.20.d.	
Bristol Camp Post	—H.35.d.3.5.	

SHELTERS AND MACHINE GUN EMPLACEMENTS, ETC

Opium Farm	—H.21.c.90.75	Filling
Indus Farm	—H.28.a.2.0	Filling
Moose Jaw Farm	—H.14.a.7.0	Filling and concrete
Dominion Farm	—G.24.c.0.5	Filling
Medoc Farm	—G.35.a.4.9	Filling and gas proofing
"E" Co. Farm	—G.15.c.6.9	Concrete
Hecla Farm	—H.25.d.85.05	Filling
Walker Farm	—H.27.b.9.8	Filling
Mersey Cross	—G.23.c.9.3	Excavation, refill, etc.
Shelter	—G.36.a.9.7	Filling, bursting blocks, gas proofing
Testoutre, Goed Moet Line	—G.35.b.3.7	Camouflage repair
Pill box	—H.28.d.3.5	Concrete and camouflage
Hague Farm	—H.31.a.6.9	Concrete and gas proofing (Camouflage complete)
Gretna Redoubt	—H.32.b.5.6	Concrete and gas proofing
Artillery O. P.	—H.8.a.92.55	Concrete, practically completed
Mic Mac Farm	—N.31.d.5.9	Gas proofing
Tiger Farm		Gas proofing
Right brigade shelter		Gas proofing
Left battalion shelter		Gas proofing

MISCELLANEOUS WORK

Erecting clothes disinfector, Hopoutre.
Repairing billets.
Salvaging material for construction
Placing signs on foot tracks
Construction and maintenance of wire entanglement.
Road screening, Ouderdom, Busseboom Road, etc.
Road patrol and repairs (by Pioneer Platoon, Headquarters Co., 105th Infantry).

Demolition of bridges, etc. Preparation, patrols and inspections.
Construction of a bath at Trappiste Farm—K.17.b.0.4.
Completed Moire pill boxes, machine gun emplacements, trenches and wiring as shown on map, C. R. E. 6th Division, scale—1:100,000.
Engineer details are also at Hopoutre dump making burster blocks.
Mt. Elgin dump issuing engineer materials.

LISTS, MAPS, PLANS, ETC.

Trench map—Divisional area—part sheets Poperinghe, Ypres, Kemmel and Wytschaete	1
Tracing—Divisional area—work on trenches and wire	1
XIX Corps Administrative map "A"	1
XIX Corps Administrative map "B"	1
Divisional area, 1:100,000 machine guns and wire	1
Message map, part sheet 28, schale 1:100,000—Dickebusch area	1
Dickebusch Support Line—wire	1
Left brigade section—scheme of wiring—from 46th French Division	1
Monolithic pill box, for Brigade Headquarters	2
Goed Moet Mill Line	1
Tracing showing strong points—N.1.b.3.6.	
Middlesex Camp—H.32.c.—N.1b.90.98	
Albemarle House	1
Water supply XIX Corps area	1
II Corps light railway map	1
Light railways—sheet 28, scale 1:20,000	1
Defense lines—sheet 28, scale 1:40,000	1
Sheet 28, N. W., scale 1:20,000	11
Sheet 28, S. W., scale 1:20,000	6
Sheet 27, N. E., scale 1:20,000	3
Sheet 28, N. W., and 28, S. W., combined, 1:20,000	1
Sheet 27, N. E. (Eastern half), 1:20,000	3
Sheet 28, N. W. S., Poperinghe—1:10,000	2
Sheet 28, N. W. 4 Ypres—1:10,000	6
Sheet 28, S. W. 1 Kemmel	3
Sheet 28, S. W. 2 Wytschaete	14
Sheet 28, N. W. 1 Elverdinghe	6
Route map—forward roads	1
Message maps, scale 1:10,000	4
Nos. 9228, 9229, 9230, each	4
Ouderdom Line	10
Intelligence maps	13
Aeroplane photographs, miscellaneous	120
Miscellaneous maps received from 46th French Division, rolls	2

Left Divisional sector defense scheme (provisional) with Appendix I to XI.

SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

APPENDIX B

(ORDERS 76)

ORGANIZATION OF ANTI-GAS DEFENSES—Sheets 27 and 28, 1:40,000.

1. The following are limits of the "Precautionary" and "Alert" zones of the 27th Divisions:

Precautionary Zone—East of the road running from Broglandt through Winnezeele to Rweld.

Alert Zone—East of line, Busseboom, Boeschepe.

List of Alert Signs:

G.23.c.8.5.	H.18.b.2.2.
G.27.d.8.6.	G.22.d.7.1.
G.24.c.5.5.	G.28.a.6.2.
G.28.a.5.5.	H.19.b.4.7.

2. The method of warning in the case of a cloud gas attack, will be as prescribed by General Order 54, Headquarters 27th Division, July 11, 1918.

(a) System of Strombos Horn for warning: Permanent sentries will be mounted at the following points in order to give warning to the troops in the divisional area forward of the Poperinghe-Abeele road.

Location	Local Name	No. of Cylinders	Pressure	Condition
	105TH INFANTRY			
H.27.b.7.7.	Regimental Headquarters	4	75K	Good
H.28.a.2.0.	Right Battalion Headquarters	2	75K	Good
H.26.d.3.3.	Support Battalion Headquarters	2	75K	Good
H.28.d.6.7.	Left Battalion Headquarters	2	75K	Good
H.35.b.6.3.	Left Company Headquarters	2	75K	Good
N.5.a.6.4.	Right Company Headquarters	2	75K	Good
	106TH INFANTRY			
H.31.a.6.9.	Hague Farm	3	100 lbs.	Good
H.31.d.5.9.	Mic Mac Farm	2	100 lbs.	Good
H.32.b.6.6.	Dickebusch Lake	2	100 lbs.	Good
	108TH INFANTRY			
G.14.a.3.3.	Medoc	2	70–80 lbs.	Good
G.36.a.4.9.	Medoc	3	70–80 lbs.	Good
	66TH DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY			
G.18.b.10.30.	Brigade Headquarters	2	120–120	Good
G.30.b.03.96.	Battery Position	2	139– 90	Good
H.19.b.31.07.	Battery Position	2	120–120	Good
H.8.c.65.10.	Brigade Headquarters	2	120–120	Good
H.14.c.30.10.	Battery Position	2	120–120	Good
K.23.a.30.50.	D. A. C	2	120–120	Good
	DIVISION HEADQUARTERS AREA			
L.14.a.2.0.	Division Headquarters	2	120–120	Good
L.17.b.20.10.	Traffic Post	2	110–110	Good
K.17.c.00.07.	Siege Battery A. C	2	110–120	Good
G.27.a.50.90.	Field Co	2	120–120	Good
G.20.a.40.40.		2	120–125	Good
K.23.d.30.30.	D. A. C	2	120–120	Good
L.20.a.2.8.	Transport Lines	2	80– 80	Good

(b) In addition to the above, Division Headquarters will warn all troops as shown in Table, and area commandants in the area. Every signal office will have a list of all units whom they are responsible for warning. In Division Headquarters, Signal Office, this list will be a Table.

The Assistant Provost Marshal will make arrangements for warning all his Traffic Control Posts, who will, in turn, pass on the warning to all persons, including drivers of vehicles passing their posts.

On receipt of the warning, all troops will observe gas alert position, remaining so until the order is cancelled by Division Headquarters.

(c) The following will be the sequence in which warning will be sounded in case of a gas attack:

Regimental Headquarters will first warn their flank and reserve regiments and then Division Headquarters signals.

The division signal office will order the Strombos Horn at Division Headquarters sounded and to warn:

(a) Officer on duty.
(b) Flanks Divisions.
(c) XIX Corps Signals.
(d) All Signal Offices and Units in the Table.

LIST OF DUGOUTS

1. Locations.
2. Dugout (D). Shelter (S). Pillbox (P). Cellar (C). Farms (F).
3. Unit in occupation.
4. Number accommodated.
5. Number of entrances.
6. Number of blanket or union cloth doors in each entrance.

6a. Gas proof or not gas proof.

1	2	3	4	5	6a	6	
H.31.a.6.9.	13 D	Reg. Hdqtrs.....	78	14	8 Yes 5 No	4–2 8–1	Need repair
H.32.b.6.6.	7 D	3d Bn. Hdqtrs....	16	4	2 Yes 3 No	2–2 1–1	Need repair
H.31.d.5.9.	4 D	2d Bn. Hdqtrs....	40	4	2 Yes 2 No	1–2 1–1	Need repair
N.2.a.1.1.	4 D	1st Bn. Hdqtrs...	26	4	No	1–1	Poor
H.28.d.9.1.	1 D	Co. Hdqtrs.....	12	2	Yes	1	Poor
H.28.d.5.1.	1 D	Bn. Hdqtrs.....	3	1	Yes	1	Poor
H.35.a.4.4.	1 D	Co. Hdqtrs.....	5	2	No	...	Poor
H.28.d.5.1.	3 D	Bn. Hdqtrs.....	12	2	2	...	Poor
H.28.d.5.1.	2 D	Signals.....	6	2	1	...	Poor
H.26.c.3.6.	1 C	R. A. P.....	20	1	No	...	Poor
H.27.b.7.7.	4 D	Reg. Hdqtrs.....	65	6	Yes	2	Good
H.28.a.2.9.	3 D	Bn. Hdqtrs.....	20	3	1 Yes 2 No	... ...	1 good 2 poor
H.29.c.3.6.	1 D	Signals.....	20	1	No	...	.....
N.5.a.6.3.	1 D	Co. Hdqtrs.....	8	1	No	1	Poor
N.5.a.6.9.	1 D	Co. Hdqtrs.....	6	1	Yes	2	Poor
G.14.a.3.3.	1 D	Reg. Hdqtrs.....	..	..	.....	...	.....
G.36.a.4.9.	6 D	Bn. Hdqtrs.....	..	1	No	None	Poor
G.24.b.7.8.	1 D	2d Bn. Hdqtrs....	..	..	.....	...	.....
G.20.b.3.1.	1 D	3d Bn. Hdqtrs.	..	..	.....	...	.....
H.8.c.6.1.	18 D	Brig. Hdqtrs.....	..	..	.....	...	Single curtain
H.9.c.0.6.	10 D	Battery.....	..	..	.....	...	Single curtain
H.14.a.2.7.	2 D	Battery.....	..	..	.....	...	Single curtain
H.10.c.3.2.	3 D	Battery.....	..	..	.....	...	Single curtain
H.19.c.5.7.	1 D	Battery.....	..	..	.....	...	Single curtain

1	2	3	4	5	6a	6	
H.21.b.4.9.	8 D	Battery	..	..	.....	...	Single curtain
H.20.a.9.6.	4 D	Battery	..	..	.....	...	Single curtain
H.14.d.2.2.	4 D	Battery	..	..	.....	...	Single curtain
H.10.c.0.5.	6 D	Battery	..	..	.....	...	8 double, 2 single
H.18.c.6.6.	2 D	Battery	..	..	.....	...	Single curtain
G.18.b.1.3.	2 F	.....	..	..	.....	...	2 double curtains
	2 D	Brig. Hdqtrs	..	..	.....	...	9 single curtains
H.14.c.3.4.	7 D	Battery	..	..	.....	...	3 double, 3 single
B.19.b.3.1.	8 D	Battery	..	..	.....	...	Single curtain
H.20.c.1.9.	1 C	Battery	..	..	.....	...	Single curtain
H.14.c.1.17.	4 D	Battery	..	..	.....	...	Single curtain
G.30.b.0.9.	1 D	Battery	..	..	.....	...	Double curtains
G.30.b.5.6.	8 D	Battery	..	..	.....	...	2 double, 6 single
H.25.b.1.1.	1 D	Battery	..	..	.....	...	Single curtain
G.25.c.9.7.	1 D	Battery	..	..	.....	...	Single curtain
H.13.d.6.4.	2 D	Battery	..	..	.....	...	Single curtain
G.23.c.9.3.	7 D	Brig. Hdqtrs	25	7	No	None	.....
G.23.c.9.3.	1 C	Brig. Hdqtrs	6	1	No	None	.....
N.1.b.3.6	1 D	Co. Hdqtrs	..	2	No	None	.....
H.33.c.1.1.	1 D	Platoon Hdqtrs	..	1	No	None	.....
H.32.d.2.2.	1 D	Platoon Hdqtrs	..	1	No	None	.....
H.34.d.2.7.	1 D	Platoon Hdqtrs	..	1	No	None	.....
N. .c.9.8.	1 D	Platoon Hdqtrs	..	1	No	None	.....
G.3.d.5.1.	1 D	Platoon Hdqtrs	..	1	No	None	.....
N.4.a.1.6.	1 D	Platoon Hdqtrs	..	1	No	None	.....
H.34.a.5.9.	1 D	Platoon Hdqtrs	..	1	Yes	...	Need repair
H.28.a.4.5.	1 D	Platoon Hdqtrs	..	1	Yes	...	Need repair
H.28.d.2.6.	1 D	Platoon Hdqtrs	..	1	Yes	...	Need repair
H.27.a.2.4.	1 D	Platoon Hdqtrs	..	1	No	None	.....

Work on hand consists at the present time of gas proofing of dugouts and the locations of Strombos horns and Alert signs.

The urgent work outstanding is the investigation and report of the XIX Corps upon the gas material and anti-gas appliances of the enemy located in the reoccupied territory.

SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

(Orders 76)

APPENDIX C

DEMOLITIONS

1. Charges have been placed under the following bridges and the officer responsible for giving the order for them to be fired is as shown.

I.	H.29.c.4.9.	Brigadier General Commanding Left Brigade, who in turn may delegate it to his Left Front Battalion Commander. The Brigade and Battalion on his left flank must be notified when the order has been given. The R. E. party to fire the charge live at the Sluice House at the northeast corner of Dickebusch Lake.
II.	H.31.b.65.15.	Brigadier General commanding Right Brigade. The R. E. parties to fire these charges are at Right Brigade Headquarters and will be sent to their posts upon receipt of the order "Precautionary Action" from these headquarters.
III.	H.25.c.35.00.	
IV.	G.36.b.35.15.	

V.	G.24.c.98.15.	The O. C. Troops in the Westoutre—Goed Moet Mill System. This will, in the first instance, be the Brigadier General commanding Reserve Brigade. If his Brigade moves forward of this System, he will hand over these orders to the O. C. relieving troops. The R. E. parties for these charges live at Mud Farm—G.27.a.4.6.
VI.	G.24.d.35.36.	
VII.	G.24.d.95.78.	
VIII.	H.19.a.70.25.	
IX.	H.19.a.80.20.	
X.	H.19.b.00.50.	
XI.	G.35.a.20.30.	Further orders regarding the demolition of these bridges will be issued should the situation demand their destruction. Meanwhile the parties for carrying the demolitions are situated at 509th Field Company's Headquarters, at G.15.c.5.5.
XII.	G.29.d.15.10.	
XIII.	G.30.c.00.95.	
*XIV.	G.21.d.35.15.	
*XV.	G.22.a.85.95.	

*Demolition charges withdrawn.

2. All orders for the firing of charges will be given in writing and signed by an officer.

3. Any demolition carried out will be reported as soon as possible to Divisional Headquarters.

SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

(ORDERS 76)

APPENDIX D

SIGNAL WORK

1. Burying cable from Hague Farm—H.31.a. to Mic Mac Farm—H.31.d. Burying cable from Walker Farm—H.27.b. to Q. Test Point in—H.27.d.

2. Testing out and repairing abandoned buried cable in the Dickebusch sector, diagram of locations to be handed over.

3. A. D. Signals, XIX Corps, British Expeditionary Forces, will arrange for cable supply.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE INTELLIGENCE SECTION

The Divisional, Regimental and Battalion Intelligence Sections were organized while the division was at Camp Wadsworth, S. C.

Immediately upon the arrival of the division in France, an advanced course of training of the division, regimental and battalion sections was instituted. This course began with a series of lectures on scouting, patrolling, use of the compass and alidade, reading and making of maps and sketches, etc., which were attended by regimental intelligence officers, battalion Scout officers, two non-commissioned officers from each regimental section, and the division observers. Before completing the course, each regimental and battalion section sent details of officers and men to the front lines in the Albert sector, where they received practical instructions in establishing and manning of observation posts, listening posts, patrolling, scouting, sniping, etc. A detail from the Division Observers Section was also sent to a British division observation post for practical instructions in the use of the telescope and alidade.

Early in July, 1918, the division moved to Flanders, where the training of the sections was continued. Here the men of the various sections established observation and listening posts, patrolled no man's land, sent out reconnaissance parties, etc., and the practises of trench warfare were carefully studied.

During the period July 9th–August 20th the division took over the defense of the East Poperinghe Line, a reserve system. Here the intelligence sections of the regiments and battalions were given their first opportunity to put to use the knowledge which they had gained during the preceding months. Observation and listening posts were established, and in addition regimental and battalion sections occupied the front lines with the British divisions then holding the outpost line, and participated in patrol and reconnaissance operations. The division observers established a division outpost near Abeele. During the holding of the Poperinghe

system, regimental intelligence officers and the division observers were required to render daily intelligence reports, as in the occupation of the front line.

On August 23d the division took over the Dickebusch Lake sector from the 6th British Division, two of our regiments taking over the front line and two being in reserve. It was during this period that the division took their first prisoner, an "unteroffizer" of the 153d I. R., 8th Division, who walked into our lines during the night of August 26th–27th. He was brought to the division prisoners of war cage, where he was questioned by an officer of the Corps of Interpreters. The man would give but little information. The work of the regimental and battalion sections during this period was carried out under difficulties, as the positions were under the constant observation of the enemy, who occupied Mt. Kemmel. These sections, nevertheless, established observation and listening posts, snipers' posts, and carried out numerous small but successful raids and patrols, while the snipers aided considerably in repelling enemy raids and patrols.

On August 30th forty-five prisoners, all enlisted men, were brought to the prisoners of war cage. These prisoners belonged to the following units:

153d I. R.—93d I. R.....8th Division
459th I. R.....236th Division

It was ascertained that the enemy intended to retire to a position on the Messines Ridge where powerful defensive positions were being constructed. The fact that many "booby traps" and delayed-action mines had been placed on Mt. Kemmel was also established. During the night of August 30th–31st a wounded German prisoner gave the information that the Germans would retire to a position on Wytschaete Ridge, leaving a screen of machine guns on the ridge to cover the retirement. Reconnaissances were immediately carried out and the fact that the enemy had evacuated Mt. Kemmel was definitely established. The divisional observers were promptly put forward and worked their way to the summit of Mt. Kemmel. They obtained much valuable information and brought back valuable and interesting documents. The probable enemy order of battle opposite the divisional front from north to south was:

457th I. R.—458th I. R.—459th I. R.....236th Division
93d I. R.—153d I. R.....8th Division

On September 2d this division was relieved by the 6th British Division, and the division moved down to the Albert front, in the Beauquesne area.

During the operations in Flanders, the regimental and battalion sections suffered many casualties, necessitating a reorganization. This was accomplished during the next three weeks while the division was in rest.

When the division again went into action, on September 27th, the intelligence sections were fully prepared to take over their important duties. The engagement of September 27th was a planned attack, with the aid of tanks and an artillery and machine gun barrage, to capture the strong advance line of the Hindenburg system. The scene of the action was the Knoll, Guillemont Farm and Quennemont Farm, near Ronssoy. The various sections participated in this engagement and rendered invaluable aid in helping to maintain liaison with the flanks. The men also performed the duties of "runners" in splendid manner. Much information was obtained concerning machine gun emplacements, enemy wire and special data on the St. Quentin Canal. The main attack was launched on September 29th and continued throughout the day and the following day. The regimental and battalion sections rendered invaluable aid in observing and destroying enemy strong points and machine gun nests, and acted as runners after all communication with headquarters had been severed through shell fire. They assisted in laying the "forming up" tape and acted as guides for tanks to their proper start positions. The utter disregard for danger of the officers and men resulted in extremely heavy casualties. The attack was launched behind a smoke screen. Fog also greatly hindered observation. Battalion sections guided the attack with the aid of prismatic compasses and the regimental sections manned and operated observation posts. Patrols under the battalion scout officers maintained flank liaison and aided in collecting the scattered units during the reorganization and consolidation of the reserve line on Egg, Doleful and Duncan posts. The division observers established and operated a divisional outpost just to the rear of the front line and established a forward outpost when the troops advanced. This forward post, however, had to be

abandoned, as it was under enemy observation and subject to continual shelling. The prisoners taken during this operation were carefully examined at the division prisoners of war cage by officers of the Corps of Interpreters attached to the Divisional Intelligence Section, and much valuable information was obtained from their statements and from documents captured during the operation. Seventeen officers and 782 other ranks belonging to:

153d I. R.	8th Division
90th I. R.—27th R. I. R.—84th R. I. R.	54th Division
7th R. I. R.	121st Division

were captured and passed through the division cage. The probable enemy order of battle from north to south on September 30th was as follows:

153d I. R.	8th Division
90th R. I. R.—27th R. I. R.—84th R. I. R.	54th Division
7th R. I. R.	121st Division

The division was relieved from the line on October 2d and went to a rear area where another reorganization of the regimental and battalion sections was again necessitated through the heavy losses sustained during the recent battles.

On October 11th the division again entered the line in the vicinity of St. Souplet. The enemy occupied strong positions on the heights overlooking Le Selle River. The river was carefully reconnoitered by the battalion sections and the information obtained as a result of these reconnaissances enabled the tanks to effect a crossing of this stream. The intelligence sections established outposts and from them located machine gun nests and other targets for the artillery and reported on the effect of our fire. The various sections also furnished guides, runners, and assisted in maintaining liaison. Snipers' posts took many prisoners during this battle. On October 15th, as a result of a daylight raid, twenty-three prisoners belonging to the 414th I. R. and 129th R. I. R., 204th Division, were cleared through the division prisoners of war cage at Busigny. Considerable information concerning the Le Selle River was obtained and it was at this stage of the operations that a distinct weakening in the enemy morale became noticeable. The total prisoners captured during this operation totaled forty-eight officers and 1,463 other ranks. The probable enemy order of battle from north to south on October 19th was as follows:

163d I. R.	17th Res. Division
76th R. I. R.	17th Res. Division
162d R. I. R.	17th Res. Division
478th R. I. R.	243d Res. Division
56th I. R.	121st Division
479th I. R.	243d Res. Division
122d Fus. Reg.	143d Res. Division
84th I. R.	54th Division
120th R. I. R.	204th Division
413th I. R.	204th Division
414th I. R.	204th Division

The total number of prisoners captured by this division is as follows:

	Officers	Men
Vierstraat Ridge	..	47
Hindenburg Line	17	782
Le Selle River	48	1,463
Total	65	2,292

In addition to conducting the examination of prisoners, a large number of maps and documents were examined by the Division Intelligence Section. The topographical section prepared innumerable maps, airplane photographs were distributed and examined, and the distribution of all maps was handled by the Division Intelligence Section.

During operations, the Division Intelligence Section published a daily summary of operations, giving accounts of the activities of the division and a résumé of the data obtained by the

regimental and battalion sections of the various regiments, as well as accounts of flanking divisions and communiques from other corps and armies. A weekly appreciation was also published and distributed throughout the division.

Along with the above-mentioned duties, the Division Intelligence Section, in cooperation with the regimental and battalion sections and individual operatives, carried on counter-espionage inquiries and rendered regular reports to the Director of Military Intelligence, Washington, D. C., and to General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces

The Intelligence Section of the division was in charge of Major William T. Starr, G-2, with Captain Auguste B. Peterson as his assistant until the termination of the Hindenburg Line battle, October 1st, when Major Starr was transferred to the Military Police. Thereafter the work was carried on by Captain Peterson. Both officers were most efficient in their duties.

A. B. PETERSON,
Major, Infantry,
Acting Intelligence Officer.

REPORT OF ACTIVITIES OF THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

VIERSTRAAT RIDGE.—August 24, 1918, to September 3, 1918.

On August 20, 1918, while at Oudezeele, orders were received for the 2/2 East Lancashire Field Ambulance and Field Hospital Company No. 105 to proceed by marching to relieve the 17th Field Ambulance, 6th British Division, and operate the main dressing station at Remy Siding. Relief to be complete by August 21st at 2:00 P. M.

On August 20, 1918, the 2/1 East Lancashire Field Ambulance received orders to take over the forward area and the advanced dressing stations at Long Barn (right flank) and St. Dunstan (left flank). The personnel of the 2/1 East Lancashire Field Ambulance in forward area was supplemented by the bearer section of the 2/2 East Lancashire Field Ambulance and Ambulance Companies Nos. 106 and 107 of the 102d Sanitary Train to be complete on night of August 23d–24th.

A collecting station for slightly wounded was opened at Busseboom. All cases were evacuated by a one-meter railway to main dressing station at Remy Siding.

Field Hospital Company No. 106, during period August 24th to September 3d, operated a sick collecting post at Trappiste Farm. Sick from reserve regiments and other units not in the front line were evacuated to this post. Minor cases were held; other cases evacuated to Esquelbecq (casualty clearing station).

The advanced dressing station at Long Barn was splinter-proof elephant shelters reinforced with sand bags. This post received patients by hand or wheel stretcher carry from nine regimental and battalion aid posts and evacuated by motor ambulances to main dressing station at Remy Siding, a distance of seven kilometers. The total number treated at this post was 335 Americans and 89 British, of which 253 Americans and 5 British were wounded, 47 Americans and 82 British were gassed. The remaining 65 patients were sick.

The advanced dressing station at St. Dunstan (left flank) consisted of two elephant shelters, reinforced, and one dugout, all constructed in old buildings at this point. Patients were received at this station from two battalion aid stations and were evacuated over a fourteen kilometer route to the main dressing station at Remy Siding. Two hundred and twenty-one cases were treated at this post, of which 85 Americans and 1 British were wounded, 55 Americans and 17 British gassed, and 59 Americans and 4 British sick. The low number of cases treated at this station was owing to the short front sector which was served, this station evacuating from only two battalion aid posts.

The personnel of the forward area consisted of nine officers and 168 men of Ambulance Companies Nos. 106 and 107. The wounded were efficiently and promptly evacuated to the main dressing station at Remy Siding by motor ambulances.

On August 27th the entire medical, surgical and ordnance equipment of the 2/1 and 2/2 East Lancashire Field Ambulances were ordered by the 2d British Army to be transferred to the 102d Sanitary Train. Upon completion of this transfer the 2/1 and 2/2 East Lancashire

Field Ambulances were relieved from further duty with the 27th American Division. The property of these two field ambulances was divided; Sections A and B, less motor and horse ambulances, to Field Hospital Companies Nos. 105 and 106; Section C, plus motor and horse ambulances, to Ambulance Companies Nos. 106 and 107.

The transport that had been taken over by the 102d Sanitary Train consisted of four Fords, nine Daimlers and six horse-drawn ambulances. The condition of this motor transport at the time it was received from the British was of such a character that under constant use it was unable to stand the strain, and about September 2d the cars had to be frequently sent to the shop for repairs and at times only seven or eight of the motor cars were fit to take the road. During this period only two cars were damaged by shell fire.

The 133d British Field Ambulance, which was attached to this division during this period, operated a divisional rest station at Arneke, and on September 1st they were relieved from this duty and took over the divisional rest station and advanced dysentery center at Hilhoek from the 16th British Field Ambulance of the 6th British Division.

During this period, August 24th to September 3d, the motor transport of the 102d Sanitary Train was reinforced by details of motor ambulances from the 133d British Field Ambulance.

Throughout this period the American Red Cross representatives were constantly in touch with the forward area. Captain Bobo, Division Representative of the American Red Cross, established a depot of supplies at Remy Siding and issued to all battalion aid stations a primus stove, cocoa, sugar, milk, cigarettes, tobacco and extra blankets, so that all cases requiring treatment at aid posts received the benefit of these comforts. The American Red Cross, upon the relief of this division in the forward area, established, at points immediately in the rear of the front line, stations where hot cocoa was supplied to all troops upon their relief.

On September 2d the main dressing station at Remy Siding, operated by Field Hospital Company No. 105, was taken over by a field ambulance of the 41st British Division. On September 3d the forward area, operated by Ambulance Companies Nos. 106 and 107, under the Director of Ambulance Companies, was relieved by a field ambulance of the 41st British Division.

Field Hospital Company No. 106 at Trappists Farm was relieved on September 3d by the 41st British Division, and the 133d Field Ambulance, operating the divisional rest station and advanced dysentery center at Hilhoek, was likewise relieved.

The 102d Sanitary Train and the 133d Field Ambulance upon the completion of their relief proceeded by marching to Proven, where they were entrained.

HINDENBURG LINE.—September 24, 1918, to October 1, 1918.

On September 23, 1918, orders were received that the division was to enter the line during the night of September 24th–25th and take over the front occupied by the 18th and 74th British Divisions. The medical arrangements of these two divisions were adopted with very slight modifications.

The main dressing station was opened at Driencourt by Field Hospital Company No. 105.

Field Hospital Company No. 106 proceeded to establish a main dressing station at Longavesnes. Here two wooden buildings were converted into operating rooms. Marquees were erected for use as wards. This was opened on September 26th, the main dressing station at Driencourt closing the same day.

Upon relief on September 26th at noon, Field Hospital Company No. 105 proceeded by marching from Driencourt to Villers Faucon, where they prepared a main dressing station. This main dressing station was opened on September 27th at noon, the main dressing station at Longavesnes closing at the same hour, and Field Hospital Company No. 108 ordered to proceed to Villers Faucon to establish and reinforce the main dressing station at that point.

Meanwhile an advanced dressing station was established in a sugar factory at St. Emilie by Ambulance Company No. 106. The Australian Corps Engineers commenced erecting three large shell-proof Nissen huts for their use as a main dressing station when the Australians took over from the 27th Division.

The forward area was covered by Ambulance Companies Nos. 106 and 107, less a detail to run the advanced dressing station, augmented by the litter bearer section of the 133d Field Ambulance and 100 men from the 108th Infantry. Motor transport consisted of three Fords and eleven Daimlers.

The facilities at first were totally inadequate at the advanced dressing station, but on September 28th the 11th Australian Field Ambulance reported at St. Emilie and ably cooperated with Captain George E. Taylor, M. C., of the Ambulance Section, 102d Sanitary Train, setting up tents, etc. Thus, with the increased personnel, the threatened congestion was relieved. The Australians redressed the necessary stretcher cases while Captain Taylor ran the walking wounded station. The walking wounded were lorried to the corps walking wounded rail post just east of Villers Faucon.

When the main attack commenced on September 29th the motor transportation of the forward area had been increased by the addition of ten Red Cross Ford ambulances, obtained through the Divisional Red Cross Representative, Captain Bobo, in cooperation with Lieutenant Colonel Walter Bell, Division Motor Transport Officer.

Upon the arrival of Colonel McGuire, A. D. M. S., of the 3d Australian Division, who was to take over the medical arrangements at 5:00 P. M., September 29th, he turned over all his available ambulances with stretcher bearers under Colonel Jolly of the 9th Australian Field Ambulance. With this additional personnel and transportation the entire forward area was efficiently and adequately covered.

It is with extreme sorrow that the death of Lieutenant D. G. K. Garrett, R. A. M. C., of the 133d Field Ambulance, from shell wounds, is recorded, besides several killed or died from wounds in our ambulance companies.

The main dressing station at Villers Faucon was assisted by an Australian Resuscitation Team of three with Major Holmes à Court in command.

As the wounded kept coming in and it was impossible to provide shelter for all, the American Red Cross was called upon for 2,000 blankets in addition to the 1,000 furnished by the Ordnance Department, thus making it possible for the wounded to lie comfortably in the open while waiting transportation to the casualty clearing station. Hot drinks and hot water bottles were furnished those cases lying in the open, and ground sheets were also used as coverings.

Motor ambulance convoy cars evacuated the main dressing station rapidly and efficiently to Tincourt and Doingt. During the night of September 29th–30th these cars were held up at the casualty clearing stations at Tincourt from one to four hours before unloading, which caused a slight congestion at the main dressing station for a few hours.

On October 2d the 102d Sanitary Train was relieved by the 3d Australian Division Field Ambulances and marched to Courcelles, a rest area.

The American Red Cross gave each wounded soldier a hot drink of cocoa, some "smokes," either at the advanced dressing station or the main dressing station; wayside drinks, chocolate and cigarettes were provided at the car posts, besides keeping the battalion aid posts supplied with food. The Resuscitation Team asked for instruments which the American Red Cross was able to furnish, such as retractors, catgut, scissors, etc.

Following is the number of cases treated:

Main Dressing Station				Walking Wounded Post			
	Wounded	Gassed	Sick		Wounded	Gassed	Sick
Americans	1,332	320	160	Americans	413	146	126
Australians	233	32	31	Australians	219	103	58
British	248	45	44	British	127	42	32
Prisoners of War	66	...	...	Prisoners of War	6	...	...
Total	1,879	397	236	Total	759	291	216
	759	291	216				
Grand Total	2,638	688	451				

St. Souplet–Le Selle River.—October 12, 1918, to October 20, 1918.

October 11, 1918, orders were received to take over the line at 0600 hours October 12, 1918, from the 30th American Division. Field Hospital Company No. 105 prepared the school rooms at Premont for the main dressing station. Field Hospital Company No. 106 opened an advanced dressing station at Busigny. These arrangements continued until the morning of the 18th of October, when the push through St. Souplet took place.

Ambulance Companies Nos. 106 and 107, the litter bearer section of the 133d Field Ambulance, with the motor and horse ambulances, evacuated the forward area. The transportation was augmented by a loan of ten Red Cross Ford ambulances obtained from the Red Cross.

At the beginning of the St. Souplet battle, the main dressing station at Premont was closed; the advanced dressing station was converted into a main dressing station and the 133d Field Ambulance opened an advanced dressing station at Escaufourt with the main car post at St. Souplet, which was later pushed across the river and railroad tracks to l'Arbre de Ouise and up to North Chimney Farm and La Roue Farm, evacuating to Escaufourt, where the stretcher cases were transferred, after being redressed, to the heavy ambulances for their trip to the main dressing station at Busigny.

The evacuation of the forward area was promptly done and completed by darkness each night, as it was possible owing to the nature of the terrain to push Ford ambulances up close to the rear of the advancing troops.

The evacuation from the main dressing station to the casualty clearing stations was very difficult, due to the distance and condition of the roads. The round-trip took eight to nine hours. At first the convoy consisted of forty cars from the 37th Motor Ambulance Convoy, but when the 30th American Division returned to the line on October 15th–16th twenty cars were transferred to them for evacuating their wounded. This was absolutely inadequate, and in five hours 160 stretcher cases were waiting for evacuation. Upon demanding additional cars from corps and army, twenty-two cars were turned over, making forty-two in all, a number just adequate for the number of casualties. The reason of the delay was the rapid advance of the Allied troops and the non-advance of railhead and hospital accommodations.

The casualties handled by the 27th Division Sanitary Units were as follows:

Wounded (stretcher cases):	27th Division	132
	30th Division	31
	British and Australians	91
	Corps Troops	1
	Total	255

—but the epidemic of influenza was beginning and 207 cases were evacuated, among which were 186 from the division.

The total number of walking wounded was 3,433 cases from American, British and Australian divisions and prisoners of war. The available transportation at detraining point consisted at first of four charabancs with a seating capacity of twenty-five men each. Two charabancs broke down on the second day and were replaced by two lorries. Owing to the lack of transportation, drivers and cars worked hard to keep the congestion down to the minimum, with successful results.

The walking wounded were loaded in either charabancs or lorries at the advanced dressing station and unloaded at Montbrehain, where Captain George McK. Hall, M. C., and a detail from Field Hospital Company No. 106 and the Division Theatrical Troupe operated an entraining post. Here the American Red Cross served hot cocoa and cigarettes to the wounded while waiting entraining on the narrow gauge railway.

Captain Matthew F. Carney, D. C., Division Dental Surgeon, with a detail from Field Hospital Company No. 105 and the Division Theatrical Troupe, detrained them at Roisel and marched them across a badly torn-up field to waiting charabancs for evacuation to the casualty clearing stations at Roisel, about one and one-half kilometers distant.

The following letter from Major General O'Ryan gives an idea of the risks and hardships the personnel of the sanitary train labored under:

HEADQUARTERS 27TH DIVISION, U. S. A.
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, FRANCE

October 22, 1918.

From: Commanding General.
To: Division Surgeon, 27th Division, American Expeditionary Forces, France.
Subject: Commendation.

1. Please convey to the officers and enlisted men of the sanitary units of the division my commendation and admiration for the endurance, skill and personal courage manifested by them at all times throughout the long period of fighting from the breaking of the Hindenburg Line to the driving of the enemy beyond the Canal de la Sambre.

2. The fierce nature of the fighting in the Hindenburg battle called for the greatest demands upon the endurance of medical officers and the sanitary personnel assisting them. That these extraordinary conditions were met so successfully is substantial tribute to the fortitude and efficiency of the sanitary units and medical personnel. It is a pleasure to write this commendation of their service.

(Signed) JOHN F. O'RYAN,
Major General.

During these battles and engagements the American Red Cross served from their rolling kitchens over 48,000 cups of hot cocoa. Besides looking after the division, the Red Cross was called upon by the local inhabitants, particularly at Busigny, where food, medicines, etc., were freely supplied.

The personnel of the Red Cross was entirely obtained from men unfit for combatant troops and recommended by regimental surgeons for reclassification.

WALTER C. MONTGOMERY,
Lieutenant Colonel, Medical Corps, U. S. A.,
Division Surgeon, 27th American Division.

December 20, 1918.

DIVISION GAS TRAINING

Much attention had been paid to gas training while this division was at Camp Wadsworth. Every man in the division had received some instruction there, and a number of officers and non-commissioned officers had been trained as gas personnel. However, this training was resumed on arrival in France, and continued whenever the division was in a training area. During July and August a complete course of gas training was carried on throughout the entire division. This consisted of a series of lectures, drills and competitions, outlined in division orders. In addition to this every man was required to wear his respirator sixteen hours a month while in the training area, including a period of four hours of consecutive wearing.

In order to have gas personnel properly trained vacancies were assigned for officers and non-commissioned officers at British and American corps gas schools. In June, July and August these vacancies were in British schools, and during the succeeding months in American gas schools. The following table shows the number of officers and men trained at these schools:

	Officers	Non-commissioned Officers
June	84	84
July	26	85
August	20	120
September	8	14
October	...	60
November	...	60
Total	138	423

The sixty non-commissioned officers trained in October attended a four-day gas school, established and controlled by the Division Gas Officer.

The number of trained gas personnel, as given above, is several times in excess of the number required by General Headquarters orders. The extra personnel were required by

promotions, transfers and casualties of gas officers and gas non-commissioned officers. It is believed that these extra officers and non-commissioned officers were of material assistance in the gas training and in keeping down the number of casualties.

Investigation has shown that the most of the replacements had had a good foundation in gas defense prior to joining the division.

GAS DEFENSE SUPPLIES

At the port of disembarkation all personnel were provided with British respirators and briefly instructed in their use. From this time on the respirators were obtained for the units through the Division Ordnance Officer. He requisitioned the respirators for the division and kept the reserve at the division ordnance dump in charge of several gas non-commissioned officers. British orders required that 1,000 respirators be held in reserve at the division dump, and that each battalion have a reserve of seventeen respirators and nine canisters. Division orders later required that each platoon carry an extra reserve of two respirators. The Division Gas Officer tried to maintain a slightly larger reserve than required, but this was generally impracticable due to the shortage of transportation. On several occasions the reserve masks were unexpectedly exhausted, but this was always remedied before the troops went into the line. The regimental and separate unit gas officers cooperated with their Supply Officers so that units were always properly equipped with respirators.

Anti-gas cloth was carried by the engineers, and gas-proofing material was requisitioned from them, or a detail of engineers did the work. This gas-proofing of shelters and dugouts was extensively carried on by all units in the line.

Gas alarms were in some cases carried by the companies, although they were generally improvised locally from shell casings.

INTELLIGENCE

Under the supervision of the Division Gas Officer information was obtained from German prisoners showing the effect of our gas, used by the supporting artillery, on the enemy.

A great many enemy ammunition dumps were examined, and frequently new shells and gas defense devices were discovered. On all such occasions a complete report was forwarded to the Corps Gas Officer, who notified the British Technical Service in order that proper records might be made.

PERSONNEL

Captain H. W. Terry was Division Gas Officer from June 12th to October 27th, on which date he was evacuated to a base hospital; and since then Lieutenant Hooker has been Acting Division Gas Officer. Much credit is due to Captain Terry for the high standard of gas training and discipline maintained in the division. A number of junior officers were assigned to the division from time to time to assist in the gas instruction. These officers were sent to separate units to assist the permanent gas officers. Some of these officers were assigned to the division and are now the gas officers of their organizations. However, most of them have since been transferred out of the division.

Regimental and separate unit gas officers and non-commissioned officers deserve much credit for the high standards they maintained within their units. It was not only necessary for them to overcome the former tendency of the soldiers to ridicule gas, but it was necessary that they require the men to undergo what was considered an unreasonable hardship—wearing the mask for prolonged periods in training areas. Through all of this they persisted, and they are now properly respected for their efforts and results. More than seventy-five per cent. of the division gas personnel were casualties.

OFFICE OPERATION

Briefly, the Division Gas Officer supervised the gas training of the division and the distribution of the gas defense material. At first he was considerably handicapped by lack of transportation; this, however, was later remedied. He kept in touch with the units of the division, assisting, instructing, and advising when necessary. Several of his men were stationed at the ordnance dump to look after supplies; several others visited the different units, making

temporary mask repairs. When the division was in the line, his men were located at dressing and clearing stations to get data from and relative to gas casualties. In addition to this he got full reports on gas shelling from the gas personnel of the units and wired this information daily to corps and army gas officers. At the end of each activity in the line a complete summary of it relative to gas was prepared.

GAS CASUALTIES

A complete report on all gas casualties which the division has had was prepared and forwarded to the Commanding General on November 7th. A copy of this report is attached.

ENEMY'S DEFENSIVE USE OF GAS

Two different reports were prepared by Captain Terry on the "Enemy's Defensive Use of Gas." These were prepared on October 5th and October 27th, and were forwarded to the Chief of Chemical Warfare Service. Copies of these reports are herewith attached.

A. H. HOOKER, Jr.,
First Lieutenant, C. W. S.

27th DIVISION
Office of the Gas Officer
American Expeditionary Forces

November 7, 1918.

From: Division Gas Officer.
To: Commanding General.
Subject: Gas Casualties.

The records of the Division Gas Office show that the following gas casualties have occurred since the division first went into the line in July:

Organization	Belgium	France		Total
	July 25th–Sept. 3d	Offensive of Sept. 24th–Oct. 3d	Offensive of Oct. 10th–20th	
105th Infantry	66	163	78	307
106th Infantry	148	119	83	350
105th Machine Gun Battalion	33	16	7	56
107th Infantry	30	52	106	188
108th Infantry	6	70	199	275
106th Machine Gun Battalion	2	3	10	15
102d Engineers	13	63	47	123
102d Field Signal Battalion	4	2	29	35
Total	302	488	559	1,349

The following units have had one casualty each: Military Police, 105th Field Hospital, 106th Ambulance, 107th Ambulance, and the 106th T. M. B. The 102d Sanitary Train and the 104th Machine Gun Battalion each had two casualties.

Total number of casualties, 1,358.

GAS CASUALTIES IN BELGIUM

On August 5th, 12 men from Company C, 102d Engineers, passed through a trench, noticed a foul odor and later reported as gas casualties.

On August 14th, 21 men of the 107th Infantry walked into gas and were evacuated. Seventeen of these men returned to their units after a short rest.

One man from Company M, 107th Infantry, on August 17th, was "gassed before awakened by alarm."

On August 16th, 2 men from Company K, 108th Infantry, neglected to adjust their masks before they were gassed. British soldiers told them it was H. E. fumes.

On August 28th, 43 men from Company A, 106th Infantry, were gassed. At least 18 cases were due to premature removal of the mask, most of the other cases were body burns apparently due to the inability of the men to leave the gassed area.

On August 28th, 24 men from Company L, 106th Infantry, were mustard gas casualties, due to premature removal of their masks.

On August 28th, 9 men from the 105th Infantry and 7 men from the 107th Infantry were casualties due to their failure to adjust their masks before the gas had taken effect.

On August 31st, 7 men from the 105th and 6 men from the 107th Infantry were gassed drinking water from shell holes.

On September 1st and 2d the 106th Infantry had 41 gas casualties and the 105th Infantry had 48. Most of these were due to Green Cross gas; men failed to adjust respirators at the first indication of gas.

On September 3d, 25 men of the 105th Machine Gun Battalion were gassed. After passing through an area which had been heavily shelled with mustard gas they slept in a closed space. The next day all were gas casualties, probably due to their contaminated clothing.

The other casualties during this period were isolated cases, the causes of which are similar to those above, are unknown, or were unavoidable.

The gas casualties were, for the most part, slight, no fatalities were reported, and frequently men returned to their units soon after being evacuated.

GAS CASUALTIES IN FIRST OFFENSIVE, SEPTEMBER 24TH TO OCTOBER 3D

On September 25th, 24 men from Company E, 105th Infantry, were gas casualties. The Company Commander reported that they were taken by surprise, the shells lighting in or near the trenches. Before the men could adjust their masks, 24 were gassed. All alarms were given and masks were immediately adjusted. Reports from all sources agree that these casualties were unavoidable.

On September 25th, 3 men from the 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry, were reported gassed and this explanation was offered: "These men were too busy dodging shells to adjust masks." On that same day 3 men from Company B "failed to adjust mask in time and were casualties." Again, on that day, 2 men of Company G were mustard gas casualties "due to failure to recognize gas." Every line company of the 105th Infantry suffered some gas casualties in the first few days of this period. Company H had 31 casualties, Company G 15, Headquarters Company 15, Sanitary Detachment 9, Machine Gun Company 9, and so on down to Company D with 1 casualty. Except as given above, it has not been possible to get an explanation of these casualties.

Of the 119 casualties in the 106th Infantry, Company M had 32, Company K 16, Company H 11, Company B 9, and so on down to 1 casualty for Company G. The report on these casualties states that a large number of them occurred "during the night of September 26th-27th, when they were shelled on the road during an advance of about 600 yards from the reserve to the advance positions. The casualties developed quickly after putting on and taking off the mask a number of times."

No explanation is available as to how the 52 men in the 107th Infantry were gassed. However, 8 of these, from Companies I and M, were eye cases due to wearing only half of mask, the mouthpiece and nose clip only being adjusted.

No explanation is available as to the causes of the 16 casualties in the 105th Machine Gun Battalion or of the 70 casualties in the 108th Infantry.

Of the 63 casualties in the 102d Engineers, 47 were in Company C. All of these casualties were reported as slight and in many cases appear to have been unavoidable. Most of the casualties occurred on September 29th. There were no casualties in Companies A or B. The 1st Battalion gas non-commissioned officer attributes the cause of the casualties to "the failure of the men to adjust their respirators in time." This generally means that men do not wear their respirators until the effects of the gas are felt. This is particularly true with mustard gas, due to its delayed effects.

GAS CASUALTIES IN SECOND OFFENSIVE, OCTOBER 10th TO 21st

A man from Company H, 108th Infantry, passed through advanced dressing station on October 15th. He stated that on the previous night there had been so many gas alarms that they put on and took off their masks many times during the night. He was not sure on which of these occasions he was gassed. Sixty-nine casualties from this company passed through the advanced dressing station as gas casualties on October 14th and 15th.

A number of men who were eye casualties frankly admitted that they had only worn half of their respirators.

Several of the Headquarters Detachment, 108th Infantry, who were mustard gas casualties stated that they had worn their masks for ten or fifteen minutes before removing them.

Members of the 102d Field Signal Battalion stated that they were casualties due to sleeping in a cellar where there was some gas.

Lieutenant Ivan Fenty, Company E, 106th Infantry, gassed October 17th, stated that he was unable to advance wearing respirator.

Forty-seven of the 78 casualties in the 105th Infantry occurred on October 18th. Of the total casualties the Headquarters had 16; Company L, 13; Company M, 11; and the rest were evenly divided.

In the 106th Infantry 72 of the 84 casualties occurred on October 18th. Of the total casualties, Headquarters had 17, Machine Gun Company, 10, and Company F, 9. The rest were fairly evenly divided.

The 107th Infantry had 84 gas casualties; 13 on October 12th, 43 on October 15th and 28 on October 18th. The following table shows the distribution of the majority of these casualties: Headquarters, 24; Company D, 16; Company B, 13. The rest were evenly divided among the other companies.

A report from the 108th Infantry, dated November 5th, gives their gas casualties for this period as 238. The records of this office show only 199 of these. This report states that all of these casualties were slight but unavoidable due to prolonged exposure in a dangerous concentration. The distribution of the majority of the 199 casualties recorded in this office is as follows:

Companies	October 14	15	16	17	18
Headquarters	2	5	12	3	1
B	..	8	..	..	1
G	3	33	1	..	1
H	31	38	1	1	..
K	12	5	..	1	2
M	8	1	..	2	..

The other companies had 6 casualties or less each; four companies had no casualties. The 1st Battalion had a total of 13 gas casualties.

Dr. Coogan, Medical Officer, 2d Battalion, 107th Infantry, questioned some of the gas casualties from the 1st Battalion Headquarters who passed through his aid post. Several of these men stated that Lieutenant Lumley, the Battalion Adjutant, had directed them while passing through mustard gas to wear the mouthpiece and nose clip only. This officer and the men with him were evacuated as eye cases.

During the early morning of October 17th the 3d Battalion, 107th Infantry, marched from Busigny to St. Souplet and wore their respirators for two hours. This was night marching under very adverse conditions. When the alarm was first given, the officer commanding stopped until all respirators were adjusted. Someone suggested wearing part of the mask, but he required that the whole respirator be worn. There were, of course, no casualties. This example of excellent gas discipline was reported by one of the Military Police.

A detachment of the Signal Battalion, on September 28th, under Captain Ireland, passed into a gassed area while riding in a truck. The gas alarm was given and all masks were adjusted. When the lorry stopped the men got out to repair some lines. The Captain ordered, "Take those damned things off." The gas non-commissioned officer who reported this states that there was gas there and casualties resulted. He further states that the necessary work could have been done while wearing the respirator.

Of the 47 gas casualties in the 102d Engineers the regimental gas non-commissioned officer states that practically all of these occurred in bridging Le Selle River. The valley was flooded with gas all during their work. Many were gassed removing debris saturated with mustard gas. All of the casualties were slight and in most cases unavoidable due to the urgency of the work.

Instances are reported in the 102d Engineers where gas personnel have recommended that masks be worn and company commanders have disregarded this advice, and casualties resulted.

The regimental gas non-commissioned officer of the 105th Infantry states that he has warned certain men to wear their masks; others, not to sleep in dugouts with gas in them, and has frequently found men wearing their respirators improperly. They did not heed his warning and in all cases there were casualties.

It was reported that two men of the 107th Infantry Headquarters died from gas poisoning. One other fatality was reported near Ronssoy on September 29th from gas.

The Military Police gas non-commissioned officer states that the gas discipline in his organization is excellent, and that he gets every assistance from his officers. This organization has had one unavoidable gas casualty.

The 106th Machine Gun Battalion has devoted much attention to gas training. Special classes have been held for officers and non-commissioned officers and the gas personnel are given every assistance by their officers. Their total of avoidable gas casualties shows the result.

CONCLUSION

Of all the casualties none have been reported as due to failure of the respirator to afford protection. Gas casualties from premature removal of the mask have seldom worn the respirator more than two hours; no one has been reported as gassed due to the necessity of removing the respirator after wearing it to the full extent of his endurance. In most cases the responsibility rests with the individual, who "took a chance." In some instances officers were directly responsible.

The gas training of the division has been good, and the number of casualties is not unusual. It is estimated that 96,700 gas shells have been used against this division; this is 1 gas casualty to 70 gas shells.

In every instance where the required gas personnel has been maintained and given proper support, gas casualties have been almost nil.

It has been reported that men were evacuated as gas casualties suffering from colds, exposure, exhaustion, influenza and from "cold feet." Many medical officers have stated that they have great difficulty in diagnosing a gas casualty and always evacuate a man on his word. It is therefore suggested that medical officers be given special instructions in diagnosing gas casualties, and that a separate building or shelter at the advanced dressing station be assigned for gas casualties. Those who are not true gas casualties can be rested here, and returned to their unit, and the others evacuated.

Undoubtedly the foregoing offers occasion for the application of considerable disciplinary action. Specific cases for such action can only be taken after more detailed investigation.

A. H. HOOKER, Jr.,
Second Lieutenant, C. W. S.

HEADQUARTERS, 27th DIVISION
Office of the Gas Officer
American Expeditionary Forces

October 27, 1918.

From: Division Gas Officer.
To: Chief of Chemical Warfare Service, American Expeditionary Forces.
Subject: Enemy's Defensive Use of Gas.

1. Attached hereto is report of gas shelling to which this division was subjected during the month of October.

2. During the entire period that the division was in the line, gas was used by the enemy in all bombardments. All towns and roads were regularly shelled with gas, H. E. and shrapnel. All kinds of gas were used, but, as usual, yellow cross predominated. The weather during

this period was generally cool and on this account the effect of the yellow cross was considerably lessened. The greatest number of casualties occurred in two companies of the 108th Infantry, these companies being located on a sunken road in a concealed position which it was impracticable to evacuate.

3. Brigade and Regimental Headquarters were located in the towns of Escaufourt and St. Souplet. These posts were immediately gas proofed, but in spite of the fact a large number of casualties occurred.

4. An enemy dump of gas shells was captured and report made to the Corps Gas Officer on the captured material. Separate report to the Chief of Chemical Warfare Service will be made if desired.

HARRY W. TERRY,
Captain, Division Gas Officer,
27th Division, A. E. F.

MAP REFERENCE S. 57 B.—S. E.

GAS SHELLING—OCTOBER 11 TO OCTOBER 19, 1918

Date	Time	Location	Kind	Number	Caliber	Casualties
11	22:00	V.29.a	Blue	100	5.9	Nil
11	22:00	W.19.d	Blue	100	4.2	
12	16:00/18:00	V.19.a.b	Blue	100	5.9	
12	16:00/18:00	W.7.c	Blue	50	5.9	18
12	16:30/17:00	Q.26	Green	100	4.2	
12	22:00/24:00	V.4	Blue	100	5.9	
13	10:00/10:15	Q.33	Mustard	50	4.2	
13	16:00	V.24.c.d	Mustard	200	77 mm.	
13	16:00/17:00	Q.33	Mustard	100	77 mm.	8
			Blue	....	4.2	
13	22:00/24:00	Q.26-27	Green	100	4.2	
14	4:45/ 5:00	Q.34.a	Blue	30	4.2	
14	3:30/ 5:00	Q.31	Yellow	400	77 mm.	
14	1:30/ 4:00	W.8.central	Blue	200	4.2	
			Yellow	...	77 mm.	
14	2:00	Le Pond Pt	Blue	200	4.2	
14	7:00/ 9:00	V.1.d	Blue	25	5.9	
14	11:00/12:00	W.7	Blue	25	5.9	
14	13:00	Q.31	Yellow	50	77 mm.	
14	22:00	R.a.W.3.a.4.7	Yellow	50	77 mm.	77
15	All night	P.36.c.8.1 / B.6.b.2.8	Yellow	20	77 mm.	
15	3:30	V.6.c.8.5	Yellow	10	77 mm.	
15	8:00/ 8:20	Q.31	Yellow	50	77 mm.	
15	16:10	Q.31	Yellow	400	77 mm.	
15	16:10	R.R.-Q.22-34	Blue, Yellow	500	4.2	
15	23:00	W.7.and 9	Blue	400	4.2	
15	23:00	W.13.b	Blue, Yellow	400	4.2	
15	All night	Edges of woods, Le Ermitage Proyart V. 19	Blue, Yellow	700	4.2	150
16	3:30	Q.31.c.6.1	Blue, Green and Yellow	300	4.2	
16	5:00	St. Souplet Valley	Blue and Yellow	200	77 mm.	47
16	5:30	Q.34-21	Yellow	100	77 mm.	

GAS SHELLING—OCTOBER 11 TO OCTOBER 19, 1918—*Continued*

Date	Time	Location	Kind	Number	Caliber	Casualties
17	22:00/03:00	Escaufort	Blue, Yellow	100	4.2	
17	22:00/03:00	St. Souplet	Blue, Yellow	150	4.2	
17	22:00/01:00	Road V.11.c.9.8. to V. 11.b.10.8	Mustard	75	77 mm.	47
17	22:00/01:00	Road V.11.c.2.7. to V. 12.b.5.8	Mustard	75	77 mm.	
17	10:00/14:00	St. Souplet	Mustard	150	77 mm.	
18	22:00/03:00	St. Souplet and R.R. Q.18.a.3.0. to Q.34.c. 3.0., also Q.28, Q.29, Q.34 and Q.36.	Blue, Green, Yellow	3,000	...	
18	20:00/03:00	Arbre Guernon	Blue Mustard	200	4.2 77 mm.	200
19	20:00/04:00	R.31.d.central to R.20. a.6.0. to R.14.a.3.0.	Mustard, Blue and Green	100	4.2	
19	16:00/17:30	Line R.8.d.8.3, R.15.c. 2.5, R.21.c.1.2. to R.27.c.8.4	.....	150	77 mm.	18
19	17:00/19:00	Road R.14.a.8.8. to R. 20.d.1.5	Green Cross	50	77 mm.	
		Totals	.....	10,100		565

HEADQUARTERS, 27TH DIVISION

OFFICE OF THE GAS OFFICER

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

October 5, 1918.

From: Division Gas Officer, 27th Division

To: Chief of Chemical Warfare Service, A. E. F.
(Through Military Channels)

Subject: Enemy's Defensive Use of Gas

EXTRACT

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2. On the night of September 26th–27th the brigade in the line was subjected to a heavy artillery barrage. The aim seems to have been not so much to neutralize strong points as to hinder the expected attack by using gas together with H. E. and shrapnel over the entire area. The gases employed were blue cross, green cross and mustard, mustard gas being used in shells containing H. E. The number of gas shells fired during this bombardment was in the neighborhood of 10,000 and caused 235 casualties.

3. Completed reports on the casualties are not yet available. Most of the cases were slight and only a small number were gassed by mustard gas. A considerable number of casualties were caused by gas shells bursting within a few feet of the men in the trenches and in a few cases men were wounded by flying shell fragments. Many cases showed no symptoms

except nausea and vomiting, caused by slight concentration of green cross. The fear of delayed after effects caused some men to report themselves gassed when medical treatment would not have been necessary.

4. During the night of the 26th–27th the enemy lines were shelled with mustard gas by the Allied batteries; accompanying map shows the areas saturated with this gas. Statements of German prisoners are conflicting as to the effect of this shelling. A German artillery lieutenant examined at Brigade Headquarters stated that the effect of the gas was negligible. Assuming his statement to be true, it gives no indication of the real effect of the attack, as his position was in an observation post, well in advance of the areas shelled. A German machine gunner stated that at his position the concentration was so great that the gas came through the masks and he himself came over to the Allied lines to escape its effects. We have no record of any enemy gas cases attended to in our aid stations. Nevertheless, from noon September 27th the enemy artillery fire lessened considerably, and for a period of twelve hours starting at 4 P. M. September 27th there was practically no enemy artillery fire.

5. On the night of September 27th–28th the brigade in the line was relieved by the brigade in support. On the morning of September 29th the attack to obtain the green line objective was commenced by the brigade in the line with certain units of the brigade in support acting as a second wave. During the day of the 28th the enemy resumed artillery fire, using gas, H. E., and shrapnel. This shelling continued during the night of the 28th–29th, day of the 29th and night of the 29th–30th, during which time in the neighborhood of 30,000 gas shells were used. The gases used were blue cross, green cross and mustard gas; it is also reported mercaptans were used. Casualties caused during this entire period numbered 255. The effect of the gas was to slow up the advance of our brigade, the men advancing with gas masks adjusted. Some of the shelling was directed upon roads and villages in the rear, which resulted in some instances in slight confusion of the units. The village of Basse Boulogne was heavily shelled with mustard gas, but as Military Police were posted outside of this village and warned all troops approaching, no casualties were caused. The weather during this entire period was rainy and windy, which assisted very materially in preventing the success of the enemy's use of gas.

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7. Though a portion of the Hindenburg Line between A21 and A27 was investigated for gas appliances, no protected dugouts, no alarms or other devices were discovered. Considering the rapidity of attack and the advance made by the division troops, the number of gas casualties was very low, and it would appear from the information now available that the gas discipline was excellent.

HARRY W. TERRY,
Captain Division Gas Officer,
27th Division, A. E. F.

REPORT OF OPERATIONS

Division Veterinarian

The first animal casualties in the division were when the headquarters were at Beauval. During an air raid, which took place at 2:40 A. M. on the morning of June 30th, four bombs were dropped on the corral of the 1st Battalion of the 105th Infantry. Two horses were killed instantly. The Division Veterinarian was notified and examined the rest of the animals, and ordered the destruction of 11 horses on account of the seriousness of their injuries. Nine other horses were evacuated to the hospital and 1 horse slightly injured was kept on the picket line and treated by the Unit Veterinarian.

On leaving the rest area at St. Nazaire, the Mobile Veterinary Section attached to the 27th Division was ordered to the American sector on detached service. The section rejoined the division at Oudezeele on August 7, 1918. In the meantime evacuations were made to

British veterinary stations. Upon the recommendation of the Division Veterinarian, the section was attached to Mobile Veterinary Section No. 6, British Expeditionary Forces, for training and equipment. The section functioned as a unit from August 19, 1918, and to date 368 animals have been evacuated to the section, of which 69 were cured and returned to the various units of the division, 9 were destroyed by order of the Commanding Officer and the remaining 290 evacuated to the various veterinary evacuating stations. In addition to divisional units, the Veterinary Corps of the 27th Division rendered veterinary service to Australian and British units as well as to horses belonging to civilians. In all actions the veterinarians were with the transport of the units to which they were assigned and one veterinary officer was commended by the Commanding General for his courage.

During the period August 24 to September 3, 1918, the section was located on the Abeele road near Abeele, and while in this area 35 animals were passed through the section. Statistics in the office of the Division Veterinarian show that during this engagement 16 animals were killed by shell fire, 1 killed by gas and 32 wounded by shell and shrapnel fire.

During the period September 24 to October 1, 1918, the section was located at Longavesnes and 33 animals passed through the section while in this town. Statistics show that 11 animals were killed by shell fire and 12 animals wounded by shell and shrapnel.

During the period October 12th to October 20th the section was first located at Joncourt and while there 51 animals were sent to the section for treatment or evacuation. While in Joncourt the section established an advanced collecting station at Brancourt. As our troops advanced, it became necessary to relay the animals back to railhead at Roisel, where the 2d Corps Mobile Veterinary Hospital was located. In accordance with orders of the Acting Corps Veterinarian, an advanced collecting post, composed of three men from Mobile Veterinary Section 105 and three men from Mobile Veterinary Section 108, 30th Division, was established at Becquigny. Mobile Veterinary Section 108 was ordered to Brancourt to act as relay and Mobile Veterinary Section 105 was directed to proceed to Bellicourt to act as a staging post for evacuations to the Corps Hospital at Roisel. While acting in the capacity of staging post, Mobile Veterinary Section 105 received and evacuated 40 animals. Statistics of animal casualties during this advance show 57 animals killed by shell fire and 46 animals wounded by shell or shrapnel.

During the period June 1 to October 20, 1918, the records of the Division Veterinarian show that 1,106 animals were treated for disease or injury, 14 animals died of disease and 39 animals were destroyed, 24 as the result of injuries, 10 as the result of disease, 4 as the result of fracture and 1 as the result of gas poisoning. The foregoing figures do not apply to divisional units only, but inlude all the various outside organizations that were rendered veterinary attendance by officers of the Veterinary Corps, 27th Division.

R. P. KUNNECKE,
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Division Veterinarian.

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